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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 May 2017
The recent appearance of the Austrian Red Book and Servian Blue Book completes the history of the breaking out of the war, as told in the official diplomatic correspondence of the belligerent nations, so far as they have seen fit to make this correspondence public.
It is the purpose of this article to attempt to summarize the story told by this correspondence, and at the same time to indicate the conclusions which in the opinion of the writer may properly be drawn therefrom, with respect to the immediate causes of the war. The dispatches are so numerous, and the action they record was crowded into such a short space of time that it is difficult to keep this summary within reasonable limits. And this difficulty is increased by the fact that those who sympathize with the viewpoint of the belligerents on the one side or the other, are apt to differ radically as to which parts of the correspondence are important, therefore making it necessary for anyone desirous of summarizing the documents in a way to afford a basis for a fair consideration of the arguments advanced on either side, to go into the correspondence much more fully than would be necessary if there were a greater agreement as to the relative importance of the issues which it presents. It will be the effort of the writer, while confining himself—with such exceptions as are specifically noted—strictly to the diplomatic correspondence, to set out impartially the portions of the correspondence especially emphasized, on the one side and on the other, with full references to the original documents. If he is successful in this, his readers can be relied on to correct any errors in his comments and conclusions.
a The latter has become available since this article was put in type. It does not materially affect the situation, but several references thereto have been added.
1 Mr.Beck, James M., in his article “In the Supreme Court of Civilization,” N. Y. Times Current History of the War, No. 3, Jan. 9, 1915, pp. 415, 416 Google Scholar, pointed out the omission from the German White Paper of practically all correspondence between Berlin and Vienna, an omission which the publication of the Austrian Red Book since that time has only made good to a limited extent. But Mr. Beck appears to have fallen into error when he made the sweeping statement that “ the official defense of England and Russia does not apparently show any failure on the part of either to submit all of the documents in their possession.”
Compare Dr. von Mach’s “Defense of the Dual Alliance, a Reply,” ibid., p. 438, pointing out omissions in the British White Paper (which however, aside from the correspondence with Rome, as to which see supra, p. 404, do not appear to be important); and Dr.Helfferich’s, “The Dual Alliance v. The Triple Entente,” N. Y. Times, March 14, 1915 Google Scholar, which performs the same service, for the French Yellow Book. An omission from the Russian Orange Book is pointed out infra, p. 421, note 43.
2 By Professor Delbrück, of the University of Berlin, in an article entitled “Germany’s Answer,” Atlantic Monthly, February, p. 241. The word “falsification” may possibly be due to an unhappy translation. But there can be no question of Professor Delbrück’s responsibility (upon the strength of a preconceived theory supported it is submitted by wholly insufficient evidence) for the substantial charge conveyed by the word, against the English and apparently also the French Government.
3 Professor Sloan, in N. Y. Times Current History of the War, Vol. I, No. 3, p. 520.
3a See Servian Blue Book, Nos. 8, 12, 16.
4 As to the nature of Germany’s advance information see infra, p. 418, note 35.
Italy, the other member of the Triple Alliance, appears not to have been taken into the confidence of Austria. On July 27th M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, reported to his government the following conversation with the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs:
“He spoke to me of the contents of the Austrian note, and formally assured me that he had not had any previous knowledge of it.
“ He knew, indeed, that this note was to have a rigorous and forcible character; but he had not suspected that it could take such a form. I asked him if it was true that be had given at Vienna, as certain papers allege, an approval of the Austrian action and an assurance that Italy would fulfil her duties as an ally towards Austria. ‘In no way,’ the Minister replied: ‘we were not consulted; we were told nothing; it was not for us, then, to make any such communication to Vienna.’”
(French Yellow Book, No. 72, Supplement to this Journal, April, 1915, p. 208). See to the same effect, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, September 1, 1914, Supplement, Jan. 1915, p. 2, who says that the Italian Ambassador at Vienna “was left completely in the dark.” See also French Yellow Book, Nos. 26, 35, 50, 56, Supplement, April, 1915, pp. 172, 181, 191, 196; British White Paper, No. 38, Supplement, Oct. 1914, pp. 282, 283.
5 Sir M. de Bunsen’s dispatch to Sir Edward Grey, Sept. 1, 1914, Supplement, Jan. 1915, p. 1, refers to this telegram which however does not appear in the British White Paper. See Dr. von Mach’s article N. Y. Times Current History of the War, Vol. I, No. 3, p. 438, referred to supra, p. 404, note 1.
