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Medellín’s New Paradigm for Treaty Interpretation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 February 2017

David J. Bederman
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Extract

Much of the scholarly attention given to the U.S. Supreme Court’s March 2008 decision in Medellín v. Texas has focused on the Court’s supposed ruling as to the presumptive nonself-execution of international agreements entered into by the United States, and the power of the president to implement such agreements without an act of Congress. Less heed has been paid to the impact and implications of the Court’s reasoning and analysis in interpreting the four international agreements at issue in the case: the 1945 United Nations Charter and Statute of the International Court of Justice, and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and its Optional Protocol. Although the Court’s analysis of the self-execution questions is beyond the scope of my contribution to this Agora, I acknowledge that the jurisprudence of treaty interpretation fits uncomfortably with the calculus of an international agreement’s selfexecution into U.S. law. And while it may seem obscure to view the Medellín decision through the lens of treaty interpretation, that is what truly brings its importance into focus, so that its impact may ultimately be seen as clarifying the established norms of U.S. foreign relations law, particularly in the selection of appropriate sources for treaty construction and the deference to be granted to various foreign relations actors and institutions.

Type
Agora: Medellín
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 102 , Issue 3 , July 2008 , pp. 529 - 540
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 2008 

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References

1 128 S.Ct. 1346 (2008).

2 See, for example, in this Agora, Curtis, A. Bradley, Intent, Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties , 102 AJIL 540 (2008)Google Scholar; Steve, Charnovitz, Revitalizing the U.S. Compliance Power , 102 AJIL 551 (2008)Google Scholar; Carlos, Manuel Vázquez, Less Than Zero? 102 AJIL 563 (2008)Google Scholar. See also Mark, E. Wojcik, The United States, the International Court of Justice, and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: Introductory Note to Medellín v. Texas, 47 ILM 281 (2008)Google Scholar; Margaret, E. McGuinness, Three Narratives of Medellín v. Texas, 31 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 227 (2008)Google Scholar; Margaret, E. McGuinness, Case Report: Medellín v. Texas, in 102 AJIL 622 (2008).Google Scholar

3 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 UST77, 596 UNTS 261 [hereinafter VCCR].

4 Optional Protocol to the Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 UST 325, 596 UNTS 487 [hereinafter VCCR Optional Protocol].

5 David, J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation , 41 Ucla L. Rev. 953 (1994).Google Scholar

6 See, e.g., Curtis, A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs , 86 Va. L. Rev. 649 (2000)Google Scholar; Robert, M. Chesney, Disaggregating Deference: The Judicial Power and Executive Treaty Interpretations , 92 Iowal. Rev. 1723 (2007)Google Scholar; Curtis, J. Mahoney, Treaties as Contracts: Textualism, Contract Theory, and the Interpretation of Treaties , 116 Yale L.J. 824 (2007)Google Scholar; Norton, John Moore, Treaty Interpretation, the Constitution and the Rule of Law , 42 Va. J. Int’l L. 163 (2001)Google Scholar; Scott, M. Sullivan, Rethinking Treaty Interpretation , 86 Tex. L. Rev. 777 (2008)Google Scholar; Michael, P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation , 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 687 (1998)Google Scholar; Michael, P. Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudence and a Call for Resurrection , 93 Geo. L.J. 1885 (2005)Google Scholar.

7 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Arts. 31, 32, opened for signature May 23 , 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 Google Scholar [hereinafter VCLT].

8 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992); Chan v. Korean Air Lines, 490 U.S. 122 (1989); United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353,371 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); O’Connor v. United States, 479 U.S. 27 (1986).

