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From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The Role of International Territorial Administration

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 June 2017

Ralph Wilde
Ralph Wilde*
Affiliation:
Trinity College, Cambridge University ([email protected])
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American Journal of International Law , Volume 95 , Issue 3 , July 2001 , pp. 583 - 606
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Copyright © American Society of International Law 2001

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References

1 E.g., Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 77, reprinted in 39 ILM 1432 (2000) [hereinafter Brahimi Report]. I discuss this issue in The Complex Role of the Legal Adviser When International Organizations Administer Territory, 95 ASIL PROC. 251, 252 n.7 (forthcoming 2001).

2 E.g., Brahimi Report, supra note 1, para. 77; Hansjörg, Strohmeyer, Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, 95 AJIL 46 (2001)Google Scholar.

3 Bathurst, M. E. & Simpson, J. L., Germany and the North Atlantic Community: A Legal Survey 41–45 (1956)Google Scholar; Crawford, James, the Creation of States in International Law 274 (1975)Google Scholar; F. A. Mann, Studies in International Law 646 (1973); Robert Y. Jennings, Government in Commission, 1946 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 112, 141.

4 For OHR’s legal rights and duties, see General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Annexes, Dec. 14, 1995, Bosn. & Herz.-Croat.-Fed.Rep.Yugo. [FRY], Annex 10, 35 ILM 75 (1996) [hereinafter Dayton Agreement]; SC Res. 1031 (Dec. 15, 1995), reprinted in 35 ILM 235 (1996). For the EUAM’s legal rights and duties, see Memorandum of Understanding on Mostar, July 5, 1994, Member States of the European Union, Member States of the Western European Union, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Local Administration of Mostar East, Local Administration of Mostar West, Bosnian Croats (unpublished) (on file with AJIL) [hereinafter Mostar MOU]. D The term “refugee camps” is used hereinafter since it is the most common. The word “refugee,” however, is misleading, since internally displaced persons are by definition not (legal) refugees. See, e.g., Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, Art. 1, 189 UNTS 150.

6 This information is drawn from Wilde, Ralph, Beyond the Yoke: Women’s Rights in the Dadaab Refugee Camps of Kenya (1997)Google Scholar (on file at UK House of Commons Library); Wilde, Ralph, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? Why and How UNHCR Governance of ‘Development’ Refugee Camps Should Be Subject to International Human Rights Law , 1 Yale Hum. Rts. Dev. L.J. 5 (1998)Google Scholar [hereinafter Wilde, UNHCR].

7 The governorates involved are Arbil, Dihouk, and Suleimaniyeh. See SC Res. 986, para. 8(b) (Apr. 14, 1995); Memorandum of Understanding on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 986 (1995), May 20, 1996, UN-Iraq, UN Doc. S/1996/356 §§II, VI, & Annex I (1996). For background information, see the Web site of the UN Office for the Iraq Program, <http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/index.html> [hereinafter UN Iraq Web site].

8 See Dayton Agreement, supra note 4, Annex 10; OHR Info (June 6, 2000), at <http://www.ohr.int/info/info.htm>; Decisions by the High Representative. OHR decisions are available online at <http://www.ohr.int/decisions.htm>.

9 International appointments are set out in the Dayton Agreement, supra note 4. The president of the European Court of Human Rights makes certain appointments to the Constitutional Court (Annex 4, Art. VI(1)) and the Commission for Displaced Persons (CDP) (Annex 7, Art. IX). The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe makes certain appointments to the Human Rights Chamber (Annex 6, Arts. VII(2), X(2)). The director general of the United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural Organization makes certain appointments to the Commission to Preserve National Monuments (CPNM) (Annex 8). The president of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development makes certain appointments to the Commission on Public Corporations (CPC) (Annex 9, Art. I). The International Monetary Fund appointed the first governor of the Central Bank (Annex 4, Art. VII). The chairman-in-office of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) appoints the human rights ombudsperson (Annex 6, Art. IV). On all but the CDP, CPNM, and CPC, international appointees cannot be nationals of Bosnia and Herzegovina or a neighboring state; in practice, this restriction has been adopted for all the international appointments. Telephone interviews between the author and local officials (July 20 & 23, 2001). For all institutions but the CPC, the Dayton Agreement allows for the presence of international appointees to end at certain dates from 2001 onwards; at the time of writing, no arrangements in this regard could be formally confirmed.

