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The Evolution of the Concept of the Just War in International Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 April 2017

Joachim von Elbe
Joachim von Elbe*
Affiliation:
Yale University Law School
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Abstract

War, as a social phenomenon, has been defined as “a fight between human societies, in primitive conditions between savage tribes, in the civilized world between states.” Ever since history has recorded the activities of organized groups, war has been one of its principal topics. Since it appears to be a fundamental element in their life, its explanation has been sought in the basic conditions of their existence. Thus, it is said, the law of growth and expansion, innate as a natural tendency in the individual being as well as in organized societies, compels them with irresistible force to assert their rights and to seek “security” by combating others. War, it seems, is ordained by nature and is an inevitable result of competition.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 33 , Issue 4 , October 1939 , pp. 665 - 688
Copyright
Copyright © by the American Society of International Law 1939

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References

1 Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th ed., Vol. 23, article “War,” p. 321; see also Johnson, A., in 15 Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, p. 331 Google Scholar. The term war is generally applied to “armed conflict between population groups conceived of as organic unities.” Dickinson, G. L., Causes of International War (London, 1920), p. 7.

2 Davie, The Evolution of War (New Haven, 1929), pp. 5, 9 ff.

3 A systematic examination of the causes of war may be found in Barnes, The Genesis of the World War (New York, 1927), pp. 1–33. From the vast literature dealing with this subject may be quoted Bakeless, The Economic Causes of Modern War (New York, 1921); Crosby, International War, Its Causes and Its Cure (London, 1919); Reports of the Conference on the Cause and Cure of War, 1925-1933; Eagleton, Analysis of the Problem of War (New York, 1937), p. 541; Rogge, , Nationale Friedenspolitik (Berlin, 1934), p. 21 Google Scholar ff.

4 See the significant statement by Baron Reijiro Wakatsuki on “The Aims of Japan” (13 Foreign Affairs, 585): “When you know this historical background and understand this overflowing vitality of our race you will see the impossibility of compelling us to stay still within the confines of our little island home. We are destined to grow and expand overseas.”

5 “Security! The term signifies more indeed than the maintenance of a people’s homeland, or even of their territories beyond the seas. It also means the maintenance of the world’s respect for them, the maintenance of their economic interests, everything, in a word, which goes to make up the grandeur, the life itself, of the nation.” Jules Cambon, The Permanent Bases of Foreign Policy (Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1931), p. 25.

6 Phillipson, The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome, Vol. II (London, 1911), p. 167; Wegner, Geschichte des Volkerrechts (Stuttgart, 1936), p. 35: “We notice everywhere in the sources of Antiquity that the ancients conceived war and its extent as instituted by Divine command. In this conception, war is raised above the stage of blind passion; it has become a legal institution”; Holland, Lectures on International Law (London, 1933), p. 244 ff.; Leist, Graeco-Italische Rechtsgeschichte (Jena, 1884), p. 431; Ballis, The Legal Position of War: Changes in its Practice and Theory from Plato to Vattel (The Hague, 1937), p. 19.

7 Alcibiades, VII, 68,1, 2. Tr. by FitzGerald, A., Peace and War in Antiquity (London, 1931), pp. 11, 75 ff.

8 Politics, I, 3, 8. Tr. by FitzGerald, op. cit., pp. 29, 94.

9 Nicomaehean Ethics, Book X, Ch. VI, XVII, 6; Politics, VII, 14.

10 Republic, II, 373 b; FitzGerald, op. cit., pp. 14, 79. For further references to Greek authors, see Ballis, op. cit., p. 17 ff.

11 Leist, op. cit., p. 456 ff.

12 Seckel, Über Krieg und Recht in Rom (Berlin, 1915), pp. 9, 13; Leist, op. cit., p. 439.

13 Leist, op. cit., pp. 432 ff., 435, 438, 440, 447, 452 ff.; Bender, Antikes Völkerrecht (Bonn, 1901), p. 13.

14 Writers disagree as to the true significance of the fetial procedure. While a minority maintains that the fetials had to pass upon the equity or intrinsic justice of the cause (for instance, Muller-Jochum, , Die Geschichte des Volkerrechts im Altertum [Leipzig, 1848], p. 155 Google Scholar; Strisower, , Der Krieg und die Volkerrechtsordnung [Wien, 1919], p. 42 Google Scholar; Vanderpol, La doctrine scolastique du Droit de guerre [Paris, 1919], p. 44; Frank, The Import of the Fetial Institution [Classical Philology, VII], pp. 335, 339 ff.; Ballis, op. cit., p. 30), a majority of writers holds that the fetial procedure was merely designed to invest a war with the character of a formally correct action. See Phillimore, Commentaries upon International Law, Vol. III (London, 1879), p. 79; Salvioli, , Le concept de la guerre juste (Paris, 1918), p. 13 ffGoogle Scholar.; Wegner, op. cit., p. 58; Phillipson, op. cit., pp. 180, 193, 327 ff.: “The fetials determined whether a war was ‘iustum’—‘bellum nullum nisi iustum’—that is whether the preliminary proceedings were conducted in a legal manner, whether they fulfilled the requirements of the prescribed law”; Seckel, op. cit., p. 13; Buret, Le Droit de la guerre chez lea Romains(Paris, 1888), p. 16: “Les F£tiaux 6taient juges de la justice de la guerre, mais settlement dans le sens formel, et non dans le sens d’6quit6”; Le Fur, “Guerre juste et juste paix,” 26 Rev. Gin. Dr. Int. Pub., p. 9 ff.; Kosters, Eenige geschiedkundige mededeelingen omtrent het begrip “justum bellum” (Amsterdam, 1930), quoted by van der Molen, Alberico Gentili (Amsterdam, 1937), p. 93: “The standard for the legality of war was merely formal. The fact whether the grievances and demands, declared as just by Rome, were really well founded, did not play a part.” Roman historians, however, extensively discuss the sufficiency or insufficiency of motives for war. A whole set of valid grounds for war can be gleaned from their writings. See Phillipson, op. cit., p. 182 ff.; Bender, op. cit., p. 15 ff.; Leist, op. cit., p. 442 ff.; Lecky, History of European Morals, Vol. II (New York, 1893), p. 258. Thus Livius (Hist., IX, 1) lets the Samnite C. Pontius explain the reasons for going to war in the famous terms: “Justum est bellum quibus necessarium et pia arma quibus nulla nisi in armis relinquitur spes.”

15 Cicero’s remarks with respect to bellum justum closely relate to the fetial procedure. In De Officiis (I, 12, 38; FitzGerald, op. cit., pp. 40, 103 ff.) he declares that “when a war is fought out for supremacy and alien glory is the object of war, it must still not fail to start from the same motives which I said a moment ago were the only righteous grounds for going to war.” As to those grounds, he had said (De Officiis, I, 11, 34–36; FitzGerald, op. cit., pp. 43 ff., 106): “The only excuse … for going to war is that we may live in peace unharmed. As for war, human laws touching it are drawn up in the fetial code of the Roman people under all guaranties of religion; and from this it may be gathered that no war is just, unless it is entered upon after an official demand for satisfaction has been submitted, or warning has been given and a formal declaration made.”

