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The “Wall” Decisions in Legal and Political Context

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 February 2017

Geoffrey R. Watson
Geoffrey R. Watson*
Affiliation:
The Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law
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Extract

In June 2002, the Israeli cabinet approved a plan to construct a continuous “security fence” separating much of the occupied West Bank of the Jordan River from Israel proper. The stated purpose of the barrier was to prevent Palestinian terrorists from entering Israel and killing Israeli civilians. Construction began in 2002, and a significant portion of the structure had been completed by early 2004. The current route of the wall deviates significantly from the “Green Line”—the 1949 armistice line that separates the West Bank from Israel. The fence frequently enters and traverses the West Bank, encircling Jewish settlements there. Eventually, about 15 percent of the territory of the West Bank, home to several hundred thousand Palestinians, will lie between the wall and the Green Line.

Type
Agora: ICJ Advisory Opinion on Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 99 , Issue 1 , January 2005 , pp. 6 - 26
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 2005

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References

1 Keinon, Herb, Cabinet Okays ‘Security Concept,’ Jerusalem Post [Jm. Post], June 24, 2002, at 1 Google Scholar

2 Amnesty International, Israel and the Occupied Territories: the Place of the Fence/Wall in International Law (AI Index No. MDE 15/016/2004, Feb. 2004), available at <http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engmde 150162004 >.

3 Even the name of the structure is a matter of disagreement. Israel insists that it is a “fence” or a “barrier,” and indeed in most places its core structure is a chain-link fence, not a solid wall. Palestinians refer to it as a “wall,” stressing that it is impassable and in a few places quite solid. Myre, Greg, Fencing Off In the Middle East, Even Words Go to War, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 2003, §4, at 3 Google Scholar. This essay will use the terms interchangeably.

4 Photographs and diagrams of the fence can be found at the Web site of Israel’s Ministry of Defense, <http://www.seamzone.mod.gov.il/Pages/ENG/operational.htm>.

5 Todd, S. Purdum, U.S. Criticizes Israel’s New Electronic Fence Along West Bank, N.Y. Times, June 18, 2002, at A6 Google Scholar.

6 UN Doc. S/PV.4842 (2003); UN Doc. S/2003/980 (draft resolution); see also UN Doc. S/PV.4841 (2003).

7 SC Res. 1515 (Nov. 19, 2003).

8 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, paras. 4, 6 (Int’l Ct. Justice July 9, 2004), 43 ILM 1009 (2004) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion].

9 Id., para. 9. The written statements are available on the Court’s Web site, <http://www.icj-cij.org>.

10 Advisory Opinion, para. 12. The oral submissions are available on the Court’s Web site, supra note 9.

11 HCJ 2056/04, Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel (June 30, 2004), 43 ILM 1099 (2004) [hereinafter Beit Sourik].

12 Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, paras. 14-15.

13 Id., para. 25.

14 Id., para. 27 (quoting the UN legal counsel, UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1637, para. 9 (1968)).

15 Id., para. 28.

16 GA Res. 377A (V), para. 1 (Nov. 3, 1950).

17 Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, para. 31.

18 Id., para. 32.

19 Id., para. 33.

20 Id., para. 34.

21 Id., para. 35 (citing Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276(1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 ICJ REP. 16, 22, para. 20 (June 21)).

22 Written Statement of the Government of Israel on Jurisdiction and Propriety 83 (Jan. 30, 2004), Advisory Opinion, supra note 8 [hereinafter Israel Written Statement].

23 Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, para. 38 (citing Interpretation of the Greco-Turkish Agreement of 1 December 1926 (Final Protocol, Article IV), Advisory Opinion, 1928 PCIJ (ser. B) No. 16(1), at 14-16; Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 1980 ICJ REP. 73, 87-89 (Dec. 20); Application for Review of Judgement No. 273 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1982 ICJ REP. 325, 348 (July 20); Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1956 ICJ REP. 23, 25 (June 1); Certain Expenses of die United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1962 ICJ REP. 151, 157-62 (July 20)).

24 Id., para. 39.

25 Id., para. 40.

26 Id., para. 41; see Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 ICJ REP. 226, 234, para. 13 (July 8).

27 Id., para. 163(1) (dispositif).

28 Id., para. 44 (quoting Certain Expenses of the United Nations, supra note 23, at. 155).

29 Status of Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923 PCIJ (ser. B) No. 5, at 27-29 (July 23).

30 Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, para. 44 (quoting Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 26, at 235-36, para. 14.