10 See text at note 63 infra.

11 See Agreement on the Principles (Peace Plan) to Move Towards a Resolution of the Kosovo Crisis Presented to the Leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the President of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari, representing the European Union, and Viktor Chernomyrdin, Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation, June 3, 1999, UN Doc. S/1999/649 [hereinafter Kosovo Peace Plan]; SC Res. 1244 (June 10, 1999), reprinted in 38 ILM 1451 (1999). On this mandate, see, for example, Michael, J. Matheson, United Nations Governance of Poslconflict Societies, 95 AJIL 76, 78–81 (2001)Google Scholar; Wilde, Ralph, From Bosnia to Kosovo and East Timor: The Changing Rote of the United Nations in the Administration of Territory, 6 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 467 (2000)Google Scholar.

12 For the consultation and UNAMET, see Agreement Regarding the Modalities for the Popular Consultation of the East Timorese Through a Direct Ballot, May 5, 1999, Indon.-Port.-UN Sec’y-Gen., at <http://www.un.org/peace/etimor99/agreement/agreeFrame_Eng03.html>; Agreement on Security, May5, 1999, Indon.-Port.-UN Sec’y-Gen., at <http://www.un.org/peace/etimor99/agreement/agreeFrame_Eng04.html>; Agreement on the Question of East Timor, May 5, 1999, Indon.-Port., at <http://www.un.org/peace/etimor99/agreement/agreeFrame_Eng01,html>, and Appendix, A Constitutional Framework for a Special Autonomy for East Timor, at <http://www.un.org/peace/etimor99/agreement/agreeFrame_Eng02.html> [hereinafter Indonesia-Portugal Agreement]; SC Res. 1246 (June 11, 1999); UN Secretary-General, Letter to the President of the Security Council Regarding the Result of the Popular Consultation, UN Doc. S/1999/944 (1999). For UNTAET, see SC Res. 1272, Arts. 1, 2(a), (b), 3(a), 6 (Oct. 25, 1999), reprinted in 39 ILM 240 (2000); Indonesia-Portugal Agreement, supra; see also Matheson, supra note 11, at 81-83; Wilde, supra note 11.

13 As for seemingly asserting plenary authority, see, for example, UNMIK Regulation 1999/1 (as amended), contained in Regulation 2000/54, §1.1 (Sept. 27, 2000), at <http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/regs.html>; SC Res. 1272, supra note 12, pmbl., para. 1; UNTAET Regulation 1999/1, §1.1 (Nov. 27, 1999), at <http://www.un.org/peace/etimor>. The Brahimi Report places two post-Cold War missions (that can only be UNMIK and UNTAET) in a class of their own as responding to “extreme” situations: “United Nations operations were given executive law enforcement and administrative authority where local authority did not exist or was not able to function.” Brahimi Report, supra note 1, para. 19. Matheson, supra note 11, at 83, describes “[t]he novel... undertakings in Kosovo and East Timor.” For Strohmeyer, supra note 2, at 46, “[t]he scope of the challenges and responsibilities deriving from these mandates [UNMIK and UNTAET] was unprecedented in United Nations peacekeeping operations.”

As for working on the territory’s legal and judicial system, Strohmeyer, id. at 60, states that “[n]owhere other than Kosovo and East Timor [where such a task was part of a UN mandate] . . . did this task require the establishment of a coherent judicial and legal system for an entire territory virtually from scratch.” On the exceptional character of the two missions, see also Michèle, Griffin & Jones, Bruce, Building Peace Through Transitional Authority: New Directions, Major Challenges, Int’l Peacekeeping, Winter 2001, at 75 Google Scholar.

14 E.g., Chopra, Jarat, The UN’s Kingdom of East Timor, 42 Survival 27, 27 (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also Traub, James, Inventing East Timor, Foreign Aff. July/Aug. 2000, at 74, 75 CrossRefGoogle Scholar (East Timor mission exceptional because of the broad mandate and lack of preexisting institutions).

