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The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 February 2017

Thomas M. Franck
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Legitimacy in 1991 flows not from the barrel of a gun but from the will of the people.

U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III

I know what real democracy is, what democracy is worth.

A thirty-seven-year-old Soviet lieutenant colonel who early on sided with anticoup forces

More than two centuries have elapsed since the signatories of the U.S. Declara^ tion of Independence sought to manifest two radical propositions. The first is that governments, instituted to secure the “unalienable rights” of their citizens, derive “their just powers from the consent of the governed.” We may call this the “democratic entitlement.” The second proposition, perhaps less noted by commentators, is that a nation earns “separate and equal station” in the community of states by demonstrating “a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.” The authors of the Declaration apparently believed that the legitimacy of the new Confederation of American States was not made evident solely by the transfer of power from Britain but also needed to be acknowledged by “mankind.” This we may perceive as a prescient glimpse of the legitimating power of the community of nations.

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American Journal of International Law , Volume 86 , Issue 1 , January 1992 , pp. 46 - 91
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Copyright © American Society of International Law 1992

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References

† N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1991, at A15, col. 6; and id., Aug. 21, 1991, at A9, col. 1.

1 UN Doc. A/46/L.8/Rev.1 (1991).

2 Support to the Democratic Government of Haiti, OEA/Ser.F/V.1/MRE/RES.1/91, corr.1, paras. 5, 6(1991).

3 Id., preamble.

4 This enumeration was compiled by reference to reports in the New York Times and the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1990, infra note 10, submitted by the Department of State to the appropriate committees of Congress. States that currently make legal provision for determining their governments by recourse to multiparty, secret-ballot elections are: Albania, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Byelorussia, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, the Comoros, Congo, the Cook Islands, Costa Rica, the Côte d’lvoire, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Hungary, Honduras, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kiribati, Korea (Republic of), Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, the Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, the Micronesian Federation, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, São Tomé, Senegal, Singapore, the Solomon Islands, the Soviet Union, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Sweden, Switzerland, Tonga, Trinidad, Tunisia, Turkey, the Ukraine, the United Kingdom, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Western Samoa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Several more states, such as Nigeria and Ethiopia, are committed to free, multiparty elections but have not yet enacted the necessary constitutional or legislative fiat. It must also be conceded that there are borderline cases, such as Morocco (included) and Jordan (not included), in which the elections are not necessarily decisive, depending on various factors, including the disposition of a monarch with substantial residual powers. In the large majority of cases, however, the decision to include or exclude is not seriously in doubt—though it should be recalled that the test for inclusion is whether the legal system establishes free and secret elections. Whether these are conducted fairly is another question.

5 Austin defined law as the enforced command of a sovereign to a subject. J. Austin, The Prov Ince of Jurisprudence Determined 201 (I. Berlin, S. Hampshire & R. Wollheim eds. 1954) (1832).

6 See, e.g., Theses on the Role of the Communist Party in the Proletarian Revolution Adopted by the Second Congress, in 1 The Communist International: 1919–1943 Documents 127 (J. Degras ed. 1971).

In 1920 Trotsky offered this response to a suggestion that the dictatorship of the Communist Party and the dictatorship of the proletariat were not identical:

Today we received peace proposals from the Polish Government. Who decides this question? We have the Council of People’s Commissars, but that too must be subject to a certain control. Whose control? That of the working class as a formless, chaotic mass? No. So we convened the central committee of the party to discuss the proposal and decide on the answer. … The same is true of the agrarian question, the food question, and all other questions.

Id. at 127–28.

7 Cf. D. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (1965).

8 Plato’s effort, in the Statesman, the Laws and the Republic, to define the extent to which a ruler’s legitimacy is validated by wisdom, on the one hand, and by his subordination to the laws, on the other, is analyzed in G. Sabine, A History of Political Theory 67–105 (rev. ed. 1953).

9 See J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government 119–20, 164–66 (W. Carpenter ed. 1955) (1690).

10 U.S. Department of State, 102D Cong., 1st Sess., Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1990: Report Submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House Of Representatives 322–23 (Comm. Print 1991).

11 Legitimacy, in this as in all other contexts, is a matter of degree. Some rules and institutions enjoy more legitimacy than others.

12 T. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations 19 (1990).

13 Id. at 50–194.

14 Id. at 91.

15 Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, 75 Asil Proc. 101, 110 (1981).

