Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-lnqnp Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T19:25:53.388Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Competence to Bind the State to an International Engagement

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 April 2017

Charles Fairman
Charles Fairman*
Affiliation:
Harvard Law School
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

The purpose of this article is to inquire what is requisite to bind the state to an international engagement. We might ask what is the international effect of constitutional limitations on the power to make treaties, thus coming directly to the most controverted aspect of the problem. But there are also less formal agreements, as well as unilateral acts, all falling within one great category of negotia juris whose common characteristic is that they express the will of a state or states. In the following discussion we shall say simply “act,” meaning thereby an official act whose purpose is to create, alter, or extinguish rights in international law.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 30 , Issue 3 , July 1936 , pp. 439 - 462
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1936

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Die Satzung des Völkerbundes, 3rd ed. (1931), I, p. 308 Google Scholar.

2 Von Mohl, , Das deutsche Reichsstaatsrecht (1873), p. 303ff Google Scholar; Meier, , Über des Abschluss von Staatsverträgen (1874)Google Scholar; Gorius, , “Das Vertragsrecht des Deutschen Reichs,” Hirth’s Annalen des Deutsehen Reichs, 1874, pp. 759–72 Google Scholar; Proebst, , “Der Abschluss völkerrechtlicher Verträge durch das Deutsche Reich und dessen Einzelstaaten,” ibid., 1882, pp. 241–328 Google Scholar; Unger, , “Veber die Gültigkeit von Staalsverträgen” in Grunhüt’s Zeitschrift für das Privat- und Öffentliche Recht der Gegenwart, 1879, Vol. 6, pp. 349–56 Google Scholar; Tezner, , “Zur Lehre von der Gültigkeit der Staatsver-träge,” ibid., 1893, Vol. 20, pp. 120–81 Google Scholar; Jellinek, , Gesetz und Verordnung (1887)Google Scholar; Seligmann, , Abschluss und Wirksamkeit der Staatsverträge (1890)Google Scholar; Haenel, , Deutsches Staatsrecht (1892) Vol. 1, p. 537ff Google Scholar; Nippold, , Der völkerrechtliche Vertrag (1894), p. 11211 Google Scholar; Heilborn, , Das System des Völkerrechts (1896), p. 138ff Google Scholar; Laband, , Das Staatsrecht des Deutschen Reiches, 4th ed. (1901), Vol. 2, p. 122ff Google Scholar; Schoen, , “Die völkerrechtliche Bedeutung staatsrechtlicher Beschränkungen . . . ,” Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht und Bundesstaatsrecht, 1911, Vol. 5, pp. 400–31 Google Scholar; Range, , Der Abschluss der Staatsverträge (1912), p. 24ff Google Scholar; Bittner, , Die Lehre von den völkerrechtlichen Vertragsurkunden (1924), p. 81ff Google Scholar; Hatschek, , Deutsches und Preussisches Staatsrecht, 2d ed. (1930), Vol. 2, p. 54711 Google Scholar; Anzilotti, , “Vohntà. e Responsibilità nella Stipulazione dei Trattati Intemazionali,” in Rivista di diritto intemazionale, 1910, Vol. 5, pp. 3–46 Google Scholar; Donati, , I Trattati Internazionali nel Diritto Costituzionale (1906)Google Scholar; Basdevant, , in Académie de droit international, Recueil des Cours, 15: 539, 574ff Google Scholar; Chailley, , La Nature Juridique des Traités Interna-tionaux selon le Droit Contemporain (1932), p. 16311 Google Scholar; McNair, , “Constitutional Limitations upon the Treaty-Making Power,” in Arnold, Treaty-Making Procedure (1933)Google Scholar; Wright, Control of American Foreign Relations, Ch. 4.

3 This Journal, Vol. 29 (1935), Supplement, p. 653ff.

4 Cf. Anzilotti, loe. cit., § 8.

5 At p. 43.

6 Seligmann had accepted the view that in pre-constitutional times the chief of state had this competence jure gentium, but argued that the general introduction of constitutional limitations was evidence of the abrogation of the rtile. Op. cit., p. 51ff.