9 Chan, 490 U.S. at 136 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, Blackmun, & Stevens, JJ.).

10 See Bederman, supra note 5, at 975–91.

11 Medellíin, 128 S.Ct. 1346, 1357–58 (2008).

12 See David, J. Bederman, Classical Canons: Rhetoric, Classicism and Treaty Interpretation 180–319 (2001)Google Scholar; Ilmar, Tammelo, Treaty Interpretation and Practical Reason: Toward a General Theory of Legal Interpretation (1967)Google Scholar; Tsune-Chi, Yü, The Interpretation of Treaties (photo reprint 1968) (1927)Google Scholar; Maarten, Bos, Theory and Practice of Treaty Interpretation (Part One), 27 Neth. Int’l L. Rev. 3 (1980)Google Scholar; Charles, Fairman, The Interpretation of Treaties , 20 Transactions Grotius Soc’y 123 (1935)Google Scholar; Cheney, Charles Hyde, Interpretation of Treaties by the Permanent Court of International Justice , 24 AJIL 1 (1930)Google Scholar; Paul, Pic, De l’interprétation des traités internationaux , 17 Revue Générale De Droit International Public 1 (1910)Google Scholar; Quincy, Wright, The Interpretation of Multilateral Treaties , 23 AJIL 94 (1929).Google Scholar

13 Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1357 (quoting Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines, 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996)).

14 UN Charter Art. 94(1).

15 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 ICJ Rep. 12 (Mar. 31).

16 See 128 S.Ct. at 1353–54, 1358.

17 Id. at 1358.

18 VCLT, supra note 7, Art. 31(1) (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”).

19 Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1358.

20 Cf. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 22, Medellín v. Texas, 128S.Ct.1346 (2008) (No. 06-984), 2007 WL 1909462 (citing ICJ Statute Art. 59, & [UN CHARTER] Art. 94(1) (“Under the Optional Protocol and the U.N. Charter, the Avena decision … continues to impose a treaty-based obligation on the United States ‘to comply with the decision’ without regard to the merits of the treaty interpretation that led to the decision.”)).

21 See text at note 14 supra.

22 Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1358.

23 See id. at 1359 & n.6 (quoting UN Charter Art. 94(2)).

24 ICJ Statute Art. 59.

25 Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1360–61 (quoting ICJ Statute Arts. 34(1) & 59, and discussing the ICJ’s diplomatic protection cases).

26 Id. at 1362.

27 Id. (citing Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829); United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 87, 89 (1833)); cf. Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 686 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“To ascertain whether Article 36 [of the VCCR] confers a right on individuals, we first look to the treaty’s text as we would with a statute’s.”).

28 VCLT, supra note 7, Art. 32 (a), (b) (such extratextual means appropriate where a textual reading “leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or … leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable”).

29 See Bederman, supra note 12, at 200–14; see also Arnold, McNair, The Law of Treaties (1961)Google Scholar; Georg, Schwarzenberger, Myths and Realities of Treaty Interpretation , 22 Current Legal Probs. 205 (1969)Google Scholar; Ian, Sinclair, The Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties , 19 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 47 (1970).Google Scholar

30 Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1373–74 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314) (“But this concern counsels in favor of reading any ambiguity in Article 94(1) as leaving the choice of whether to comply with ICJ judgments, and in what manner, ‘to the political, not the judicial department.’”).

31 Justice Stevens did resort to a cross-reading with Articles 36(1) and 59 of the ICJ Statute, but, like the majority, reached indeterminate results, which do not change his ultimate conclusion that ICJ judgments are not self-executing with binding effect for U.S. courts. Id. at 1374.

32 Id. at 1384 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

33 Id. (quoting Webster’s New International Dictionary 2770 (2d ed. 1939) (for entry on “undertake”)).

34 Id. (citing United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 88 – 89 (1833)) (quoting Spanish version of the UN Charter, in an interpretive move meant expressly to resonate with the Supreme Court’s revisiting of the self-execution issue in Percheman after examining the Spanish text of the 1819 treaty).

35 See Gonzales v. O Centra Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 437-38 (2006) (applying a literalist interpretation to the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Feb.21, 1971, 32 UST 543, 1019 UNTS 175). Compare The Amiable Isabella, 19U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 72 (1821) (Story, J.) (“[T]his Court is bound to give effect to the stipulations of the treaty in the manner and to the extent which the parties have declared, and not otherwise.”), with Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963) (the clear language of a treaty controls unless “application of the words of the treaty according to their obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of the signatories”).

36 Extradition Treaty, U.S.-Mex., May 4, 1978, 31 UST 5059.

37 See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 664–70 (1992); see also Bederman, supra note 5, at 982–83.

38 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669 (2006).

39 See id. at 2681, 2685–86 (critiquing ICJ’s textual analysis on this point), 2691–92, 2698–99 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (glossing Article 36).