6 British White Paper, No. 1, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 1. The German Ambassador in turn either upon this or some other occasion about the same time, appears to have asked Sir Edward Grey privately, if need arose, to “exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburg.” (British White Paper, No. 11, Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, British Ambassador at Paris, July 24, 1914, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 266.)
7 French Yellow Book, No. 19, M. Paul Cambon to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 22, 1914, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 165.
8 French Yellow Book, No. 15, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 21, 1914, Supplement, April, p. 162 (recounting representations at Berlin by the Servian, Russian and French representatives). See also French Yellow Book, No. 17, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 164.
9 French Yellow Book, No. 10, M. Palèologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 6, 1914, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 159.
10 French Yellow Book, Nos. 18 and 20; British Command Paper 7596, Miscellaneous No. 10, 1914, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, Sept. 1, 1914, Supplement, Jan. 1915, p. 1. As a consequence the Russian Ambassador at Vienna felt justified in going on leave July 20th. (French Yellow Book, No. 18, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 164).
11 Austrian Red Book, No. 6, Freiherr von Giesl to Count Berchtold, July 21, 1914. This book will be printed in a future issue of the Supplement to this Journal.
12 Note addressed to the Servian Government by the Austro-Hungarian Government on July 23, 1914. Austrian Red Book, No. 7; British White Paper, No. 4, Supplement, Oct. 1914, pp. 254–257.
13 Note addressed to the Servian Government by the Austro-Hungarian Government on July 23, 1914. Austrian Red Book, No. 7; British White Paper, No. 4, Supplement, Oct. 1914, pp. 254–257.
14 Austrian Red Book, No. 8. British White Paper, No. 4, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 259.
15 Austrian Red Book, No. 19.
16 French Yellow Book, No. 75, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 212.
17 See for instance enclosure 11, relating to “Anti-Austro-Hungarian paintings in the Ministry of War at Belgrade,” which are thus described: “Over a landscape, part mountain (Bosnia) and part plain (Southern Hungary) there is shown the ‘zora’ or dawning of Servian hopes. In the foreground is an armed woman upon whose shield are the names of all the provinces ‘yet to be freed’—Bosnia, Herzegovina, Vojvodina, Syrmia, Dalmatia, etc.”
18 On June 30th the Austrian legation at Belgrade asked the Secretary General of the Servian Foreign Office “the pertinent inquiry as to what steps the Royal police had taken or intended to take in an effort to trace the threads of the outrage which notoriously led into Servia. His reply was that so far the Servian police had not even taken the matter up.” (Austrian Red Book, No. 2, Ritter Von Storck to Count Berchtold.) Servia would seem to have made a great mistake, to say the least, in not immediately starting an inquiry on the basis of this suggestion.
One cannot but be impressed with a remark of Count Mensdorff, Austrian Ambassador to London, in discussing the Austrian note with Sir Edward Grey on July 24th, that “the present situation might never have arisen if Servia had held out a hand after the murder of the Archduke.” (British White Paper, No. 5, Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.)
[When the above was written the Servian Blue Book was not available. See Nos. 5, 8 and 30. The conclusion reached in the text is not, however, affected.]
19 See remarks of M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Count Szapary, July 24, 1914, as reported by M. Palèologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, French Yellow Book, No. 54, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 194.
“ ‘The intention which inspired this document,’ he said, ‘is legitimate if you pursue no other aim but the protection of your territory against the agitation of Servian anarchists. But the step to which you have had recourse is not defensible.’ He concluded, ‘take back your ultimatum, modify its form, and I will guarantee its result.’”
20 British White Paper, No. 18, supra. According to the German Ambassador to Austria, however, it was “impossible to speak effectively in any other way to Servia.” (British White Paper, No. 32, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, July 26, 1914, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 279 at 280.) And compare the German official statement on July 24th, that “the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as equitable and moderate.” British White Paper, No. 9, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 263.
21 British White Paper, No. 5, Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July 24, 1914, Supplement, Oct. 1914, pp. 259–260. See also French Yellow Book, No. 34, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 180.
Compare Sir Edward Grey’s reference in speaking with the German Ambassador; to the “extraordinarily stiff character of the Austrian note.” (British White Paper, No. 11, July 24, 1914, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 266.) See also British White Paper, Nos. 7, 16, 24, and 44.
