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Iran and United States Continue to Implement Nuclear Deal, Although Disputes Persist

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 March 2017

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Type
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 110 , Issue 4 , October 2016 , pp. 788 - 795
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 2016

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References

1 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, July 14, 2015, 55 ILM 80 (2016) [hereinafter JCPOA]. Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 109 AJIL 649 (2015); 110 AJIL 347 (2016) [hereinafter Daugirdas & Mortenson, 110 AJIL].

2 White House Press Release, Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Josh Earnest and Senior Advisor Brian Deese en route to Midway Atoll (Sep. 1, 2016), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/01/press-gaggle-press-secretary-josh-earnest-and-senior-advisor-brian-deese.

3 Ambassador Samantha Power, U.S. Mission to the UN, Remarks at the UN Security Council Briefing on Iran Nonproliferation and the Implementation of Resolution 2231 (July 16, 2016), at http://usun.state.gov/remarks/7374 [hereinafter Ambassador Power's Remarks to UNSC].

4 U.S. Dep't of State Press Release, Daily Press Briefing (Feb. 26, 2016), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/02/253722.htm.

5 U.S. Dep't of State Press Release, Daily Press Briefing (Sept. 1, 2016), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/09/261531.htm.

6 Ambassador Power's Remarks to UNSC, supra note 3.

7 JCPOA Proved Necessity of Distrust in US Promises: Leader, Press TV (Aug. 1, 2016), at http://www.presstv.com/Detail/2016/08/01/477946/Iran-US-Leader-Khamenei-JCPOA.

8 Id.

9 UN Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), Annex I.B, para. 5, UN Doc. S/2016/589 (Aug. 2, 2016) [hereinafter Secretary-General's Report]. See generally 31 C.F.R. 560.516 (2015) (detailing the rules for U.S. depository institutions regarding transfers to and from Iran); Iranian Transaction Regulations, 73 Fed. Reg. 66,541 (Nov. 10, 2008) (laying out amendments made to the Iranian Transaction Regulations).

10 Barbara Slavin, Central Bank Governor: Iran Expects Access to US Financial System, Al-Monitor (Apr. 15, 2015), at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/04/iran-expects-limited-access-us-financial-system.html.

11 Id. Moreover, in a submission to the United Nations, Iran claimed that the Iranian Central Bank did not “have free access to its assets held abroad due to the US lack of cooperation in converting those assets into non-US currencies as well as for their transfer, despite the U.S. commitments in this regard under paragraph 21(iv) and paragraphs and 7.2 of Annex IV of JCPOA.” UN Secretary-General's Report, supra note 9, Annex I.B, para. 5.

12 Why U.S. Economic Leadership Matters: The Case for U.S. Economic Leadership: A Conversation with Jacob J. Lew, Council on Foreign Relations (Apr. 11, 2016), at http://www.cfr.org/united-states/why-us-economicleadership- matters/p37731; see also U.S. Dep't of State Press Release, Background Briefing on the JCPOA Implementation (Sep. 17, 2015), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/09/247017.htm; U.S. Dep't of State Press Release, Daily Press Briefing (Apr. 15, 2016), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/04/255860.htm.

13 Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016); see also Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 110 AJIL 555 (2016).

14 Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1316.

15 28 U.S.C. §1605A (2012).

16 Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1325.

17 Secretary-General's Report, supra note 9, Annex I.B, para. 2.

18 U.S. Dep't of State Press Release, Daily Press Briefing (Apr. 20, 2016), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/04/256417.htm.

19 Cristian Farias, Iran Decries Supreme Court Ruling Favor of Terror Victims as “Theft, ” Huffington Post (Apr. 22, 2016), at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/iran-supreme-court-terror-ruling_us_571a66f5e4b0d912d5fe8054; see also White House Press Release, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest and Ben Rhodes (Apr. 21, 2016), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/21/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-and-ben-rhodes-4212016.

