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Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 February 2017

Robin R. Churchill  and
Geir Ulfstein
Geir Ulfstein
Affiliation:
Cardiff University, United Kingdom Department of Public and International Law, University of Oslo, Norway
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Extract

Since the early 1970s a considerable number of multilateral agreements have been concluded in the environmental field that establish a common pattern of institutional arrangements. The purpose of these arrangements is to develop the normative content of the regulatory regime established by each agreement1 and to supervise the states parties’ implementation of and compliance with that regime. These institutional arrangements usually comprise a conference or meeting of the parties (COP, MOP) with decision-making powers, a secretariat, and one or more specialist subsidiary bodies. Such arrangements, because of their ad hoc nature, are not intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) in the traditional sense. On the other hand, as the creatures of treaties, such conferences and meetings of the parties, with their secretariats and subsidiary bodies, add up to more than just diplomatic conferences. Because such arrangements do not constitute traditional IGOs and yet are freestanding and distinct both from the states parties to a particular agreement and from existing IGOs, we have chosen to describe them as “autonomous.” They are also autonomous in the sense that they have their own lawmaking powers and compliance mechanisms.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 94 , Issue 4 , October 2000 , pp. 623 - 659
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 2000

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References

1 Most of the agreements in question establish what international relations writers describe as regimes, i.e., to cite one widely quoted definition, “governing arrangements constructed by states to coordinate their expectations and organize aspects of international behavior in various issue-areas. [Regimes] thus comprise a normative element, state practice, and organizational roles.” Kratochwil, Friedrich & John, Gerard Ruggie, International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State, 40 Int’l Org. 753, 759 (1986)Google Scholar. The normative content of the regime is therefore more than simply the provisions of the agreement concerned. This point will become clearer in part IV infra.

2 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, Feb. 2, 1971, TIAS No. 11,084, 996 UNTS 245 [hereinafter Ramsar Convention].

3 Dec. 29, 1972, 26 UST 2403, 1046 UNTS 120 [hereinafter London Convention].

4 Mar. 3, 1973, 27 UST 1087, 993 UNTS 243 [hereinafter CITES].

5 June 23, 1979, 1990 UKTS No. 87 [hereinafter Bonn Convention].

6 Mar. 22, 1985, 1513 UNTS 293 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].

7 Sept 19, 1987, 1522 UNTS 293 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. Documentation regarding the Montreal Protocol is available online at <http://www.unep.org/ozone/>.

8 Mar. 22, 1989, 28 ILM 657 (1989) [hereinafter Basel Convention]. Documentation regarding the Basel Convention is available online at <http://www.unep.ch/basel/>.

9 Basel Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Dec. 10, 1999 <http://www.basel.int/COP5/docs/prot-e.pdf>.

10 May 9, 1992, 31 ILM 849 (1992) [hereinafter Climate Change Convention]. Documentation regarding the Climate Change Convention is available online at <http://www.unfccc.de/>.

11 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 ILM 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].

12 June 5, 1992, 31 ILM 818 (1992) [hereinafter Biodiversity Convention]. Documentation on the Biodiversity Convention is available online at <http://www.biodiv.org/>.

13 Jan. 29, 2000, 39 ILM 1027 (2000) [hereinafter Biodiversity Convention].

14 June 17, 1994, 33 ILM 1328 (1994) [hereinafter Desertification Convention].

15 Sept. 11, 1998, 38 ILM 1 (1999) [hereinafter Prior Informed Consent Convention].

16 These are as follows: Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, Feb. 16, 1976, 1102 UNTS 27; Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution, Apr. 24, 1978, 1140 UNTS 133; Convention for Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the West and Central African Region, Mar. 23, 1981, 20 ILM 746 (1981); Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and Coastal Area of the South-East Pacific, Nov. 12, 1981, reprinted in Peter H., Sand, Marine Environment Law in the United Nations Environment Programme 84 (1988)Google Scholar; Regional Convention for the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment, Feb. 14, 1982, reprinted in id. at 114; Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region, Mar. 24, 1983, 22 ILM 227 (1983); Convention for the Protection, Management and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Eastern African Region, June 21, 1985, reprinted in 1986 O.J. Eur. Comm. (C 253) 10; Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region, Nov. 25, 1986, 16 ILM 41 (1987); and Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution, Apr. 21, 1992, L. Sea Bull., Jan. 1993, at 31.

