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The United States and International Agreements

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 April 2017

Quincy Wright
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Extract

There is no doubt but that the President can, with the consent of two-thirds of the Senate, make treaties binding the United States and compelling the House of Representatives, under penalty of sacrificing the good faith of the United States, to make such appropriations or to pass or to refrain from passing such laws as may be necessary to carry them out. The House has objected to being thus coerced on several occasions, but constitutional lawyers have not questioned the power of the President and Senate to act.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 38 , Issue 3 , July 1944 , pp. 341 - 355
Copyright
Copyright © by the American Society of International Law 1944

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References

1 Wright, Q., Control of American Foreign Relations, pp. 6, 226, 353–356 Google Scholar; Willoughby, W. W., Constitutional Law, p. 483 Google Scholar; Crandall, S. B., Treaties, their Making and Enforcement, p. 177 Google Scholar; Alexander Hamilton, Works (Hamilton Ed.), Vol. 7, p. 566, and note 38, below.

2 “It seems to me that an executive agreement ratified by joint resolution differs from a treaty largely in name only.” New York Herald Tribune, Oct. 27, 1943.

3 “The Constitution must have meant … to except (from the treaty-making process) those subjects of legislation in which it gave a participation to the House of Representatives. This last exception is denied by some on the ground that it would leave very little matter for the treaty power to work on. The less the better say others.” (Thomas Jefferson, Manual of Parliamentary Practice, Sec. 52.) In excluding the field of delegated powers from “treaty-making” Jefferson has not been supported by practice, but his implication that the treaty-making power could not prevent Congressional authorization of agreements in this field has been supported. ( Wright, Q., work cited, p. 123 Google Scholar.) In pursuance of this implication, in view of the delegation of power to Congress to admit states to the Union and to regulate territory, Jefferson at first proposed to submit the Louisiana Purchase Agreement to Congress but was dissuaded by political considerations of the moment. ( Hayden, J. R., The Senate and Treaties, 1789–1817, p. 139 Google Scholar; McClure, Wallace, International Executive Agreements, p. 47 Google Scholar.)

4 “In this particular case (the treaty-making power) a concurrence of two-thirds at least is made necessary, as a substitute or compensation for the other branch of the legislature, which on certain occasions could not be conveniently a party to the transaction.” Madison, James, “Helvidius” letter No. 1, Writings (Hunt Ed.), Vol. 6, p. 140 Google Scholar; Corwin, E. S., The President’s Control of Foreign Relations, p. 18 Google Scholar; Sen. Merrick of Maryland, in Congressional Globe, Vol. 14 (1845), p. 322.

4.1 The Jeffersonians in the House of Representatives suggested this position when they contended in the debate on the Jay Treaty, with the support of a majority of the House, that the discretion of the House in the exercise of its powers could not be impaired by the treaty- making power (Annals of Congress, 4th Congress, 1st Sess., 1795–96, especially remarks by Livingston, p. 427; Gallatin, p. 465; and Madison, p. 488). In answer to Washington’s message of March 30, 1796, refusing the request of the House for papers on the negotiation of this treaty and stating the Federalist position that “the power of making treaties is exclusively vested” in the President and Senate, and that treaties so made must be carried out by Congress (p. 767), Madison thought “nothing more was necessary on this point than to observe that the Constitution had as expressly and exclusively vested in Congress the power of making laws, as it had vested in the President and Senate the power of making treaties” (p. 774). During the debate Congressman Holland said that the North Carolina Ratifying Convention in which he had participated adopted the Constitution only on the explicit understanding that the power of the President and Senate to make commercial treaties was qualified by the fact that “commercial regulations had been previously and expressly given to Congress and to them secured” (p. 546) (see also remarks by Brent, p. 580; Tracy, p. 625; and Madison, p. 778).

