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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 May 2017
That the laws of nations with respect to the right of visit and search, and the right of capture were well defined and established in 1914 can not be doubted. The best proof that there were such laws in force is the fact that there was not in the sisterhood of nations a single enlightened state whose prize courts had not undertaken to interpret and administer them, and to award damages for their violation. The interpretations of these courts may have varied, just as the interpretations of statutory law vary among the municipal courts of the same state, but there were, nevertheless, such laws, and they were interpreted. Furthermore, it would appear that by the courts of Great Britain and the United States in particular, they were interpreted and administered with as high a degree of uniformity as the same law is ordinarily interpreted and administered by the courts of two or more different states of the American Union.
1 Sec. 411, Vol. II, page 596.
2 The George, Fed. Cas. No. 5, 328.
3 1 C. Rob. 228. Bened. Adm. Sec. 509.
4 Talbot v. The Amelia, 4 Dali. (U. S.) 34.
5 Wheaton's International Law, 5th Eng. Ed. p. 58, referring to Tudor's Leading Cases on Maritime Law, pp. 1092, 1093, and Calvo, II, Sec. 1236.
6 A seizure of this character is entirely different from the requisition of neutral property and the taking of neutral property under the exercise of the right of angary, as will appear later.
7 9 Cranch, 388,427.
8 4 Lloyd's Prize Cases, 62 (1916).