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The Economic Structure of International Law. By Joel P. Trachtman. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008. Pp. xii, 354. Index. $55.00, £40.95, €49.50.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 March 2017

Jide Nzelibe
Jide Nzelibe*
Affiliation:
Northwestern University School of Law
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Abstract

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Type
Recent Books on International Law
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 103 , Issue 3 , July 2009 , pp. 619 - 623
Copyright
Copyright © 2009 by The American Society of International Law

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References

1 See Anne-Marie, Slaughter International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AJIL 205 (1993)Google Scholar; Abbott, Kenneth W. Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Laivyers, 14 Yale J. Int’l L. 335 (1989).Google Scholar

2 Obviously, this list is merely intended to be illustrative. Arguably, other international law scholars such as Tom Ginsburg, Kal Raustiala, Eric Posner, and Jack Goldsmith might fit this description as well, but I would characterize these scholars’ work as more eclectic from an interdisciplinary perspective. In other words, while these scholars routinely invoke Insights from law and economics, they tend to use them in conjunction forged largely in the international relations literature.

3 See, e.g., Dunnoff, Jeffrey L. & Trachtman, Joel P. Economic Analysis of International Law, 24 Yale J. Int’l L. 1 (1999)Google Scholar.

4 See Goldsmith, Jack L. & Posner, Eric A. The Limits of International Law 36–39 (2005).Google Scholar

5 See id. at 36-37.

6 See id. at 87.

7 See Guzman, Andrew T. How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory 71–86 (2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 A growing group crop of scholars in the legal academy, such as Richard Steinberg, Daniel Abebe, and Ami Bradford, are emphasizing such asymmetric power dynamics among states in their scholarship.

9 See Gruber, Lloyd Ruling The World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions (2000).Google Scholar