16 Wünsch, Evangelische Ethik des Politischen (Tübingen, 1936), p. 685; Erdmann, Die Eretstehung des Kreuzzugsgedankens (Stuttgart, 1936), p. 3; Lecky, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 248; Salvioli, op. cit., p. 19; Wright, R. F., Medieval Internationalism (London, 1930), p. 135 ff.; van der Molen, op. cit., p. 95 ff.; Beaufort, La guerre comme instrument de secours ou de punition (La Haye, 1933), p. 3 ff.; Nys, Les origines du droit international (Haarlem, 1894), p. 44 ff.; Strisower, op. cit., p. 44.

17 Ballis, op. cit., pp. 35, 37, 41; Erdmann, op. cit., p. 3 ff.; Wünsch, op. cit., p. 585; Lecky, op. cit., pp. 247 ff., 250 ff., 260; Beaufort, op. cit., p. 8 ff.

18 In De Civitaie Dei, Contra Faustum and Epistula ad Bonifacium. The relevant Latin texts are quoted by Beaufort, op. cit., p. 14 ff. See also Scott, The Spanish Origin of International Law, Pt. I, Franciscus de Vitoria and His Law of Nations (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1934), p. 183 ff.; a survey of Augustinian texts dealing with the right of war, given by de la Brière, in 44 Rev. Gin. Dr. Int. Pub. (1937), p. 139.

19 Troeltsch, E., Augustin, die christliche Antike und das Mittelalter (München, 1915), pp. 7, 51Google Scholar.

20 Heamshaw, Some Great Political Idealists of the Christian Era (London, 1937), p. 10 ff.: “The Church and the Empire were reconciled. Three centuries of dualism were brought to an end. A Respublica Christiana was, in theory at least, set up—a Christian State in which the Emperor as pontifex maximus became episcopus episcoporum.”

21 Beaufort, op. cit., p. 28; de la Brière, loc. cit., p. 144.

22 Combès, La doctrine politique de Saint Augustin (Paris, 1927), p. 269 ff.; Beaufort, op. cit., p. 20: “There exists no uncertainty any more; war in itself is not contrary to the Christian concept of life”; Fuchs, Augustin und der antike Friedensgedanke (Berlin, 1926), p. 16; Bemheim, Mittelalterliche Zeitanschmtungen, Vol. I (Tubingen, 1918), p. 29 ff.; Ter Meulen, Der Gedanke der intenationalen Organisation, Vol. I (Haag, 1917), p. 35; Mausbach, Die Etkik des hi. Augustin, Vol. I (Freiburg, 1909), pp. 313, 337, 426 ff.

23 Beaufort, op. cit., p. 21 ff.: “It is the crime of others which constitutes the justifying reason for war … this central and predominant idea that war can be justified only by the injustice of another”; Erdmann, op. cit., p. 5 ff.: “Thus, Augustine was the originator of the idea of the war guilt which he introduced into history and which through him became the decisive element in the European concept of war”; Regout, La doctrine de la guerre juste de Saint Augustin & nos jours (Paris, 1934), p. 42.

24 Strisower, op. cit., p. 44, n. 14; Scott, op. cit., p. 181; Beaufort, op. cit., p. 23 ff.

25 “ A just war is wont to be described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation or a state has to be punished for refusing to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what has been seized unjustly.” See Scott, op. dt, p. 192; Regout, op. cit., p. 43; van der Molen, op. cit., p. 97; Beaufort, op. cit., pp. 20,29.

26 “Pax omnium rerum tranquillitatis ordinis. Ordo est parium dispariumque rerum, sua cuique loca tribuens, dispositio.” De Civitate Dd, XIX, 13; Scott, op. cit., pp. 185 ff., 189,193 (Ep. ad Bonif.): “We do not seek peace in order to be at war, but we go to war that we may have peace”; Regout, op. cit., p. 40; Beaufort, op. cit., p. 28; de la Brifire, “Les itapes de la tradition thiohgique concernant le droit de juste guerre,” loc. cit., p. 141 ff.

27 de la Brifère, “Les droits de la juste victoire selon la tradition des thiologiens caiholigues,” 32 Rev. Gin. Dr. Int. Pub. (1925), pp. 366 ff., 375, 382; Le Fur, “Guerre juste et juste paix,” loc. cit., p. 349 ff.; Regout, op. cit., p. 40 ff.; Beaufort, op. cit., p. 16.

28 Summa theologica. Secunda Secundae, Quaestio XL. French translation of the relevant passages by Vanderpol, op. cit., p. 308 ff.; see also Scott, op. cit., p. 188 ff.; van der Molen, op. cit., p. 101 ff.

29 Scott, op. cit., p. 192; Regout, op. cit., p. 81; Nys, Le Droit international, Vol. I (Paris, 1912), p. 227 ff.; Beaufort, op. cit., p. 56 ff.; Vanderpol, op. cit., p. 309 ff.

30 Scott, op. cit., p. 192; Schilling, Die christlichen Soziallehren (Koln, 1926), p. 180; van der Molen, op. cit., p. 102.

31 “Ut scl. illi qui impugnantur propter aliquam culpam impugnationem mereantur.” Regout, op. cit., pp. 81, 83 ff., 91 ff., 141; Scott, op. cit., p. 192; Beaufort, op. cit., p. 62; Vanderpol, op. cit., p. 251; de la Brifere, loc. dt, Vol. 44, p. 148.

32 Regout, op. cit., pp. 83 ff., 92 ff.

33 Regout, op. dt, p. 84; Scott, op. dt, p. 193.

34 Regout, op. cit., pp. 94 ff., 142; Vanderpol, op. cit., passim; Nys, Les origines du droit international (1894), p. 10S ft.; Strisower, op. cit., p. 45; Beaufort, op. cit., p. 63 ff.; Finke, Der Gedanke des heiligen und gerechten Krieges, p. 18 ff.

35 The Reformation did not alter the fundamental idea that war must have a just cause if it is to be in harmony with the Christian faith. See Troeltsch, E., Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen (Tubingen, 1912), pp. 549, 563 ff.; Ballis, op. cit., p. 66 ff. To Luther, war is a necessary element of the world order; it is a consequence of original sin. The prince, however, is in duty bound to limit its occurrence. See Maine, International Law (New York, 1888), p. 209. War is justified only if it is necessary to protect the peace and well-being of the subjects against external attacks. Wars of aggression are unjust. Troeltsch, op. cit., p. 563. The Augsburg Confession of 1530, Art. XVI, expressly recognizes the right of the Christian ruler to wage “just wars” (rechte Kriege), without, however, defining the term. As to the Calvinist conception of war, see Wunsch, op. cit., p. 587, and Troeltsch, op. cit., p. 725 ff.