Fifty years later a majority of both Houses supported President Tyler’s assurance that Congress had power to annex Texas after a treaty for this purpose had failed to gain the consent of the Senate (Message to House of Representatives, June 10,1944). Spokesmen of the majority relied upon the power of Congress to admit new states to the union, to declare war, and to consent to compacts and agreements. On the latter point Congressman Bayly of Virginia pointed out that the Constitution referred to five distinct modes of making agreements with foreign nations—by treaty, by alliance, by confederation, by agreement, and by compact. Only the first mode was given to the President and Senate. The last two could be accomplished by the States with consent of Congress or, in his opinion, by Congress alone, and the other two, forbidden to the States, could be accomplished, he thought, by Congress. (Congressional Globe, , Vol. 14 (1845), Appendix, p. 124 Google Scholar. See also remarks in House of Representatives by Bowlin [Congressional Globe, , Vol. 14, p. 140 Google Scholar], in the Senate by Woodbury [p. 298], Merrick [p. 322], and McDuffie [p. 335], and below, note 11).

4.2 Strictly speaking Congress can not delegate power to the President to make international agreements because it has no power to negotiate such agreements itself, but it can authorize the President to make an agreement by providing for execution of the agreement when made or by giving assurance that it will do so. (Q. Wright, work cited, p. 375.)

5 It has been argued that it is explicitly not exclusive because the phrase “he shall have power” used in connection with treaty-making and recess appointments differs from the phrase “he shall,” used in connection with nominations and appointments: see Catudal, H. M, “Executive Agreements, A Supplement to the Treaty Making Procedure,” The George Washington Law Review, Vol. 10 (1942), p. 653 Google Scholar. It seems, however, from an inspection of the whole of Art. II, Sections 2, 3 that this difference was not intended to distinguish between concurrent and exclusive powers but between discretionary and mandatory powers. The President “shall have power” to grant reprieves and pardons, but he “shall,” be Commander-in-Chief, give Congress information on the state of the Union, receive am- bássadors, take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and commission all officers. It is to be noted, however, that in cases where a discretionary power is clearly intended the phrase “he may” is used, as in connection with the requiring of the opinions of principal executive officers and convening and adjourning Congress in emergencies.

6 McClure, work cited.

7 Congressional Record, Vol. 89, pp. 9586–9608, 9641–50 (Dec. 3–4, 1942).

8 Congressional Record, Vol. 89, pp. 7511–14 (July 8,1943), Vol. 90, pp. 1737,1746,1826, 1840 (Feb. 16–17, 1944). See also Senator O’Mahoney, Joseph C., America is Being Made Over, Reader’s Digest, Aug., 1943 Google Scholar, and Kenneth, Colegrove, The American Senate and World Peace, pp. 28 Google Scholar ff. 93 ff.

9 See discussion by Senator Gillette, of Iowa and Senator Pepper, of Florida, Cong. Rec., Vol. 89, pp. 10708–10714 Google Scholar (Dec. 13, 1943). See also Colegrove, , work cited, p. 170 Google Scholar ff.; Sol Bloom, (Chairman of House Foreign Affairs Committee), The Treaty-Making Power, Washington, 1944, pp. 13–19 Google Scholar; Comstock, A. Barr, New York Times, May 7, 1944, p. 8 Google Scholar E.

10 House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Extension of Lend-Lease, Jan. 29–Feb. 23, 1943, pp. 106–115.

11 Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 10, Cl. 1–3; Holmes vs. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540; U. S. vs. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407; Green vs. Biddle, 8 Went. 1; Virginia vs. Tennessee, 148 U. S. 503; Q. Wright, work cited, p. 230; Levitan, David M. (“Executive Agreements,” in Illinois Law Review, Vol. 35 (1940), p. 369 Google Scholar) and Weinfeld, “What Did the Framers of the Federal Constitution Mean by Agreements or Compacts?”, in University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 3 (1936), p. 435 CrossRefGoogle Scholar suggest that probably this distinction came from Vattel’s Law of Nations (Sections 152, 153, 192) defining “compacts” as agreements to be executed by a single act. Practice, however, has given a more extensive meaning to compacts and agreements. (See Frankfurter, and Landis, “The Compact Clause of the Constitution,” in Yale Law Journal, Vol. 34 (1925), p. 695 CrossRefGoogle Scholar). See remarks by Senator Austin, , Cong. Rec. Vol. 90, p. 1829 Google Scholar (Feb. 17,1944), and above, note 4.1.