17 Nov. 13, 1979, TIAS No. 10, 541, 1302 UNTS 217 [hereinafter Lrtap Convention].

18 Mar. 17, 1992, 31 ILM 1312 (1992).

19 Mar. 17, 1992, 1995 UKTS No. 52.

20 Nov. 24, 1996, 36 ILM 777 (1997).

21 Sept. 19, 1979, 1982 UKTS No. 56.

22 Jan. 29, 1991, 30 ILM 773 (1991).

23 June 16, 1994, 34ILM 67 (1995).

24 Dec. 1, 1996, reprinted in 1 J. Int’l Wildlife L. & Pol’y 179 (1998).

25 On these issues, see, for example, from a large literature, The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments, pt. I, passim (David G. Victor, Kal Raustiala, & Eugene B. Skolnikoff eds., 1998); Jørgen, Wettestad, Designing Effective Environmental Regimes: The Key Conditions (1999)Google Scholar; Bernauer, Thomas, The Effect of International Environmental Institutions: How We Might Learn More, 49 Int’l Org. 351 (1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gehring, Thomas, International Environmental Regimes: Dynamic Sectoral Legal Systems, 1 Y.B. Int’l Envtl. L. 35 (1990)Google Scholar. Many international relations writers make a distinction between organizations and institutions. No such distinction is made in this article and in general the terms are used interchangeably.

26 Montreal Protocol MOP Decision II/5, Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3 (1990) <http://www.unep.org/ozone/2mlonfin.htm>, as amended by Decision 111/20, Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.3/11 (1991) <http://www.unep.org/ozone/3mnbofin.htm>. These decisions, and other decisions of the Montreal Protocol’s Meeting of the Parties referred to below, as well as those of other COPs referred to in this article, are designated in accordance with the number of the meeting, in roman numerals, and the number of the decision, in arabic; hence, Decision II/5 is the fifth decision of the second MOP. Some COPs reversé the sequence and change the style of the numbers, see, e.g., note 28 infra.

27 See Patricia W., Birnie & Alan E., Boyle, International Law and the Environment 77–78 (1992)Google Scholar.

28 Institutional Linkage of the Convention Secretariat to the United Nations, Climate Change COP Decision 14/CP.1, para. 2, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1, at 42 <http://www.unfccc.de/resource/docs/cop1/07a01.htm>.

29 For lists of such agreements, see Environmental Change and International Law, App. B at 479–82 (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1992) [hereinafter Environmental Change]; Peter M., Haas with Sundgren, Jan, Evolving International Environmental Law: Changing Practices of National Sovereignty, in Global Accord: Environmental Challenges and International Responses 401, 422–25 (Choucri, Nazli ed., 1993)Google Scholar.

30 Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161 UNTS 72.

31 Feb. 8, 1949, TIAS No. 2089, 157 UNTS 157. In general, international fisheries commissions, including the International Whaling Commission and the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, were not explicitly endowed with legal personality by their constituent conventions; but in most cases legal personality was implicit in their functions and powers. See Albert W., Koers, International Regulation of Marine Fisheries 161–64 (1973)Google Scholar.

32 May 12, 1954, Art. XXI, 12 UST 2989, 327 UNTS 3.

33 Dec. 6, 1951, Art. VII, 150 UNTS 67.

34 Oct. 12, 1940, TS No. 981, 161 UNTS 193.

35 Sept. 15, 1968, 1001 UNTS 3.

36 See Lyster, Simon, International Wildlife Law 110–11, 123–24 (1985)Google Scholar.

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38 See Hurrell, Andrew & Kingsbury, Benedict, The International Politics of the Environment: An Introduction, in The International Politics of the Environment 1, 34–35 (Hurrell, Andrew & Kingsbury, Benedict eds., 1992)Google Scholar; Palmer, Geoffrey, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AJIL 259, 282 (1992)Google Scholar; World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future 9 (1987).

39 See GA Res. 2997 (XXVII), UN GAOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 43, UN Doc. A/8730 (1972). On the origins and functioning of UNEP, see also Hurrell & Kingsbury, supra note 38, at 30–34, 186–88; Carol, Annette Petsonk, The Role of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in the Development of International Environmental Law, 5 AM. U.J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 351, 354–56 (1990)Google Scholar; Paul C., Szasz, Restructuring the International Organizational Framework, in Environmental Change, supra note 29, at 340, 340–44, 351–52 Google Scholar.

40 UN, Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, UN Doc. A/CONF.48/14, at 29 (1973). The contents of the resolution were subsequently substantially incorporated in Resolution 2997, supra note 39.

