Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 May 2017
The text of the jurist Marcianus, preserved in the Digest of Justinian, is the first formal pronouncement in recorded legal theory on the legal status of the sea and on the right of men to use the sea and its products. It is stated that the sea and its coasts are common to all men. Since Marcianus lived in the early years of the second century of the Christian era, it follows that this doctrine was known in a written form at least as early as the beginning of the second century. Since, further, Marcianus belonged to that class of jurists the official pronouncements of which were recognized as being statements of the law, it follows that the doctrine of the common right of all men to a free use of the sea was a law of the Roman Empire at the beginning of the second century, although this law was not put in a codified form until the sixth century.
1 See D.1.8.pr. and 1.8.1.
2 Strabo, Geography, transl. by Hamilton, H. C. and Falconer, W., 3 vols., London, 1857, iii, p. 14. Or, Strabo, xiv, cap. I, sec. 26.Google Scholar See also iii, I, 6–9;Google Scholar iii, II, 6–8; ii, V, 33. Bockh, A., Die Staatshaltung der Athener, 2d ed., 4 vols., Berlin, 1851, dealing with the interval between the Persian War and the time of Alexander, while considering the food of the Athenians, says, i, p. 145: Eingesalzenes, besonders Fische, wurde aus dem Pontus, Phrygien, Agyptien, Sardinien und Cadix weit verfuhrt, und war zu Athen in Menge verhanden, aber von verschiedener GtiterGoogle Scholar.
3 See references above. Also, Plutarch's Lives, Dryden's transl. revised by A. H. Clough, 5 vols., London, 1859; Poplicola, in i, p. 214; Livy, ii.9.30; Ulpian, in D.50.16.17.1. Bockh, op. cit., i, p. 414, states that part of the property of the Athenian state comprised Meeresge-wasser, and, in note c, says, Die Attische TempelbehOrde von Delos verpachtet Meeresge-wasser, sei es in Rticksicht des Salzgewinnes oder der Fischerei, and adds that both in Asia (citing Strabo, xiv, 642) and Byzantium the state owned salt (or sea) water.Google Scholar
See also Charles Maynz, Cours de Droit Romain, 4th ed., 3 vols., Bruxelles, 1876, i, p. 145;Google Scholar and Dionysii Halicarnassensis, Operum volumen quintum, curavit Io. lac. Reiske, Lipsiae, 1774–77, vol. v, De Lysia Indicium, p. 522.Google Scholar
4 Polybius, The Histories, transl. by Paton, W. R., 6 vols., London and New York, 1922, i, p. 9.Google Scholar Referring to Rome, Polybius writes of the “enterprise which has made them (the Romans) lords over our land and our seas.” It would be erroneous to read into these words any right of property or right of sovereignty.
For evidence of the public opinion cited above, see Cicero, Pro Sex, Roscio Amerino, 26.11;Google Scholar De Officiis, i.7.21;Google Scholar Seneca, De Beneficiis, 4.28.4;Google Scholar Plautus, Budens, 4.3.33;Google Scholar Ovid, Metamor-phoseon, 6.349.Google Scholar
5 D'O. Dapper, Description exacte des Isles de L'Archipel. Traduite du Flamand, Amsterdam, 1703, p. 146.Google Scholar
6 Lacroix, M. L., Isles de la Grece, Paris, 1881, p. 139.Google Scholar
7 The well-known reconstruction of Leunclavius (Lowenklau) is found in two works used by the present writer. The first is, loan. Leunclavium, LX Librorum, Basilikon (Greek lettering), id est, Universi iuris Romani, Basileae, 1575.Google Scholar The other is, Iohannes Leunclavii Juris Graeco-Romani, Francofurti, 1596. At the end of each volume. For Leunclavius himself, see Stintzing, R., Geschichte der Deutschen Rechtswissemchaft, 2 vols., Mfinchen & Leipzig, 1880–84, i, p. 239 and note 1.Google Scholar
8 Telfy, I. B., Corpus luris Attici, Graece et Latinae, e fontibus composuit. Pestini et Lipsiae, 1868.Google Scholar
9 On this whole subject see L. Beauchet, HisUrire du Droit Privi de la Republique Athi-nienne, 4 vols., Paris, 1897, iii, passim.