22 Professor Delbrück, in the magazine article already referred to (supra, note 2, p. 405) maintains that “the fundamental error of the British Blue Book in the presentation of the case is the assumption of the right of Russia to assume the protection of Servia,” and argues that if Sir Edward Grey had really desired to maintain peace “he would have made it clear to the Czar that he must withdraw his protecting hand from Servia,” which Professor Delbrück admits “would have been rather hard for the Czar to concede.” But this contention entirely ignores the previous relations of the parties. In Count Berchtold’s circular note to the Austrian Ambassadors to the Powers, communicating the text of the note to Servia, of July 23rd, he charges that the Servian Government had failed “in the duty imposed on it by the solemn declaration of the 31st March, 1909, and acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary” (Austrian Red Book, No. 8, Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors, July 22, 1914; communicated by Count Mensdorff, Austrian Ambassador at London, to Sir Edward Grey, July 24, 1914, British White Paper No. 4, Supplement, October, 1914, p. 258. Italics the author’s), thereby recognizing that, although the undertaking of 1909 was given in terms to Austria, it was given as the result of consultation and joint action on the part of the great Powers. (See British White Paper, No. 17, Sir George Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, July 25, 1914, Supplement, October, 1914, p. 270.)
The memorandum introductory to the Austrian Red Book refers to Russia as “assuming the part” of protector to Servia in 1909; and that Russia’s attitude was unchanged and was well known to the Austrian and German Governments. “During the Balkan crisis” the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs “had made it clear to the Austrian Government that war with Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Servia.” (British White Paper No. 139, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, quoting the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Aug. 1st, 1914, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 361. See to the same effect British White Paper No. 78, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, July 29, 1914, Supplement, Oct., p. 313 at 314.) And at that time the Austrian government recognized Russia’s right to befriend Servia by agreeing to a compromise with respect to the Albanian frontier line. (British White Paper, No. 118, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, July 31, 1914, Supplement, Oct., p. 346.) Both Austria and Germany in the course of the published correspondence make formal record of their understanding of Russia’s conception of her interest in the premises. In Count Berchtold’s elaborate dispatch to the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, of July 25th, in which he gave the Ambassador general instructions with respect to his attitude during the pending crisis, he said “In resolving to proceed firmly against Servia we are fully aware that a conflict with Russia may result from the existing Servian differences.” (Austrian Red Book, No. 26, Count Berchtold to Count Szapary, at St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914.) In the German official memorandum upon the negotiations it is said “we were fully aware in this connection that warlike moves on the part of Austria-Hungary against Servia would bring Russia into the question and might bring us into the war in accordance with our duties as an ally.” (German memorandum, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 373.)
Finally, Austria recognized Russia’s interest in the matter by her repeated assurances to Russia and to other Powers that she intended to respect Servia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Why these assurances if it was no concern of Russia’s what happened to Servia? If the Powers in general, or Russia in particular, had any right to these assurances, they were likewise entitled to consider whether the Austrian demands did not in fact render them nugatory. It is too late to deny that the “Eastern question” is a matter of general European concern. Indeed, it would seem that Professor Delbrück’s contention that Russia was not entitled to a voice with respect to Austria’s proposed chastisement of Servia really amounts to an admission of the truth of the Russian contention that Austria aimed at overthrowing the “status quo in the Balkans and establishing her own hegemony there.” (British White Paper, No. 17, July 25, 1914, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey; Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 270 at 271.)
28 British White Paper, No. 6, Supplement, Oct. 1914, pp. 261, 262.
The Russian and French Governments repeatedly urged this view upon Great Britain during the course of the negotiations. Thus, on July 25th, Sir George Buchanan reports M. Sazonof as saying that “he did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia, there would be no war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would flow and we would in the end be dragged into the war.” (British White Paper, No. 17, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 271. See also British White Paper, No. 47, Sir Edward Grey to Sir George Buchanan, July 27, 1914; Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 292.)
The same argument was made by the President of the French Republic to the British Ambassador to France, July 30th. (British White Paper, No. 99, Supplement, Oct. 1914, pp. 331, 332. See also French Yellow Book, No. 47, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 25, 1914, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 189; British White Paper, No. 119, Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 31, 1914, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 347.) Perhaps the best statement of Great Britain’s answer to this line of argument, found in the correspondence, is that made by Sir George Buchanan in conversation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 27, 1914, when he urged that:
“His excellency was mistaken if he believed that the cause of peace could be promoted by our telling the German Government that they would have to deal with us as well as with Russia and France, if she supported Austria by force of arms. Their attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace, and we could only induce her to use her influence at Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend who was anxious to preserve peace.” (British White Paper, No. 44, Supplement, Oct. 1914, pp. 289–290.) See also Sir G. Buchanan’s language to M. Sazonof as reported in British White Paper, No. 17, July 25th, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 271.