31 See A Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, UN Doc. S/253/2003, annex. The road map proposes a three-phase peace process leading to a two-state solution. The first phase calls for an end to terrorism and the construction of Palestinian civic institutions. The second, transitional phase would include conferences and confidence-building measures, all of which would culminate in the establishment of a Palestinian state. The third and final phase would lead to a permanent status agreement on issues such as borders, refugees, settlements, and Jerusalem, as well as a larger peace agreement involving other Arab states, such as Syria and Lebanon. Although the details and timing of the road map differ from those of the Oslo Accords, the essential ingredients are similar: interim measures that lead eventually to a permanent status agreement.

32 Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, para. 53.

33 Israel Written Statement, supra note 22, at 107-10.

34 Id at 110.

35 Id.

36 Report of the Secretary-General Prepared Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution ES-10/13, UN Doc. A/ES-10/28 (2003) [hereinafter S-G Report] (containing a later Written Statement of the United Nations and accompanied by a dossier of documents, both available at <http://www.icj-cij.org>).

37 Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, para. 57.

38 Id., para. 58.

39 Id., para. 61 (quoting Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 26, at 237, para. 16).

40 Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, para. 62.

41 Id., para. 64.

42 Id., para. 163(2) (dispositif).

43 See infra p. 19.

44 See infra pp. 16-19. For examinations of the Court’s view of its advisory function in the Wall case, see Pomerance, Michla, The ICJ’s Advisory Jurisdiction and the Crumbling Wall Between the Political and the Judicial, 99 AJIL 26 (2005) CrossRefGoogle Scholar (in this Agora); Richard, A. Falk, Toward Authoritativeness: The IC] Ruling on Israel’s Security Wall, 99 AJIL 42 (2005) Google Scholar (in this Agora).

45 Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, paras. 70-78.

46 Id., paras. 79-85.

47 Id., para. 87.

48 Id., para. 88.

49 Id., para. 89.

50 Convention [No. IV] Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,1949, 6 UST 3516, 75 UNTS 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].

51 Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, para. 95.

52 Id., paras. 95-100.

53 Id., para. 105 (quoting Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 26, at 240).

54 Id., para. 106.

55 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, Art. 2(1), 999 UNTS 331 [hereinafter ICCPR].

56 Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, paras. 109-11.

57 Id., para. 112 (quoting Concluding Observations: Israel, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.90, paras. 15, 31 (2003), available at <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf>). For the Covenant, see International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 UNTS 3 [hereinafter ICESC].

58 Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, para. 113. For the Convention, see Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 UNTS 3.

59 Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, paras. 115-16.

60 See, e.g., Written Statement Submitted by Palestine 305-06 (Jan. 30, 2004), Advisory Opinion, supra note 8; Written Statement Submitted by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 126-30 (Jan. 30, 2004), Advisory Opinion, supra; Written Statement of the League of Arab States 62-65 (Jan. 2004), Advisory Opinion, supra.

61 Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, paras. 117-20.

62 Id., para. 120.

63 Id., para. 121.

64 Id., para. 122.

65 Id., para. 126; see Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 50, Arts. 6(3), 49, 53, 59.

66 Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, para. 127.

67 Id., para. 128; see ICCPR, supra note 55, Arts. 17(1), 12.

68 Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, para. 130; see ICESC, supra note 57, Arts. 6, 7, 10-14.

69 Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, para. 131.

70 Id., para. 129.

71 General Armistice Agreement, Apr. 3, 1949, Isr.-Jordan, Art. VIII(2), available at <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/arm03.htm>.

72 Treaty of Peace, Oct. 26, 1994, Isr.-Jordan, Art. 9(1), 34 ILM 43 (1995), quoted in Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, para. 129.

73 See Written Statement Submitted by Palestine, supra note 60, at 302-07 (summarizing Palestine’s legal argument); Written Statement Submitted by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, supra note 60, at 152-55 (summary of Jordan’s argument); see also Written Statement of the League of Arab States, supra note 60, at 62-103 (emphasizing self-determination, humanitarian law, and human rights law but not instruments relating to the holy places).

74 Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, para. 132 (citing Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Arts. 46, 52, annexed to Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 49, Art. 53).

75 Id., paras. 132-33 (citing S-G Report, supra note 36).

76 Id., para. 133.

77 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 50, Arts. 49, 53.

78 Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, para. 135.

79 Id., para. 139.

80 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its First-third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43, Art. 25, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (2002).

81 Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, para. 140.

82 Id., para. 163(3)(A) (dispositif). Again, Judge Buergenthal’s was the sole dissenting vote. See infra p. 19.

83 Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, paras. 149-51.