40 See supra note 18; see also Bederman, supra note 5, at 972–75.

41 Bederman, supra note 5, at 1015 (noting that often Rehnquist Court cases surveyed in the article, in all but one the Supreme Court followed the interpretive position of the executive branch, as enunciated in party or amicus briefs presented in the case); see also David, J. Bederman, Deference or Deception: Treaty Rights as Political Questions . 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1439, 1442–45 (1999)Google Scholar. For literature testing the limits of my thesis, see Bradley, supra note 6, at 701–02; Alex, Glashausser, Difference and Deference in Treaty Interpretation , 50 Vill. L. Rev. 25, 37 (2005)Google Scholar; David, Sloss, When Do Treaties Create Individually Enforceable Rights? The Supreme Court Ducks the Issue in Hamdan and Sanchez-Llamas, 45 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 20, 33 (2006)Google Scholar; Tim, Wu, Treaties’Domain , 93 Va. L. Rev. 571, 643 (2007).Google Scholar

42 See text at note 11 supra (quoting Medellín) and cited cases.

43 See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 713–14 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring) (relying on transmittal and submittal letters, committee testimony, and U.S. delegation reports); Société Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 530–38 (1987) (citing transmittal letter and hearing testimony).

44 United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 366–68 (1989) (Brennan, J., for the majority) (citing S. Exec. Rep. No. 77–3 (1942), and 88 Cong. Rec. 4714 (1982), to construe tax treaty with Canada).

45 Id. at 373 (Scalia, J., concurring).

46 See Detlev, F. Vagts, Senate Materials and Treaty Interpretation: Some Research Hints for the Supreme Court , 83 AJIL 546 (1989)Google Scholar; see also Bederman, supra note 5, at 999–1002.

47 Stuart, 489 U.S. at 374–76 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also id. at 367–68 n.7 (for Justice Brennan’s response).

48 See 128 S.Ct. at 1359-60 (citing The Charter of the United Nations for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations , 79th Cong. 124–25, 286 (1945)Google Scholar (statement of Leo Paslovsky, special assistant to the secretary of state for international organizations and security affairs); A Resolution Proposing Acceptance of Compulsory Jurisdiction of International Court of Justice: Hearings on S. Res. 196 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations , 79th Cong. 142 (1946)Google Scholar (statement of Charles Fahy, legal adviser of the Department of State)).

49 Id. at 1359; see also Brief for Respondent at 20–24, Medellín v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-984), 2007 WL 242837 (for detailed briefing on ratification history).

50 128 S.Ct. at 1360; see also id. at 1358 (reasoning that “the Senate that ratified the U.N. Charter [did not] intend] ] to vest ICJ decisions with immediate legal effect in domestic courts”), 1362 (“The dissent’s understanding of the treaty route, depending on an ad hoc judgment of the judiciary without looking to the treaty language—the very language negotiated by the President and approved by the Senate— cannot readily be ascribed to those same Framers.”).

51 Id. at 1362.

52 For commentary, see Bederman, supra note 5, at 958–59 & n.19; Michael, J. Glennon, Interpreting “Interpretation”: The President, the Senate, and When Treaty Interpretation Becomes Treaty Making , 20 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 913 (1987)Google Scholar; Malvina, Halberstam, The Use of Legislative History in Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Treaty Approach , 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1645 (1991)Google Scholar; David, A. Koplow, Constitutional Bait and Switch: Executive Reinterpretation of Arms Control Treaties , 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1353 (1989)Google Scholar; Michael, W. Reisman, Necessary and Proper: Executive Competence to Interpret Treaties , 15 Yale J. Int’l L. 316 (1990).Google Scholar

53 See, e.g., Rainbow Navigation v. Dep’t of the Navy, 686 F.Supp. 354, 357–58 (D.D.C. 1988) (interpretation of provision in military cargo agreement with Iceland).