36 van Vollenhoven, The Law of Peace (London, 1936), p. 6 ff.; Carlyle, History of Medise-val Political Theory, Vol. VI (New York, 1922), pp. III, 127; von Eicken, Geschichte und System der Mittelalterlichen Weltanschauungen (Stuttgart, 1887), pp. 213, 216, 222, 235, 279, 302.

37 Carlyle, op. cit., pp. 11, 123.

38 Woolf, C. N. S., Bartolus of Sassoferrato, His Position in the History of Medieval Political Thought (Cambridge, 1913), pp. 198, 201, 208 ff.; see also Nys, Le Droit international, Vol. I (1912), p. 229: “… l’ancienne id<Se de l’unitè romaine ne disparatt point; elle est invoqufe pour justifier une theorie nouvelle: celle de l’empire du droit romain dans les relations intenationales”; Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International Law (5th ed.), Vol. I, p. 73; Verdross, Volkerrecht (Berlin, 1937), p. 6; van Vollenhoven, op. cit., pp. 35 ff., 82.

39 Woolf, op. cit., pp. 202, 207: “… the medieval Italian lawyer, who lived in conditions where Roman law was actually a common law above the conflicting statutes of the Italian cities, naturally went to that common law for rules to guide international relations … seeing that the superiority of the Emperor was de facto gone, he did actually turn to the Law Books and the Canons in order to find rules which might regulate the relations of the cities”; van Vollenhoven, op. dt, pp. 35 ff., 56.

40 Commentary on Digestum Novum, Pt. II (ad lib. XLIX Dig. [Bâle ed., 1589, Vol. VI]), De captivis et postliminii reversiis, L. XXIV: “Bellum indicitur inter civitatem et civitatem, et in eo locum habeat ius postliminii.” See also Woolf, op. cit., p. 199 ff.

41 A passage in Commentary on Codex, Pt. I (Bâle ed., Vol. VII, p. 84), where Bartolus declares it a “bona lex” that the Church makes war upon the Saracens “quia detinent terram nostram” and upon the Turks “quia non possumus aliter ire ad Saracenos,” has been interpreted as showing that Bartolus felt the need for a legal ground of war. See Woolf, op. cit.,p. 202, n. 3. The passage, however, refers expressly to the Church, which does not wage public wars in the legal sense of the term.

42 Tractatus Represaliarum (Bâle ed., Vol. X), p. 331: “Concedere represalias est indicere bellum.” See also Woolf, op. cit., p. 204; Spiegel, , “Origin and Development of Denial of Justice,” this Journal, Vol. 32 (1938), p. 70 Google Scholar; Vanderpol, op. cit., p. 73 ff.; Verdross, op. cit.,p. 7.

43 “Represaliarum materia nec frequens nec quotidians erat tempore quo in statu debito Romanum vigebat Imperium … Postea vero peccata nostra meruerunt quod Romanum Imperium prostratum jaceret per multa tempora, et reges et principes ac etiam civitates, maxime in Italia, saltern de facto in temporalibus dominum non agnoscerent, propter quod de injustitiis ad superiorem non potest haberi regressus, coeperunt represalias frequentari ...” Bartolus, Tractatus Represaliarum (B&le ed., Vol. X), p. 327.

44 Bartolus clearly distinguishes between the permissibility of reprisals “de foro conscientiae” and “de foro civili.” Ibid. He quotes Augustine’s definition of the just war as authority for the moral justification of reprisals: “non licet in foro conscientiae facere id quod repugnat naturali rationi; in contrariam quod sint licitae, videtur auctoritas Augustini in libro Quaestionum: Justa bella solent definiri quae ulciscuntur iniurias.”

45 Bartolus, op. cit., p. 327; Woolf, op. cit., p. 205.

46 Bartolus, op. dt, p. 327.

47 Bartolus, op. cit., p. 329: “quis debeat requirere dominum, populum, seu gentem ut faciat justitiam? Respondeo, potestas eius qui concedet represalias, succedit in loco superioris deficientis.”

48 Tractatus de Bello, de Represaliis et de Duello (1360), edited by Sir Erskine Holland, in The Classics of International Law, edited by James Brown Scott, No. 8, Oxford, 1917 (Latin text and English translation).

49 Holland, loe.cit., p. XXXII.

50 Holland, loe. cit., p. IX; Nys, Le Droit international, Vol. I, p. 227 ff.

51 Legnano, op. cit., pp. 86, 228: “Bella iure divino inducta originaliter.”

52 Legnano, op. cit., pp. 218, 224, 225, 227: “Sometimes the disease has advanced so far that a poisonous medicament is needed, extirpating the matter of disease entirely and such medicament is war to eradicate and exterminate the bad … God, as the most high doctor and preserver of the Universe, ordains wars in order that offense may be rooted out … God is the governor of the world, and the doctor who eradicates its vices, for the sake of the salvation and conservation of the world.”

53 If, however, the superior should act unlawfully, resistance may be offered. Ibid.,p. 289.

54 Legnano, op. cit., p. 231 ff.

55 “Legnano, op. cit., p. 233. See also Bartolus, Tractatus Represaliarum, p. 331: “Bellum justum non potest indicere nisi ille qui superiorem non habet.”

56 Legnano, op. cit., p. 234.

57 Legnano, op. cit., p. 234.

58 Legnano, op. cit., p. 307 ff.: “When the Empire began gradually to be exhausted, so that now there are some who in fact recognize no superior and by them justice is neglected, the need arose for a subsidiary remedy when the ordinary remedies fail … it has been necessary to resort to this device of a declaration of war lest justice should perish.” This “extraordinary remedy” which originates in the law of nations is a form of “lawful war.” Ibid. See also Bartolus, op. cit., p. 327. It may not be used for “slight cause.” Legnano, op. cit., p. 323.

59 Legnano, op. cit., p. 308 ff.: … it is the right, granted on the ground of necessity, to take the law into one’s own hand.”

60 de la Brière, “Èvolution de la doctrine el de la pratique en matiire des reprisaiUes,” 22 Rec. des Cours de VAcad. de Droit Int. (1928, II), p. 256; Kappus, Der völkerrechtliche Kriegs-begriff (Breslau, 1936), p. 11 ff.; Bulmerinq, “Staatenstreitigkeiten,” in Handbuch des Völkerrechts, Vol. IV (Hamburg, 1889), pp. 72 ff., 80; in particular with respect to the connection between war and reprisals in early theory, see Spiegel, loc. cit., pp. 75, 78.

61 Casulli, , La sovranità, degli stati e la Società, delle Nazioni (Rome, 1934), p. 5 Google Scholar.

62 De Re MiUtariet Bello Tractatus (1536), in The Classics of International Law, No. 18, Oxford, 1936. Introduction by Arigo Cavaglieri and English translation by Herbert C. Nutting (Vol. II of the edition).

63 Belli, op. cit., p. 61.

64 Belli, op. cit., pp. 6 ff., 10; see also Cavaglieri’s introduction (Vol. II, p. 14a). Belli refers to “Innocent and Panormitanus who find illustrations in the case of the Pope and Emperor, and the Kings of Spain and France; and there is added a supplementary note assigning this same right to the Duke of Milan, since in his position the last named fills the room of supreme ruler, and has full powers like the Emperor.”