10 Beauchet, op. cit, iii, p. 3.Google Scholar
11 Beauchet, ib., pp. 52–3.Google Scholar
12 Politics, Jowett's transl., 2 vols., Oxford, 1885, i, p. 19.Google Scholar (Politics, bk. i.c.10.)
13 Op. cit, p. 14 (Bk. 1.8);Google ScholarPubMed Beauchet, op. cit, p. 109.Google Scholar
14 Beauchet, ib., pp. 108–9 for the acquisition of private property.Google Scholar II est vrai que les anciens n'ont pas 6t6 ported a croire, comme les modernes, que les droits de propria derive de I'occupation et du travail . . . ce fut la religion qui, en Grece, servit de principal fondemont a la propria fonciere. . . . Neanmoins il y avait toujours des choses nullius, ne fut-ce le gibier et le poisson, et des lors I'occupation restait le mode normal d'acquerir cette espece de chose.
15 The earnest Roman laws of which records have been preserved are those of the Iwelve Tables. Table X has a number of provisions de iure sacro. IX treats de iure publico. They were promulgated in the 303rd year of Rome, in the middle of the fifth century before Christ. For an account of their formation and a reconstruction of their text, see Ortolan, Explication historique des Instituts de I'Empereur Justinien, 8th ed., 3 vols., Paris, 1870, i, p. 102.Google Scholar
16 The Sententia of Paul and the Fragments of Ulpian are to be found in Ulpiani Liber Singularis Regularum, Pauli Libri Qunique Sententiarum . . . ed. Paulus Krueger, Berolini, 1878. Also in Ph. E. Huschke, Juris prudentiae Anteiustinianae . . . 4th ed., Lipsiae, 1879.
17 Huschke, op. cit., p. 18:Google Scholar Solebat igitur Aquillius, collega et familiaris meus, quum de litoribus ageretur, quae omnia publica esse vultis, quarentibus iis, ad quos id pertinebat, quid esse* lituo, ita definire: quia fluctus eluderet.
18 The Ediclum Perpetuum, compiled by Salvius Julian, a Praetor and eminent jurisconsult of the time of Adrian, 117–138, contains provisions respecting seamen in Titles XI.49, XV.78, and XXIII.136.Google Scholar On the Ediclum see Lenel, O., Das Edictum Perpetuum, 2d ed. Leipzig, 1907, pp. 126 and 322;Google Scholar Ortolan, op. cit, pp. 304–5.Google Scholar
The division of things has been elaborated. There are res publicae, res religiosae, sanctae, and sacrae. See Titles XVI. 91, 92, 93, 94;Google Scholar XLIII.235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240–44; XLIV. 273. Lenel, op. cit, pp. 442–3.Google Scholar
The Theodosian Code was promulgated in both East and West in 438. The Code of Justinian was promulgated in 529. Nearly every edict that appears in the Code Theodosian regulating the various aspects of maritime commerce and navigation reappears either in substance or verbatim in the Justinian Code.
For the Theodosian Code see Krueger and Mommsen, Theodosiani Libri XVI. ... 2 vols., Berolini, 1905. For the Justinian Code, see Paulus Krueger, Codex Iustinianus, Berolini, 1877.
The edicts referred to are: T. C. vii.16, vii.16.2, vii.16.3, which reappears in J. C. xii.44; T. C. xiii.6 and J. C. xi.3; T. C. xiii.7.1, xiii.7.2 and J. C. xi.4.1, J. C. xi.4.2; T. C. xiv.20; T. C. xiv.21.1 and J. C. xi. 27; T. C. xiii.6.1–10 and J. C. xi.3.1–3. In Vol. II of Krueger and Mommsen, entitled Leges Novellae ad Theodosianum pertinentes, is vii.4.3.Google Scholar
All of these edicts are dated in the 4th and 5th centuries. It would seem reasonable to conclude that this class of law had become settled through the action of experience and practice. T. C. v.20.1 and J. C. viii.52 concern the value of custom as a source of law.
