No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 March 2017
Extract
The material for this section has been prepared by a committee consisting of Richard B. Bilder, Harold S. Burman, Stanley L. Cohen, Thomas T. F. Huang, Sylvia E. Nilsen, and Herbert K. Reis under the chairmanship of Ernest L. Kerley, all of the Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State. Mr. Alfred P. Rubin of the Office of General Counsel, Department of Defense, has provided the committee with material originating in the Department of Defense.
Keywords
- Type
- Other
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © The American Society of International Law 1964
References
1 Reprinted below, p. 336.
1 The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U. S. Treaties 794; T.I.A.S., No. 4780; 54 A.J.I.L. 477 (1960).
2 Art. I: “1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons.”
3 Art. VII: “1. In order to promote the objectives and ensure the observance of the provisions of the present Treaty, each Contracting Party whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings referred to in Article IX of the Treaty shall have the right to designate observers to carry out any inspection provided for by the present Article. Observers shall be nationals of the Contracting Parties which designate them. The names of observera shall be communicated to every other Contracting Party having the right to designate observers, and like notice shall be given of the termination of their appointment.
“2. Each observer designated in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall have complete freedom of access at any time to any or all areas of Antarctica.
“3. All areas of Antarctica, including all stations, installations and equipment within those areas, and all ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel in Antarctica, shall be open at all times to inspection by any observers designated in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.
“4. Aerial observation may be carried out at any time over any or all areas of Antarctica by any of the Contracting Parties having the right to designate observers.
“5. Each Contracting Party shall, at the time when the present Treaty enters into force for it, inform the other Contracting Parties, and thereafter shall give them notice in advance, of
“(a) all expeditions to and within Antarctica, on the part of its ships or nationals, and all expeditions to Antarctica organized in or proceeding from its territory;
“(b) all stations in Antarctica occupied by its nationals; and
“(c) any military personnel or equipment intended to be introduced by it into Antarctica subject to the conditions prescribed in paragraph 2 of Article I of the present Treaty.”
1 Reprinted in 57 A.J.I.L. 1026 (1963).
* Convention for the unification of certain rules relating to international transportation by air; International Load Line Convention; Convention on safety of life at sea; Geneva Convention relating to the treatment of prisoners of war; Eed Cross Convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field; Red Cross Convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded, sick, and ship-wrecked members of armed forces at sea; Convention relating to the protection of civil persons in time of war; Agreement for the suppression of the circulation of obscene publications; Convention for the protection of industrial property; Convention relating to the suppression of the abuse of opium and other drugs; Convention for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs.
1 Aug. 5, 1963, T.I.A.S., No. 5433; 57 A.J.I.L. 1026 (1963).
1 “While it will not end the threat of nuclear war or outlaw the use of nuclear weapons, it can reduce world tensions, open a way to further agreements, and thereby help to ease the threat of war.”
2 “The phrase ‘ any other nuclear explosion ’ includes explosions for peaceful purposes. Such explosions are prohibited by the treaty because of the difficulty of differentiating between weapon test explosions and peaceful explosions without additional controls. The article does not prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in the event of war nor restrict the exercise of the right of self-defense recognized in article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.”
3 “ [The treaty] is only a first step. It does not end the threat of nuclear war. It does not reduce nuclear stockpiles; it doesn’t halt the production of nuclear weapons; it does not restrict their use in time of war.”
1 It has, however, been alluded to in at least two cases before the Permanent Court of International Justice, “Diversion of Water From the Biver Meuse,” P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 70, 50 (1937) ; Case concerning the Factory at Chorzow, P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9, 31 (1927).
2 The second edition of McNair deals with the law of treaties generally, rather than with British practice. In the second edition, he limits the exercise of the right to cases of “fundamental breach.” Id. at 571 (2d ed., 1961).
3 The United States alleged that Great Britain had violated the treaty by exercising sovereignty over British Honduras, and by treating that territory as a British colony. The British considered the allegation “wholly untenable, “on the ground that the treaty was not intended to cover British Honduras. However, they also assumed that the United States would be entitled to abrogate the treaty if Great Britain had violated it, McNair, 567-568 (2d ed.).
4 The treaties with France were abrogated by act of Congress. However, the President may, acting alone, declare a treaty inoperative or suspended. See 40 Ops. Att’y Gen. 119, 123 (1941). See also “Restatement,” sec. 167.
5 In the first edition of his “Law of Treaties,” McNair said flatly, “ * * * it is not possible to say that some stipulations are essential ones and some are not, and that only a breach of one of the former class gives rise to the right; it must be assumed that each stipulation forms part of the consideration which induced the other party to enter into the treaty,” at 515.
1 S. Exec. L, 88th Cong., 1st Seas.
2 S. Exec. K, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
3 S. Exec. J, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
1 Treaty of Extradition, and Additional Article, Jan. 19 and 21, 1922, 43 Stat. 1698, Treaty Series, No. 675; 18 A.J.I.L. Supp. 174, 179 (1924).
2 See 57 A.J.I.L. 670 (1963).
1 Stat. 669 (1945); 22 U.S.C. $ 288 (1959); reprinted in 40 A.J.I.L. Supp. 85 (1946).
2 Treaty of Peace with Morocco, Sept. 16, 1836, 8 Stat. 484; Treaty Series, No. 244-2.
3 70 Stat. 773 (1956).