65 Belli, op. cit., p. 59.

66 Ibid.; see also p. 279: “peace is nothing else than duly established concord.”

67 Belli, op. cit., pp. 8, 61, 78.

68 Ibid., p. 60.

69 Ibid.

70 De India et de lure Belli Relectionea (1532), edited by Nys, E., in The Classics of International Law, Washington, 1917 Google Scholar. Latin text and English translation; further, Scott, The Spanish Origin of International Law, Part I, Franciscus, de Vitoria and His Law of Nations (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1934)Google Scholar; idem, The Catholic Conception of International Law (Washington, 1934).

71 Wegner, op. cit., p. 139; Hentschel, “Franciacua de Victoria und seine Stellung zum Volkerrecht,” 17 Zeitschr.f. ojjentliches Recht, p. 388; de la Brifere, in 44 Rev. Gin. Dr. Int. Pub.,p. 149; Scheuner, in XXII Zeitschr.f. Volkerrecht (1938), p. 453 ff.; Nys (ed.), Victoria, De lure Belli, p. 95.

72 Westlake, , Introduction to Ayala, De lure et Officiis Belli, in The Classics of International Law, Vol. I, p. XII; van der Molen, op. cit., pp. 6 ff., 107 Google Scholar.

73 Victoria, op. cit., p. 169: “A perfect State or community … is one which is complete in itself, that is, which is not a part of another community, but has its own laws, and its own council and its own magistrates.”

74 Ibid.: “… kings who are subordinate to the Emperor can make war on one another without waiting for the Emperor’s authorization, for … a State ought to be self-sufficient, and this it would not be, if it had not the faculty in question.” See also de la Briere, loc. cit., p. 149 ff.

75 Victoria, op. cit., p. 170.

76 Ibid.; see also von der Heydte, “ Franciscus de Victoria und sein Volkerrecht,” 13 Zeitschr. f. offentliches Recht, p. 264 ff.; Scott, , The Catholic Conception of International Law, p. 38 Google Scholar; idem, The Spanish Origin of International Law, p. 227; Nys (ed.), he. cit., p. 87; van der Molen, op. cit., p. 109; de la Bri&re, Inc. cit., p. 151.

77 de la Brifere, ibid.

78 Gierke, , Political Theories of the Middle Ages, tr. by Maitland (Cambridge, 1900), p. 75 Google Scholar if.; von der Heydte, he. cit., p. 248 ff.; Scott, , The Catholic Conception of International Law, p. 491 Google Scholar; Hentschel, he. cit., p. 371.

79 Victoria, op. cit., p. 173: “… among the things which a prince is bound to defend and preserve for hia State are its honor and authority.”

80 Ibid., p. 175: “… princes are judges in their own cases, inasmuch as they have no superior”; p. 171: . if there were any competent judge over the two belligerents, he would have to condemn the unjust aggressors and authors of wrong … But a prince who is carrying on a just war is as it were his own judge in matters touching the war … ”; and see Scott, The Spanish Origin of International Law, p. 210 ff.; von der Heydte, he. cit.,p. 262; Beaufort, op. cit., p. 123.

81 Victoria, op. cit., p. 173.

82 Ibid., p. 174.

83 Ibid., p. 177; Ballis, op. cit., p. 86. Suarez, the other great founder of the Spanish school of international law, calls “entirely absurd” the assumption that war may be just on both sides; for “two rights contrary to each other cannot both be just.” See Scott, , The Catholic Conception of International Law, p. 449 Google Scholar; Barcia Trelles, “Francisco Suarez, Les Thtohgiens espagnols du XVI‘ sibcle,” 43 Rec. des Court de VAcad. de Droit Ini., p. 293 ff.; Ballis, op. cit., p. 92.

84 Victoria, op. cii., p. 177: ”… it may be that on the side where true justice is the war is just of itself while on the other side the war is just in the sense of being excused from sin by reason of good faith, because invincible ignorance is a complete excuse”; p. 186: “… princes … who in reality have no just cause of war, may nevertheless be waging war in good faith, with such good faith, I say, as to free them from fault; as, for instance, if the war is made after a careful examination and in accordance with the opinion of learned and upright men.” See also von der Heydte, he. cit., p. 265; de la Brifere, 44 Rev. Gin. Dr. Int. Pub., p. 152; van der Molen, op. cit., p. 118; Regout, op. cit., p. 267.

85 de la Bri&re, loc. cit., Vol. XXXII, p. 373 ff.; Scott, , Spanish Origin of International Law, p. 210 Google Scholar ff.; Victoria, op. cit., p. 184 ff. See also p. 187: “… the victor ought not to make seizures or exactions in temporal matters beyond the limits of just satisfaction, seeing that anything beyond these limits could only be justified as a punishment, such as could not be visited on the innocent.”

86 De lure et Officiis Bellicis et DiscipUna Militari Libri III (1582), in The Classics of International Law, ed. by Westlake, Latin text and English translation. Washington, 1912. See Chapter II: On the just war and just causes of war, such causes are principally the defense of one’s own self and of one’s friends and allies, the recovery of what has been unjustly taken away by violence and the vindication of injuries received.

87 Ayala, op. cit., p. 22: … our remarks so far about the just causes of war deal rather with considerations of fairness and goodness and propriety, and not with the character of the legal result which is produced.” Westlake, in his introduction to Ayala’s treatise, op. cit.,Vol. I, p. VII, remarks with regard to this sudden flash of the light of legal thought in the otherwise impenetrable darkness of scholastic concepts: “Here then at last Ayala is alive to the difference between the provinces of the legist and the moralist in what concerns war.”

88 I.e., not rebels, pirates, brigands.

89 Ayala, op.cit., p. 23.

90 Supra, note 14; see also Westlake, loc. cit., p. VIII.

91 Ayala, op. cit., p. 22; he immediately adds, however, that “if it be just cause of war that is adverted to … one and the same cause cannot be just for this side and that.” Ibid.

92 De lure Belli Libri Tres (Hanau, 1593), in The Classics of International Law, Oxford, 1933. Latin text and English translation. Introduction by Coleman Phillipson. Vol. II, pp. 31, 32; van der Molen, op. cit., p. 119; Westlake, , Chapters on the Principles of International Law (Cambridge, 1894), p. 35 Google Scholar. The term “just” is used by Gentilis in his definition of war. “War is a just and public contest of arms.” De lure Belli, p. 12. As Phillipson (Introduction, Vol. II, p. 33a) points out, the word “just” here signifies “not a question-begging epithet in regard to the justice of the cause,” but rather a distinction of “warfare that is regular (i.e., begun and prosecuted according to the rules by the sovereign authority) from the acts of marauders, pirates, etc., and insurgents.”