16 Exodus 1:2.

17 The author is indebted to Fr. Robert Crouse, Professor of Classics at Dalhousie University and King’s College, for this approximation, one carefully hedged with caveats appropriate to so risky an enterprise.

18 See H. Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination 20–31 (1990). The use of self-determination at Versailles and subsequently is also discussed more fully in Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AJIL 705, 743–48 (1988).

19 “[T]he phrase [self-determination] is simply loaded with dynamite. It will raise hopes which can never be realized.” R. Lansing, The Peace Negotiations, a Personal Narrative 97 (1921). See Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 Yale J. Int’l L. 177 (1991).

20 1 R. S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement 109 (1922).

21 1 S. Wambaugh, Plebiscites Since the World War 13 (1933).

22 1 R. S. Baker, supra note 20, at 188.

23 2 A History of the Peace Conference of Paris 203 (H. W. V. Temperley ed. 1920).

24 id. at 261.

25 Id. at 262.

26 4 The Intimate Papers of Colonel House 334–35, 345 (C. Seymour ed. 1928).

27 1 S. Wambaugh, supra note 21, at 16.

28 M. Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice 4 (1982); D. Fleming, The United States and World Organization 152–55 (1938). For example, Czechoslovakia ended up with defensible boundaries only by denying self-determination to a large Sudeten-German minority.

29 L. Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination 71 (1978).

30 UN Charter Art. 76(b).

31 Note, however, the decision of the political leaders of imperial India to partition the country, in effect permitting Pakistan to secede. On “territorial integrity,” see Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, GA Res. 1514, 15 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, UN Doc. A/4684 (1960); and Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Annex to GA Res. 2625, 25 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, UN Doc. A/8028 (1970), reprinted in 9 ILM 1292 (1970) [hereinafter Friendly Relations Declaration]. Note also GA Res. 1654 of 1961, in which, without dissent, the Assembly expressed itself as “[d]eeply concerned that, contrary to the provisions of paragraph 6 of the Declaration, acts aimed at the partial or total disruption of national unity and territorial integrity are still being carried out in certain countries in the process of decolonization.” 16 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 65, UN Doc. A/5100 (1961).

32 See Franck, The Stealing of the Sahara, 70 AJIL 694 (1976).

33 As part of the cease-fire package, UNAVEM, the UN observer mission in Angola, oversaw the withdrawal of Cuban troops. The mission will culminate in the observance of elections in 1992. See N.Y. Times, May 26, 1991, §1, at 9, col. 1; and id., June 1, 1991, at Al, col. 3.

34 Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambodia, UN Doc. A/46/608-S/23177, Annex (1991).

35 T. Franck, supra note 12, at 52–55.

36 Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 283 (1989).

37 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/122, reprinted in United Nations, Official Text of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with Annexes and Index, UN Sales No. E.83.V.5 (1983), 21 ILM 1261 (1982). For the Court’s interpretation of Article 83(1), see Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 ICJ Rep. 18 (Judgment of Feb. 24); Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), 1985 ICJ Rep. 13 (Judgment of June 3).

38 See Passage through the Great Belt, 1991 ICJ Rep. 12 (Order of July 29).

39 GA Res. 1541, 15 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16), supra note 31, at 29.

40 Annex to GA Res. 2625, supra note 31, principle 4.

41 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 171, reprinted in 6 ILM 368 (1967) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. The same provision is stated as Article 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 UNTS 3, reprinted in 6 ILM 360 (1967) (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).

42 T. Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law 80–81 (1989); Sohn, Generally Accepted International Rules, 61 Wash. L. Rev. 1073, 1077–78 (1986); Schachter, International Law Implications of U.S. Human Rights Policies, 24 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 63, 68 (1978).

43 D. Mcgoldrick, The Human Rights Committee 14 (1991).

44 Id.

45 Id. at 15.

46 For a different view as to the legal status of the right to secede, see Brilmayer, supra note 19.

47 GA Res. 1541, supra note 39.

48 ICCPR, supra note 41, Art. 40(1).

49 Id., Arts. 28, 30.

50 Id., Art. 32.

51 For a discussion of this procedure, see D. McGoldrick, supra note 43, at 62–119.

52 ICCPR, supra note 41, Art. 41. For a discussion of this procedure, see D. McGoldrlck, supra note 43, at 120–246.

53 ICCPR, supra note 41, Optional Protocol, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, Art. 1, 999 UNTS 302; see also D. McGoldrick, supra note 43, at 127.

