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Ukraine, Open-Source Investigations, and the Future of International Legal Discourse

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 October 2022

Henning Lahmann Open the ORCID record for Henning Lahmann [Opens in a new window]
Henning Lahmann*
Affiliation:
Assistant professor at the Center for Law and Digital Technologies at Leiden University Law School, Leiden, Netherlands.
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Abstract

Russia's aggression against Ukraine has brought into focus the growing significance of open-source information for international legal processes. Enabled by novel digital technologies, civil society actors have seized the opportunity provided by the vast amount of publicly available evidence to counter-narrate Russia's pretexts to justify its invasion within the deliberative bodies of the United Nations. This Essay explains the potential of this emerging practice to influence international legal discourse by increasing the costs for actors who base their conduct on false factual claims.

Type
Agora Essays: The War in Ukraine and the Future of the International Legal Order
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 116 , Issue 4 , October 2022 , pp. 810 - 820
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press for The American Society of International Law

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Footnotes

The research for the Article was conducted while in residence as a Post-Doctoral Global Fellow at the Hauser Global Law School Program at New York University with additional support from a research grant by the German Academic Exchange Service. I am grateful to Mariana Velasco-Rivera, Pola Cebulak, Francesca Episcopo, Thiago Amparo, Thomas Streinz, Angelina Fisher, Christian Marxsen, Gráinne de Búrca, Philip Alston, Benedict Kingsbury, and the participants of the 2022 International Law and Technological Progress Conference at the University of Aberdeen School of Law, Scotland for their invaluable critical feedback and input.

References

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2 D'Alessandra, Federica & Sutherland, Kirsty, The Promise and Challenges of New Actors and New Technologies in International Justice, 19 J. Int'l Crim. Just. 9, 12 (2021)Google Scholar.

3 Russia laid out the most explicit and detailed legal rationale during the UN General Assembly emergency special session after the beginning of the invasion. See UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.1, at 7–11 (Feb. 28, 2022).

4 James A. Green, Christian Henderson & Tom Ruys, Russia's Attack on Ukraine and the Jus Ad Bellum, 9 J. Use Force Int'l L. 4, 29 (2022); Marko Milanović & Eliav Lieblich, JIB/JAB Podcast, at 12:45, 13:30 (Mar. 8, 2022), at https://jibjabpodcast.com/episode-28-the-war-in-ukraine-jus-ad-bellum-implications.

5 Christian Marxsen, Völkerrechtsordnung und völkerrechtsbruch. Theorie und praxis der illegalität im ius contra bellum 106–09 (2021).

6 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 ICJ Rep. 14, para. 186 (June 27).

7 Green, Henderson & Ruys, supra note 4, at 29.

8 Holzscheiter, Anna, Between Communicative Interaction and Structures of Signification: Discourse Theory and Analysis in International Relations, 15 Int'l Stud. Perspec. 142, 146 (2014)Google Scholar; Johnstone, Ian, Security Council Deliberations: The Power of the Better Argument, 14 Eur. J. Int'l L. 437, 453–54 (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9 Lauren Sukin & Allen S. Weiner, War and Words: The International Use of Force in the United Nations Charter Era, in Challenges to the International Legal Order 33 (David Sloss ed., 2022), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3862024.

10 Milanović, supra note 4, at 12:48.

11 Brunnée, Jutta & Toope, Steven J., Norm Robustness and Contestation in International Law: Self-Defense Against Nonstate Actors, 4 J. Glob. Security Stud. 73 (2019)Google Scholar, who build their argument on earlier work by Nicole Deitelhoff and Lisbeth Zimmermann, see most recently, Deitelhoff, Nicole & Zimmermann, Lisbeth, Things We Lost in the Fire: How Different Types of Contestation Affect the Robustness of International Norms, 22 Int'l Stud. Rev. 51 (2020)Google Scholar.

12 Marxsen, supra note 5, at 212–17; Brunnée & Toope, supra note 11, at 84.

13 Brunnée & Toope, supra note 11, at 84; Perina, Alexandra H., Black Holes and Open Secrets: The Impact of Covert Action on International Law, 53 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 507, 566 (2015)Google Scholar; Marxsen, supra note 5, at 327; Ginsburg, Tom, Article 2(4) and Authoritarian International Law, 116 AJIL Unbound 130, 132 (2022)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

14 UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.1, at 13 (Feb. 28, 2022) (Denmark).

15 Aust, Helmut Philipp & Payandeh, Mehrdad, Praxis und Protest im Völkerrecht: Erosionserscheinungen des völkerrechtlichen Gewaltverbots und die Verantwortung der Bundesrepublik im Syrien-Konflikt, 73 JuristenZeitung 633, 635 (2018)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Franck, Thomas M., The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International Law in an Age of Power Disequilibrium, 100 AJIL 88, 96 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gray, Christine, The Use of Force to Prevent the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 52 Japanese Y.B. Int'l L. 101, 114 (2009)Google Scholar; Marxsen, supra note 5, at 335; Garwood-Gowers, Andrew, Israel's Airstrike on Syria's Al-Kibar Facility: A Test Case for the Doctrine of Pre-emptive Self-Defence?, 16 J. Conflict & Security L. 263, 288 (2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ginsburg, supra note 13, at 131.