93 De lure Belli, p. 31.

94 Ibid.

95 The comparison of war to legal proceedings for the assertion of even doubtful rights has its theological counterpart in the so-called Probabilist Theory of the Spanish theologians Molina (1536-1600) and Gregorius de Valentia (1551-1603), who maintain that a prince may justly go to war if, according to his probable opinion, though not realiter, the right is on his side. See Valentia, Commentaria Theologica, quoted by Regout, op. cit., at p. 248,n. 2:“… illeetiam qui re vera non haberetcausam justampugnaret juste per accidens propter opinionem probabilem. Sicut is etiam per accidens contendit juste in judicio, qui sequitur opinionem probabilem, quamvis falsam.” See further, van der Molen, op. cit.,p. 119; Ballis, op. cit., p. 129; Barcia Trelles, loc. cit., p. 285; Vanderpol, op. cit., p. 254 ff.

96 De lure, Belli, Vol. II, p. 33 Google Scholar: “Although it may sometimes happen … that injustice is clearly evident on one of the two sides, nevertheless this ought not to affect the general principles and prevent the laws of war from applying to both parties.”

97 Ibid.

98 Belli, De lure, Vol. II, Bk. III, Chs. IV–VI, XIII, p. 353 Google Scholar. Gentilis quotes here from Augustine: “by punishing past offenses we glut our anger; by being compassionate we ensure the future.” See also Phillipson, in XII Jour. Comp. Leg. (1911), p. 76.

99 Phillipson, , Introduction, loc. cit., Vol. II, pp. 18a, 33aGoogle Scholar; idem, in XII Jour. Comp. Leg. (1911), pp. 70, 80; van der Molen, op. cit., pp. 210, 240 ff.; Ballis, op. cit., p. 94; Holland, Studies in International Law (Oxford, 1898), p. 58; Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2d ed.), Vol. V, p. 53.

100 Phillipson, , Introduction, loc. cit., Vol. II, p. 25a Google Scholar; van Vollenhoven, op. cit., p. 67.

101 Phillipson, loc. cit., p. 26a ff.; van der Molen, op. cit., pp. 114 ff., 240 ff. As to the influence of Bodin’s concept of sovereignty on Gentilis, see van der Molen, op. cit., p. 226 ff.

102 The main body of Book I of De lure Belli is devoted to an examination of the causes of war, which Gentilis divides into Divine, natural and human causes. Thus, the command of God legitimatizes a war under Divine law; self-defense is an instinct implanted in all living beings and, therefore, a “natural” reason for taking up arms, like utility and honor. Human causes for war appear when an offended state proceeds to exact reparation for violated positive rights. See van der Molen, op. cit., pp. 126, 129.

103 Regout, op. cit., pp. 249 n. 2, 273; van der Molen, op. cit., p. 120: “As long as it is accepted as self-evident, that the sovereign (state) may take the law into his own hand, either to avenge a real or a supposed wrong or to assert real or supposed rights, the door is opened wide to the grossest wrong, in spite of the finest theories.”

104 Belli ac Pacis, De lure, in The Classics of International Law, Oxford, 1925, Vol. II. Translation. Prolegomena 28, p. 20 Google Scholar. See also van, Vollenhoven, op. cit., p. 70 Google Scholar; Walker, , History of the Law of Nations (Cambridge, 1899), p. 284 Google Scholar; Wright, , Medieval Internationalism (London, 1930), p. 16 Google Scholar.

105 Heamshaw, op.cit., p. 87.

106 Regout, op. cit., p. 276; Beaufort, op. cit., p. 176; Nys, Les origines du droit international, p. 95 ff.; Phillipson, , Introduction, loe. cit., Vol. II, p. 10a Google Scholar, n. 13. When reading Grotius after a study of his predecessors one cannot but agree with Walker, who states: “Again and again the reader of the pages of Grotius, who shall have made the acquaintance of the lights of moral and legal learning of the sixteenth century, will catch the echo of their opinions and their very phrases.” Op. cit., p. 333.

107 De lure Belli ac Pads, Bk. II, Ch. I, sec. II, 2. As to the punitive war, see Bk. II, Ch. XX, sec. 40 ff.: “There is a just cause of war as against those who are without reverence for parents … who practice piracy …” . Van Vollenhoven, in “Grotius and Geneva” (Bibliotheca Visseriana, Vol. VI, 1926), maintains (p. 22) that “the topic of war against crime, of punitive warfare, overshadowed the other topics to the effect that the author often overlooked other kinds of justifiable warfare: those intended to recover property, to recover debts, to obtain reparation for losses and damages … All the author’s real interest was centered on state crimes and on their punishments.” It must, however, be noted that Grotius, like his theological predecessors, considers as a decisive test for the justness of a war “a wrong received” (Bk. II, Ch. I, sec. 1,4), regardless of its legal nature as civil wrong or crime. See Beaufort, op. cit., p. 165 ff.; p. 175: “La guerre juste (bellum justum) telle que la concoit Grotius est dans 1’acceptation gendrale du terme, une guerre punitive en ce sens qu’elle combat l’injustice et venge l’injure faite au droit.” See also Wehberg, in 20 Die Friedem- warte (1918), p. 270: “The war in Grotius’ concept is a war of execution and punishment”; Wolzendorff, , Die l/Uge des Vdlkerrechts, Der Krieg als Rechts-Institution (Leipzig, 1920), p. 29 Google Scholar ff.

108 De lure Belli ac Pacis, Bk. II, Ch. XXII, secs. VIII-XII.

109 Ibid., Bk. II, Ch. I, sec. II, 1.

110 Ibid., Bk. II, Ch. XXIII, sec. XIII: “ In the particular sense and with reference to the thing itself, a war cannot be just on both sides, just as a legal claim cannot.”

111 Ibid. See also Holland, , Lectures on International Law, p. 246 Google Scholar: “Grotius distinguishes justice with reference to cause from justice with reference to effect: only quoad effectus quosdam iuris can a war be said to be ‘just’ on both sides (i.e., the formal sense).” Zouche, Grotius’ English follower, defines this principle in his Iuris et Iudidi Fedalis, Sive Iuris Inter Genies, et Quaestionum de Eodern Explicntio, 1650 (The Classics of International Law, Washington, 1911), in the following terms which, incidentally, contain an express rejection of the Probabilist Theory (supra, note 95): “A thing is called just either in respect of the act or in respect of the person acting. In respect of the act a war cannot be just on both sides. But it may well be that neither of the belligerents acts unjustly. For none acts unjustly save he who knows that he is acting unjustly. Thus, two persons may go to the law justly, that is in good faith, on each side. But in embarking upon a war, the gravity of the matter is such that, not content with probable reasons, it demands reasons of the greatest clearness.” Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 112. To Zouche war is, in accordance with the teachings of Grotius, “but a means, whereby, in the last resort, the rights which Nations enjoy in time of peace may be vindicated.” Holland, , Introduction to Zouche, Iuris et Iudidi, ibid., Vol. I, p. XIII Google Scholar.

l12 De lure, Belli ae Pacis, Bk. III, Ch. XVII; Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International Law (5th ed.), Vol. II, p. 493 Google Scholar.