41 Ramsar Convention, supra note 2, Art. 6.

42 Amendments to Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, May 28, 1987, 1996 UKTS No. 13. See further Lyster, supra note 36, at 184, 203–07; Bowman, M.J., The Ramsar Convention Comes of Age, 42 Neth. Int’l L. Rev. 1, 33–38 (1995)Google Scholar.

43 Lang, supra note 37, at 114.

44 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Working Group III, Formulation of Response Strategies: Legal and Institutional Mechanisms 255 (1990), reprinted in International Law and Global Climate Change 295, 299 (Robin Churchill & David Freestone eds., 1991) [hereinafter Global Climate Change].

45 COPs that meet frequently may not differ so much in cost because premises have to be hired for the meetings and members of the secretariat, which is usually located elsewhere, must be transported to them, often at considerable expense.

46 e.g., Lee A., Kimball & William C., Boyd, International Institutional Arrangements for Environment and Development: A Post-Rio Assessment, 1 Rev. Eur. Comm. & Int’l Envtl. L. 295 (1992)Google Scholar; Palmer, supra note 38, at 278–82.

47 Agenda 21, ch. 38.1 (I), 1 Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, UN Sales No. E.93.I.8 (1993); GA Res. S–19/2, pt. IVA, 36ILM 1639 (1997).

48 Nov. 2, 1973, 12 ILM 1319 (1973) (in particular Arts. 2(7), 4(3), 6(4), 8(2), 11, 12(2), 16, 17).

49 Nov. 30, 1990, 30 ILM 733 (1991) (in particular Arts. 2(6), 12, 14).

50 Sept. 26, 1986, 25 ILM 1370, Art. 4, and 1377, Art. 5 (1986).

51 Oct. 24, 1978, Art. II, S. Exec. Doc. T, 90th Cong. (1979), Cmnd. 7569.

62 May 20, 1980, Arts. VII, VIII, 33 UST 3476, 1329 UNTS 47.

53 June 4, 1974, Arts. 15–18, 1978 UKTS No. 64.

54 Sept. 22, 1992, Arts. 10–12, 1999 UKTS No. 14.

55 London Convention, supra note 3, Art. XIV(4) (f).

56 Lrtap Convention, supra note 17, Art. 10(2) (c).

57 Climate Change Convention, supra note 10, Art. 7(2) (m).

58 Concerning this feature of international institutional law, see Amerasinghe, C. F., Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations 44–48 (1996)Google Scholar; Henry G., Schermers & Niels M., Blokker, International Institutional Law 158–63 (3d rev. ed. 1995)Google Scholar; White, N. D., The Law of International Organisations, ch. 5 (1996)Google Scholar.

59 1996 ICJ Rep. 66, 79, para. 25 (July 8).

60 Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the U.N. Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1954 ICJ Rep. 47, 53 (July 13).

61 See Amerasinghe, supra note 58, at 48–55; Schermers & Blokker, supra note 58, at 718–19.

62 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 ICJ Rep. 16 (June 21).

63 Sands, Philippe, Principles of International Environmental Law: Framework, Standards and Implementation 92 (1995)Google Scholar. A similar view is expressed by Szasz, supra note 39, at 347. See also Werksman, Jacob, The Conference of Parties to Environmental Treaties, in Greening International Institutions 55, 55 (Werksman, Jacob ed., 1996)Google Scholar (stating that “these MEAs establish independent intergovernmental bodies . . . with the potential to develop powers over states that may far exceed those of more formally established international institutions” (citation omitted)).

64 See notes 156, 178 infra and corresponding text.

65 Schermers & Blokker, supra note 58, at 23; see also Amerasinghe, supra note 58, at 9.

66 See “Powers of the Host Organization,” the next section below.

67 See Sabel, Robbie, Procedure at International Conferences 19 (1997)Google Scholar.

68 On “self-contained” regimes, see United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 ICJ Rep. 3, 39–41 (May 24). See also Koskenniemi, Martti, Breach of Treaty or Non-Compliance? Reflections on the Enforcement ofthe Montreal Protocol, 3 Y.B. Int’l Envtl. L. 123, 134–37 (1992)Google Scholar (discussing the relationship between the noncompliance procedure of the Montreal Protocol and, on the other hand, the law of treaties and the law of state responsibility).

