No CrossRef data available.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 March 2017
1 Dept. of State File L/AF.
1 See Judicial Decisions, infra pp. 325–30.
2 For the full text of Mr. Aldrich’s letter, as well as those from Simpson Thacher & Bartlett (dated Oct. 19, 1973), and Mr. Rabinowitz (dated Oct. 25, 1973), see Dept. of State File No. PS 8–4 US-Cuba.
1 See Editorial Comment, supra pp. 280–89. Relevant documents in 13 ILM 120–63 (1974).
2 26 Dept. State Bull. 984 (1952).
1 119 Cong. Rec. S18684 (daily ed., Oct. 4, 1973).
2 Senate Resolution 205 (1969) states, in its operative portion, that “it is the sense of the Senate that when the United States recognizes a foreign government and exchanges diplomatic representatives with it, this does not of itself imply that the United States approves of the form, ideology, or policy of that foreign government.” See United States Recognition of Foreign Governments, Hearing before the Senate Com. on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
3 Dept. of State File PFOR, US, UG.
4 Article 45 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (TIAS 7502; 23 UST 3227; 55 AJIL 1064 (1961)) provides:
If diplomatic relations are broken off between two States, or if a mission is permanently or temporarily recalled:
(a) the receiving State must, even in case of armed conflict, respect and protect the premises of the mission, together with its property and archives;
(b) the sending State may entrust the custody of the premises of the mission, together with its property and archives, to a third State acceptable to the receiving State;
(c) the sending State may entrust the protection of its interests and those of its nationals to a third State acceptable to the receiving State.
1 Article 36, para. 1(6) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (TIAS 6820; 21 UST 77; 57 AJIL 995 (1963)) provides:
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to nationals of the sending State:
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph;
2 Dept. of State File L/M/SCA.
1 46 USC §835.
2 38 Fed Reg. 29239–40 (1973).
3 Final adoption of the interim policy will be in 1974, after consideration of written views, data, or arguments on the policy submitted by the public. The NOAA is currently applying the interim policy, pending its final adoption.
1 22 USC 288–88f.
2 See HR REP. No. 93–349, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 2–3 (1973).
3 87 Stat. 560.
4 66 Stat. 516; 22 USC 288g.
5 The General Assembly of the OAS, by resolution AG/RES.50 (I-0/71), adopted April 23, 1971, established the status of Permanent Observers to the Organization and authorized the Permanent Council to set the criteria for this status. By resolution CP/RES.52 (61/72), adopted January 19, 1972, the Council provided that nonmember American states and those non-American states that participate in OAS programs were eligible to apply for this status. See HR REP. NO. 93–496, 93d Cong., 1st Sess, (1973).
1 UN SCOR. SUPP., Jan. 1-May 31, 1950, at 22–23. The Secretary-General’s memorandum said, in part:
. . . It is quite possible that a situation (involving two rival governments) will occur again in the future and it is highly desirable to see what principles can be followed in choosing between the rivals. . . .
It is submitted that the proper principle can be derived by analogy from Article 4 of the Charter. This Article requires that an applicant for membership must be able and willing to carry out the obligations of membership. The obligations of membership can be carried out only by governments which in fact possess the power to do so. Where a revolutionary government presents itself as representing a state, in rivalry to an existing government, the question at issue should be which of these two governments in fact is in a position to employ the resources and direct the people of the state in fulfillment of the obligations of membership. In essence, this means an inquiry as to whether the new government exercises effective authority within the territory of the state and is habitually obeyed by the bulk of the population.
2 Dept. of State telegram No. 236327 to United States Embassy Helsinki, Dec. 3, 1973. Dept. of State File No. PFOR, UN, CB, FI.
1 UN Doc. S/11052/Rev.l; 68 AJIL 195 (1974); 12 ILM 1539 (1973).
2 UN Doc. A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.l, Nov. 15, 1973.
3 UN Doc. A/C.5/L.1135, Nov. 16, 1973.
4 UN Doc. A/C.5/L.1137, Nov. 20,1973.
5 UN Doc. A/C.5/SR.1606, Nov. 21, 1973, at 13–17; see also Press Release US-UN 114 (73), Nov. 21, 1973, at 3–4 and 70 DEPT. STATE BULL. 29 (1974) for full text.
6 General Assembly Resolution 1874(S-IV), June 27, 1963, incorporates the following five principles on the financing of peacekeeping operations:
(a) The financing of such operations is the collective responsibility of all Member States of the United Nations;
(b) Whereas the economically more developed countries are in a position to make relatively larger contributions, the economically less developed countries have a relatively limited capacity to contribute toward peacekeeping operations involving heavy expenditures;
(c) Without prejudice to the principle of collective responsibility, every effort should be made to encourage voluntary contributions from Member States;
(d) The special responsibilities of the permanent members of the Security Council for the maintenance of peace and security should be borne in mind in connection with their contributions to the financing of peace and security operations;
(e) Where circumstances warrant, the General Assembly should give special consideration to the situation of any Member States which are victims of, and those which are otherwise involved in, the events or actions leading to a peacekeeping operation.
1 Dept. of State Memorandum to Mr. Paul Washington, Office of the Secretary, from Mr. George H. Aldrich, Acting Legal Adviser, Oct. 15, 1973.
1 Text in Official Documents section infra pp. 372–76; also in 12 ILM 1521 (1973).
2 119 Cong. Rec. H9400–01 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1973).
3 Id., H9641–61 and S20093–116 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1973).
4 P.L. 93–50; P.L. 93–52, as extended by P.L. 93–118 and 93–124; P.L. 93–126; and P.L. 93–155.
5 For the exchange of letters, see Dept. of State File No. DEF 1 US.
6 69 Dept. State Bull. 758 (1973).