113 See Meinecke, , Die Idee der Staatsrdson (Munehen, 1924), p. 262 Google Scholar: ”The old illusion to which Grotius still clung, namely, that in each case a ‘just’ war may be distinguished from an ‘unjust’ war was likely to confuse things and to increase existing possibilities for wars and conflicts rather than to reduce their occurrence. He declared it to be the duty of neutrals to do nothing whereby the party who supports a wicked cause would be rendered more powerful or whereby the movements of him who wages a just war would be hampered. In point of fact, that meant nothing more than urging the neutral to take sides on the basis of a value judgment which, in reality, is always dictated by reasons of state and by national interests.”

114 His emphasis, however, lies on the civil nature of the wrong which may justify resort to war. He reduces the just causes to three heads: (1) We may defend ourselves and our possessions against the attacks of others; (2) we may obtain by force the settlement of rightful claims that the debtor refuses to meet; (3) we may obtain reparations for losses which we have suffered by injuries and demand security for the future. De lure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo (1672), in The Classics of International Law, Oxford, 1934.

115 De lure Belli ac Pads, Bk. II, Ch. XXIV, sec. IX.

116 Pufendorf, , De lure Naturae et Gentium, Vol. II, p. 1295 Google Scholar.

117 Ibid., p. 356.

118 Quaestiones Iuris Publici Libri Duo (1737), in The Classics of International Law, Oxford, 1930, Vol. II, p. 15.

119 Ibid., p. 15.

120 Ibid., p. 61.

121 Ibid., p. 62 ff.

122 De, Louter, Introduction to Bynkershoek, ibid., Vol. II, p. XVIII Google Scholar.

123 Elementa luris Naturae et Gentium (Halle, 1738).

124 “Per bellura vero intellegimus statum liberarum gentium vel hominum, in statu naturali viventium, iuris sui persequendi caussa vi dolove concertantium, propositumve concertandi retinentium.” Ibid., Lib. II, Sec. 191. See also Secs. 195, 196.

125 “Quemadmodum vero iuris tan turn perfecti denegatio iustam belli caussam praebet … denegatio omnino in laesionem incidit, ac proinde bello defensivo caussam suppeditat iustissimam.” Ibid., Sec. 196.

126 “… tertia caussa, quam commentus est Grotius de iure belli ac pacis II, 1, 2, 1, punitio nimirum scelerum, eo minus videatur admittenda, quo magis constat, parem a pari, adeoque gentem a gente puniri non posse.” Ibid., Sec. 195. Hobbes already had expressed the view that even if state crimes were possible, states would not be authorized to punish the offender because they have no jurisdiction over each other. See van Vollenhoven, op. cit., p. 22; Beaufort, op. cit., p. 166.

127 Ins Gentium Methodo Scientifico Pertradatum (1749), in The Classics of International Law, Oxford, 1934, Vol. II, p. 325.

128 “Nations, in their relations to each other, are regarded as individual free persons living in a state of nature.” Ibid., Vol. II, p. 313.

129 Ibid., Vol. II, p. 453 ff.

130 Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 314, 325; mere utility is no justifying reason, Vol. II, pp. 316, 331. Wolff incidentally rejects here the theory of Machiavelli who, quoting approvingly Livius’ saying (supra, note 14), maintained that those wars are just which are necessary, viz., dictated by reasons of state. See Gilbert, Allen H., Machiavelli’s Prince and its Forerunners (1938), pp. 166, 224 ff.

131 Ius Gentium, Vol. II, p. 324: “War cannot be just on each side. For there is no just cause of war save a wrong done or likely to be done”; p. 325: “The injustice of a war cannot be imputed to one who, because of ignorance or irrefutable error, thinks that he has a just cause of war when he has not.”

132 Ibid., p. 347.

133 Ibid., p. 324. See also p. 455: “War is not a suitable method for deciding the controversies of nations.”

134 Ibid., p. 315.

135 Ibid.

136 Ibid., p. 454.

137 Ibid., p. 455.

138 Vattel, , The Law of Nations (1758) [Tr. by Chitty. Philadelphia, 1872], p. 380 Google Scholar ff.

139 Vattel, , The Law of Nations, p. 301 Google Scholar: “Humanity revolts against a sovereign, who, without necessity or without very powerful reasons, lavishes the blood of his most faithful subjects. … He is responsible to God, and accountable to human nature, for every individual that is killed.”

140 Ibid., p. 305 ff.: “Since nations are equal and independent and cannot claim a right of judgment over each other, it follows that in every case susceptible of doubt, the arms of the two parties at war are to be accounted equally lawful.”

141 Ibid., p. 382: “The first rule … is, that regular war, as to its effects, is to be accounted just on both sides. This is absolutely necessary … if people wish to introduce any order, any regularity, into so violent an operation as that of arms …”

142 Ibid., pp. 382, 386: “… the rights founded on the state of war, the lawfulness of its effects, the validity of the acquisitions made by arms, do not, externally and between mankind, depend on the justice of the cause, but on the legality of the means in themselves… . There would be no stability in the affairs of mankind, no safety in trading with nations engaged in war, if we were allowed to draw a distinction between a just and an unjust war, so as to attribute lawful effects to the one which we denied to the other.”

Similar arguments are set forth by Johann Jacob Moser in his Versuch des neuesten europdischen Vblkerrechts in Friedens- und Kriegszetien (1777). He declares (Sec. 52): “To the question as to whether it is possible to determine, under international law, what causes may justify war, we reply that it must of necessity be answered in the negative because (1) it is always doubtful what were the true causes for the resort to war; (2) the opponent will never recognize the justice or sufficiency of the alleged cause; (3) there is no judge who may decide the issue.” Moser’s approach was historical; he deduced his conclusions from the actual practice of states. See Verdross, “J. J. Moser’s Programm einer Vblkerrechiswissenschaft der Erfahrung,” 3 Zeitschr. f. offentliches Recht, p. 96 ff.; Rettich, Zur Theorie und Geschiehte des Reckts zum Kriege (Stuttgart, 1888), p. 38 ff.