69 See Amerasinghe, supra note 58, at 140; Schermers & Blokker, supra note 58, at 743. In fact, the cites cop has established subsidiary bodies even though it has no explicit power to do so (and its catchall power allows it to do no more than “make recommendations for improving the effectiveness” of the Convention, see CITES, supra note 4, Art. XI(3)(e)). It must be assumed that such establishment was based on implied powers.

70 See Amerasinghe, supra note 58, at 192; Schermers & Blokker, supra note 58, at 744.

71 See Schermers & Blokker, supra note 58, at 104–05.

72 See part V infra for further discussion of this matter.

73 See, for example, Rule 40(1) of the Rules of Procedure of both the Basel Convention and the Biodiversity Convention. For the former, see <http://www.basel.int/text/rules.html>. For the latter, see UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/1/17, Annex III (Jan. 1995), <http://www.unep.ch/bio/cdbrepi.htm>. In the absence of formally adopted rules of procedure, the Climate Change Convention applies draft rules contained in UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1996/2. Draft Rule 42 on majority voting, however, is not applied. See Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Fifth Session, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1999/6, para. 14.

74 Koskenniemi, supra note 68, at 139, holds that suspension of rights is a matter of substance under the Montreal Protocol and would require a qualified majority.

75 See part IV infra for further discussion.

76 Note by the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/AC.237/79/Add.1, at 7 (1994).

77 Decision 14/CP.1, supra note 28, para. 7.

78 See Letter from Kinley, Richard, Climate Change Convention secretariat (Dec. 4, 1998)Google Scholar (on file with authors).

79 See E-mail from Tucker, Julia, Ramsar secretariat (May 28, 1999)Google Scholar (on file with authors).

80 See Kinley, supra note 78; fax from Gilbert M. Bankobeza, UNEP (Feb. 9, 1999) (on file with authors).

81 See Letter from Lars Nordberg, UN/ECE (Jan. 28, 1999) (on file with authors).

82 See note 28 supra and corresponding text.

83 Letter to the President of the Climate Change COP from the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General (Apr. 5, 1995), UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1995/5/Add.4, annex.

84 See, e.g., Ramsar Convention, supra note 2, Art. 10 bis (added by the Protocol of Dec. 3, 1982, TIAS No. 11, 084); London Convention, supra note 3, Art. 15; CITES, supra note 4, Art. XVII; Bonn Convention, supra note 5, Art. X; Vienna Convention, supra note 6, Art. 6(4); Montreal Protocol, supra note 7, Art. 11(4)(h); Basel Convention, supra note 8, Art. 15(5); Climate Change Convention, supra note 10, Art. 15; Biodiversity Convention, supra note 12, Art. 23(4)(d); Desertification Convention, supra note 14, Art. 22(2) (f).

85 e.g., Ramsar Convention, supra note 2 (in 1987); London Convention, supra note 3 (in 1978); CITES, supra note 4 (in 1979); Basel Convention, supra note 8 (in 1995); Montreal Protocol, supra note 7 (in 1990, 1992, 1997, 1999).

86 Opened for signature May 23, 1969, Arts. 39–40, 1155 UNTS 331.

87 See, e.g., UN Charter Arts. 108–09; Convention on the International Maritime Organization, Mar. 6, 1948, Art. 52, 9 UST 621, 289 UNTS 48; Council of Europe Statute Art. 41.

88 Montreal Protocol MOP Decision II/2, Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3, supra note 26, reprinted in 1993 UKTS No. 4.

89 See Barrett, Jill, The Negotiation and Drafting of the Climate Change Convention, in Global Climate Change, supra note 44, at 183, 190 Google Scholar. But this justification for the action of the Meeting of the Parties has been questioned, see Gehring, supra note 25, at 48. Subsequent amendments to the Montreal Protocol have the same provisions relating to entry into force as the 1990 amendments.

90 See further Werksman, supra note 63, at 65–67. An analogous situation has occurred in the Ramsar COP. See Bowman, M.J., The Multilateral Treaty Amendment Process: A Case Study, 44 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 540, 549–50 (1995)Google Scholar.

91 See further on this point Patrick, Széll, Decision Making Under Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 26 Envtl. Pol’y & L. 210, 213 (1996)Google Scholar.

92 For these Protocols, see supra notes 7, 9, 11, 13, respectively.

93 For example, the Protocols to UNEP’s Regional Seas Conventions, supra note 16, and the Protocols to the Lrtap Convention, supra note 17.

94 London Consultative Meeting of the Parties Res. LDC.5 (3) (1978), 1979 UKTS No. 71; Res. LDC.50 (16) (1993), 1995 UKTS No. 90.