16 See Allegations of Genocide Under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukr. v. Russ.), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Verbatim Record of March 7, 2022, at 58 (Int'l Ct. Justice), available at https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/182/182-20220307-ORA-01-00-BI.pdf.

17 See on this predicament for states such as the United States or the United Kingdom, John Reid, Putin, Pretext, and the Dark Side of the “Responsibility to Protect,” War on the Rocks (May 27, 2022), at https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/putin-pretext-and-the-dark-side-of-the-responsibility-to-protect. During the Security Council deliberations on Russia's invasion, the representative of Kenya clearly alluded to this fact. See UN Doc. S/PV.8979, at 11 (Feb. 25, 2022).

18 Andris Banka & Adam Quinn, Killing Norms Softly: US Targeted Killing, Quasi-secrecy and the Assassination Ban, 27 Security Stud. 665, 672 (2018). During the Security Council deliberations on Russia's invasion, Kenya's permanent representative recalled the 1994 genocide in Rwanda as one example of devastating consequences of the Council members’ inability to agree on a shared factual basis of a situation. UN Doc. S/PV.9011, at 19 (Apr. 5, 2022).

19 Thérèse O'Donnell, Security Council Resolution 1530, Evidence and the United Nations Security Council, 100 ASIL Proc. 47, 51 (2006).

20 Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Transparency in the Security Council, in Transparency in International Law 367, 380 (Andrea Bianchi & Anne Peters eds., 2013).

21 See Richard N. Gardner, Commentary on the Law of Self-Defense, in Law and Force in the New International Order 49, 52–53 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds., 1991).

22 Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: The Bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan, 24 Yale J. Int'l L. 537, 537–38 (1999).

23 Shiri Krebs, Experiments in International Law and the Efficacy of International Fact-Finding: Evidence from the U.S. and Israel, in Research Methods in International Law: A Handbook 244, 244 (Rossana Deplano & Nicholas Tsagourias eds., 2021).

24 UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/49/1, at para. 11(a) (Mar. 7, 2022).

25 Allegations of Genocide Under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukr. v. Russ.), Order, para. 59 (Int'l Ct. Just. Mar. 16, 2022).

26 Deepak Raju, Ukraine v. Russia: A “Reverse Compliance” Case on Genocide, EJIL:Talk! (Mar. 15, 2022), at https://www.ejiltalk.org/ukraine-v-russia-a-reverse-compliance-case-on-genocide. Regarding Russia's factual claims, the Court merely determined that it “is not in possession of evidence substantiating the allegation . . . that genocide has been committed on Ukrainian territory.” Allegations of Genocide, Order, supra note 25, para. 59.

27 Thomas M. Franck, Reflections on Force and Evidence, 100 ASIL Proc. 51, 52 (2006).

28 Allison Carnegie & Austin Carson, Secrets in Global Governance: Disclosure Dilemmas and the Challenge of International Cooperation 28–33 (2020); Marie Jacobsson, Evidence as an Issue in International Legal Practice, 100 ASIL Proc. 40, 42 (2006); Amy McKinnon, Bellingcat Can Say What U.S. Intelligence Can't, For. Pol'y (Dec. 17, 2020), at https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/17/bellingcat-can-say-what-u-s-intelligence-cant.

29 Ruth Wedgwood describes the 1996 situation in which the United States disclosed high-resolution satellite images as evidence of India's violation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons only for India to subsequently improve the secrecy of its program. Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden, 24 Yale J. Int'l L. 559, 567 (1999).

30 For example, both Ghana and Madagascar rejected the Unites States’ offered justification for its 1986 air strikes against Libya since the evidence presented in the UN Security Council relied on undisclosed intelligence. See UN Doc. S/PV.2677, at 13 (Apr. 16, 1986) (Madagascar); UN Doc. S/PV.2680, at 32–33 (Apr. 18, 1986) (Ghana).