12 Field vs. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 1892; Hampton v. U. S., 1928, 276 U. S. 394; U. S. v.Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 1936, 299 U. S. 304. See also Memorandum by Attorney General Robert H. Jackson on Constitutionality of the Trade Agreement Act, February 29, 1940, Senate Committee on Finance, Hearings on Extension of Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, 76th Congress, 3rd Sess., March 6,1940, pp. 729–43: statement by Green H. Hackworth, legal advisor of Department of State, House Committee on Ways and Means, Hearings on Extension of Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, 76th Congress, 3rd Sess., February 1,1940, Vol. 3, pp. 2480–93; Report of Senate Committee on Finance, 76th Congress, 3rd Sess., March 8, 1940 (No. 1297) pp. 5–6; Report of House Committee on Ways and Means, 76th Congress, 3rd Sess., February 14, 1940 (No. 1594), pp. 34–36; 78th Congress, 1st Sess., May 5, 1943 (No. 409), pp. 47–48.

13 U. S. vs. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324, 331, 1937; U. S. vs. Pink, 315 U. S. 203, 220,1942. See also Watt vs. U. S. 1 Wash. Terr. 288, 294, 1870; Altman vs. U. S., 224 U. S. 583, 1912; McCall’s Estate, 28 Pa. Dist. Ct. 433, 448,1919, which suggest a more modest r61e for executive agreements; Q. Wright, work cited, p. 239; Catudal, work cited, p. 665 ff. An executive agreement, unless supported by Congressional action, cannot supersede earlier acts of Congress as can a “treaty.” (See Senator Gillette, , Cong. Rec., Vol. 89, p. 10711 (Dec. 13, 1943 Google Scholar); Senator Taft, , the same, Vol. 90, p. 1828 (Feb. 17, 1944)Google Scholar; and Q. Wright, work cited, pp. 340, 375.

14 McClure, work cited, p. 4.

15 Q. Wright, work cited, pp. 235–46, 375.

16 The same, 235–6.

17 Geofroy vs. Biggs, 133 U. S. 258, 1890; Q. Wright, work cited, pp. 246–8.

18 Levitan, work cited, p. 395; Q. Wright, work cited, p. 340 ff. This overlapping nec-essarily leaves the President discretion to decide which method shall be used and makes it impossible to define ‘treaties’ and ‘executive agreements’ except by the statement that ‘treaties’ are international agreements submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent : and ‘executive agreements’ are all other international agreements made by the United States. See Senator Gillette, work cited, p. 10711, citing William B. Whittington of the Treaty Division, Dept. of State: Conference of Teachers of Int. Law, 1938, p. 5. Senator J Taft of Ohio, during the Senate debate on the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation P Administration agreement tried to draw the line between treaties and executive agreements by distinguishing (1) minor international matters, such as postal arrangements, | which could be dealt with by executive agreements, (2) important international matters which could only be dealt with by treaty, (3) domestic matters on which, if within its delegated powers, Ckjngress could authorize the President to make executive agreements, and (4) executive and military matters upon which the President could make executive agreements which, however, could only control his own policy, not that of Congress or of future Presidents (see below, notes 19–21). The difficulty of applying these distinctions in practice was illustrated in the Senator’s speech. He said he considered the recent executive agreements on Panamanian land titles and reciprocal tariff reduction so important that they should have been made by treaty but he acknowledged that the majority of his colleagues had thought differently and had supported legislation to implement them. He also considered that the reciprocal trade agreements were outside of the “domestic” legislative powers of Congress because they purported to bind the United States for three years while Congress could not bind its own future action, but here again the general opinion of the Senate had been against him. He considered the UNRRA agreement to be a “part of the war effort ” within the President’s military powers but others thought that, since it involved mainly appropriations, it was within the “domestic” powers of Congress (Cong. Rec. Vol. 90, pp. 1827–9 (Feb. 17, 1944). Opinions are likely to differ on what is “important” and what “minor.” “Domestic” legislation as used in United States practice has both authorized and abrogated international agreements and has precipitated claims by foreign governments on the ground that it has violated international law. (See Q. Wright, work cited, p. 263 ff.) But as used in international law and the League of Nations Covenant (Art. 15, par. 8) “domestic jurisdiction” refers to matters which do not affect the state’s obligations under international law or treaties. (Per. Ct. Int. Jus., Tunis Nationality Decrees case.)