95 London Consultative Meeting of the Parties Res. LDC.49(16), 51 (16) (1993), 1995 UKTS Nos. 89, 91, respectively.

96 Montreal Protocol MOP Decision II/1, Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro2/3, supra note 26, reprinted in 1 Y.B. Int’l Envtl. L. 612 (1990); Montreal Protocol MOP Decisions IV/2, IV/3, Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15 (1992) <http://www.unep.org/ozone/4mop_cph.htm>, reprinted in 3 Y.B. Int’l Envtl. L. 805, 806 (1992). “Adjustments” relate to changes in the timetable and targets set out in Article 2 of the Protocol for reducing the production and consumption of ozone-depleting substances; “amendments” refer to other changes in the Protocol.

97 For a table showing the results of the changes made in the phasing out of ozone-depleting substances by adjustments to the Protocol up to and including 1997, see Sebastian, Oberthür, Montreal Protocol: 10 Years After, 27 Envtl. Pol’y & L. 432, 433 (1997)Google Scholar.

98 It should be noted, however, that under Article 19, a state must have been a party for at least four years before it may withdraw from the Protocol.

99 Széll, supra note 91, at 213; see also Richard, Elliot Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet 90 (1991)Google Scholar. Compare Werksman, supra note 63, at 62, who speaks of the adjustment process as being tailored to the “scientific imperative of ozone depletion.”

100 Climate Change COP Decision 5/CP.l, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1, supra note 28, at 18.

101 Basel COP Decision II/12 (1994), reprinted in 5 Y.B. Int’l Envtl. L. 868 (1994).

102 For the 1995 amendment, see 6 Y.B. Int’l Envtl. L. 779 (1995).

103 See further Werksman, supra note 63, at 63–64. See also Kummer, Katharina, International Management of Hazardous Wastes 63–65 (1995)Google Scholar; Louise de, La Fayette, Legal and Practical Implications of the Ban Amendment to the Basel Convention, 6 Y.B. Int’l Envtl. L. 703, 705–10 (1995)Google Scholar.

104 Montreal Protocol MOP Decision II/8, Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3, supra note 26, reprinted in 1 Y.B. Int’l Envtl. L. 602 (1990); see also Gehring, supra note 25, at 49. The fund was an interim one and remained in being only until the amendments to the Protocol establishing a permanent fund, which were adopted at the same time as Decision II/8, came into force. Decision II/8, like Decision 11/12 of the Basel COP, does not state on which provision of the agreement it is based.

105 See Sands, supra note 63, at 380; see also Lyster, supra note 36, at 248–49.

106 While all the various powers discussed here are described as “lawmaking,” some writers make a distinction between legislative powers (which enable a majority of states to bind a minority, leaving the minority no possibility of opting out of the measure by objecting to it) and quasi-legislative powers (under which decisions taken by the majority can be objected to). See Sommer, Julia, Environmental Law-Making by International Organizations, 56 Zeit Schrift Für Auslandisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht[ ZaöRV] 628, 634–35 (1996)Google Scholar and literature cited there.

107 On ICAO, see Bowett, D. W., The Law of International Institutions 145–47 (4th ed. 1982)Google Scholar. On the IAEA, see Paul C., Szasz, International Norm-Making, in Environmental Change, supra note 29, at 41, 65 Google Scholar. See further Contini, Paolo & Peter H., Sand, Methods to Expedite Environment Protection: International Ecostandards, 66 AJIL 37, 41–53 (1972)Google Scholar; Palmer, supra note 38, at 273–74 and literature cited there.

108 Széll, supra note 91, at 212; see also Peter H., Sand, Lessons Learned in Global Environmental Governance 14–18 (1990)Google Scholar.

109 Széll, supra note 91, at 213.

110 See Handl, supra note 37, at 33; Palmer, supra note 38, at 270–78.

111 Montreal Protocol Parties: Adjustments and Amendments to the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, 30 ILM 537, 550 (1991).

112 Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15, supra note 96, Annex VIII, reprinted in 3 Y.B. Int’l Envtl. L. 822 (1992).

113 CITES COP Res. CITES.conf.4.27 (Apr. 1983) <http://www.wcmc.org.uk/CITES/eng/resols/resol4.shtml>.

114 CITES COP Res. CITES.conf.9.24 (Nov. 1994) <http://www.wcmc.org.uk/CITES/eng/resols/resol921.shtml#9.24>; see also Sommer, supra note 106, at 637, 647.