What would have been the immediate practical effect of the adoption of M. Sazonof’s policy it is of course impossible to say. The subsequent course of the negotiations suggests that it might conceivably have been effective for the moment in preventing war. But it is submitted that the peace maintained by such a course could in the nature of things have been only temporary, and that Sir George Buchanan’s answer was absolutely sound even although it has turned out as M. Sazonof predicted, that rivers of blood are flowing and England has been dragged into the war. Mr. Bernard Shaw, in his scintillating and amusing “ Common sense about the War,” has seized upon M. Sazonof’s argument, and grafted upon it a charge that Sir Edward Grey by failing to pursue the course suggested entrapped Germany into an untenable position and then “unmasked the Junker-militarist battery” upon the German Ambassador “caught in a death-trap.” (N. Y. Times Current History of the European War, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 20.) The German Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, evidently does not agree with this view, as appears from the following passage from an authorized interview with him, by Mr. James Creelman:
“It has been suggested, Mr. Chancellor, that the English Government was not frank in dealing with Germany; that if it had announced plainly its intention to take part in the war on the side of the allies the course of Germany might have been wholly different.”
“No, the English Government was frank enough about that, and I never had any doubt as to what they intended to do in the event of actual war. Their crime against the world was that they actually had in their power to say whether there should be a world war or not, and with that opportunity in their hands they deliberately supported France and Russia and made an absolute certainty of the greatest disaster in the history of the world.” (Press dispatches.) Compare Lord Cromer’s remarks in the London Spectator, May 1, 1915, p. 611.
24 British White Paper, No. 6, Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey, July 24, Supplement, Oct. 1914, pp. 260, 262. Sir George Buchanan’s whole dispatch is most interesting, and his conduct on this occasion—which met the full approval and commendation of Sir Edward Grey (see his dispatch of acknowledgment, British White Paper, No. 24, Sir Edward Grey to Sir George Buchanan, July 28, 1914, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 275)—is typical of the efficient work done by the members of the British diplomatic corps in every capital of Europe in the days from July 23rd to August 4th. The German army has shown itself no more prepared and efficient in the field of arms than the British Foreign Service in the field of diplomacy.
25 Russian Orange Book, No. 4, July 24, 1914, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Charge1 d’Affaires at Vienna, Supplement, Jan. 1915, p. 10.
26 Russian Orange Book, No. 5, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian representatives at London, Berlin, Rome and Paris, July 24, 1914, Supplement, Jan. 1915, p. 11.
27 British White Paper, No. 26, Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July 25, 1814, Supplement, Oct. 1914, pp. 276–277; Russian Orange Book, No. 16, Supplement, Jan. 1915, p. 16.
28 Russian Orange Book, No. 15, Supplement, Jan. 1915, p. 15; French Yellow Book, No. 39, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 184.
29 French Yellow Book, Nos. 44 and 50, Supplement, April, 1915, pp. 187, 191; British White Paper, No. 40, Supplement, Oct. 19)4, p. 287. The Italian Foreign Minister was not the only European diplomat absent from his post at the time of the delivery of the Austrian note. The President of the French Republic and the President of the Council were at sea returning from a visit to Russia. (British White Paper, No. 6, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 262, etc.) The Russian Ambassador to Austria-Hungary was on leave. (See supra, p. 408, note 10.) So was the Italian Ambassador at Berlin. (French Yellow Book, No. 35, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 181). So apparently was the English Ambassador at Berlin, Sir Edward Goschen. (French Yellow Book, No. 73, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 209.) On the other hand, the German Emperor was also absent, cruising in Norwegian waters. He returned suddenly to Berlin, July 26th. (British White Paper, No. 33, Supplement, Oct. 1914, pp. 280, 281.)
30 British White Paper, No. 11, Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, July 24, 1914, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 266; British White Paper, No. 18, Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey, July 25, 1914, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 271.
31 Russian Orange Book, No. 14, July 25, 1914, Supplement, Jan. 1915, p. 15.
32 French Yellow Book, No. 41, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 185.
33 German White Paper, Annex 1 B, Supplement, Oct. 1914, pp. 396, 397. The hour at which this telegram was sent is not given.
