Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 March 2017
1 See 68 AJIL 69 (1974).
2 See UN Doc. A/AC. 160/2, at 6–9 (1973).
3 See UN Doc. A/C.6/418, at 6 (1972).
4 See, e.g., Paust, J., Terrorism and the International Law of War, 64 Mil. L. Rev. 1 (1974)Google Scholar, to be reprinted at 13 Revue de Droit Pénal Militaire et de Droit de la Guerre (1974) and in a forthcoming book (Bassiouni, M. C. ed.)Google Scholar; Paust, J., Possible Legal Responses to International Terrorism: Prevention, Punishment and Cooperative Action, forthcomingGoogle Scholar; Symposium, International Terrorism—Mid East, forthcoming Akron L. Rev. (1974) (panelists: Baxter, R., Bassiouni, M. C. Rosenbaum, A., Paust, J.)Google Scholar; Proceedings, Abidjan World Conference on World Peace Through Law (Africa 1973) (Paust, J., panelist, panel on international terrorism), forthcomingGoogle Scholar; and Walter, E. V., Terror and Resistance 5 (1969)Google Scholar, cited by the authors.
5 See supra note 4.
6 See supra note 4.
7 Realism to the authors appears to be merely the quest for consensus among state elites and not a quest to explore a broader context for a more rational, realistic serving of legal policy. See supra note 1 at 72, 82, 89–90; cf. id., at 88. For a concise disclosure of the absurdity of an attempt to sweep “motive” under the rug, see A. Sewell, remarks, Phoc. Amer. Soc. Int. L., 67 AJIL 107–08 (Nov. 1973).
8 Moreover, why is it appropriate to use a “list theory” in connection with terrorism, but inappropriate to use one in connection with questions of aggression? See also McDougal, M., Feliciano, F., Law and Minimum World Public Order (1961)Google Scholar.