115 London Consultative Meeting of the Parties Res. LDC.41 (13) (1990), reprinted in 6 International Organizations and the Law of the Sea: Documentary Yearbook 332(1990).

116 On the use of soft law in international environmental law, see, from a considerable literature, Birnie & Boyle, supra note 27, at 26–30; Handl, supra note 37, at 7–8; Palmer, supra note 38, at 269–70; Sand, supra note 108, at 16–17; and Szasz, supra note 107, at 69–72.

117 cites cop Doc. Plen.2.6 (Rev.), item XIX (1980); see Bowman, Michael, Conflict or Compatibility? The Trade, Conservation and Animal Welfare Dimensions of cites, 1 J. Int’l Wildlife L. & Pol’y 9 (1998)CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

118 Ramsar cop Recommendation 2.3, Doc. C.4.12 (1984), reprinted in 12 Envtl. Pol’y & L. 118 (1984).

119 London Consultative Meeting of the Parties Res. LDC.14 (7) (1983) & LDC.21 (9) (1985), reprinted in IMO, The London Dumping Convention: The First Decade and Beyond 207, 208 (1991).

120 See note 95 supra and corresponding text.

121 See Buzan, Barry, Negotiating by Consensus: Developments in Technique at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 75 AJIL 324, 325–26 (1981)Google Scholar.

122 Id. at 326.

123 Id. a t 327.

124 Birnie & Boyle, supra note 27, at 37.

125 See Széll, supra note 91, at 212; Schermers & Blokker, supra note 58, at 506, 512–15. It is also of interest that at the fourth meeting of the Climate Change Convention COP, held in 1998, Switzerland protested against a decision that had been adopted by consensus but did not formally object to it.

126 See Széll, supra note 91, at 213.

127 This section deals only with institutional aspects of the topic. For a broader perspective, see, from a growing literature, Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K, Jacobson eds., 1998); Improving Compliance with International Environmental Law (James Cameron, Jacob Werksman, & Peter Roderick eds., 1996); Koskenniemi, Martti, New Institutions for Implementation Control and Reaction, in Greening International Institutions, supra note 63, at 236 Google Scholar; Sachariew, Kamen, Promoting Compliance with International Environmental Standards: Reflections on Monitoring and Reporting Mechanisms, 2 Y.B. Int’l Envtl. L. 31 (1991)Google Scholar; Patrick, Széll, Compliance Regimes for Mulilateral Environmental Agreements—A Progress Report, 27 Envtl. Pol’y & L. 304 (1997)Google Scholar.

128 See, e.g., CITES, supra note 4, Art. XI(3); Bonn Convention, supra note 5, Art. VII (5); Basel Convention, supra note 8, Art. 15(5); Climate Change Convention, supra note 10, Art. 7(2) (e–g); Biodiversity Convention, supra note 12, Art. 23(4).

129 Montreal Protocol, supra note 7, Art. 8.

130 Montreal Protocol MOP Decision II/5, supra note 26; Montreal Protocol MOP Decision IV/5, Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro4/15, supra note 96.

131 Climate Change Convention, supra note 10, Art. 13; Kyoto Protocol, supra note 11, Art. 16.

132 See text at notes 58–72 supra.

133 Noncompliance mechanisms have been criticized, however, for blurring the adjudicative and conciliatory functions and for not taking account of the interests of the international community in general, see Chinkin, Christine, Alternative Dispute Resolution Under International Law, in Remedies in International Law: The Institutional Dilemma 123, 128–34 (Evans, Malcolm ed., 1998)Google Scholar.

134 Montreal Protocol MOP Decision IV/5, supra note 130, para. 8.

135 Lrtap Executive Body Decision 1997/2, annex, para. 3 (b) <http://www.unece.org/env/Lrtap/conv/report/eb53_a3.htm>.

136 Climate Change COP Decision 10/CP.4, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1998/16/Add.1, annex, para. 3, obtainable from <http://www.cop4.org>.

137 Nov. 7, 1996, Art. 11(2), 36 ILM 710 (1997).

138 Climate Change COP Decision 10/CP.4, supra note 136, annex, paras. 6, 12.

139 Montreal Protocol MOP Decision IV/5, supra note 130.

140 Lrtap Executive Body Decision 1997/2, annex, supra note 135, para. 11.

141 Lrtap Executive Body, Report of the Fifteenth Session, UN Doc. ECE/EB.AIR/53, para. 48 (Jan. 7, 1998) <http://www.unece.org/env/Lrtap/conv/report/ebair53.htm>.