An interesting attempt to preserve the notion of an “unjust enemy” within the positivist system of law was made by Immanuel Kant in his Philosophy of Law (1796) [Tr. by Hastie, Edinburgh, 1887]. He rejects the concept of a punitive war. “No war of independent States against each other can rightly be a war of punishment (bellum punitivum). For punishment is only in place under the relation of a Superior (imperantis) to a Subject (subditum); and this is not the relation of the States to one another” (p. 219). This has an important consequence with respect to the “Right after the War.” “The conqueror may not demand restitution of the cost of the war, because he would then have to declare the war of his opponent to be unjust or … to be punitive, andhewouldthusinturninflictaninjury” (p.221; see also Metaphysik der Sitten, Sec. 58). However, the right of an injured state against its enemy in asserting what is its own has no limits because such war is waged against an unjust enemy. But “what is an unjust enemy according to the conceptions of the Right of Nations, when, as holds generally of the State of Nature, every State is judge in its own cause? ” The answer is that an unjust enemy is “one whose publicly expressed will, whether in word or deed, betrays a maxim which, if it were taken as a universal rule, would make a state of Peace among the nations impossible… . Such for instance is the violation of public Treaties” (p. 223). A similar idea is stated in Pitt Cobbett’s Cases on International Law (5th ed. by W. L. Walker, 1937), Vol. II, p. 8: “The primary test of the justness or otherwise of war might, perhaps, well be found in the answer to the question, is the State at war bona fide endeavouring to restrain the use of physical force by another or is it endeavouring to make use of force to impose its will on others … ?” See further Ebbinghaus, Kant’s Lehre vom Ewigen Frieden und die Kriegsschuldfrage (Tubingen, 1929), p. 34 ff.

143 A comprehensive survey of the literature is given by Gohler, Freies Kriegsfuhrungsrecht und Kriegsschuld (Leipzig, 1931).

144 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International Law (5th ed.), Vol. II, p. 148.

145 Balladore Pallieri, “II problema della guerra lecita nel diritto intemazionale commune e nett’ ordinamento della Societd, delle Nazioni,” IX Rivista di Diritto Intemazionale, 512; Funck- Brentano and Sorel, Pricis du droit des gens (1900), p. 497; Lawrence, , Principles of International Law (1928), p. 311 Google Scholar; De, Louter, Le droit international positif (1920), Vol. II, p. 213 Google Scholar; Hold-Ferneck, Lehrbuch des Volkerrechts (2d pt., Leipzig, 1932), p. 238 ff.; Lueder, “Krieg und Kriegsrecht im Allgemeinen, ” in Handbueh des Volkerrechts, Vol. IV, Hamburg, 1889, pp. 176, 221 ff.

146 Quincy, Wright, in this Journal ,Vol. 18 (1924), p. 758 Google Scholar: “The question of when war exists is one of fact unrelated to the nature of the controversy beginning it”; von Waldkirch, Volkerrecht (1926), p. 338; Salvioli, op. cit., p. 124; Strupp, Grundzilge des Volkerrechts (1928), p. 211; Heilborn, System des Volkerrechts (1896), pp. 330, 333, 364 ff.; idem, in Handbuch des Volkerrechts, Vol. I, p. 22 ff.; Ullmann, , Volkerrecht (Tubingen, 1908), p. 465 Google Scholar.

147 Convention on the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contractual Debts. Scott’s Hague Peace Conferences, Vol. II, pp. 357–361.

148 Convention (III) Relative to the Opening of Hostilities. Scott, , The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907 (New York, 1918), p. 96 Google Scholar ff.

149 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op. cit., p. 147 ff.; Lammasch, Volkermord oder Volkerbund?(1920), p. 39; Phillimore, Commentaries, op. cit., p. 77; Holtzendorf, Principien der Politik (1869), p. 90; Lomonaco, Trattato di diritto internazionale (1905), p. 576; Hautefeuille, , Des droits et des devoirs des nations neutres (Paris, 1848), Vol. I, titre III Google Scholar, Ch. 1.

150 Hall, , A Treatise on International Law (8th ed.), p. 81 Google Scholar.

151 Phillimore, Commentaries, op. cit., p. 77.

152 Anzilotti, , Corso di diritto intemazionale (1914—15), Vol. III, p. 183 Google Scholar; see also Kunz, , in this Journal ,Vol. 33 (1939), p. 33 Google Scholar.

153 Balladore Pallieri, loc. cit., p. 355.

154 Westlake, , International Law, Vol. II (2d ed. Cambridge, 1913), p. 3 Google Scholar; Balladore Pallieri, loc. cit., p. 522.

155 Lorimer, , The Institutes of the Law of Nations (London, 1884), Vol. II, p. 26 Google Scholar; Lauter-pacht, , in Manning, Peaceful Change (New York, 1937), p. 163 Google Scholar ff.

156 Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community (Oxford, 1933), p. 363 S.; Strisower, op. cit., p. 21 ff.; Bilfinger, “Betrachtungen uber politisches Recht,” I Zeit- schrift fur ausl&ndisches ofientliches Recht und Volkerrecht, 1, p. 66.

157 Hedemann, “Gedanken uber Gerechtigkeit,” 10 Archiv fur Rechtsphilosophie (1916-17), p. 161 ff.; Kunz, in this Journal, Vol. 33 (1939), p. 45. States, in their declarations of war, are wont to express the hope that the justice of their cause will procure Divine assistance. Thus, the Duke of Milan declares that he takes up arms against the Duke of Savoy “confident in the Divine mercy which always favors the just cause.” Declaration of Sept. 4, 1427 ( Du, Mont, Corps Universel Diplomatique du Droit des Gens, Vol. II, 2, p. 193 Google Scholar); King Charles II of England’s declaration of war against The Netherlands in 1672 ends on the same note of “confidence which we have in God that he will assist us in our just enterprise” (Du Mont, Vol. VII, 1, p. 163); the King of England enters the War of 1812 against the United States “under the favour of Providence, relying on the justice of his Cause” (Br. and For. State Papers, Vol. I, 2, p. 1508); the same is true with regard to the Emperor of Russia in his wars against Turkey of 1828, 1853 and 1877 (Manifesto of the Emperor of Russia, 14-26 April, 1828, Br. and For. State Papers, Vol. 15, p. 655; Russian Declaration of War of Oct. 20-Nov. 1, 1853, ibid., Vol. 61, p. 1056: “The Most High … may be pleased to bless our arms in the holy and just cause”; Manifesto of the Emperor of Russia, April 24, 1877, ibid.,Vol. 68, p. 845: “Profoundly convinced of the justice of our cause …”). Sometimes the cause itself is called “holy” or “sacred.” See the Italian Manifesto of War with Austria, June 18, 1866 (ibid., Vol. 63, p. 585): “You may rely more firmly upon the sacredness of your rights”; Proclamation of War by Serbia against Bulgaria, Nov. 2-14, 1885 (ibid., Vol. 76, p. 1291): “The just cause of Serbia … the sacred cause of Serbia …”; Proclamation of the Prince of Bulgaria, Nov. 2-14, 1885 (ibid., Vol. 76, p. 1295); Proclamation of the King of Prussia against France, March 17, 1813 (ibid., Vol. I, 2, p. 1042); Circular addressed to Austrian Representatives at Foreign Courts, April 29, 1859 (ibid., Vol. 57, p. 230); Declaration of War by Chile against Peru, April 5, 1879 (ibid., Vol. 70, p. 184).

158 British Declaration of War against France, May 17,1689 (Du Mont, Vol. VII, 2, p. 230).

159 Russian Declaration of War against Turkey, April 14-26, 1828 (Br. and For. State Papers, Vol. 15, p. 656); see also the Russian Declaration of War against Turkey of Oct. 20-Nov. 1, 1853 (ibid., Vol. 61, p. 1056).