20 Exec. Order No. 13,645, 3 C.F.R. §298 (2014).

21 Exec. Order No. 13,716, 81 Fed. Reg. 3693 (2016).

22 Id.

23 Secretary-General's Report, supra note 9, Annex I.B, para. 4.

24 See Remarks on Iran, 2015 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 22 (Jan. 17, 2016).

25 JCPOA, supra note 1, para. 25.

26 U.S. Dep't of State Press Release, Daily Press Briefing (Apr. 18, 2016), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/04/255946.htm.

27 Id. Kerry emphasized this point in response to a question at a congressional hearing:

Mr. Desantis…. Secretary Kerry, just real quickly, because this is not going to be ratified as a treaty, there are a lot of States, and Florida particularly, where State legislatures have enacted sanctions against Iran in various capacities. Do you acknowledge that this deal will not affect states’ ability to do it since it is not going to be approved as a treaty, it is not going to be considered the supreme law of the land, it will be more of an Executive- to-an-Executive agreement?

Secretary KERRY. That is accurate, but we would urge those States, if Iran is fully complying with this agreement, we will take steps to urge them not to interfere with that.

Iran Nuclear Agreement: The Administration's Case: Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 114th Cong. 81 (2015). See also Jack Goldsmith & Amira Mikhail, Does the Iran Deal Require USG to Seek Preemption of (Some) State Sanctions?, Lawfare (Apr. 27, 2016), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/does-iran-deal-require-usg-seek-preemption-some-state-sanctions (discussing whether the JCPOA preempts state sanctions against Iran).

28 Secretary-General's Report, supra note 9, Annex I.B, para. 3.

29 White House Press Release, Statement by the Press Secretary on H.R. 2029 (Dec. 18, 2015), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/12/18/statement-press-secretary-hr-2029; H.R. Res. 2029, Div. O, Title II, 114th Cong. (2015) (enacted); Daugirdas & Mortenson, 110 AJIL, supra note 1, at 356.

30 See H.R. Res. 2029, Div. O §203.

31 Letter from John Kerry, Sec’y of State, to Mohammad Javad Zarif, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Dec. 19, 2015), at http://www.niacouncil.org/text-sec-kerry-letter-to-zarif-regardingvisawaiver-reform/.

32 Secretary-General's Report, supra note 9, Annex I.B, para. 1.

33 [Editors’ note: Paragraph 26 provides: “The United States will make best efforts in good faith to sustain this JCPOA and to prevent interference with the realisation of the full benefit by Iran of the sanctions lifting specified in Annex II.” Paragraph 28 provides: “The E3/EU+3 and Iran commit to implement this JCPOA in good faith and in a constructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and to refrain from any action inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that would undermine its successful implementation.” Paragraph 29 provides: “The EU and its Member States and the United States, consistent with their respective laws, will refrain from any policy specifically intended to directly and adversely affect the normalisation of trade and economic relations with Iran inconsistent with their commitments not to undermine the successful implementation of this JCPOA.” JCPOA, supra note 1.]

34 Secretary-General's Report, supra note 9, Annex I.B, para. 1

35 U.S. Dep't of State Press Release, Statement by France, Germany, United Kingdom, United States, and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security on Post-JCPOA Business With Iran (May 19, 2016), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/05/257455.htm.

36 U.S. Dep't of State Press Release, Remarks Before Meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Sharif (April 22, 2016), at http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/04/256536.htm.

37 Id.

38 Daugirdas & Mortenson, 110 AJIL, supra note 1, at 352–56.

39 Ambassador Power's Remarks to UNSC, supra note 3.

40 [Editors’ note: The “Broader Conclusion” is a determination that may be reached by the IAEA “that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities.” JCPOA, supra note 1, Annex V, para. 19.]

41 S.C. Res 2231, Annex B, para. 3 (July 20, 2015).

42 Secretary-General's Report, supra note 9, para. 8.

43 Ambassador Power's Remarks to UNSC, supra note 3.

44 S.C. Res 2231, supra note 43, Annex B, para. 6(b).

45 Dep't of the Navy, Press Release, Third Illicit Arms Shipment in Recent Weeks Seized in Arabian Sea (Apr. 4, 2016), at http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id_93990.

46 Id.

47 Secretary-General's Report, supra note 9, para. 9.