84 Id., para. 152 (citing Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol), 1928 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 17, at 47 (Sept. 13)).

85 Id., para. 153.

86 Id., para. 163(3)(B), (C) (dispositif).

87 Id., para. 154 (citing Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), Second Phase, 1970 IC] REP. 5, 32, para. 33 (Feb. 5)).

88 Id., para. 158.

89 Id., para. 159.

90 Id., para. 163(3)(D) (dispositif).

91 Id., para. 160.

92 Id., para. 162.

93 Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, Separate Opinion of Judge Koroma, 43 ILM at 1056, para. 2.

94 Id., paras. 5-10.

95 Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, Separate Opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh, 43 ILM at 1075, para. 13.

96 Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, Separate Opinion of Judge Elaraby, 43 ILM at 1081, para. 2.5.

97 See id., 2d para, (quoting Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 ICJ REP. 14, 158 (June 27) (Lachs, J., sep. op.)); see also Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, para. 8; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Order (Int’l Ct. Justice Jan. 30, 2004) (rejecting Israel’s motion by a vote of 14-1); id., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Buergenthal.

98 Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, Separate Opinion of Judge Owada, 43 ILM at 1091, para. 7 (quoting Status of Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923 PCIJ (ser. B) No. 5, at 27 (July 23)).

99 Id., paras. 10-11.

100 Id., para. 19.

101 Id., para. 22.

102 Id., para. 31.

103 Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, 43 ILM at 1058, para. 10 (quoting Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 ICJ REP. 12, 25, paras. 32-33 (Oct. 16)).

104 Id., para. 12 (quoting Western Sahara, supra note 103, at 26-27, para. 39).

105 Id., paras. 12, 13.

106 Id., para. 16.

107 Id., para. 18.

108 Id., paras. 24, 25.

109 Id., para. 27.

110 Id., para. 30.

111 Id., paras. 33, 34.

112 Id., paras. 37-39.

113 Id., para. 40.

114 Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, 43 ILM at 1065, paras. 3-13.

115 Id.,para. 18.

116 Id., paras. 14-28.

117 Id., paras. 31-33.

118 Id., paras. 35-36.

119 Id., paras. 43-44.

120 Id., para. 47 (citing Kalshoven, Frits, The Undertaking to Respect and Ensure Respect in All Circumstances: From Tmy Seed to Ripening Fruit, 1999 Y.B. Int’l Humanitarian L. 3 CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

121 Id., para. 50.

122 Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, Declaration of Judge Buergenthal, 43 ILM at 1078, para. 1.

123 Id., para. 3.

124 Id., paras. 4-6.

125 Id., paras. 7-9.

126 Id., para. 10.

127 Lefkovits, Etgar & Katz, Yaakov, Court Stops Work on Part of Barrier, Jm. Post, Mar. 1, 2004, at 1 Google Scholar.

128 Beit Sourik, supra note 11, para. 9.

129 Id., para. 22.

130 Israeli law authorizes the Supreme Court to sit as a High Court of Justice in the first instance on certain questions of administrative and constitutional law. BASIC LAW: Judiciary §15(c), (d) (Isr.).

131 Beit Sourik, supra note 11, para. 16.

132 Id., para. 23; cf. HCJ 4764/04, Physicians for Human Rights v. Commander of IDF Forces, para. 19 (May 30, 2004) (holding that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to IDF military operations in the Gaza Strip).

133 Beit Sourik, supra note 11, paras. 28-29.

134 Id., para. 30.

135 Id., para. 31.

136 Id„ para. 32.

137 Id., paras. 36-40.

138 Id., para. 41.

139 Id., paras. 45-47.

140 Id., para. 46.

141 Id., paras. 46-47, 56-57, 70, 75.

142 Id., paras. 58, 70, 75.

143 Id., para. 60.

144 Id., para. 61.

145 Id., para. 67 (holding that the parties “must continue to discuss this issue” with a view to a negotiated change in route).

146 Id., paras. 70-71 (annulling the corresponding military order).

147 Id., para. 80.

148 Id., paras. 82-83.

149 Id., para. 86 (quoting HCJ 5100/94, Public Comm. Against Torture v. Israel, 53(4) P.D. 817, 845 (Sept. 6, 1999)).

150 Id.

151 On the Court’s past practice, see, for example, HCJ 5591/02, Yassin v. Commander of Kziot Military Camp, para. 12 (Dec. 18, 2002) (finding the Fourth Geneva Convention applicable because “Israel sees itself as bound by the humanitarian provisions of the convention”); HCJ 3278/02, Center for Defense of Individual v. IDF Commander, para. 23 (Dec. 18, 2002) (similar). My argument can be found in Geoffrey R. Watson, the Oslo Accords 136-42 (2000).