15 For Fiume, see Ydit, Meir, Internationalised Territories 51–59 (1961)Google Scholar; for Memel, see id. at 48; for Alexandretta, see Steven, R. Ratner, The New Un Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After The Cold War 97 (1995)Google Scholar; for Sarajevo, see David Owen, Balkan Odyssey 199, 210, 212, 215, 235-36, 238-40, 242-43, 263 (1995); for Jerusalem, see, for example, Moshe Hirsch, Deborah Housen-Couriel, & Ruth Iapidoth, Whither Jerusalem? Proposals and Petitions Concerning the Future Status of Jerusalem (1995); Ydit, supra, at 273-314, bibliography at 315; Report of the UN Trusteeship Council, Annex II, Statute for the City of Jerusalem, UN GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 1, 19, UN Doc. A/1286 (1950).

16 In international law, this issue is relevant to both statehood and territorial title. Regarding statehood, see, for example, Crawford, supra note 3, at 42-47; regarding territorial tide, see, for example, Ianbrownlie, Principles of Public International Law 105-67 (5th ed. 1998).

17 For background, see, for example, Walters, F. P., A History of the League of Nations 525-26, 536–40 (1952)Google Scholar; Ydit, supra note 15, at 59-62; Woolsey, L. H., The Leticia Dispute Between Colombia and Peru, 27 AJIL 317 (1933)CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Woolsey, L. H., The Leticia Dispute Between Colombia and Peru, 29 AJIL 94 (1935)CrossRefGoogle Scholar [hereinafter Woolsey 1935]; John, V. Czerapowicz, International Territorial Authority: Leticia and West New Guinea 6–94 (1972)Google Scholar (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University).

18 Agreement Relating to the Procedure for Putting into Effect the Recommendations Proposed by the Council of the League of Nations, May 25, 1933, Peru-Colom., 138 LNTS 253 [hereinafter Geneva Agreement]. On the League administration, see 14 League of Nations O.J. 944-45 (1933); Walters, supra note 17, at 538-40; Ydit, supra note 15, at 59-62; Woolsey 1935, supra note 17, at 95-99; Czerapowicz, supra note 17, at 9-76.

19 Geneva Agreement, supra note 18, Arts. 2, 7, respectively.

20 Czerapowicz, supra note 17, at 27-29 (the flag); Woolsey 1935, supra note 17, at 96; Ydit, supra note 15, at 61 (the troops).

21 Czerapowicz, supra note 17, at 16.

22 This was also the view taken by the League commission. Czerapowicz, supra note 17, at 88-91.

23 Id. at 83-84, 89-90.

24 Id. at 226; see also id. at 9.

25 Protocol of Friendship and Co-operation, May 24, 1934, Colom.-Peru, 164 LNTS 21.

26 On this period in West Irian’s history, see, for example, D. W. Bowett, United Nations Forces 255-56 (1964); Crawford, supra note 3, at 332-33, 382 n.132 (and sources cited therein); Thomas, M. Franck, Nation Against Nation 76–82 (1985)Google Scholar; 2 Higgins, Rosalyn, United Nations Peacekeeping 93–100 (1970)Google Scholar; William, J. Durch, UN Temporary Executive Authority, in The Evolution of Un Peacekeeping 285, 285–87 (William, J. Durch ed., 1994)Google Scholar (and sources cited therein); Pomerance, Michla, Methods of Self Determination and the Argument of ‘Primitiveness,’, 1974 Can. Y.B. Int’l L 38.Google Scholar

27 Agreement Concerning West New Guinea (West Irian), Aug. 15, 1962, Indon.-Neth., Art. XVIII(c), 437 UNTS 273 [hereinafter Indonesia-Netherlands Agreement]; Exchange of Letters (with Annexed Memorandum of Understanding) on Cessation of Hostilities, Aug. 15, 1962, Indon. & Neth.-UN, 437 UNTS 294.

28 For the powers of UNTEA, see Indonesia-Netherlands Agreement, supra note 27, Arts. II—III, XIII-XV; Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, June 16, 1962 -June 15,1963, UN GAOR, 18th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 35, UN Doc. A/5501 (1963).

29 Richard, C. Holbrooke, To End A War 236–39 (1998)Google Scholar; Silber, Laura & Little, Allan, The Death of Yugoslavia 370–71 (2d ed. 1996)Google Scholar.

