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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 February 2017
1 Donald G. Brennan, ed., Arms Control. DAEDALUS, Fall 1960. Boston: American Academy of Arts and Sciences (1960). A somewhat revised and enlarged version was published. Donald G. Brennan, ed., Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security (1961).
2 On these ambiguities, see testimony by Henry S. Rowen in The Vladivostok Accord: Implications to U.S. Security, Arms Control, and World Peace. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., June 24, 25 and July 8, 1975. On the particular problem of cruise missiles, see Lawrence Weiler, D., Strategic Cruise Missiles and the Future of Salt, 5 Arms Control Today (October 1975)Google Scholar.
3 On the potentially destabilizing effect of maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs), see testimony of Congressmen Robert L. Leggett and Thomas J. Downey in The Vladivostok Accord, supra note 2.
4 United Nations Charter, Arts. 11(1) and 26.
5 Leland M. Goodrich and Edvard Hambro, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents 71, 210 (2d rev. ed. 1949).
6 In this context, “strategic” means “mutually dependent.” See Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 15-16 (1960).
7 Sullivan, Michael J. III, Conference at the Crossroads: Future Prospects for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, 29 International Organization 405 (1975)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. This article examines the recent performance of the CCD and sets forth the rationale for the proposed World Disarmament Conference.