34 British White Paper, No. 9, which gives the text of this note as communicated to Great Britain, Supplement, Oct. 1914, pp. 263–265. Compare French Yellow Book, No. 28, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 174.
35 Official German memorandum, German White Paper, Supplement, Oct. 1914, pp. 373, 374. After this unequivocal statement, it becomes entirely immaterial whether or not the German Foreign Office had knowledge of the actual text of the Austrian note prior to its delivery, except as affecting Germany’s good faith, in view of the formal and repeated statements of the German Foreign Office that there was no such knowledge. In a note verbale handed to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs at St. Petersburg, by the German Ambassador, July 25th, it was stated:
“ The German government had no knowledge of the text of the Austrian note before it was presented, and exercised no influence upon its contents. A threatening attitude is wrongly attributed to Germany.” (Russian Orange Paper, No. 18, Supplement, Jan. 1915, p. 17.) For similar declarations at Berlin see French Yellow Book, Nos. 15, 30, 41; British White Paper, No. 2. At London, Russian Orange Paper, No. 20. At Paris, French Yellow Book, Nos. 36 and 57; Russian Orange Paper, No. 19.
Considerable surprise and some incredulity is expressed in various quarters, in the course of the diplomatic correspondence in regard to the German statement on this point (for instance, see the French Yellow Book, Nos. 15, 30, 41, 57), and one or two hearsay statements are recorded as justifying this incredulity. (French Yellow Book, No. 21; British White Paper, No. 95; Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, September 1, 1914, Supplement, Jan. 1915, p. 1.) But these statements are not of a character in themselves to entitle them to serious consideration as against the official German statements to the contrary. As a matter of reasoning on the facts, the German admission of prior consultation with Austria and approval of Austria’s course and full assumption of responsibility for the Austrian note appears to furnish an adequate explanation of what happened. And it would seem more in accordance with the theory which Germany had determined to apply, i. e., that “the question at issue was one for settlement between Servia and Austria alone” for the German Foreign Office to abstain from collaboration in the textual preparation of the Austrian note, or knowledge of its contents in advance of delivery. (See British White Paper, No. 2, Sir Edward Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, July 22; Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 252.) The substance of the note having been agreed upon, it was possibly deemed better for Germany to be in a position to plead ignorance of the precise wording, and this course was more in accordance with the dignity of Austria as a great Power.
35 French Yellow Book, No. 41, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, July 25, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 185.
37 British White Paper, No. 18, July 25, 1914, Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 271.
38 Russian Orange Book, No. 14, Supplement, Jan. 1915, p. 15.
39 Russian Orange Book, No. 11, July 25, 1914, Russian Chargé d’Affaires at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Supplement, Jan. 1915, p. 14. See French Yellow Book, No. 45, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 188.
40 Russian Orange Book, No. 12, Supplement, Jan. 1915, p. 14; Austrian Red Book, No. 20, July 25, 1914.
41 Austrian Red Book No. 21, Count Berchtold to Count Szapary, July 25, 1914. The memorandum introductory to the Austrian Red Book says on this point: “Russia’s proposal to extend the time-limit for the Servian answer would have furnished the Belgrade Government with the opportunity for underhanded procrastination, and would have opened the door to the intervention of other Powers on Servia’s behalf. An extension of the time-limit had, therefore, to be declined.”
42 The instructions of the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs to support the Russian request for more time arrived too late to be acted on, and the same was true of the French instructions which arrived just as the time limit expired. (French Yellow Book, No. 48, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 190).
43 The Prince Regent of Servia appealed to the Czar for assistance, and promised to abide by his advice, July 24th. (Russian Orange Book, No. 6, Supplement, Jan. 1915, pp. 11, 12.) No note embodying the Russian advice appears in the Russian Orange Book, prior to the general pacific advice contained in telegram of the Czar to the Prince Regent, July 27th, two days after the Servian reply. (Russian Orange Book, No. 40, Supplement, Jan. 1915, p. 27.) But there seems every reason to believe that the advice must have been given. The Russian Ambassador at Vienna said to the British Ambassador “that Russia had counselled Servia to yield as far as she possibly could without sacrificing her independence.” (See British White Paper, No. 118, July 31, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 346.) And the British representative at Belgrade telegraphed Sir Edward Grey, July 25, “ I think it is highly probable that the Russian Government have already urged the utmost moderation on the Servian Government.” (British White Paper, No. 22, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 274.) See also British White Paper, No. 46, Sir Edward Grey to Sir Edward Goschen, July 27, 1914, “I assumed that Servian reply could not have gone as far as it did unless Russia had exercised conciliatory influence at Belgrade.”