19 G.2.1. See E. Poste, Gaii Imtitutiones Iuris CwiUs Commentarii quattuor, 3d ed., Oxford, 1890.
20 G.2.2.
21 G.2.10.
22 G.2.11.
23 G.2.11. Before the investigations of Studemund, this passage was reproduced in the editions as a conjectural reading. Since and as the result of his work, the passage has been verified. J. B. E. Boulet (1827), G. A. C. Klenze and E. Boecking (1829), J. F. L. Groeschen and C. Lechmann (1842), E. Boecking (1866), G. Studemund (1874), Abdy and Walker (1874), Krueger and Studemund (1877,1899,1905), E. Huschke (4th ed. 1879), J. Muirhead (1880), and Poste (3d ed. 1890) may be consulted.
24 Poste, op. cit., p. 153.Google ScholarPubMed
25 Cf. Bonjean, op. cit., i, p. 411.Google Scholar Ortolan, op. cit., i, p. 608.Google Scholar
26 G. 2. 9.
27 Institutes, 2.1.1.
28 Ib., 2.1.1.
29 Ib., 2.1.pr—.1.
30 Ib., 2.1.7–9.
31 G. 2.66, 67.
32 This passage is unfortunately partly illegible. For reconstruction of it see Muirhead, J., Institutes of Gaius and Rulesof Ulpian, Edinburgh, 1880, p. 94.Google Scholar E. Boecking, Gaii Institulionum Ph. E. Huschke, Beitrdge, Krueger and Studemund, Gait Institutiones, may be compared.
33 Poste, op. cit., p. 152.Google Scholar Cf. Ortolan, op. cit., i. p. 808;Google Scholar Thezard, L., Repetitions Ecrites sur le Droit Romain, 2d ed., Paris, 1873, p. 118;Google Scholar T. E. Sandars, Institutes of Justinian, London, 1853, p. 177.Google Scholar
34 J.2.1.1and J.2.1.3.
35 Thizard, L., op. cit., p. 118:Google Scholar Cette regie a ete faite pour la Mediterranee. Sandars, T. E., op. cit., p. 177:Google Scholar “Celsus ascribes this definition to Cicero, who apparently borrowed it from Aquilius.” The reference to Celsus is to D.l.16.96; to Cicero, to Top. 7.
36 D.1.8.2.pr.
37 D.l.8.2.1.
38 D.43.8.3.1.
39 D.47.10.13.7.
40 D.18.1.51.
41 D.41.1.14.
42 J.2.1.5.
43 Cf. Paulus, in D.18.1.51: Litora, quae fundo vendito coniuncta sunt, in modum non eomputantur, quia nullius sunt, sed iure gentium omnibus vacant, nec viae publicae aut loca religiosa vel sacra, itaque ut proficiant venditori, caveri solet, ut viae, item litora et loca publica in modum cedant.
44 Ulpian, D.47.10.13.7: Et quidem mare commune omnium est et litora, sicut aer, et est saepissime rescriptum non posse quern piscari prohiberi. and Marcianus, D.1.8.4.pr.: Nemo igitur ad litus maris accedere prohibeatur piscandi causa. . . .
45 J.2.1.5; and Gaius, in D.l.8.5.1.
46 Marcianus, in D.l.8.6; Pomponius, in D.l.8.10.; Neratius, in D.41.1.14.
47 D.43.8.3. “The modern doctrine that the seashore between high and low tide belongs to the state is derived from Celsus 43.8.3.” Moyle, J. B., Imperatoris lustiniani Institu-tionum, Oxford, 1883, 2 vols., i, p. 183, note on sec. 1.Google Scholar
48 Ib.,ed. 1853, p. 177.Google Scholar For further provisions for the exercise of this jurisdiction, see D.47.10.13.7 and D.43.8.2.8–9.