19 Q. Wright, work cited, pp. 9, 66, 235, 358; Levitan, p. 394.

20 Above, note 13.

21 Chinese Exclusion Cases, 1889, 130 U. S. 581; Pigeon River Co. v. Cox, 1933, 291 U. S. 138; Q. Wright, work cited, pp. 17, 162.

22 Madison, work cited, pp. 147–150; Corwin, work cited, p. 19; Q. Wright, work cited, p. 138; Lewis, David J., Hearings, the World Court, House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, May 20, 1932 Google Scholar; also note 4, above.

23 Above, note 3.

24 Crandall, work cited, 189–90; Q. Wright, work cited, pp. 102, 344. See note on participation of House of Representatives in the making, execution and termination of treaties: Rules of the House of Representatives, Washington, 1943, pp. 269–270.

25 By an act of 1871 Congress forbade the making of further treaties with the Indian tribes, Moore, J. B., Digest of International Law, Vol. 5, p. 220 Google Scholar. Q. Wright, work cited, p. 234.

26 Q. Wright, work cited, p. 258.

27 McClure, work cited, pp. 11, 62–70; Q. Wright, work cited, pp. 291–3; Miller, Hunter, Treaties and other International Acts of the United States, Vol. 4, p. 702 Google Scholar ff.

28 McClure, work cited, pp. 35–189; Q. Wright, work cited, p. 236.

29 Ware vs. Hylton, 3 Dall, 199, 1796. In Missouri vs. Holland, 252 U. S. 416, 1920, the Court recognized the power of Congress to pass laws necessary and proper to carry out a treaty even though, in the absence of the treaty, it would lack power to deal with the subject. See also Neeley vs. Henkel, 180 U. S. 102, 121, 1900.

30 Q. Wright, work cited, pp. 62, 246; above note 4.1.

31 Same, pp. 248, 528, 279, 281.

32 Same, p. 260; above, note 21.

33 Q. Wright, work cited, pp. 253–56.

34 Same, pp. 6, 356.

35 Same, pp. 21–26, 28–37, 233.

36 McClure, work cited, 362–3; Levitan, work cited, pp. 394–5.

37 Q. Wright, work cited, pp. 6–9; 341 ff.

38 See House Resolutions concerning appropriations to carry out the Jay Treaty (1796) and the Alaska Purchase Treaty (1867); Q. Wright, work cited, pp. 6, 226.

39 Above, note 13.

40 See Altman vs. U. S. 224, U. S. 503, 1912; Mo. vs. Holland, 252 U. S. 416, 1920; Lewis, D. J., Congressional Record, Vol. 54 (1917), p. 3508 Google Scholar, p. 4205; Q. Wright, work cited, p. 57.

41 This interpretation is supported by Art. III, sec. 2, of the Constitution which extends the judicial power to “all cases in law or equity arising under the Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made or which shall be made, under their (the United States’) authority.”

42 Martin vs. Mott, 12 Wheat 19; Jones vs. U. S., 137 U. S. 202, 212, 1890; Pearcy vs.Stranahan, 205 U. S. 257, 1907; U. S. vs. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U. S. 304, 1936; Q. Wright, work cited, p. 172, 215.

43 Q. Wright, work cited, p. 349.

44 Same, pp. 364–5. In the original Senate of 26 the difference between a majority (14) and two thirds (18), was only four Senators, a point commented on by Senator McDuffie of South Carolina during the Texas annexation debate (Congressional Globe, Vol. 14 (1845), p. 335).

45 Q. Wright, work cited, p. 264; Holt, W. Stull, Treaties Defeated by the Senate, p. 1 Google Scholar ff.

46 Charles Warren, the Mississippi River and the Treaty Clause of the Constitution, George, Washington Law Review, Vol. 2 (1934), p. 271 Google Scholar; Catudal, work cited, p. 653; McClendon, R. E., Origin of the Two-Thirds Rule in the Senate Action upon Treaties, American Historical Review, Vol. 36 (1931), p. 768 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; W. S. Holt, work cited, p. 8; Tansill, C. C., The Treaty Making Power of the Senate, this Journal, Vol. 18 (1924), p. 459 Google Scholar; Bloom, work cited.

47 Livingston Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention, Vol. 2, p. 538; Q. Wright, work cited, p. 246; below, note 55.