As for the advice given by the French Government, see French Yellow Book, Nos. 26 and 36, Supplement, April, 1915, pp. 172, 181; and British White Paper, No. 15, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 269.
Sir A. Nicholson, of the English Foreign Office, in conversation with the Servian Minister, July 3rd, expressed the hope “that Servia would endeavor to meet the Austrian demands in a conciliatory and moderate spirit.” (British White Paper, No. 30, Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, July 25, 1914, Supplement, Oct. 1914, pp. 278, 279.)
For Sir Edward Grey’s official advice in the same sense, see British White Paper, No. 12, July 24, 1914, Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 267. This advice, however, appears not to have actually been tendered directly by the British representative at Belgrade (British White Paper, No. 22, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 274. See also British White Paper, No. 17, Supplement. Oct. 1914, p. 270). But it undoubtedly reached Servia in substance and effect through French and Russian channels.
44 Russian Orange Book, No. 33, July 27, 1914, Supplement, Jan. 1915, p. 24.
45 French Yellow Book, No. 61, July 27, 1914, Circular instructions of M. Bienvenu-Martin, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 201. See also French Yellow Book, No. 56, July 26, 1914, Circular instruction of M. Bienvenu-Martin in which he speaks of the Servian Government having “given way on all points with the exception of two small reservations.”
46 British White Paper, No. 46, July 27, Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 291.
47 British White Paper, No. 48, July 27, Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 292 at 294.
48 British White Paper, No. 75, July 29, Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 311.
49 British White Paper, No. 32, July 26, 1914, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, Supplement, Oct. 1914, pp. 279, 280.
50 British White Paper, No. 93, July 28, Russian Ambassador to Vienna, to M. Sazonof, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 325.
51 Austrian Red Book, No. 41, July 28, 1914, Count Berchtold to Austrian Ambassador at London.
52 French Yellow Book, No. 75, July 28, 1914, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 212. The personal views of the Austrian and German Ambassadors at Paris as reported by the French Foreign Office (Russian Orange Book, No. 27, July 26th, Russian Chargè d’Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and French Yellow Book, No. 57, July 26, 1914, note for the Minister) do not appear to be entitled to any particular weight, inasmuch as the Ambassadors had at that time apparently not seen the text of the Servian reply.
53 Austrian Red Book, No. 34, July 27th, Count Berchtold to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors in Berlin, London, Rome, Paris and St. Petersburg. See also German White Book, Supplement, Oct. 1914, pp. 386–393.
54 British White Paper, No. 64, July 28, 1914, Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 304.
55 Russian Orange Book, No. 25, July 26, 1914, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Russian Ambassador at Vienna, Supplement, Jan. 1915, p. 20; Austrian Red Book, No. 31, July 27, 1914, Count Szapary, Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Count Berchtold.
56 British White Paper, No. 39, Reply of Servian Government to Austro-Hungarian note, Supplement, Oct. 1914, pp. 283–287; Austrian Red Book, No. 34.
57 German White Paper, Supplement, Oct. 1914, 389.
58 British White Paper, No. 4, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 256.
59 Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 1914, p. 390.
60 Supplement, Oct. 1914, pp. 390, 391. It will be remembered that the coöperation demanded was “in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy.”
61 Ibid., p. 391.
62 Austrian Red Book, No. 27, Count Berchtold to Count Szapary in St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914.
63 Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 391.
64 British White Paper, No. 48, July 27, Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 292 at 294.
65 British White Paper, No. 39, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 283 at 287.
66 Compare the advice given to the Servian Minister at Paris by M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, July 24, 1914, “above all, to attempt to escape from the direct grip of Austria by declaring herself ready to submit to the arbitration of Europe.” (French Yellow Book, No. 26, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 172. See supra, p. 420, note 41.)
67 British White Paper, No. 23, July 25th, Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 274.
68 French Yellow Book, No. 50, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 191; Austrian Red Book, Nos. 29, 30, 39, 40.
69 British White Paper, No. 23, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 274; French Yellow Book, No. 50, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 191.