160 Ibid., Vol. 27, p. 1214.

161 Proclamation of the President of the United States of War against Mexico, May 13, 1846 (ibid., Vol. 34, p. 1137).

162 Turkish Declaration of War against Russia, Oct. 4, 1853 (Br. and For. State Papers, Vol. 42, p. 1321); see also the note of the Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sept. 1, 1864 (Makarov and Schmitz, Digest of the Diplomatic Correspondence of the European States, 1856-1871, No. 951): “The Imperial Government … recurs to coercive measures which the right of nations at last authorizes to carry out that which cannot be obtained by persuasive means, thus, so that justice may be done to its claims.” The United States declare in 1861 that they do not contest the right of Spain, France and England ”de declarer la guerre au Mexique, afin d’obtenir satisfaction des injures qui leur ont 6t&6 faites.” Mr. Seward to Mr. Schurtz (Makarov and Schmitz, op. cit., No. 895).

163 Manifesto of the Emperor of Austria declaring War against Sardinia, April 28, 1859 (Br. and For. State Papers, Vol. 57, p. 228).

164 See, for instance, Declaration de Ouerre de la France contre les Hollandais, Nov. 16, 1688 (Du Mont, Vol. VII, 2, p. 212); Declaration de Guerre de I’Empereur contre la France, May 15,1702 (ibid., Vol. VIII, 1, p. 115); Message of the President of the United States, June 1, 1812 (Br. and For. State Papers, Vol. I, 2, p. 1316); Proclamation of the Emperor of Japan declaring war against China, Aug. 1,1894 (ibid., Vol. 86, p. 303): “Such conduct on the part of China is … a direct injury to the rights and interests of this Empire”; see also Tam- baro, “Das Recht Krieg zufuhren,” XXXI Niemeyer’s Zeitschrift fur internationales Recht,pp. 44, 66; Italian Declaration of War against Austria-Hungary, May 23,1915 (Br. and For. State Papers, Vol. 109, p. 963): “The Government of the King are firmly decided to assure the defense of Italian rights and interests.”

165 Declaration de Guerre des Provinces Unies contre la France, March 9, 1688 (Du Mont, Vol. VII, 2, p. 213); Diclaration de Guerre du Roi d’Espagne contre la France, May 3, 1689 (ibid., p. 226); Declaration de Guerre de la Grande Bretagne contre la France et I’Espagne, May 4,1702 (ibid., Vol. VIII, 1, p. 115); Declaration du Rot d’Espagne contre Portugal, April 30, 1704 (ibid., 1, p. 154); Declaration de Guerre de Grande Bretagne contre VEspagne, Dec. 27, 1718 (ibid., p. 555); Manifesto de la Cour de Bio de Janeiro, Dec. 10, 1825 (Br. and For. State ' Papers, Vol. 15, p. 655); Circular addressed to the Austrian Representatives at Foreign Courts, April 29, 1859 (ibid., Vol. 57, p. 230): “The Emperor … has drawn the sword because guilty hands have attacked the dignity and honor of his Crown”; Special Message to the Legislative Chambers of the Argentine Republic, May 4, 1865 (ibid., Vol. 66, p. 1274); Italian Manifesto of War with Austria, June 19, 1866 (ibid., Vol. 63, p. 585): “I took up the sword to defend … the liberty of my people, the honor of the Italian name”; Declaration of War by Paraguay against Argentina, March 18,1865 (ibid., Vol. 66, p. 1272); French Declaration of War, July 19, 1870 (ibid., Vol. 60, p. 907).

166 See the Declaration de Guerre du Roi de France contre les Genois, May 15, 1684 (Du Mont, Vol. VII, 2, p. 79): “Sa Majesty voulant empecher la Continuation du commerce que les Genois font”; Russian Declaration of April 14-26, 1828 (Br. and For. State Papers, Vol. 15, p. 656): “Amende par le besoin imp&ieux de guarantir au commerce de la Mer Noire … une liberty … inviolable.”

167 Dock, Der Souveränitätsbegriff (Strassburg, Diss. 1897), p. 87; this writer’s article on the Congress of Vienna and the European Balance of Power, in 4 Zeitschriftfur ausld.ndisch.es offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht, p. 228 ff.; ter Meulen, Der Gedanke der Intemationalen Organization, Vol. I, p. 38 ff.; see also Declaration de Guerre de la Grande Bretagne contre la France et I’Espagne, May 4, 1702 (Du Mont, Vol. VIII, 1, p. 115); Austria’s Declaration of War against France, Aug. 12, 1813 (Br. and For. State Papers, Vol. I, 1, p. 810).

168 As to origin and significance of Art. 231 and the penal clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, see Holborn, Kriegsschuld und Reparationen auf der Pariser Friedenskonferenz von 1919 (Berlin, 1932); exhaustive on the legal points: Kunz, Die Revision der Pariser Friedensvertroge (Wien, 1932), pp. 166 ff., 172 (with further references); Gohler, op. cit., p. 58 ff.; Beheim Schwarzbach, Der Kriegsschuldartikel (Berlin, 1934); Le Fur, loc. cit., p. 368 ff.

169 Verdross, op. cit., p. 192; Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, Vol. II, p. 184 ff.; Gohler, op. cit.,p. 50 ff.; Bibo, ”Le dogme du bellum justum,” Revue Internationale de la Thiorie du Droit,1936, pp. 14-27; de la Briere, 44 Rev. Gen. Dr. Int. Pub., p. 159; Wehberg, “Das Kriegsprob- lem in der neueren Entudcklung des Vdlkerrechts,” 38 Die Friedenswarte (1938), pp. 129, 133 ff.; Campagnolo, “La Paix, la Guerre et le Droit,” 45 Rev. Gin. Dr. Int. Pub., p. 449 ff.

170 See for instance the Report of the Special Committee set up to Study the Application of the Principles of the Covenant. Adopted by the Committee on Feb. 2, 1938. League of Nations Publications, VII. Political, 1938, VII, 1 (Doc. A. 7.1938. VII), p. 51; Fischer Williams, Chapters on Current International Law (New York, 1929), p. 72: “We have thus an automatic test of, at any rate, one kind of ‘unjust’ war—war to which a State Member of the League resorts in violation of the League Covenant, or which is resorted to by a nonmember of the League under similar conditions, is an unjust war.”

171 See Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 151, for references to the various international declarations and instruments; further, Barandon, Le systhne juridique de la Soeieti des Nations pour la pretention de la guerre (Paris, 1933), p. 280 ff.; Gretschaninov, Politische Verträge (Berlin, 1936), Vol. II, 1, pp. 323, 399, 486.

172 See Scott, , The Spanish Origin of International Law, p. 191 Google Scholar; de la Briere, Le droit de Juste guerre: Tradition thiologique, Adaptations contemporaines (Paris, 1938), p. 186 ff.; Regout, op. cit., p. 309 ff.

173 E. Jackh, in IV New Commonwealth Quarterly, p. 313.