30 Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, Nov. 12, 1995, 35 ILM 184 (1996), Annex to Letter from the Permanent Representative of Croatia to the United Nations Addressed to the UN Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/50/757-S/1995/951 (quotation from text of the letter); see also SC Res. 1037 (Jan. 15, 1996), reprinted in 35 ILM at 189; SC Res. 1079 (Nov. 15, 1996); SC Res. 1120 (July 14, 1997); Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/1996/705. On these arrangements, see, for example, Silber & Little, supra note 29, at 370-71; Bothe, Michael, The Peace Process in Eastem Slavonia, Int’l Peacekeeping, Dec. 1995-Jan. 1996, at 6 Google Scholar; The New UN Mission in Eastem Slavonia, id. at 11; UNTAES Chronology (Jan. 15, 1998), at <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/untaes_e.htm>.

31 SC Res. 1023 pmbl., paras. 1-2 (Nov. 22, 1995), reprinted in 35 ILM 188 (1996); Bothe, supra note 30, at 6.

32 On the background to, and operation of, the League administration in the Saar, see, for example, W. R. Bisschop, The Saar Controversy (1924); Walters, supra note 17, at 89-90, 239-43, 337-38, 416, 586-98; Ydit, supra note 15, at 44-48. On the reason for French exploitation of the mines, see Treaty of Peace, June 28, 1919, Art. 45, 2 Bevans 43 [hereinafter Versailles Treaty]; Walters, supra, at 89.

33 On France’s powers to exploit the mines, see Versailles Treaty, supra note 32, Arts. 45, 46, 50, & Annex to pt. III, §IV (after Art. 50), ch. I, and the commentary by Bisschop, supra note 32, at 20-22, 52-56. On the League administration, see Versailles Treaty, supra, Arts. 46, 49, & Annex to pt. III, §IV (after Art. 50), Arts. 16-33; Bisschop, supra, at 22-31, 38-52, 87-133.

34 Versailles Treaty, supra note 32, Arts. 47, 49, & Annex to pt. III, §IV (after Art. 50), Arts. 34-40 (the first two quotations come from the Annex, supra, Art. 34, and the third from id., Art. 35).

35 Versailles Treaty, supra note 32, Annex to pt. Ill, §IV (after Art. 50), Art. 34.

36 Walters, supra note 17, at 587-98; Ydit, supra note 15, at 45 n.1.

37 On the divisions in Mostar, see, for example, Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia 246 (3d ed. 1996); Owen, supra note 15, at 239; International Crisis Group, Reunifying Mostar: Opportunities for Progress (Apr. 19, 2000), at <http://www.intl-crisis-group.org>.

38 See generally Mostar MOU, supra note 4, in particular Article 2. On the background to the EUAM, see, for example, Owen, supra note 15, at 212, 238-40, 257.

39 Holbrooke, supra note 29, at 264-65; Silber & Little, supra note 29, at 370-71.

40 Holbrooke, supra note 29, at 264-65; Silber & Little, supra note 29, at 370-71.

41 See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 ICJ Rep. 12 (Oct. 16); Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 ICJ Rep. 16 (June 21) [hereinafter Namibia Opinion]; GA Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970); GA Res. 1541 (XV) (Dec. 15, 1960); GA Res. 1514 (XV) (Dec. 14, 1960).

42 On the consultation, see, for example, Crawford, supra note 3, at 382 n.132 and sources cited therein; Franck, supra note 26, at 81-82; Michla Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice 32-35 (1982); Durch, supra note 26, at 295-96 (on UNTEA); Pomerance, supra note 26, at 48-62.

43 For such criticism, see the citations of Franck, supra note 26, Pomerance, supra note 42, and Pomerance, supra note 26, in note 42 supra.

44 In the case of Mostar, this conclusion is misleading. See text at note 82 infra.

45 Versailles Treaty, supra note 32, Annex to pt. III, §IV (after Art. 50), Art. 35.

46 Wilde, UNHCR, supra note 6, paras. 4-7.

47 See Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany, June 5, 1945, TIAS No. 1520, 68 UNTS 189; Bathurst & Simpson, supra note 3; Crawford, supra note 3, at 273-79 (and sources cited therein at 273 n.10, 311 n.70); Norman Hill, International Organization 511 (1952); Mann, supra note 3, at 634-705; Jennings, supra note 3.

48 For the constitutive and other contemporary documents relating to ONUC, see 3 Higgins, supra note 26 (1980). On ONUC, see, for example, Ratner, supra note 15, at 102-09; William, J. Durch, The UN Operation in the Congo: 1960-1964, in The Evolution of Peacekeeping, supra note 26, at 315 Google Scholar.