48 Q. Wright, work cited, p. 137.

49 Same, pp. 21–27.

50 See Hayden, work cited; Corwin, work cited, p. 84 ff; Holt, work cited; Q. Wright, work cited, p. 360 ff.; Bloom, work cited.

51 Holt, work cited, pp. 17–18; above, note 4.1.

52 House of Representatives, Jan. 7, 1845, Congressional Globe, Vol. 14, Appendix, pp. 122, 124; above, note 4.1.

53 Henry James, Richard Olney, p. 150; Haynes, G. H., The Senate of the United States, Vol. 2, p. 657 Google Scholar; Holt, work cited, p. 159.

54 Woodrow, Wilson, Congressional Government, p. 50 Google Scholar; Holt, work cited, p. 107.

55 In the early days the relatively isolated situation of the United States seldom required the making of treaties. The presumption was in favor of the status quo. In such a situation, as Jefferson observed, a difficult procedure for treaty-making protects the general opinion against ill-considered measures. In the twentieth century, on the other hand, close international contacts and the need for continuous adaptation of treaty relations to rapidly changing conditions require frequent treaties. The presumption favors change. In a situation requiring positive action a requirement for extraordinary majorities means minority rule. Even in the Federal Convention it was recognized by Madison and others that the termination of a war necessarily involved positive action and consequently they proposed that treaties of peace should only be made by majority vote of Congress. This proposal was not approved because of the reluctance of many to make participation of the House of Representatives necessary. Roger Sherman of Connecticut in the Convention particularly stressed the need for secrecy as did Hamilton and Jay in the Federalist. Sherman, however, saw that the two-thirds rule would be “embarrassing” and proposed to substitute a simple majority of the entire Senate. This proposal lost by a vote of five to six. A shift of one vote would have prevented what John Hay called “the irreparable mistake of the Constitution” (see Gillette, work cited, 10710; Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, New Haven, 1911, Vol. 2, pp. 538, 540, 549).

56 The motives of the Senate in defeating treaties are examined in detail by Holt, work cited, who concludes:

“The fate of the Treaty of Versailles turned the attention of thoughtful people to the treaty- making power of the United States. They saw that the exercise of that power had produced such bitter conflicts between the President and the Senate and had so increased the opportunities for political warfare unconnected with the merits of the question that many treaties had been lost. They knew that the ratification of nearly every important treaty had been endangered by a constitutional system which, instead of permitting a decision solely on the merits of the question, produces impotence and friction. They realized that if no disaster had resulted it was due partly to good fortune and chiefly to the relative unimportance of foreign relations in the history of the United States so that few treaties had contained vital issues. They also realized that, if the United States was to play the part in world affairs demanded by its interests and its strength, a deadlock between the President and the Senate over a treaty involving a really critical foreign problem may end in ruin.”

Equally drastic criticism has come from the Senate itself. After referring to the possibility that Senators representing one-twelfth of the population might defeat a treaty, Senator Gillette of Iowa said in the Senate, supporting an amendment providing for majority rule: “I have just directed attention to the obstructive force of a minority based on population. How much more dangerous and destructive would be a situation where all the efforts of our executive department and the will and wish of two-thirds of this body, less one, could be thwarted by a small group of Senators who were offensively partizan, or by a similar small group of arbitrary radicals, or a similar small group of hard-headed reactionaries, or by any other group small and compact, motivated by partizan antagonisms, political prejudices, or personal antagonism and ill will against an Executive, based on resentments which found their genesis in campaign contentions, patronage distribution, or equally unworthy situations.” He added, “I don’t think so meanly of my colleagues in this body as to believe that they would be actuated by any such despicable motives, but I cannot close my eyes to the record of our national history.” Cong. Rec., Vol. 89, p. 10709 (Dec. 13, 1943). “The historical evidence,” he said later, “certainly should convince us that our Chief Executives have been given much cause for being sceptical and reluctant in the matter of laying international pacts before the Senate for ratification as treaties” (Same, p. 10712). See also Colegrove, work cited, pp. 15–24, 55 ff.; Bloom, work cited, pp. 8, 18.

57 See Department of State, List of Treaties Submitted to the Senate, 1789–1931, which have not gone into Force, Washington, 1932; Haynes, work cited, Vol. 2, p. 603; Dangerfield, Royden, In Defense of the Senate, Norman, pp. 151 Google Scholar, 252.