31 Simon Chesterman, Shared Secrets. Intelligence and Collective Security 21 (2006).

32 UN Doc. S/PV.8991, at 9 (Mar. 11, 2022) (United States).

33 UN Doc. S/PV.8968, at 12 (Feb. 17, 2022) (United States).

34 Id. at 13.

35 Monica Hakimi, The Media as Participants in the International Legal Process, 16 Duke J. Comp. Int'l L. 1, 4 (2006).

36 Id.; Marxsen, supra note 5, at 217. See, e.g., in the context of UN Security Council deliberations during the genocide in Rwanda, UN Doc. S/PV.3377, at 14 (Spain), at 15 (Czech Republic) (May 16, 1994).

37 Perina, supra note 13, at 549 (emphasis added); likewise Oona A. Hathaway, National Security Lawyering in the Post-War Era: Can Law Constrain Power?, 68 UCLA L. Rev. 2, 30 (2021).

38 See Julian E. Barnes, U.S. Exposes What It Says Is Russian Effort to Fabricate Pretext for Invasion, N.Y. Times (Feb. 3, 2022), at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/03/us/politics/russia-ukraine-invasion-pretext.html.

39 See Shawna Chen, AP Reporter Confronts Biden Spokesperson Over Russia Allegations, Axios (Feb. 3, 2022), at https://www.axios.com/russia-ukraine-ned-price-b5f16863-d495-46c1-ba3b-6bb43193fce6.html.

40 See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra note 6, paras. 62–65.

41 Matthew Fuller & Eyal Weizman, Investigative Aesthetics: Conflicts and Commons in the Politics of Truth 5 (2021).

42 Eyal Weizman, Introduction: Forensis, in Forensis: The Architecture of Public Truth 9, 12 (Forensic Architecture ed., 2014).

43 Bellingcat Investigation Team, MH17 – The Open Source Investigation, Three Years Later, Bellingcat (July 17, 2017), at https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2017/07/17/mh17-open-source-investigation-three-years-later.

44 See Christoph Koettl, et al., How a U.S. Drone Strike Killed the Wrong Person, N.Y. Times (Sept. 10, 2021), at https://www.nytimes.com/video/world/asia/100000007963596/us-drone-attack-kabul-investigation.html.

45 A New Era of Transparent Warfare Beckons: Russia's Manoeuvres Are a Coming-Out Party for Open-Source Intelligence, Economist (Feb. 18, 2022), at https://www.economist.com/briefing/2022/02/18/a-new-era-of-transparent-warfare-beckons.

46 See Yousur Al-Hlou, Masha Froliak, Evan Hill, Malachy Browne & David Botti, New Evidence Shows How Russian Soldiers Executed Men in Bucha, N.Y. Times (May 19, 2022), at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/19/world/europe/russia-bucha-ukraine-executions.html; Eliot Higgins, Russia's Bucha “Facts” Versus the Evidence, Bellingcat (Apr. 4, 2022), at https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2022/04/04/russias-bucha-facts-versus-the-evidence.

47 Eliot Higgins, @EliotHiggins, Twitter (Feb. 17, 2022, 3:53 a.m.), at https://twitter.com/EliotHiggins/status/1494233592913879041?s=20&t=PFPxI7rGTMOcH6uudXlgEw.

48 Allegations of Genocide, Request, supra note 16, at 36.

49 Human Rights Watch, Shelling Residential Areas Puts Civilians at Risk (Feb. 18, 2022), at https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/02/18/ukraine-shelling-residential-areas-puts-civilians-risk.

50 OSCE, Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Daily Report 38/2022, at 3 (Feb. 18, 2022), at https://www.osce.org/files/2022-02-18%20Daily%20Report_ENG.pdf?itok=23379.

51 Valerie Hopkins, Poised on Border, Russia May Be Seeking Pretext for Ukraine Invasion, Officials Say, N.Y. Times (Feb. 20, 2022), at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/20/world/europe/ukraine-russia-belarus-putin.html.

52 UN Doc. S/PV.8970, at 2 (Feb. 21, 2022).

53 See Eliot Higgins, @EliotHiggins, Twitter (Feb. 20, 2022, 6:11 a.m.), at https://twitter.com/EliotHiggins/status/1495355366141534208.

54 Bellingcat Investigation Team, Documenting and Debunking Dubious Footage from Ukraine's Frontlines, Bellingcat (Feb. 23, 2022), at https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2022/02/23/documenting-and-debunking-dubious-footage-from-ukraines-frontlines.

55 Eyal Weizman, Open Verification, E-Flux Architecture (June 2019), at https://www.e-flux.com/architecture/becoming-digital/248062/open-verification.