70 French Yellow Book, No. 51, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 193.
71 British White Paper, No. 18, July 25, 1914, Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 271.
72 French Yellow Book, No. 43, July 25th, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 186.
73 British White Paper, No. 14, July 25th, Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie and Sir George Buchanan, Supplement, Oct. 1914, pp. 268, 269. In Count Berchtold’s original instructions to the Austrian Ambassador in London the Ambassador was directed to communicate this information as “strictly confidential.” (Austrian Red Book, No. 17.)
74 British White Paper, No. 11, July 24th, Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, Counselor of the British Embassy at Berlin, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 266. See also British White Paper, No. 10, Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 265.
75 British White Paper, No. 26, July 25, 1914, Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, Supplement, Oct. 1914, pp. 276, 277.
76 British White Paper, No. 27, July 25th, Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir H. Rumbold and Sir George Buchanan, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 277.
77 British White Paper, No. 63, July 28, 1914, Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 304.
78 British White Paper, No. 34, July 26, 1914, Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 281.
79 British White Paper, No. 46, July 27th, Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 291.
80 German official memorandum, German White Book, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 377; British White Paper, No. 67, July 28, 1914, Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, Supplement, Oct. 1914, pp. 305, 306; Austrian Red Book, No. 43, July 28th, Count Berchtold to Count Szogyeny in Berlin.
81 Austrian Red Book, No. 44, Count Berchtold to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors in St. Petersburg, London, Paris and Rome.
82 German White Book, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 377. See also British White Paper, No. 75, July 29, 1914, Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 311.
83 British White Paper, No. 62, July 28th, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 303.
84 French Yellow Book, No. 56, July 26, 1914, Circular instruction of M. Bienvenu-Martin, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 196; French Yellow Book, No. 50, July 26, 1914; British White Paper, No. 51, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 296.
85 French Yellow Book, No. 51, July 26, 1914, M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 193.
86 British White Paper, No. 18, July 25, Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey, Supplement, Oct. 1914, pp. 71, 72; French Yellow Book, No. 67, July 27, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 205.
87 British White Paper, No. 25, July 25, Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 276.
88 German White Book, Annex 13, July 25, 1914, telegram from the Imperial German Chancellor to the German Ambassador to London, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 403.
89 French Yellow Book, No. 74, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 27th, Supplement, April, 1915, p . 210; Austrian Red Book, No. 47, July 29, 1914, Count Szapary to Count Berchtold.
90 British White Paper, No. 36, July 26, Sir Edward Grey to Sir F . Bertie and Sir R. Rodd, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 282.
91 French Yellow Book, No. 70, July 27, M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. de Fleuriau, French Charge1 d’Affaires at London, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 207; British White Paper, No. 42, July 27, Sir F . Bertie to Sir Edward Grey, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 288; British White Paper, No. 51, July 27, Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p . 296; British White Paper, No. 52, July 28, note communicated by the French Embassy, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 297.
92 British White Paper, No. 35, July 26, Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 281; British White Paper, No. 49, July 27, Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, Supplement, Oct. 1914, pp. 294, 295.
93 Italy accepted the same day the proposition was made—July 26th—France on July 27th.
94 British White Paper, No. 53, July 27, M. Sazonof, Russian Premier, to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, communicated July 28, Supplement, Oct. 1914, pp. 297, 298; Russian Orange Book, No. 32, Supplement, Jan. 1915, p. 23; British White Paper, No. 55, July 27, Sir George Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, received July 28, Supplement, Oct. 1914, pp. 298, 299; French Yellow Book, No. 80, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 229.
95 British White Paper, No. 43, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 288; French Yellow Book, Nos. 74, 81, Supplement, April, 1915, pp. 210, 230.
96 British White Paper, No. 43, July 27, Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey. This explanation was confirmed by Sir Edward Grey the next day. British White Paper, No. 67, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 305. Compare Ambassador Jules Cambon’s account of this interview between Herr von Jagow and Sir E. Goschen, French Yellow Book, No. 73, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 209.
97 British White Paper, No. 43, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 288.
98 French Yellow Book, No. 74, July 27, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 210.
99 French Yellow Book, No. 74, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 210.
100 British White Paper, No. 46, Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 291.
101 French Yellow Book, No. 81, July 28, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 230.
102 French Yellow Book, No. 81.
103 British White Paper, No. 60, July 28, Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 202.
104 British White Paper, No. 71, July 28, Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 308.
105 British White Paper, No. 67, July 28, Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, Supplement, Oct. 1914, pp. 305–306; No. 69, July 28, Sir Edward Grey to Sir George Buchanan, Supplement, Oct. 1914, pp. 306–7.