7 ölkerrecht und Landesrecht (1899), p. 235ff Google Scholar. Translated by Brunet, , Droit international et droit interne (1920), p. 233ff Google Scholar.

8 Loc. cit., p. 11.

9 Schoen, in Strupp, Worterbuch des Volkerrechts, II, 658, 660; Chailley, op. cit., p. 169 n.

10 Cours de droit international (Gidel, trans.) I (1929), p. 366. Adding that other organs may be duly authorized to bind the state.

11 Publications of the P. C. I. J., Ser. A/B, No. 53, pp. 91–2.

12 Cours, I, p. 260.

13 Annuaire de l’Institut International de Droit Public (1930), pp. 225–7 Google Scholar. Cf. Verdross, , Die Verfassung der Völkenechtsgemeinschaft (1926), p. 52 Google Scholar, and in 30 Hague Academy Recueil des Cours (1929), p. 300.

14 Following the language of the Havana Convention on Treaties (1928). Final Act of the Sixth International Conference of American States, p. 135; 4 Hudson, International Legislation, p. 2378.

15 1 Am. St. Papers (For. Rel.), p. 184; 1 Wharton, International Law Digest, p. 586.

16 5 Am. St. Papers (For. Rel.), p. 783; 3 Wharton, op. tit., p. 11.

17 But from the correspondence it seems that the British inquiry was aimed, not at Mr. Seward’s authority, but at his meaning in a somewhat imprecise dispatch. House Doc. No. 471, Vol. 91, 56th Cong., 1st Sess.

18 Cf. Potter, , “Inhibitions upon the Treaty-making Power of the United States,” in this Journal, Vol. 28 (1934), p. 456 Google Scholar.

19 Secy. Forsyth, Sen. Doc. 319, 25th Cong., 2d Sess., at p. 15. Cf. ibid., pp. 4, 16, 17.

20 Speech of Lord Palmerston, Mar. 21, 1843, 67 Hansard 1162, at 1180.

21 Writings and Speeches of Daniel Webster, XIV, p. 595. Cf. ibid., XIV, p. 277; XV, pp. 119, 121.

22 It should be recalled that the older writers could have not thought precisely of our problem, which is largely an incident of democratic constitutional government, but were rather concerned with the question whether there was a duty to ratify the promise made by a plenipotentiary.

23 Outlines of an International Code, Art. 190.

24 Le Droit International Codifié (Lardy, trans.), Art. 404 bis.

25 Op. cit., p. 81ff.

26 E.g., by Chailley, op. cit., p. 188ff.

27 Satow, A Guide to Diplomatic Practice, 3rd ed. (Ritchie), secs. 133, 721. Apparently even now the Rumanian form makes no reference to ratification. Ibid., sec. 139A.

28 E.g., the treaty of non-aggression, U. S. S. R.-Lithuania, of Sept. 28, 1926 ( de Martens, , Nouveau Recueil Général, 3rd ser., Vol. 20, p. 4 Google Scholar), and the protocol of May 6, 1931, by which it was prolonged (ibid., Vol. 29, p. 4), provide simply for ratification, while the same Powers in their convention on the definition of aggression, July 5,1933 (ibid., Vol. 29, p. 40) stipulate for ratification “conformément à leur législation respective.”

29 Satow, op. cit., secs., 728, 730; Masters, International Law in National Courts, p. 92 n; Genet, , Traité de diplomatie et de droit diplomatique, Vol. 3, sec. 1463 Google Scholar.

30 The history of its relations with the League is traced in Kelchner, Latin American Relations with the League of Nations (1930), pp. 46–9, 91–103, and by Hudson, , “The Argentine Republic and the League of Nations,” this Journal, Vol. 28 (1934), p. 125 Google Scholar.

31 League of Nations Official Journal, 1920, p. 13.

32 Translation, from ibid., p. 14.

33 However, the Covenant does not appear among the Tratados y Convenciones Vigentes en la Naciön Argentina published by the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto in 1926.