49 SC Res. 143 (July 14, 1960); see Ratner, supra note 15, at 105-09.

50 Ratner, supra note 15, at 105-09.

51 GA Res. 2248 (S-V) (May 19, 1967); see also GA Res. 2372 (XXII) (June 12, 1968). On South West Africa/Namibia generally, see, for example, John Dugard, The South West Africa/Namibia Dispute 409-13, 436-46

(1974); Laurent, C. W. Kaela, The Question of Namibia (1996)Google Scholar (and sources cited therein at 205-11); Lawrence, L. Herman, The Legal Status of Namibia and of the United Nations Council for Namibia, 1975 Can.Y.B. Int’l L. 306 Google Scholar.

52 For the termination, see Namibia Opinion, supra note 41; GA Res. 2145 (XXI) (Oct. 27, 1966); see also SC Res. 264 (Mar. 20, 1969).

53 On South Africa’s refusal, see, for example, DUGARD, supra note 51, at 436, 440. On the council’s activities, see United Nations Council for Namibia, Decree No. 1 on Natural Resources of Namibia, UN Doc. A/C. 131/33, in Report of the Council for Namibia, Addendum, UN GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 24A, at 27, UN Doc. A/9624/Add.1 (1974); GA Res. 2372 (XXII), supra note 51, para. 4; GA Res. 2325 (XXII) (Dec. 16, 1967); Engers, J. F., The United Nations Travel and Identity Document for Namibians, 65 AJIL 571 (1971)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Herman, supra note 51, at 320. A member of the commissioner’s office remarked in 1971 that the council operated “as a kind of UNTEA in partibus or as the second World War governments-in-exile.” Engers, supra, at 574.

54 SC Res. 632 (Feb. 16, 1989); SC Res. 435 (Sept. 29, 1978); Cliffe, Lionel, The Transition to Independence in Namibia 65–77, passim (1994)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kaela, supra note 51, at 96-125; Virginia, Page Fortna, United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia, in The Evolution of Un Peacekeeping, supra note 26, at 353 Google Scholar.

55 Kosovo Peace Plan, supra note 11, para. 5; SC Res. 1244, supra note 11, paras. 10, 11.

56 Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of East Timor, UN Doc. A/54/654, paras. 32-37 (1999) [hereinafter Secretary-General Report]; SC Res. 1264, para. 3 (Sept. 15, 1999).

57 Secretary-General Report, supra note 56, paras. 36, 37.

58 Brcko is at the intersection between both the two parts of RS and the main part of the Federation and additional Federation territory. See the map in Glenny, supra note 37, at xii. For the situation in Brcko by 1995, see, for example, Dispute over Inter-Entity Boundary in Brcko Area (Rep. Srpska v. Fed. of Bosn. & Herz.) (arb. Feb. 14, 1997), UN Doc. S/1997/126, paras. 42-57, reprinted in 36 ILM 396 (1997) [hereinafter Brcko Award 1997], By the end of 1997, the RS controlled 48% and the Federation 52% of the territory, id., para. 52. On Brcko generally, see, for example, International Crisis Group, supra note 37.

59 Brcko Award 1997, supra note 58, paras. 50, 53.

60 For the boundary, and the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Annexes 2 and 4, respectively, Dayton Agreement, supra note 4.

61 Dayton Agreement, supra note 4, Annex 7.

62 Id., Annex 2, Art. V. Tribunal decisions are obtainable online at <http://www.ohr.int/brcko.htm> [hereinafter OHR Brcko site] (visited Aug. 6, 2001).

63 See Brcko Award 1997, supra note 58, paras. 54, 104.

64 In its final award. See note 67 and corresponding text infra.

65 On the tribunal’s consideration of this option, see, for example, Brcko Award 1997, supra note 58, para. 68.

66 SC Res. 1244, supra note 11, para. 11, & Annex 1, para. 6; Kosovo Peace Plan, supra note 11, para. 8 (quotation from SC Res. 1244, para. 11).

67 Dispute over Inter-Entity Boundary in Brcko Area, paras. 11, 34, 36 (Final Award, Mar. 5, 1999), at <http://www.ohr.int/docu/d990305c.htm> [hereinafter Brcko Award 1999].

68 See Statute of the Brcko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 7, 1999, 39 ILM 879 (2000); Supervisor of Brcko, Supervisory Order on the Establishment of the Brcko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Mar. 8, 2000), at <http://www.ohr.int/docu/d20000308c.htm>; Brcko Award 1999, supra note 67, paras. 36, 38, 39, 40, 41. The supervisor performed further acts to implement the district settlement, including establishing the interim regime. See the orders of the supervisor from March 8, 2000, onwards, at OHR Brcko site, supra note 62.