142 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 11, Art. 18.

143 On this question, see Koskenniemi, supra note 68.

144 See text at notes 63–72 supra.

145 See part IV supra.

146 See Schermers & Blokker, supra note 58, at 866.

147 See id. at 898.

148 See Montreal Protocol mop Decision VIII/24, Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro8/12 (1996), <http://www.unep.org/ozone/8mop_snj.htm>.

149 See Schermers & Blokker, supra note 58, at 906, 913–14.

150 See Montreal Protocol mop Decision VIII/25, Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro8/12, supra note 148.

151 See Schermers & Blokker, supra note 58, at 906–12, 916–18.

152 Montreal Protocol mop Decisions X/20, 21, 23–28 (1998) <http://www.unep.org/ozone/1Omop-rpt.htm>, concerning Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. As pointed out by Werksman, the application of trade measures may conflict with commitments under GATT/World Trade Organization. Werksman, Jacob, Compliance and Transition, Russia’s Non-Compliance Tests the Ozone Regime, 56 ZaöRV 750, 773 (1996)Google Scholar.

153 See text at note 139 supra.

154 See text at note 71 supra.

155 See Schermers & Blokker, supra note 58, at 97; Amerasinghe, supra note 58, at 124.

156 United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, Arrangements for the Implementation of the Provisions of Article 11 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Concerning the Financial Mechanism, para. 4 (Nov. 4, 1993) (on file with authors) [hereinafter UNOLA I]; see also UN Doc. A/AC.237/50 (1993).

157 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between International Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986, 25 ILM 543 (1986).

158 UNOLA I, supra note 156, para. 6.

159 See Amerasinghe, supra note 58, at 85; Schermers & Blokker, supra note 58, at 978.

160 UNOLA I, supra note 156, para. 6 (quoting Climate Change Convention, supra note 10, Art. 7(2)).

161 Bonn Convention, supra note 5, Art.VII(5)(h); Desertification Convention, supra note 14, Art. 22 (2) (j); see also Lrtap Convention, supra note 17, Art. 10(2) (c); Vienna Convention, supra note 6, Art. 6(2) (k); Montreal Protocol, supra note 7, Art. 11 (3) (j); Basel Convention, supra note 8, Art. 15(5) (c); Kyoto Protocol, supra note 11, Art. 13(4); Prior Informed Consent Convention, supra note 15, Art. 18(5) (c).

162 UNOLA I, supra note 156, para. 6 (citing Climate Change Convention, supra note 10, Art. 7(2) (1)).

163 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 ICJ Rep. 174 (Apr. 11).

164 See note 28 supra and corresponding text.

165 GA Res. 50/115, UN GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 49, Vol. 1, at 174, UN Doc. A/50/49 (1995) (emphasis omitted).

166 UNOLA I, supra note 156, para. 7; see also Werksman, Jacob, Consolidating Governance of Global Commons: Insights from the Global Environment Facility, 6 Y.B. Int’l Envtl. L. 27, 54–60 (1995)Google Scholar.

167 UN Doc. A/AC.237/74, annex, para. 16 (1994) [hereinafter UNOLA Ii].

168 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Council of the Global Environment Facility, Decision 12/CP.2, annex, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add.1 (1996).

169 See Aust, Anthony, The Theory and Practice of Informal International Instruments, 35 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 787, 800–04 (1986)Google Scholar.

170 Climate Change COP Decision 12/CP.2, supra note 168, para. 2; see also Biodiversity COP Decision III/8, Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/3/38, at61 (1996), <http://www.biodiv.org/Decisions/COP3/pdf/COP-3-AllDecisions-e.pdf>.

171 UNOLA Ii, supra note 167, paras. 18, 19.

172 See the documents presented by the secretariat to the Subsidiary Body for Implementation and the cop, respectively, UN Docs. FCCC/SBI/1995/3, FCCC/CP/1996/9.

173 Agreement Regulating Matters Resulting from the Establishment in Canada of the Multilateral Fund and Its Organs, Nov. 23, 1998, Can.-Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer (on file with authors).

174 Agreement Concerning the Headquarters of the Convention Secretariat, UN–FRG–Secretariat of UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, June 20, 1996 (on file with authors) [hereinafter 1996 Agreement].

175 Montreal Protocol MOP Decision IV/18, Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15, supra note 96.

176 Montreal Protocol MOP Decision VI/16 , Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.6/7 (1994), <http://www.unep.org/ozone/6mop_nbo.htm>.