152 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).

153 Customary international law has the force of law in Israeli courts, whereas conventional law must be incorporated into domestic law by implementing legislation. See generally Lapidoth, Ruth, International Law Within the Israeli Legal System, 24 ISR. L. Rev. 451 (1990) Google Scholar.

154 See, e.g., Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13, 1993, Isr.-PLO, Art. XVII(l), 32ILM 1525 (1993) [hereinafter Declaration of Principles]; Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Sept. 28, 1995, Isr.-PLO, 36 ILM 551 (1997) [hereinafter Interim Agreement].

155 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, Art. 2(1 )(a), 1155 UNTS 331.

156 The PLO signed the accords, not the Palestinian Authority. The accords recognized the PLO as having some competence to sign international agreements “for the benefit” of the PA, whereas the PA’s competence was restricted to domestic matters. Interim Agreement, supra note 154, Art. IX(5). Apparently, this arrangement was intended to allay Israeli concerns that a unified PLO/PA might be regarded as a state. But there is no evidence that this configuration was intended to relieve the accords of binding force.

157 For a fuller discussion of this practice, see WATSON, supra note 151, at 91-99.

158 Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 ICJ REP. 253 (Dec. 20).

159 Sabel, Robbie, Book Review, 95 AJIL 248, 250–51 (2001) Google Scholar (reviewing Watson, supra note 151).

160 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 155, Art. 60(1).

161 See, e.g., Keinon, Herb, US Envoy Talks to Tocus on Outposts, Jm. Post, July 13, 2004, at 2 Google Scholar (reporting on Israeli commitments to return tax revenue to the PA); Keinon, Herb, Israel to Transfer Additional NIS 130m. in Taxes to PA, Jm. Post, Jan. 2, 2003, at 1 Google Scholar.

162 Interim Agreement, supra note 154, Annex V, app. 1, Art. V(4)(a), (b).

163 Cf. Written Statement Submitted by Palestine, supra note 60, at 49 (asserting that elections have not been held because of the “prevailing coercive situation” in the occupied territories).

164 See Najib, Mohammed et al., Palestinians Reaffirm Plan to Declare Statehood at the UN, Jm. Post, Sept. 25, 1998, at 2 Google Scholar.

165 See Lynfield, Ben, Erekat: May 4 Will Be a Normal Day, Jm. Post, May 4, 1999, at 1 Google Scholar.

166 Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum on Implementation Timeline of Outstanding Commitments of Agreements Signed and the Resumption of Permanent Status Negotiations, Sept. 4, 1999, Isr.-PLO, 38 ILM 1465 (1999).

167 For a critique of the Court’s use of human rights law in the Wall advisory opinion, see Michael, J. Dennis, Application of Human Rights Treaties in Times of Armed Conflict, 99 AJIL 119 (2005) Google Scholar (in this Agora).

168 Interim Agreement, supra note 154, Art. XXXI(7).

169 Declaration of Principles, supra note 154, Art. V(3).

170 See, e.g., Ross, Dennis, U.S. special Middle East coordinator, Note for the Record (Jan. 15, 1997), 36 ILM 665 (1997) Google Scholar, reprinted in WATSON, supra note 151, at 375 (summarizing each side’s major responsibilities under the accords).

171 For a critique of this and other aspects of the Court’s treatment of humanitarian law, see Kretzmer, David, The Advisory Opinion: The Light Treatment of International Humanitarian Law, 99 AJIL 88 (2005) CrossRefGoogle Scholar (in this Agora).

172 See, e.g., Gutman, Matthew, ‘In the Last Five Months, We’ve Had Zero Attacks,’ Jm. Post, June 2, 2004, at 1 Google Scholar.

173 Erlanger, Steven, Israeli Court Orders Assessment of West Bank Barrier, N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 2004, at Al Google Scholar.

174 Yoaz, Yuval, Mazuz: Hague Ruling on Fence Could Lead to Sanctions on Israel, Haaretz, Aug. 20, 2004 Google Scholar (Eng. ed.), available at <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=467077>.

175 Cf. William Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, act 2, sc. 2 (“The law hath not been dead, though it hath slept.”), quoted in Waldron v. Brit. Petroleum Co., 231 F.Supp. 72, 89 n.30 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (referring to the Logan Act, 18 U.S.C. §953).