106 British White Paper, No. 78, July 29, Sir George Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 313. See also British White Paper, No. 55, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 299.
107 British White Paper, No. 71, July 28, 1914, Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 308.
108 Russian Orange Book, No. 38, July 27, Russian Chargè d’Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Supplement, Jan. 1915, p. 26. Compare French Yellow Book, No. 81, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 28, 1914, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 230.
109 German White Paper, Annex 15, telegram of Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in London, July 27, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 404.
110 See German memorandum, Supplement, Oct. 1914, pp. 372–377.
111 Supplement, October, 1914, p. 378.
112 Austrian Red Book, No. 26, July 25, 1914, Count Berchtold to Count Szapary, in St. Petersburg. (Italics the author’s.)
113 Austrian Red Book, No. 26, Count Berchtold to Count Szapary, in St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914.
The diplomatic correspondence does not definitely show the time and manner in which these assurances were conveyed to the Russian Foreign Minister. In his dispatch to Count Berchtold, of July 29, 1914 (Austrian Red Book, No. 47), Count Szapary refers to these assurances as having already been given. And in a dispatch of the Russian Chargè d’Affaires at Paris to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 26, 1914, the Chargè reports the German Ambassador to France as having referred to them on that date. Presumably therefore, they were given at the interview of Count Szapary with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs on the afternoon of July 26, which is discussed in the text. They were repeated in various forms during the course of the negotiations, and great importance was attached to them by Germany and Austria.
114 French Yellow Book, No. 54, M. Pateologue, French Ambassador to St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 26, 1914, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 194.
115 Austrian Red Book, No. 31, July 27, 1914, Count Szapary, in St. Petersburg, to Count Berchtold.
116 Russian Orange Book, No. 25, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, July 26, 1914, Supplement, January, 1915, p. 20. There would seem to be no doubt from the similarity of the two accounts that the conversation referred to in Mr. Sazonof’s telegram of July 26th is the same as that reported by the Austrian Ambassador in his telegram of July 27th (Austrian Red Book, No. 31), although it will be noted that Count Szapary’s dispatch dated the 27th begins “ Have just had a long interview with Mr. Sazonof.” The conversation appears to have taken place “on the afternoon of July 26th” (German White Paper, German memorandum, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 375) which would easily account for one of the telegrams reporting it being dated the 27th.
As further fixing the time of the interview as the 26th, see British White Paper, No. 56, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, July 27th, Supplement, October, 1914, p. 299 at 300; and British White Papers, Nos. 44, 45, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, July 27th, Supplement, Oct. 1914, pp. 289–291.
117 Russian Orange Book, No. 25, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Vienna, July 26, 1914, Supplement, Jan. 1915, p. 20. It appears from Mr. Sazonof’s telegram that he bad made this suggestion to Count Szapary, and his instructions to the Russian Ambassador in fact take the form of directing him to bring the substance of his conversation with Count Szapary to Count Berchtold’s attention. Textually this portion of his telegram reads:
“With this object in view it seemed to me most desirable that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador should be authorized to enter into a private exchange of views in order to redraft certain articles of the Austrian note of the 10th [23rd] July in consultation with me. This method of procedure would perhaps enable us to find a formula which would prove acceptable to Servia, while giving satisfaction to Austria in respect of the chief of her demands. Please convey the substance of this telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in a judicious and friendly manner.” (Russian Orange Book, No. 25, Supplement, Jan. 1915, p. 20.)
118 See supra, p. 436, and notes 108 and 109.
119 Austrian Red Book, No. 40, Count Berchtold to Count Szapary in St. Petersburg.
120 Russian Orange Book, No. 45, Russian Ambassador to Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 28, 1914, Supplement, Jan. 1915, p. 29 at 30. See also British White Paper, No. 74, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, July 28, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 310; No. 78, Sir George Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, July 29, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 313.
121 German White Paper, German memorandum, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 378.
122 Austrian Red Book, No. 47, Count Szapary to Count Berchtold, July 29, 1914; No. 49, Count Berchtold to Count Szapary in St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914; No. 50, Count Berchtold to Count Szapary in St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914. French Yellow Book, No. 104, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Viviani, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Supplement, April, 1915, p. 247.
123 Austrian Red Book, No. 37, Count Berchtold to the Royal Servian Minister for Foreign Affairs at Belgrade; British White Paper, No. 73, Sir M. de Buneen to Sir Edward Grey, July 28, 1914, Supplement, Oct. 1914, p. 310.