177 Climate Change cop Decision 16/CP.l, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1, para. 2.

178 Institutional and Budgetary Matters: Arrangements for Relocation of the Convention Secretariat to Bonn, UN Doc. FCCC/SBI/1996/7, para. 11(2) (1996).

179 Id., para. 11(5).

180 Id.

181 Report of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation on the Work of Its Second Session, UN Doc. FCCC/SBI/1996/9, para. 66(c).

182 Agreement Concerning the Headquarters of the United Nations Volunteers Programme, Nov. 10, 1995, UNFRG [hereinafter UNV Agreement] (on file with authors).

183 Climate Change cop Decision 15/CP.2, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add.1, para. 2.

184 Report of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation on the Work of Its Third Session, UN Doc. FCCC/SBI/1996/12, para. 46.

185 e.g., UNV Agreement, supra note 182, Arts. 4, 13, 14. Cf. 1996 Agreement, supra note 174, Art. 3.

186 UNV Agreement, supra note 182, Art. 26(2).

187 Id., Art. 4(3).

188 Report of the United Nations Task Force on Environment and Human Settlements, UN Doc. A/53/463, annex, para. 30 (1998).

189 Biodiversity Convention, supra note 12, Art. 23(4) (h).

190 See Biodiversity COP Decision 11/13, Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/2/19, at 24 (1995), <http://www.biodiv.org/cop2/COP2_decisions_e.pdf>, reprinted in 6 Y.B. Int’l Envtl. L. 830 (1995); Biodiversity COP Decision 111/21, para. 2, Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/3/38, supra note 170, at 112; Biodiversity COP Decision IV/15, para. 3 (1998) <http://www.biodiv.org/Decisions/COP4/html/COP-4-Dec-15.html>.

191 See UNEP, A Programme for Change: Decisions from the Fourth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity 119–22 (UNEP/IUC/98/8, 1998).

195 See Gehring, supra note 25, at 54.

196 Sommer, supra note 106, at 629–33.

197 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, TIAS No. 1700, 55 UNTS 188.

198 See Bowett, supra note 107, at 118; see also Van Meerhaeghe, M. A. G., International Economic Institutions 90–95 (2d ed. 1971)Google Scholar.

199 Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 UST 794, 402 UNTS 71.

200 It should be noted that consultative parties do not comprise all parties to the Treaty, but the original 12 parties, together with such other parties as conduct “substantial scientific research activity” in Antarctica. Id., Art. IX(1),(2).

201 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, supra note 52, Arts. VII-XXI.

202 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Oct. 4, 1991, Arts. 10–12, 30 ILM 1455 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Protocol].

203 See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 199, Art. IX(3); 1991 Protocol, supra note 202, Arts. 12, 15.

204 On the carrying out of secretariat functions in the Antarctic Treaty system, see Scully, R. T., Alternatives for Cooperation and Institutionalization in Antarctica: Outlook for the 1990s, in Antarctic Resources Policy 281, 284–85 (Francisco, Orrego Vicuna ed., 1983)Google Scholar. See also Jeffrey D., Myhre, The Antarctic Treaty System: Politics, Law and Diplomacy, chs. IV, IX (1986)Google Scholar.

205 See Scully, supra note 204, at 283.

206 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 36 ILM 1507 (1997).

207 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, May 3, 1996, 35 ILM 1206 (1996).

208 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 32 ILM 800 (1993) [hereinafter Chemical Weapons Convention].

209 Opened for signature Sept. 24, 1996, 35 ILM 1439 (1996) [hereinafter Test Ban Treaty].

210 Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 208, Art. VIII (48); Test Ban Treaty, supra note 209, Art. 11(54).

211 Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 208, Art. VIII(34); Test Ban Treaty, supra note 209, Art. 11(38).

212 The CSCE came into being following the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 ILM 1292 (1975). It became more fully institutionalized after the adoption of the Charter of Paris, Nov. 21, 1990, 30 ILM 190 (1991). In 1994 the CSCE was converted into the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. See further McGoldrick, Dominic, The Development of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe—From Process to Institution, in Legal Visions of the New Europe 135 (Bernard S., Jackson & McGoldrick, Dominic eds., 1993)Google Scholar.

213 Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, Sept. 19, 1996, 35 ILM 1382 (1996).

214 See Friedmann, Wolfgang, The Changing Structure of International Law 60–62 (1964)Google Scholar.