54 See text at note 11 supra.

55 Bederman, supra note 5, at 992–96.

56 VCLT, supra note 7, Art. 32, quoted in note 28 supra.

57 See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 184–87 (1993) (consulting procès verbaux at the diplomatic conference adopting the Refugees Convention); Eastern Airlines v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 543–46 (1991) (using documentation prepared by the Comité International Technique d’Experts Juridiques Aériens); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700–04 (1988) (placing emphasis on successive texts of Hague Evidence Convention and failed amendments), 711–13 (Brennan, J., concurring) (employing the official treaty commentary prepared by the Hague Conference on Private International Law). But see Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,437-38 (2006) (rejecting interpretive conclusion drawn from the use of an official commentary to the UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, but also holding— unrelated to the interpretation issue—that “[t]he fact that hoasca is covered by the Convention … does not automatically mean that the Government has demonstrated a compelling interest in applying the Controlled Substances Act, which implements the Convention”).

58 Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 13 57,1367 (observing that” [n]othing in the text, background, negotiating and drafting history, or practice among signatory nations suggests that the President or Senate intended the improbable result of giving the judgments of an international tribunal a higher status”). 1382 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that “[d]’rafting history is also relevant” to an analysis of whether a treaty was intended to be self-executing).

59 Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 52 (1929); see also Bederman, supra note 5, at 1002–06.

60 Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 430 (1902).

61 United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989); O’Connor v. United States, 479 U.S. 27, 33 n.2 (1986); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 295–96 (1933); United States v. Reynes, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 127, 147–48 (1850).

62 Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 257–58 (1984).

63 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669, 2678 n.3 (2006); Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 655 n.9 (2004); El Al Israel Airlines v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 175–76 (1999); Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 537 (1995); Eastern Airlines v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 538–40 & nn.6, 7 (1991); Tucker, 183 U.S. at 442–43.

64 For an opinion taking an affirmative position, see Tseng, 525 U.S. at 175 (“Decisions of the courts of other Convention signatories corroborate our understanding of the Convention’s preemptive effect.”). For one taking a negative position, see Husain, 540 U.S. at 655 n.9 (distinguishing English and Australian decisions), 658–63 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (relying on those opinions).

65 See Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1363 (“[N]either Medellín nor his amici have identified a single nation that treats ICJ judgments as binding in domestic courts.”).

66 See id. at 1363 n. 10 (disagreeing with conclusion of the Brief of International Court of Justice Experts as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 20 n.31, Medellín v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-984), 2007 WL 1886207, that Moroccan courts directly enforce ICJ decisions, by citing a decision of the then Court of Appeal for the International Territory of Tangier, Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Lal-La Fatma Bent si Mohamed el Khadar, 21 ILR 136 (Ct. App. Int’l Juris. Tangier 1954)).

67 See id. at 1364–65 & n. 11 (discussing Comegys v. Vasse, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 193 (1828); La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423 (1899)).

68 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (per curiam); see also Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2683, 2685.

69 See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2700–01 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Husain, 540 U.S. at 660 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is reasonable to impute to the parties an intent that their respective courts strive to interpret the treaty consistently”); and The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“‘[Trustworthy evidence of what [international] law really is’ can be found in ‘the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of labor, research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat’”)); id. At 2701– 02 (collecting a variety of cases in which U.S. courts have relied on ICJ and other international tribunal decisions to construe treaties).

70 Id. at 2683–86 (majority opinion).

71 Id. at 2685.

72 Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1361 n.8.

73 Id. at 1361 n.9 (quoting Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 ICJ Rep. 12,72 (Mar. 31)).

74 See id. at 1367–72.

75 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 34, Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 916 (2005) (No. 04-5928), 2005 WL 504490 [hereinafter U.S. Amicus Brief].

76 128 S.Ct. at 1358 (quotingU.S. Amicus Brief, supra note 75, at 34), 1361 (“The Executive Branch has unfailingly adhered to its view that the relevant treaties do not create domestically enforceable federal law.”).

77 Id. at 1361 (quoting Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184–85 (1982); and citing El Al Israel Airlines v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 168 (1999)).

78 See, e.g., Tseng, 525 U.S. at 167-68 & n.10, 171–72; Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line, 545U.S. 119,135–36 (2005); see also Bederman, supra note 5, at 1015-19 (for earlier cases).

79 128 S.Ct. at 1363.

80 Id. at 1364 (quoting Sumitomo Shoji, 457 U.S. at 180).

81 See id. at 1380 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

82 See Bederman, supra note 5, at 1024–33.