34 Translation from League of Nations Document A. 30.1933.

35 Loc. cit., p. 133. In the Serbian Loans Case the Permanent Court of International Justice said there was no basis for invoking the Anglo-Saxon doctrine of estoppel where the debtor state had not changed its position in reliance on a clear and unequivocal representation by the bondholders. Ser. A, Nos. 20/21, pp. 38–9. This suggests that the doctrine might be applied under other circumstances.

36 Implication from the judgment concerning German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, Ser. A, No. 7, p. 28.

37 Records of the First Assembly, C II, p. 225.

38 Ibid., C II, p. 226.

39 Ibid., P., p. 586.

40 League of Nations Official Journal, 1921, p. 96.

41 Ibid., pp. 706–8.

42 Records of the Second Assembly, P., p. 102.

43 Evidently Luxemburg has done what it could to save whatever rights it still has under the treaty of 1867, whereby it was neutralized. (57 Br. and For. State Papers, p. 32.) It has maintained the position that its neutrality, both by international and by constitutional law, is unimpaired, in communications to the League of Nations. League of Nations Of-ficitd Journal, 1925, p. 636; Document C. 683. M. 289.1931. IX. Cf. preamble of Treaty of Conciliation and Judicial Settlement, of April 15,1932, between Italy and Luxemburg. 142 League of Nations Treaty Series, p. 119. Wehrer, , “La politique de securité et d’arbitrage du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg,” in Rev. de Droit int. et Légis. comp., 1932, 3d ser., XIII, 326–366, 641–663, esp. p. 360ff Google Scholar; same, “Le statut de Luxembourg et la société des nations,” in Rev. Gén. de Droit int. pub., 1924, XXXI, 169–202 Google Scholar; Schücking, and Wehberg, , op. eit., I, p. 307 Google Scholar; Strupp, in his Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts, I, p. 859.

44 Op. dt., I, pp. 266–7, 308. The Government of Venezuela declared its accession to the Covenant subject to congressional ratification. League of Nations Official Journal, 1920, p. 259. It appears that legislative approval was given on June 25, 1920, and that the executive ratified the accession on Oct. 12, 1920. Tratados Publicos y Acuerdos Internacionales de Venezuela (Caracas, 1925), II (1900-1920), p. 584 Google Scholar.

When Bulgaria was admitted to the League there was no official action by the Sobranje, but a tacit approval may be spelled out of its acquiescence in the announcement made to it by the Prime Minister (Schücking and Wehberg, I, p. 305).

45 League of Nations Official Journal, 1924, pp. 1351, 1599.

46 League of Nations Official Journal, 1925, p. 577, Annex 755.

47 Official Journal, 1925, p. 479.

48 Records of the Seventh Assembly, C VI, pp. 13, 14; C II, p. 86; P., pp. 47, 97, 410; Records of the Tenth Assembly, C I, pp. 35 ff., 70 ff.; P., pp. 78,171; Records of the Eleventh Assembly, C I, p. 71; P., p. 217.

49 Official Journal, 1930, pp. 76, 100, 598ff; A. 10. 1930. V.

50 The Swiss Government had referred to such an accession and queried its legal effect. A. 12. 1927. V. Reference by the Council to the Assembly: Official Journal, 1927, p. 373; C. 115. 1927. V. Discussion in Eighth Assembly: Records, C I, pp. 8ff, 41; P., p. 141.

51 P., p. 141; A. 95. 1927. V. Cf. the remarks of M. Politis, Records of the Ninth Assembly, C I, p. 66.

52 League of Nations Document C. 196. M. 70. 1927. V, at p. 105ff.

53 Ibid., p. 271. The Austrian, Egyptian, and Swedish replies set out their respective constitutional provisions.

54 Ibid., p. 253.

55 Basdevant, loc. cit., p. 582 n.

56 De Lapradelle and Politis, Recueil des Arbitrages Intemationaux, II, pp. 676, 700, 705ff.

57 Award of Aug. 3,1912. Text in Rivista di diritto internazionale, 1913, Vol. 7, pp. 518–20 Google Scholar, with a note by Anzilotti, ; translation in this Journal, Vol. 6 (1912), pp. 995–1002 Google Scholar. Discussion by Chailley, op. cit., pp. 230–2, and by McNair, loc. cit., p. 8.