54 D. McGoldrick, supra note 43, at 45.

55 Human Rights Committee, Provisional Rules of Procedure, Rule 78(1), UN Doc. CCPR/C/3/Rev.2 (1989). See Report of the Human Rights Committee, 44 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 40) at 179–82, UN Doc. A/44/40 (1989).

56 D. McGoldrick, supra note 43, at 127.

57 Id. at 48.

58 A.D. v. Canada, Report of the Human Rights Committee, 39 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 40) at 200, UN Doc. A/39/40 (1984). See also Ominayak and Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Report of the Human Rights Committee, 45 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 40), vol. 2, App. A, UN Doc. A/45/40 (1990). See discussion in D. McGoldrick, supra note 43, at 254–56; and McGoldrick, Canadian Indians, Cultural Rights and the Human Rights Committee, 40 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 658 (1991).

59 General Comments of the Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1, at 10–11 (1989). See also D. McGoldrick, supra note 43, at 247–48.

60 GA Res. 217A (III), UN Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).

61 ICCPR, supra note 41.

62 Id., Art. 19(3).

63 See D. McGoldrick, supra note 43, at 461.

64 Report of the Human Rights Committee, 36 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 40) at 42–43, UN Doc. A/36/40 (1981) [hereinafter 1981 Report].

65 Id. at 50–51.

66 Id. at 56–57.

67 D. McGoldrick, supra note 43, at 469–70.

68 Alba Pietroroia v. Uruguay, Communication R.10/44, 1981 Report, supra note 64, at 153–59.

69 Report of the Human Rights Committee, 35 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 40) at 111, UN Doc. A/35/40 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 Report].

70 Id. See also Grille Motta v. Uruguay, Communication R.2/11, 1980 Report, supra note 69, at 132; Weinberg Weisz v. Uruguay, Communication R.7/28, 1981 Report, supra note 64, at 114; Hertzberg v. Finland, Communication R.14/61, Report of the Human Rights Committee, 37 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 40) at 161, UN Doc. A/37/40 (1982).

71 Central America: Efforts Towards Peace: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/22494 and Corr.1 (1991); see also N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1991, at A8, col. 3.

72 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 UNTS 221, Europ. TS No. 5 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention].

73 Id., Art. 19, establishing the European Commission on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights. See also Arts. 20–55.

74 The Sunday Times Case, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978).

75 Handyside Case, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976); Case of Muller and Others, 133 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988).

76 Lingens Case, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986).

77 American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, OEA/Ser.K/XVI.1.1, doc. 70, rev.1, corr.1 (1970), reprinted in 1 The Inter-American System, pt. II at 51 (F. V. García-Amador ed. 1983), 9 ILM 673 (1970) (entered into force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter American Convention].

78 Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela. See Current State of Conventions and Protocols on Human Rights, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V.II.79, doc. 12, rev.1, Ann. A (1991).

79 ICCPR, supra note 41.

80 Case 34/1979, 1981 Report, supra note 64, at 130; Case 44/1979, id., Ann. XVI, at 153.

81 Supra note 53.

82 GA Res. 45/150 (Feb. 21, 1991).

83 Id., para. 2.

84 Id.,, para. 3.

85 Id., para. 8.

86 Id., paras. 10, 11. The Secretary-General’s report to the Assembly is UN Doc. A/46/609 (1991).

87 OEA/Ser.F/II.17, doc. 40, rev.2 (1979).

88 OEA/Ser.G/CP/RES.489, doc. 720 (1987).

89 OEA/Ser.F/II.21, doc. 8, rev.2 (1989); see also OEA/Ser.F/II.21, doc. 45 (1989).

90 Representative Democracy, OEA/Ser.P/AG/RES.1080 (XXI–0/91), para. 1.

91 Id., para. 2.

92 Support to the Democratic Government of Haiti, supra note 2.

93 Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.77, doc. 7, rev.1, at 97 (1990) (Mexico Report).

94 Protocol 1 to the European Convention, supra note 72, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 UNTS 262, entered into force May 18, 1954, and, as of June 1991, had been ratified by all but one party to the Convention (Liechtenstein).

95 The Greek Case, 12 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on Hum. Rts. 179 (1969); see also Case of Mathieu-Mohin, 113 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22 (1987).