49 Treaty of Peace with Germany, June 28, 1919, Art. 22: “To those colonies . . . which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization.”
Vol. 38, p. 424, Congressional Record, 58th Cong., 2nd Sess.: President Roosevelt, in his special message to Congress of Jan. 4, 1904, said, “In the third place, I confidently maintain that the recognition of the Republic of Panama was an act justified by the collective interests of civilization. If ever a government could be said to have received a mandate from civilization to effect an object the accomplishment of which was demanded by the interest of mankind, the United States holds that position with regard to the interoceanic canal.”Google Scholar
50 Celsus, D.43.8.3.1. Scaevola, D.43.8.4. Respondit in litore iure gentium aedificare licere, nisi usus publicus impediretur.
51 See note 50. Also, Bonjean, op. cit., p. 410; D.43.8.5; D.41.1.50.
52 J.2.1.2.
53 J.2.1.2. It has been necessary to note that the word, public, is used by the jurists in two senses. In its technical signification, it denotes state ownership. In its popular signification it is equivalent to the phrase, common to all. The context generally, but not always, indicates which meaning is being used. For examples, see J.2.1.4 and D.l.8.5. The technical use of “public” appears in the term, res publica, denoting some thing the proprietas of which is lodged in the populus Romania considered as a unit. In its nontechnical use publica is synonymous with communis, and denotes the nature of the use to which a thing may be put, or, more strictly, to describe the breadth of the use. D.50.16. 15–17 contain definitions of publicus.
A similar confusion attends the use of the term, res nullius. It is used sometimes to denote a thing which has no owner, whether that condition is the result of the nature of the thing itself, or whether the condition is merely temporary, and due to circumstances. The term is used also in a technical sense, to denote a thing which, being susceptible of becoming the object of private property, is for the time being without an owner.
54 For the definition of a public river, see D.1.8.4.pr., D.43.12.1.3.
55 J.2.1.2: Flumina autem omnia et portus publica sunt: ideoque ius piscandi omnibus commune est in portubus fluminisque.
56 Sandars, op. cit, p. 177, holds the view contended for in the text. Mr. Potter, in his “The Freedom of the Seas,” etc., New York, 1924, says, p. 32:Google Scholar “The rules in the Institutes and in the Digest refer merely to the free use, common use, public use, of the sea by all members of the Roman state. They relate to the rights of individuals towards one another in a single national society.”
57 Buckland, W. W., A Text-Book of Roman Law, etc., Cambridge, 1921, p. 186 and notes, especially Note 5: “The better view is perhaps that also stated in the Institutes, i.e., that only the use was public, as is clearly the case with the banks of rivers.”Google Scholar
It was an offense known to the law intentionally to prevent a person from fishing in the sea (Paulus, in D.47.10.14). On this general topic see also Hunter, op. cit., pp. 166–6, and D.8.4.13;Google ScholarPubMed D.41.1.58; D.43.8.2.9; D.44.3.7; D.47.10.13.7; D.47.10.14 for the exercise of jurisdiction.
58 Ortolan, op. cit., pp. 595–6.Google Scholar
59 A lack of precision in the use of the terms ius naturale and ius gentium will have been noticed. Gaius uses these terms interchangeably. They signify an eternal law in its relation to the world. It is universal, rational, just, supreme (D.1.1.9 and 41.1.1). His Inst., (1.1), Paulus (D.l.1.11), and Marcianus (D.l.8.2. and 4), agree. TJlpian distinguishes between the two iura (D.l.1.1.2–4). So do the third century jurists Try-phoninus (D.12.6.64) and Florentinus (D.l.5.4). The tendency is to make this distinction. TJlpian holds the ius naturale to be common to all animals, the ius gentium, to all men. Later jurists do not accept this definition of the ius naturale. For an exhaustive analysis of this subject see Carlyle, A History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West, New York, 1903 and after, vols, i and ii, passim.