58 Démocratie et Politique Éitrangère (1917), p. 118ff Google Scholar.

59 For. Rel. of the U. S., 1888, pt. 1, p. 459ff.

60 Arts. 6, 3, Convention on Rights and Duties of States (1933). Final Act of the Seventh International Conference of American States.

61 The League of Nations, 2d ed., p. 100.

62 An Outline of International Law (Manning, trans.), pp. 19–20.

63 The Canons of International Law (1930), p. 418ff.

64 Loc. cit., p. 581.

65 The statute of the I. L. O. expressly recognizes that the competence of a federal government may be limited by internal law. Treaty of Versailles, Art. 405.

66 Cf. Baty, p. 420; Hatschek, p. 19; Dickinson, Equality of States in International Law, p. 206ff.

67 E.g., by Art. 9 of the Swiss Constitution, cantons are competent to treat with foreign states on matters of police and local traffic.

68 E.g., Art. II, sec. 2 of the U. S. Constitution: the President “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”

69 Perhaps Art. 26 of the Norwegian Constitution, as amended in 1931, would fall under this head. By its terms all treaties concerning matters of special importance . . . are not binding until approved by the Storting. Arnold, Treaty-Making Procedure, p. 54. Unless an authentic interpretation had been rendered, or practice had given some specific meaning to “matters of special importance,” other high contracting parties could not know the scope of this expression.

70 E.g., the common provision that it is for parliament to make appropriations (even when necessary to give effect to a treaty).

71 B. G. Bl., p. 63. Translation from Dodd, Modern Constitutions, I, 330: “It shall be the duty of the Emperor to represent the Empire among nations, . . . to enter into alliances and other treaties with foreign countries. ... So far as treaties with foreign countries relate to matters which, according to Art. 4, are to be regulated by imperial legislation, the consent of the Bundesrat shall be required for their conclusion, and the approval of the Reichstag shall be necessary to render them valid.”

72 The chief exponent of this view was Prof. Ernst Meier. Op. cit.

73 Das Staatsrecht des Deutschen Reiches, Tübingen and Leipzig (1901), II, p. 122ff. For the same interpretation of the Prussian Constitution of 1852, Gneist, Gutachten uber die Auslegung des Art. 48 der Verfassungs-Urkunde, Annex to Meier, op. cit.

74 The same opinion has been set forth by the late Judge Schücking, who regarded this as a general principle of law which the Permanent Court might apply under Art. 38(3) of its Statute. Annuaire de l’Instibut IiUernational de Droit Public (1930), p. 225 Google Scholar. Sed quaere, how far the relation between the government and the state is analogous to agency.

75 Gorius and Proebst, already cited.

76 Jellinek, op. cit., p. 341ff: where, as in Belgium, the constitution provides that a treaty shall have no effect until parliament approves, such approval is an implied suspensive condition. Where, as in Great Britain, legislation may be necessary to carry a treaty into effect, its enactment is a resolutive condition. Seligmann, op. cit, p. 146ff, argued that a treaty is existent if concluded by the respective chiefs of state, but is not effective—i.e., there is no obligation to carry out its provisions—until the constitutional requirements have been complied with.

77 Donati, op. cit., p. 513.

78 Journal du droit international privé (1880), 7:5–55 Google Scholar. With certain reservations, Renault agreed with Clunet. “De la conclusion des traités internationaux,” Le Droit, May 26, 1880; reprinted in L’oeuvre international de Louis Renault, Vol. 3, pp. 11–19.

79 (1920) 252 U. S. 416.

80 Publications of the P.C.I.J., Ser. A, Nos. 20/21, at pp. 46–7.

81 Publications of the P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 62.

82 Ibid., Ser. C, No. 74, pp. 120, 201.

83 Ibid., pp. 161, 239ff.

84 Ibid., Ser. A/B, No. 62, p. 22.

85 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. (1909), 213 U. S. 347.

86 Cf. Garner, , “The International Binding Force of Unilateral Oral Declarations,” this Journal, Vol. 27 (1933), p. 493 Google Scholar.