96 Application 7140/75, 7 Eur. Comm’n H.R. 95, 97 (1977).

97 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, 73 Dep’t St. Bull. 323 (1975), reprinted in 14 ILM 1292 (1975).

98 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, June 29, 1990, reprinted in 29 ILM 1305, 1308, para. 3 (1990) [hereinafter Copenhagen Document].

99 Id., para. 5.

100 Id. at 1309, para. 6.

101 Meron, Democracy and the Rule of Law, 153 World Aff. 23, 24 (1990). See also Steiner, Political Participation as a Human Right, 1 Harv. Hum. Rts. Y.B. 77 (1988).

102 Copenhagen Document, supra note 98, at 1310, para. 7.

103 Buergenthal, The Copenhagen CSCE Meeting: A New Public Order for Europe, 11 Hum. Rts. L.J. 217, 221–22 (1990).

104 Copenhagen Document, supra note 98, at 1310, para. 8.

105 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Charter of Paris for a New Europe and Supplementary Document to Give Effect to Certain Provisions of the Charter, Nov. 21, 1990, Preamble, reprinted in 30 ILM 190, 193 (1991) [hereinafter Paris Charter].

106 Paris Charter, supra note 105, at 193.

107 Id. at 194.

108 Id. at 195.

109 Buergenthal, CSCE Human Dimension: The Birth of a System, 1 Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law, No. 2, at 3, 42–43 (forthcoming).

110 Paris Charter, supra note 105, at 206.

111 Id. at 207.

112 Id.

113 Id. at 214–15.

114 Id. at 214.

115 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, Oct. 3, 1991, Preamble, at 2 (unofficial text of the U.S. delegation), reprinted in 30 ILM 1670 (1991). [hereinafter Moscow Document].

116 Moscow Document, supra note 115, para. 17, at 9.

117 Report of the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner for the Trust Territory of Togoland under British Administration, UN Doc. T/1258 and Add.1 (1956).

118 See GA Res. 1350, 13 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 18A) at 2, UN Doc. A/4090/Add.1 (1959) (whether the Northern Cameroons wished “to be part of the Northern Region of Nigeria when the Federation of Nigeria becomes independent”); GA Res. 1352, 14 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 26, UN Doc. A/4354 (1959) (whether the Southern Cameroons wished to achieve independence by “joining the independent Federation of Nigeria [or] the independent Republic of Cameroons”); GA Res. 1473, id. at 38 (putting the questions posed in the GA Res. 1352 plebiscite before the Northern Cameroons); see also Report of United Nations Commissioner for the Supervision of the Plebiscites in the Southern and Northern Parts of the Trust Territory of the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, UN Doc. T/1556 and app. (1961).

119 GA Res. 1579, 15 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16), supra note 31, at 34 (elections); GA Res. 1605, 15 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16A) at 8, UN Doc. A/4684/Add.1 (1961) (referendum).

120 GA Res. 1569, 15 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16), supra note 31, at 33 (whether the inhabitants of the territory accepted “the Constitution adopted by the Constitutional Convention on 28 October 1960” and endorsed “that on 1 January 1962 Western Samoa should become an independent State on the basis of that Constitution”); see also Report of United Nations Commissioner for the Supervision of the Plebiscite in Western Samoa, UN Doc. T/1564 and Add.1 (1961).

121 Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscite in the Northern Mariana Islands, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 43 UN TCOR Supp. (No. 2) at 24, UN Doc. T/1771 (1976).

122 See Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscite in the Federated States of Micronesia, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 51 UN TCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 14, UN Doc. T/1860 (1984) (June 21, 1983 plebiscite for the islands of Truk, Yap, Kosrae and Ponape); Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscite in the Marshall Islands, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, id. (No. 2) at 12–13, UN Doc. T/1865 (1984) (Sept. 7, 1983 plebiscite); Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscite in Palau, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 53 UN TCOR Supp. (No. 2) at 14, UN Doc. T/1885 (1986) (Feb. 21, 1986 plebiscite).

123 24 UN TCOR Annex 1 (Agenda Item 3) at 21, UN Doc. T/L.928 (1959).

124 GA Res. 2005, 19 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 7, UN Doc. A/5815 (1965); Report of the United Nations Representatives for the Supervision of the Elections in the Cook Islands, UN Doc. A/5962 and Corr.1 (1965).