69 On asserting plenary authority, see note 13 supra.

70 SC Res. 1244, supra note 11, para. 11.

71 See Indonesia-Portugal Agreement, supra note 12, Art. 6; Secretary-General Report, supra note 56, para. 39.

72 On the background to the Danzig dispute, see, for example John, Brown Mason, The Danzig Dilemma 3–76 (1946)Google Scholar; Ydit, supra note 15, at 186-90, 227; John, Kuhn Bleimaier, The Legal Status of the Free City of Danzig 1920-1939: Lessons to Be Derived from the Experience of a Non-State Entity in the International Community, 1989 Hague Y.B. Int’l L. 69, 70–81 Google Scholar. On the background to the Trieste dispute, see, for example, Crawford, supra note 3, at 161-62; Ydit, supra note 15, at 231-71 and sources cited therein at 272.

73 For the Free City of Danzig, see Versailles Treaty, supra note 32, Arts. 100-08. For the Free Territory of Trieste, see Peace Treaty with Italy, Feb. 10, 1947, pt. II, §III, Arts. 21-22, & Annexes VI-VIII, 49 UNTS 126.

74 Ydit, supra note 15, at 268-71.

75 On the Free City of Danzig, see CRAWFORD, supra note 3, at 164-66 and sources cited at 163 n. 118,165 n.126; MASON, supra note 72, and sources in the bibliography, id. at 308-22; Walters, supra note 17, at 82, 90, 131, 140, 301, 453-55, 615-21, 793-97; Ydit, supra note 15, at 185-228 and sources in the bibliography, id. at 229-30; Bleimaier, supra note 72, and bibliography, id. at 93; Lewis, Malcolm, The Free City of Danzig, 1924 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 89 Google Scholar.

76 See Const. (Danzig), League of Nations O.J. Spec. Supp. 7, at 1 (1922), as amended, 11 League of Nations O.J. 1794 (1930) [hereinafter Danzig Const. 1930]; Treaty of Paris, Nov. 9, 1920, Pol.-Danzig, 6 LNTS 189; Versailles Treaty, supra note 32, Art. 104; Mason, supra note 72, at 61-66, 89-227; Ydit, supra note 15, at 191-211.

77 Versailles Treaty, supra note 32, Arts. 102, 103 (quotation from Art. 102); see also Treaty of Paris, supra note 76, Arts. 7, 8, 18, 20, 22, 25, 26, 39; MASON, supra note 72, at 77-88; walters, supra note 17, at 301, 454-55; Ydit, supra note 15, at 194-97, 211-23.

78 Danzig Const. 1930, Art. 49; Versailles Treaty, supra note 32, Art. 103.

79 Danzig Const. 1930, Art. 5; Treaty of Paris, supra note 76, Art. 6.

80 Walters, supra note 17, at 453-54, 615-21, 793-97; Ydit, supra note 15, at 218-21, 227.

81 OHR, Decision Removing Ante Jelavic from his Position as the Croat Member of the BiH Presidency and Further Banning Jelavic from Holding Public and Party Offices (Mar. 7, 2001); see supra note 8.

82 International Crisis Group, supra note 37, esp. at 12.

83 E.g., OHR, Decision Adding the Fundamental Interest Clause and the Position of Deputy Head of Municipality to the Mostar City Municipalities Statutes (July 6, 1999); see supra note 8.

84 Treaty of Paris, supra note 76, Art. 19.

85 For the plebiscite, see infra note 114. For the partition, see Ydit, supra note 15, at 46.

86 For the special regime, see Ydit, supra note 15, at 46-47.

87 The United Nations classifies its electoral operations into eight types. The first two (A and B)—conduct and supervision/control—fall within the scope of this study. The other categories cover monitoring (including verification), observation, and assistance, and have taken place in various trust and non-self-governing territories, as well as Angola, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Haiti, Liberia, Mexico, Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and South -Africa. See Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/49/675, Annex III (1994); Report of the Secretary-General on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections, UN Doc. A/46/609 (1991) [hereinafter Secretary-General Report 1991 ]; UN Dep’t Pol. Aff., Member States’ Requests for Electoral Assistance to the United Nations System Since 1989 (as of June 1999), at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa> (visited Aug. 2, 2001).

