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How Tightly Can Congress Draw the Purse Strings?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 February 2017

Louis Fisher
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Extract

Of all the revelations emanating from the Iran-contra hearings, the most startling constitutional claim was the assertion that Congress cannot control foreign affairs by withholding appropriations. According to the argument advanced by some administration officials, if Congress prohibits the use of appropriations for foreign policy objectives—as it did with the Boland amendment—the President can nevertheless continue his goals by soliciting funds from the private sector and from foreign countries. If one well dries up, tap another. This theory has profound implications for executive-legislative relations and constitutional government.

Type
Distribution of Constitutional Authority
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 83 , Issue 4 , October 1989 , pp. 758 - 766
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1989

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References

1 Further Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 97-377, §793, 96 Stat. 1830, 1865 (1982).

2 H.R. Rep. No. 122, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 11 (1983).

3 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §2907, 98 Stat. 494, 1210.

4 Continuing Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §8066(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 1935(1984).

5 Security and Development Assistance: Hearings Before the Senate Coram, on Foreign Relations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 908 (1985).

6 Id. at 910. At the time he testified, Ambassador Motley was Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

7 Department of Defense Appropriations for 1986 (Part 2): Hearings Before the House Comm. on Appropriations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1092 (1985).

8 Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, H.R. Rep. No. 433 and S. Rep. No. 216, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 85–103 (1987) [hereinafter Iran-Contra Report].

9 Id. at 38–39, 45, 63, 69–70.

10 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-169, §105(b)(2), 99 Stat. 1002, 1003(1985).

11 Iran-Contra Report, supra note 8, at 148–49, 352–53.

12 Memorandum from Bretton G. Sciaroni to Robert C McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Sept. 12, 1985), reprinted in 100-5 Iran-Contra Investigation: Joint Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and the House Select Comm. to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1158 (1988) [hereinafter Iran-Contra Hearings].

13 50 U.S.C. §403(a)(1982).

14 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. §401, at 45, §1.2 (1982).

15 50 U.S.C. at 45, §1.5.

16 Id. at 46, §1.8(f).

17 Id. at 50, §3.2.

18 Id. at 46, § 1.8(e).

19 P. Einzig, The Control of the Purse 57–62, 100–06 (1959).

20 The Federalist No. 48, at 334 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).

21 Id. No. 58, at 394 (J. Madison).

22 Id. No. 69, at 465 (A. Hamilton).

23 5 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 123 (P. Ford ed. 1895).

24 6 The Writings of James Madison 148 (G. Hunt ed. 1906).

25 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 139–40 (M. Farrand ed. 1937).

26 Bills of attainder: United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946); Blitz v. Donovan, 538 F.Supp. 1119 (D.D.C. 1982); pardon power: Hart v. United States, 118 U.S. 62 (1886); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871); religion: Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 104–05 (1968).

27 U.S. Const. Art. II, §1, and Art. Ill, §1; United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980).

28 Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 Yale L.J. 1343, 1351 (1988). However, the House of Representatives may deny appropriations to implement treaties. L. Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President 260–68 (1985).

29 L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 114(1972).

30 Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 602, 615 (1850).

31 Second Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-50, §307, 87 Stat. 99, 129; Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-52, §108, 87 Stat. 130, 134 (1973). See L. Fisher, Presidential Spending Power 110–18 (1975).

32 International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-329, §404, 90 Stat. 729, 757.

33 Continuing Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-591, §216, 100 Stat. 3341-299, 3341-307 (1986).

34 462 U.S. 919(1983).

35 L. Fisher, supra note 28, at 169–70, 321–22.

36 31 U.S.C. §1321 (1982).

37 5 U.S.C. §7342 (1982).

38 31 U.S.C. §3302 (1982).

39 U.S. General Accounting Office, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law 5-65 (1982); see also id. at 5-82–89.

40 1 Stat. 369 (1794); 18 U.S.C. §§960–962 (1982).

41 Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department ofjustice, Applicability of the Neutrality Act to Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum from Larry L. Sims to Philip B. Heymann, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, at 5 (Oct. 10, 1979).

42 100-7 Iran-Contra Hearings, supra note 12, pt. II at 37.

43 Id., pt. I at 207.

44 100-8 id. at 158.

45 100-1 id. at 25, 201, 279–80.

46 100-9 id. at 75.

47 The Uses of Military Power, Remarks Prepared for Delivery by the Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, at 6 (Nov. 28, 1984).

48 72 Dep’t St. Bull. 562 (1975).