125 GA Res. 2355, 22 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 54, UN Doc. A/6716 (1967); United Nations Mission for the Supervision of the Referendum and the Elections in Equatorial Guinea, UN Doc. A/7200/Add.4, Anns. V, VI (1968). Independence was formally achieved on October 12, 1968.

126 GA Res. 1752, 17 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 70, UN Doc. A/5217 (1962); Report of the Secretary-General regarding the Act of Self-determination in West Irian, UN Doc. A/7641 (1969).

127 GA Res. 34/10, 34 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 199, UN Doc. A/34/46 (1979); Report of the United Nations Mission to Observe the Elections in the New Hebrides, UN Doc. A/34/852 (1979).

128 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 ICJ Rep. 16 (Advisory Opinion of June 21).

129 SC Res. 435, 33 UN SCOR (Res. & Dec.) at 13, UN Doc. S/INF/34 (1978). It did not authorize the sending of UNTAG until 1989. SC Res. 628, 44 UN SCOR (Res. & Dec.) at 2, UN Doc. S/INF/45 (1989); SC Res. 629, id.

130 Namibia, Independence at Last, UN Chron., June 1990, at 4. Namibia formally achieved independence on March 21, 1990. Id.

131 SC Res. 690 (Apr. 29, 1991).

132 The Situation Concerning Western Sahara: Report by the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/22464 (1991).

133 See The Situation in Central America: Threats to International Peace and Security and Peace Initiatives, UN Doc. A/44/642, at 2 (1989) [hereinafter First Nicaragua Report].

134 GA Res. 43/24, 43 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 27, UN Doc. A/43/49 (1988).

135 UN Doc. A/44/304, at 2 (1989).

136 UN Doc. A/44/375 (1989).

137 SC Res. 637, 44 UN SCOR, supra note 129, at 19.

138 See, e.g., The Situation in Central America: Threat to International Peace and Security and Peace Initiatives, UN Doc. A/44/927 (1990) [hereinafter Fifth Nicaragua Report]. See also First Nicaragua Report, supra note 133; UN Doc. A/44/834 (1990) (Second Report); UN Doc. A/44/917 (1990) (Third Report); UN Doc. A/44/921 (1990) (Fourth Report).

139 Fifth Nicaragua Report, supra note 138.

140 Id. at 3.

141 UN Doc. A/44/965 (1990).

142 GA Res. 45/2 (Oct. 12, 1990).

143 First Report of the United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti, UN Doc. A/45/870, at 9–10 (1990).

144 GA Res. 45/2, supra note 142, para. 1(d).

145 United Nations Electoral Assistance to Haiti, UN Doc. DPI/1120 (1991).

146 Electoral Assistance to Haiti: Note by the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/45/870/Add.1, at 23 (1991).

147 GA Res. A/46/L.8/Rev.1, paras. 1, 2, 4 (Oct. 11, 1991) (italics omitted).

148 The “secondary” role of the General Assembly in recommending collective measures by the members has been controversial, but was found to be justified by Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Charter. See Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), 1962 ICJ Rep. 151, 163 (Advisory Opinion of July 20).

149 N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1990, at A3, col. 4.

150 OEA/Ser.G/CP/RES.537, doc. 805 (1990).

151 Report of the Secretary General on the Assistance the Organization Is Giving to the Provisional Government of Haiti in its Electoral Process, OEA/Ser.G/CP/doc.2108/90, at 1.

152 N.Y. Times, June 9, 1991, §4, at 2, col. 1.

153 See, e.g., the OAS condemnation of General Manuel Noriega’s usurpation of democratic electoral process in Panama’s election of May 7, 1989, supra note 89. See also N.Y. Times, May 18, 1989, at A8, col. 3; id., Aug. 16, 1989, at A9, col. 1.

154 N.Y. Times, June 9, 1991, §4, at 2, col. 1. Cuba is not a member.

155 N.Y. Times, June 6, 1990, at A10, col. 3.

156 See Kahn, Bulgaria’s Different Pathway, Christian Sci. Monitor, June 22, 1990, at 18. Helsinki Watch also sent monitors. N.Y. Times, June 11, 1990, at A1, col. 1.

157 N.Y. Times, June 10, 1990, §1, at 31, col. 1.

158 N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1989, at A13, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1991, at A3, col. 1.