88 For consultations in trust and non-self-governing territories, see Secretary-General Report 1991, supra note 87, paras. 6, 7, 12, & Annex.

89 For Unmogip, see SC Res. 47 (Apr. 21, 1948); United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping 133-43, UN Sales No. E.96.I.14 (3d ed. 1996). For Minurso, see SC Res. 690 (Apr. 29, 1991); Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/22464 (1991); Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/21360 (1990); William, J. Durch, United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, in The Evolution of Un Peacekeeping, supra note 26, at 406 Google Scholar. For the latest situation, see, for example, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara, UN Doc. S/2001/613 (2001). On the Sahrawis’ right to external self-determination, see Western Sahara, supra note 41.

90 For consultations held in trust and non-self-governing territories, see note 88 supra.

91 For UNTAC, see Cambodia Settlement, infra note 93, Arts. 2, 12-14, & Annex 1, §D, Annex 3; SC Res. 745 paras. 1, 2 (Feb. 28, 1992); Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia, UN Doc. S/23613 & Add.1 (1992); see also Trevor Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of Untac 33-74, 101-07, 213-22 (1995); Janet E. Heininger, Peacekeeping in Transition: the United Nations in Cambodia (1994); United Nations, The United Nations and Cambodia 1991-1995, at 15-37, passim, UN Sales No. E.95.I.9 (1995); Steven, R. Ratner, The Cambodian Settlement Agreements, 87 AJIL 1, 9-18, 20–22 (1993)Google Scholar. For the OSCE in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Dayton Agreement, supra note 4, Annex 3. For the EUAM in Mostar, see Mostar MOU, supra note 4, Art. 2; International Crisis Group, supra note 37, at 12. For UNTAES in Eastern Slavonia, see Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/1997/487, paras. 2, 3. For UNMIK (delegated to the OSCE) in Kosovo, see SC Res. 1244, supra note 11, para. 11(c); OSCE, Permanent Council [P.C.], Decision No. 305, Agenda item 2, para. 3, & Doc. PCJOUR/237/Corr, OSCE P.C.J., No. 237, 1999.

92 See the sources cited in note 89 supra.

93 This was part of a wider settlement to end the 20-year-old conflict in the country. Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambodia, Oct. 23, 1991, Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Oct. 23, 1991 [Cambodia Settlement], Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality and National Unity of Cambodia, Oct. 31, 1991, and Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia, UN Doc. A/46/608-S/23177 (1991), reprinted in 31 ILM 174 (1992). On the settlement, see, for example, Findlay, supra note 91, at 1-20; Heininger, supra note 91, at 9-30; United Nations, supra note 91, at 5-9; Ratner, supra note 91, at 2-8 and sources cited at 2 n.2, 3 n.7.

94 Cambodia Settlement, supra note 93, Arts. 1, 3, 5, Annex 1, §§A, B. On the elections, see Findlay, supra note 91, at 75-100; Heininger, supra note 91, at 100-16; United Nations, supra note 91, at 38-53.

95 This policy was one of the central planks of the special regime. See Ydit, supra note 15, at 46-47.

96 Bothe, supra note 30, at 6.

97 For the constitutive documents of the “oil-for-food” program, see the UN Iraq Web site, supra note 7.

98 OHR, Decision on the Deadlines for the Implementation of the New Uniform License Plate System (May 20, 1998); see supra note 8.

99 On the return agenda generally, see note 61 supra and corresponding text; for the supervisor’s return program mandate, see Brcko Award 1997, supra note 58, paras. 54,104. On property legislation, see the section “Decisions in the Field of Property Laws, Return of Displaced Persons and Refugees and Reconciliation” of the list Decisions by the High Representative, supra note 8.

100 See SC Res. 1244, supra note 11, para. 11(k). The figures come from Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, UN Doc. S/1999/779, paras. 8-9, quoted by Matheson, supra note 11, at 78 n.22.

101 For this appointment, see note 9 supra.

102 See the sources cited in note 32 supra.

103 For the special regime, see note 86 supra.

104 See Convention Concerning the Territory of Memel, May 8, 1924, Lith.-Principal & Allied Powers, Annex II, Port of Memel, Art. 5, 29 LNTS 87; see also Ydit, supra note 15, at 48-49.