87 Publications of the P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 53, p. 70.

88 Ibid., p. 71. To the Norwegian contention that M. Ihlen lacked competence to make the declaration on which Denmark relied, the Danish agent replied: “The Danish Government therefore maintains [1] that the Foreign Minister M. Ihlen was invested with the necessary constitutional authority to give the said declaration of recognition, and [2] that he, even if this had not been so, had the necessary powers in international law.” Ser. C, No. 66, pp. 2761–2.

89 For. Rel. of the U. S., 1901, p. 262, at 271.

90 League of Nations Official Journal, 1923, p. 1011; Doc. C. 386. 1923. VII.

91 Emeric Kulin c. Etat xoumain, 7 Déc. des T.A.M., p. 138; Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases, 1927–1928, Case No. 337.

92 The Mavrommatis Case (Merits), Ser. A, No. 5, at p. 37 (disclaimer of intention to expropriate); German Interests in Upper Silesia (Merits), Ser. A, No. 7, at pp. 13, 58, 72 (withdrawal of notice of intention to expropriate, and undertaking not to expropriate); Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia, Ser. A, No. 15, pp. 21–25 (consent to the court’s jurisdiction inferred from the conduct of agents). So, too, do arbitral tribunals regard an agent as qualified to speak for his state in respect of the litigation: Héritiers Protopapa c. Éitat bulgare (1929), 9 Déc. des T.A.M. 132, 137; Veuve Eugène de Bruyn c. Sally M. Mainz (1924), 4 ibid., 738; Georges Pinson Case (1928), Annual Direct, 1927–1928, Case No. 319.

93 Dig. 50. 17. 19.

94 P. 293, London ed.; p. 187, Philadelphia ed.

95 “ ‘He who contracts with another,’ says Ulpian, ‘knows, or ought to know, his condition. Qui cum alio contrahit, vel est, vel debet esse non ignarus conditionis ejus’ (1.19. D. de div. R. J. 50. 17). But, in practice, the full-powers given by the government of the United States to their plenipotentiaries, always expressly reserve the ratification of the treaties concluded by them, by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate.” At p. 308.

96 The case of an heir dealing with a legatee aliena juris. Ad Sabinum, in Lenel, Palingensia iures civiles, Vol. 2, p. 1019ff. There were other exceptions. E.g., under the S. C. Vel-leianum a creditor could not enforce an undertaking by a woman to answer for the debts of another. But it was not applicable if the woman had used fraud (Dig. 16.1.2.3) or if there was excusable error on the part of the creditor (Dig. 16.1.4), and in some other cases. The S. C. Macedonianum forbade loans to a filiusfamilias: but where the lender fell into error because the filius was generally believed to be sui juris, the debtor could not invoke the benefit of the S. C. (Dig. 14. 6. 3).

97 De Praesumptionibus, Conjecturis, Signis, et Indiciis Commentaria (1627), Vol. 3 Google Scholar, Praesump. lxxxvii. "Dedaralur primo, ut locum non habeat haec praesumptio, quando adest ignorantia multum probabilis etjusta. Nam haec excusat.”

98 Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, 8th ed. by Bigelow (1883), p. 98.

99 Cujas, Observationum et Emendationum Libri XIII, Obs. vii, cap. xxxvi.

100 A Treatise on International Law, 8th ed., p. 381.

101 Loc. cit., at pp. 6–7.

102 Leipzig (1892), I, p. 544, note 16.

103 As he calls it in his Cours, p. 357.

104 Strupp’s WSrterbuch des Völkerrechts, II, 660.

105 Op. cit., p. 139.

106 Written in 1860. Gesammelte Aufsätze, I, 327–425 Google Scholar; Oeuvres choisis (Meulenaere, trans.) II, 1–100. Ihering had been considering the case where A leads B to contract with him; the contract later proves to be a nullity, for some reason such that some degree of culpa may be charged to A. His conclusion was that each party owed a duty to the other to exercise diligence in respect to the formation as well as the execution of a contract, and that B would be entitled to receive his negative Vertragsinleresse—i.e., to be indemnified for his actual loss.

107 Op. cit., p. 169 n.

108 Die Verfassung der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft, p. 53.