159 National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Response to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 45/150: Developing a United Nations Elections Assistance Capability 2 (1991) (memorandum submitted to the Secretary-General).

160 N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1991, at A5, col. 4.

161 N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1991, at A11, col. 1.

162 Fin. Times (London), Mar. 4, 1991, at 14.

163 Fifth Nicaragua Report, supra note 138, at 3.

164 Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AJIL 866, 868–69 (1990).

165 N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1990, at A12, col. 1.

166 N.Y. Times, May 29, 1991, at A6, col. 5.

167 N.Y. Times, June 22, 1991, at 3, col. 1.

168 Principles for United Nations Observance of Elections, Confidential Memorandum (June 6, 1989) (in the possession of the author).

169 OEA/Ser.G/CP/RES.421, doc. 606 (1985).

170 See U.N. Says It Won’t Monitor Romanian Elections (NEXIS, CURRNT Library, Reuters, Jan. 25, 1990).

171 Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/46/609, para. 79, at 25 (1991). See also Gelb, The Free Elections Trap, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1991, at A23, col. 1.

172 Letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs (H. van den Broek) to the Advisory Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Policy (June 20, 1990), reprinted in Netherlands Advisory Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Policy, Democracy and Human Rights in Eastern Europe 30–31 (1990).

173 See T. Franck, supra note 12, at 150–82.

174 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 UNTS 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).

175 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 UNTS 195, reprinted in 5 ILM 352 (1966) (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter Racial Convention].

176 GA Res. 217A (III), supra note 60.

177 ICCPR, supra note 41.

178 Racial Convention, supra note 175.

179 GA Res. 3068, 28 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 75, UN Doc. A/9030 (1973), reprinted in 13 ILM 56 (1974) (entered into force July 18, 1976) [hereinafter Apartheid Convention].

180 GA Res. 36/55, 36 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 51)at 171, UN Doc. A/36/51 (1981), reprinted in 21 ILM 205 (1982).

181 GA Res. 34/180, 34 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, UN Doc. A/34/46 (1979), reprinted in 19 ILM 33 (1980) (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981).

182 European Convention, supra note 72.

183 American Convention, supra note 77.

184 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5, reprinted in 21 ILM 58 (1982) [hereinafter Banjul Charter].

185 Copenhagen Document, supra note 98.

186 Paris Charter, supra note 105.

187 UN Doc. A/44/210, at 2 (1989).

188 Central America: Efforts Towards Peace, supra note 71.

189 ONUSAL, the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador, will monitor the “release of individuals who have been imprisoned for political reasons … , the right of all persons to associate freely with others for ideological … political … or other purposes … , freedom of expression and of the press” and “freedom of movement.” Agreement on Human Rights, Annex to Note verbale dated 14 August 1990 from the Charge d’affaires of the Permanent Mission of El Salvador to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/44/971–S/21541, ann. at 4–5 (1990). For the March 1991 elections in El Salvador, however, the United Nations declined to mount an observer operation, dedicating its strained resources to other aspects of the peacemaking and monitoring process while letting the OAS take the lead, supported by nongovernmental organizations, in observing those elections. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, supra note 159, at 14.

190 The Security Council failed to reach consensus on the issue, with China threatening to veto. In the General Assembly, Cuba and Colombia argued that election monitoring in an independent state, unrelated to a threat to the peace, constituted a violation of Article 2(7) of the Charter. See UN Doc. A/45/PV.29 (1990).

191 Id. at 62.

192 Id. at 59–60.

193 Id. at 64–65.

194 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 ICJ Rep. 14, 131 (Judgment of June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua opinion].

195 See supra text at and notes 82–86.

196 GA Res. 45/151, para. 2 (Dec. 18, 1990).

197 Id., para. 4.

198 3 J. S. Mill, Dissertations and Discussions: Political, Philosophical and Historical 238–63 (1873).

199 UN Doc. A/34/PV.14, at 4–6 (1979).

200 N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1991, at A13, col. 5.

201 N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1991, at 5, col. 3.

202 Resolution on Representative Democracy, supra note 90.

203 Paris Charter, supra note 105.

204 Moscow Document, supra note 116.

205 See supra text at and notes 196–97.

206 GA Res. 45/151, supra note 196, para. 7.

207 N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1991, at A14, col. 1.

208 Buergenthal, supra note 109, at 43.

209 The General Assembly, in the case of the 1991 Haitian military coup, appears to have concluded that it is empowered to recommend action of an economic and diplomatic kind to its members. In approving regional military action under Article 53, the Security Council appears not to be limited to cases in which international peace has been threatened or breached.