105 See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 3, at 275-77.

106 O n privatization legislation, see, for example, OHR, Decision Imposing the Framework Law on Privatisation of Enterprises and Banks in BiH (July 22, 1998). O n the appointments, see OHR, Decision on the Appointment of the Board of Governors of Radio-Television of the RS (July 27, 2000), at <http://www.ohr.int/mediares/d20000727.htm>.

107 See SC Res. 814, para. 4 (Mar. 26, 1993); Chopra, Jarat, Peace Maintenance: The Evolution of International Political Authority 49, 158 (1999)Google Scholar.

108 Crawford, supra note 3, at 187. On protectorates generally, see, for example, id. at 187-208.

109 Id. at 199. On the colonial protectorate, see, for example, Anghie, Antony, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 Harv. Int’l L J. 1, 54–57 (1999)Google Scholar.

110 Ydit, supra note 15, at 32, 95-108 (Cracow), 23-24, 127-53 (Shanghai), 28-29, 109-26 (Crete), 27-28, 154-84 (Tangier), 29-33 (Albania). According to Ydit, proposals were made, but never realized, for similar experiments in Istanbul (1821 and 1896), Mount Athos (1913), and Spitzbergen (1914). Id. at 32-33 (Istanbul), 33-34 (Mount Athos), 34-39 (Spitzbergen).

111 See citations in note 110 supra.

112 On the waterway commissions, see, for example, Hill, supra note 47, at 507-10. For the proposed International Congo River Commission in 1885, see Ydit, supra note 15, at 25-27.

113 See Hill, supra note 47, at 507-10.

114 For the plebiscite commissions generally, see id. at 505-06; Wambaugh, Sarah, Plebiscites Since The World War (2 vols. 1933)Google Scholar. For the Upper Silesia plebiscite, see Versailles Treaty, supra note 32, Art. 88 & Annex to pt. Ill, §VIII (after Art. 82); Wambaugh, supra, at 206-70; Ydit, supra note 15, at 45-46.

115 On the 1923 Commission, see, for example, Hill, supra note 47, at 505.

116 League of Nations Covenant Art. 22 [hereinafter League Covenant] . On the mandates system, see, for example, 1 Oppenheim’s International Law §86 & sources cited at 295 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter Oppenheim]; Quincywright, Mandates Under The League of Nations (1930).

117 See UN Charter, ch. XII, esp. Art. 77. On the trusteeship system, see, for example, Oppenheim, supra note 116, §§89-95 & sources cited at 308.

118 UN Charter Art. 77(1) (c) (open to further territories), Art. 78 (not open to UN members); Crawford, supra note 3, at 335 n.6 (no new trusteeships created).

119 League Covenant Art. 22.

120 UN Charter Art. 76(b).

121 See Western Sahara, Namibia Opinion, GA Res. 1514, all supra note 41.

122 League Covenant Art. 22 (1).

123 League Covenant Art. 22(2); UN Charter Art. 76(b) (quotation taken from the former).

124 Wright, supra note 116, at 26-34.

123 Id.

126 Oppenheim, supra note 116, §89, at 308.

127 UN Charter Art. 81.

128 See supra note 52 and corresponding text.

129 In the case of Kosovo, there is also the possibility of a barrier because of the nonapplicability of the trusteeship system to “territories which have become Members of the United Nations” under Article 78 of the UN Charter. However, whereas the FRY government was claiming to represent the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)—an existing UN member—at the time when ITA was introduced in Kosovo, the Security Council had determined that the SFRY no longer existed, and recommended to the General Assembly that the FRY apply for UN membership. SC Res. 777 (Sept. 19, 1992). After the fall of the Milošević government in 2000, the FRY joined the United Nations. See GA Res. 55/12 (Nov. 10, 2000); SC Res. 1326 (Oct. 31, 2000); UN Doc. A/55/528-S/2000/1043.

130 The Brahimi Report, supra note 1, para. 78, remarks:

Although the Security Council may not again direct the United Nations to do transitional civil administration, no one expected it to do so with respect to Kosovo or East Timor either. Intra-State conflicts continue and future instability is hard to predict, so t h a t . . . other such missions may indeed be established in the future…….

131 This question is raised, but not addressed, in id.

132 I explore some of the issues raised in this paragraph in The Ambivalent Mandates of International Organizations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and East Timor, ANZSIL/ASIL Proc. 311 (2000).