56 As an example, see the link to the original “saboteur” video of above example with the explicit invitation to validate the findings. Eliot Higgins, @EliotHiggins, Twitter (Feb. 20, 2022, 6:26 a.m.), at https://twitter.com/EliotHiggins/status/1495359103673188355.

57 Eliot Higgins, We Are Bellingcat: An Intelligence Agency for the People 58 (2021).

58 Weizman, supra note 55.

59 Claudia Aradau & Jef Huysmans, Assembling Credibility: Knowledge, Method and Critique in Times of “Post-Truth,” 50 Security Dialogue 40, 50–54 (2019).

60 UN Doc. S/PV.8988, at 9 (Mar. 7, 2022) (Russian Federation); see also UN Doc. S/PV.9011, at 28 (Apr. 5, 2022) (Russian Federation) (“Of course, they are not interested in the fact that modern technologies today make it possible to create any video.”).

61 UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.1, at 10 (Feb. 28, 2022) (Russian Federation). Note the veiled reference to the shelling of the kindergarten. Id.

62 See, e.g., UN Doc. S/PV.8991, at 17 (Mar. 11, 2022) (Russian Federation).

63 Ingrid Dickinson, How Russia Employs Fake Fact-Checking in Its Disinformation Arsenal, DFRLab (May 4, 2022), at https://medium.com/dfrlab/how-russia-emplo , ys-fake-fact-checking-in-its-disinformation-arsenal-b1790d5f5442.

64 UN Doc. S/PV.8991, at 7 (Mar. 11, 2022) (Russian Federation). Not incidentally, the Russian representative closely mimicked the language used by then-U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in the UN Security Council in his attempt to justify the invasion of Iraq. See UN Doc. S/PV.4701, at 17 (Feb. 5, 2003) (United States).

65 Steven Lee Myers & Stuart A. Thompson, Truth Is Another Front in Putin's War, N.Y. Times (Mar. 20, 2022), at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/20/world/asia/russia-putin-propaganda-media.html. That does not mean that Russia's false narratives were not aimed at the public in Russia at all, as the banning of Bellingcat in Russia on March 16, 2022, indicates. See Bellingcat Investigative Tech Team, Bellingcat Is Banned in Russia. Here's How to Beat the Block, Bellingcat (Apr. 22, 2022), at https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/2022/04/22/how-to-beat-russias-block-on-bellingcat.

66 See, most explicitly, UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.2, at 20 (Feb. 28, 2022) (Syria); UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.3, at 17 (Mar. 1, 2022) (Cuba).

67 Carnegie and Carson, supra note 28, at 33.

68 See, e.g., UN Doc. S/PV.8968, at 29 (Feb. 17, 2022) (Germany); UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.1, at 27 (Feb. 28, 2022) (Canada).

69 See especially Albania's invocation of Bellingcat's investigations of Russia's attempts to assassinate Sergei Skripal and Alexei Navalny during Security Council deliberations on Russia's allegations of chemical weapons research labs in Ukraine. UN Doc. S/PV.8991, at 7 (Mar. 11, 2022).

70 A survey of UN state representatives’ information-gathering practices and attitudes toward open-source material initiated by the author indicates tentative acknowledgment of the work of civil society actors in this regard; however, the preliminary results do not yet allow for any further conclusions.

71 GA Res. ES-11/1 (Mar. 2, 2022).

72 See Joel Shannon, “We Do Not Want to Be Involved”: As Horror Unfolds in Ukraine, Most of the World Isn't Punishing Putin, USA Today (Apr. 28, 2022), at https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2022/04/28/russia-ukraine-world-leaders-wont-punish-putin/9516853002.

73 See, e.g., UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.1, at 25 (Feb. 28, 2022) (Brazil); UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.3, at 12 (Mar. 1, 2022) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines).

74 See Ardi Janjeva, Alexander Harris & Joe Byrne, The Future of Open Source Intelligence for UK National Security (June 2022), available at https://static.rusi.org/330_OP_FutureOfOpenSourceIntelligence_FinalWeb.pdf.

75 See Shiri Krebs, The Invisible Frames Affecting Wartime Investigations: Legal Epistemology, Metaphors, and Cognitive Biases, in International Law's Invisible Frames 124 (Andrea Bianchi & Moshe Hirsch eds., 2021).

76 See Giancarlo Fiorella, Charlotte Godart & Nick Waters, Digital Integrity: Exploring Digital Evidence Vulnerabilities and Mitigation Strategies for Open Source Researchers, 19 J. Int'l Crim. Just. 147 (2021).