210 Sec Apartheid Convention, supra note 179. See also R. Bissell, Apartheid and International Organizations 156–59 (1977).

211 SC Res. 253, 23 UN SCOR (Res. & Dec.) at 5, UN Doc. S/INF/23/Rev.1 (1968).

212 See Arend, International Law and the Recourse to Force: A Shift in Paradigms, 27 Stan. J. Int’l L. 1, 40–45 (1991).

213 While it is true that General Assembly resolutions, state practice or even a subsequent treaty cannot vitiate a specific rule of the UN Charter, all three can affect a Charter rule’s interpretation. See Czaplinski & Danilenko, Conflicts of Norms in International Law, 21 Neth. Y.B. Int’l L. 3, 35–41 (1990).

214 See T. Franck, Nation Against Nation 224–45 (1985).

215 D. Mcgoldrick, supra note 43, at 459–79. Under the procedure for review of country reports, the Committee has sought to

examine, comment, and request clarification in respect of the different aspects of freedom of expression revealed in the State reports. This has involved, for example, such matters as general and specific banning or censorship, registration or notification requirements, governmental control and direction in its various forms, limitations applicable to particular groups, for example, armed forces, civil servants, prior restraints or subsequent penal responsibility for publications, rights of reply or correction, the applicable limitations embodied in the criminal law or penal codes for offences such as blasphemy or blasphemous libel, sedition, subversive propaganda, anti-State or anti-ideological propaganda, and the effective remedies demanded by … an individual who claims that his rights under article 19 have been violated.

Id. at 461.

216 The Commission is established by part II of the Banjul Charter, supra note 184.

217 European Convention, supra note 72, Arts. 9, 10, 11.

218 American Convention, supra note 77, Arts. 13, 14, 15, 16.

219 Banjul Charter, supra note 184, Arts. 8, 9, 10, 11.

220 T. Franck, supra note 12, at 184.

221 UN Charter, Art. 2(4). See also Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, Art. 1, 46 Stat. 2343, TS No. 796, 94 LNTS 57 (Kellogg-Briand Pact).

222 See Nicaragua opinion, 1986 ICJ Rep. 14.

223 The customary law is well summarized in the Court’s Nicaragua opinion, id. at 98–105. See, especially, Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 31; Definition of Aggression, GA Res. 3314, 29 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, UN Doc. A/9631 (1974), reprinted in 13 ILM 710 (1974).

224 SC Res. 660 (Aug. 2, 1990), reprinted in 29 ILM 1325 (1990), and subsequent resolutions. See Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AJIL 452 (1991).

225 Mearsheimer, Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War, Atlantic Monthly, August 1990, at 35, 46.

226 T. Smith, Democracy Resurgent, in Sea Changes 152, 157 (N. Rizopoulos ed. 1990).

227 I. Kant, Perpetual Peace 107–39 (T. Humphrey rev. ed. 1983) (1795).

228 See Doyle, Liberalism and World Politics, 80 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1151 (1986).

229 Note, however, that the notion of human rights operates to limit not only totalitarian, but also democratic, excess. Thomas Jefferson underscored this with his oft-quoted observation that “an elective despotism was not the government we fought for.” T. Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 120 (W. Peden ed. 1954).

230 The point is well developed by Doyle, An International Liberal Community, in Rethinking America’s Security (G. Allison ed., forthcoming).

231 Copenhagen Document, supra note 98, Preamble, at 1307.

232 SC Res. 253, supra note 211.

233 OEA/Ser.F/II.17, doc. 40/79, rev.2.

234 OEA/Ser.F/II.21, doc. 8/89, rev.2.

235 Central America: Efforts Toward Peace, supra note 71.

236 Reparations for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, 1949 ICJ Rep. 174, 179–80 (Advisory Opinion of Apr. 11).

237 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Doc. SN 151/2/91 (Ann. V) at 27 (1991).

238 To limit collective security measures to cases of attack against democratic states is a change in the system’s rules that is unlikely to come about in the near future. Yet it is worth contemplating. Would it help Kuwait to establish a democratic internal order if its future protection by UN-authorized collective measures depended upon such a transformation?