58 “The Senate can amend, change, emasculate, mutilate or completely destroy a treaty proposal by a majority vote, but cannot give it approval in any form except by a two-thirds vote of assent.” Senator Gillette, , Cong. Rec., Vol. 89, p. 10711 (Dec. 13, 1943)Google Scholar.

59 See Fleming, D. F., “The Rôle of the Senate in Treaty Making; a Survey of Four Decades,” in American Political Science Review, Vol. 28 (1934), p. 583 CrossRefGoogle Scholar ff. Wickersham, George, former Attorney-General wrote (Foreign Affairs, Vol. 2 (1923), p. 187 Google Scholar) : “The conduct of foreign relations will be almost impossible of satisfactory direction if the Senate shall continue in future to interfere with and hamper the Executive as it has done the last four years. … The fact is the treaty-making machinery of the United States has become so complicated as to be almost unworkable.” Among the treaties killed by the Senate during this period have been the Hay Arbitration Treaties, the Knox-Taft Arbitration Treaties, and treaties providing for American participation in the League of Nations, the Permanent Court of International Justice, and the Geneva Arms Trade Convention.

60 Poole, De Witt, “Cooperation Abroad Through Organization at Home,” in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, July, 1931; Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 72 (1943), pp. 77–86 Google Scholar; Haynes, work cited, p. 660; Fleming, D. F., The Treaty Veto of the American Senate, pp. 266–68 Google Scholar.

61 McClure, work cited; Colegrove, work cited, pp. 11 ff, 49 ff, 99 ff; Q. Wright, work cited, pp. 362, 368.

62 The present writer in 1922 gave insufficient weight to the possibility of using “executive agreements’’ supported by Congress as practical alternatives to “treaties” in most cases. (See work cited, pp. 235, 368, note 26.) The development of Congressional and executive practice, and of judicial opinion, as well as historical research, has thrown new light on the question since that date. (See Levitan, work cited.) Professor Colegrove, while recognizing the practicability of using the Executive-Congressional process for matters within the delegated powers of Congress, fears that instruments made in this way may lack the ‘ ‘ symbolical significance” of treaties and may be regarded as “evasions of the fundamental law” (work cited, pp. 106, 110). These fears, which should be dispelled by a more complete examination of the law and history of the subject, were shared by Senator Vandenburg (Mich.) and Taft (Ohio) during the debate on the UNRRA agreement: Cong. Rec., Vol. 90, pp. 1749,1826 (Feb. 16–17,1944). Senator Taft regarded Senator Vandenburg’s suggestion that the UNRRA agreement was an “executive-congressional agreement” different from either an “executive agreement” or a “treaty,” as a novel suggestion which he could not accept. He considered it an “executive agreement,” a form of instrument which he reluctantly acknowledged was fully supported by practice and judicial precedent if confined to its proper field. (See note 18 above.) In his opinion Congress was asked by the pending resolution to participate, not in making the agreement, but in executing it. (Same, pp. 1746,1827.) On this he was supported by Senator Connally (Tex.), Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, who had presented the resolution (p. 1756). Neither of them, however, recognized the relationship between the propriety of Presidential conclusion of such agreements and the probability of Congressional support for their execution.

63 After citing the practice in regard to executive agreements and treaties and the judicial decisions on the subject Senator Gillette says: “It would be a logical conclusion that a decision not to submit to the Senate an agreement with a foreign power, even one of as high import as a treaty of peace, could not properly be questioned in any judicial proceedings for mandatory action” (p. 10713). He felt that termination of a war by prolonged armistice without peace treaty would amount to a coup d’état but he did not discuss the approximation to such a procedure involved in the fact that World War I really ended by the joint resolution of July 2, 1921. Senator Gillette’s comment that, if the above-stated opinion concerning executive agreements is true, reference in the Constitution to the treaty-making process is “irrelevant, superfluous, and mere verbiage” (p. 10713), overlooks the main intent of this process, namely, to make it possible for the President to by-pass the House of Representatives in the interest of secrecy and dispatch if that seems expedient. It was thought that the President would usually wish to do this because it was assumed that he would use the Senate as an executive council during the course of negotiations and so would be assured of its speedy consent: Bloom, work cited, pp. 10–12, 16.