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Soviet Attitude Toward International Space Law*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2017

Robert D. Crane
Robert D. Crane*
Affiliation:
Space Research Institute, World Rule of Law Center
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Extract

The injection of nuclear armaments and modern delivery systems into Communist world strategy, together with shifts in the balance of world political and economic power, have caused basic revisions in Soviet theories of war, politics, and international law.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 56 , Issue 3 , July 1962 , pp. 685 - 723
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1962

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Footnotes

*

This article is condensed from a background study prepared for the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, United States Senate,

References

1 See Section G below on Peaceful Co-existence and International Space Co-operation.

2 M. A. Arzhanov, “Gosudarstvo i Pravo v ikh Sootnoshenii” [State and Law in Their Interrelations] 96 (Moscow, 1960). Dr. Arzhanov attacked those who, before the period of peaceful co-existence (specifically 1950–1955), tried to ascribe ideological significance to traditional international law by fitting it into a Marxist framework of base and superstructure. An additional reason for the emphasis on this ideological battle is the conclusion of Soviet specialists on “bourgeois” law that the battle between Communism and anti-Communism is “shifting progressively from the field of economics to the field of the political and legal superstructure.” V. A. Tumanov, paper delivered at the First Annual Meeting of the Soviet Association of Political Sciences in March, 1961, reviewed in Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo, July, 1961 (No. 7), p. 133.

3 V. M. Koretsky, paper delivered to the Second Annual Meeting of the Soviet Association of International Law in February, 1959, reviewed in 1959 Sovetskiy Yezhegodnik Mezhdunarodnogo Prava (hereafter cited as Soviet Yearbook of International Law) 421 (Moscow, 1960).

4 By way of caveat, it should be noted that the ideological and politicized nature of Soviet space law, together with the constant state of flux in Soviet space legal development, makes it hazardous to state categorically what the Soviet position is on any specific space legal problem. In order to make any statements at all, it is often necessary to infer the Soviet position from the context of discussions or even to deduce the position from the writings of two or more Soviet authors.

5 Although the Soviets thus support what is known as the “civil-law functional approach” (as distinct from the common-law case-by-case functional approach) to space law, their desire for flexibility has caused them to oppose the extreme concept of an “aerospace continuum,” which would eliminate the distinction between airspace and outer space. Of course, they strongly oppose the idea of a “conceptual identity” of outer space, which would divorce outer space entirely from terrestrial political and military realities. They also oppose the static elements of “systems analysis” and “game theory” applications of the functional approach.

6 Thus at the October, 1959, Moscow Space Policy Symposium, the Executive Secretary of the Space Law Commission of the U.S.S.E. Academy of Sciences stated: “If security is ensured, I believe that the possibility of establishing a relatively low limit for the applicability of state sovereignty above land space is quite real.” G. P. Zhukov, “Conquest of Outer Space and Some Problems of International Relations,” International Affairs, November, 1959 (No. 11), p. 95; English in “Communist Viewpoints: Guides to the study of Communist views on the legal problems of space exploration, Bibliography, and Communist Articles,” prepared by Robert D. Crane as Part IV of Legal Problems of Space Exploration, A Symposium, p. 1083 (1400 pp., ed. Eilene Galloway, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, U. S. Sen. Doc. 26, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., March, 1961, hereinafter referred to as 1961 Senate Symposium).

7 See, for example, note 19 below.

8 Vadim I. Lisovsky, “Mezhdunarodnoye Pravo” [International Law] 160 (Kiev, 1955, edited by A. M. Ladyzhensky). See George Ginsburgs, “The Teaching and Study of International Law in the USSR,” Proceedings, Section of International and Comparative Law, American Bar Association, 1961, p. 313, commenting on the review of Lisovsky’s book in Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo, June, 1956 (No. 6), pp. 121–124.

9 A. Kislov and S. Krylov, “State Sovereignty in Air Space—A Generally Accepted Principle of International Law,” International Affairs, March, 1956, p. 43; also in 1961 Senate Symposium, p. 1045. “Western comment on the Soviet use of the usque ad coelum doctrine illustrates the difficulty frequently encountered in determining the precise Soviet position on specific space/legal questions.

Some leading American commentators on Soviet space law have contended that Drs. Kislov and Krylov interpreted the principle usque ad coelum to extend the sovereignty of the U.S.S.R. even beyond the airspace and on into the infinity of outer space. Leon Lipson, “Outer Space and International Law,” RAND Paper P-1434 (Santa Monica, California), Feb. 24, 1958, p. 13; Samuel Kucherov, “Legal Problems of Outer Space, USA and Soviet Viewpoints,” Proceedings, Second Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 67 (London, 1959), published as a revision of Dr. Kueherov’s report, “The Legal Status of Outer Space and the Soviet Union,” AFCIN-1A1 AIIR: IR-1879–58, Nov. 10, 1958, p. 3. These original commentaries then served as the basis for similar interpretations by other authors, e.g., 74 Harvard Law Rev. 1154, 1167 (1961).

Other commentators, however, assumed that the Soviets followed the interpretation that usque ad coelum applied only within the airspace. Rehm, Georg W., “Sowjetunion und Weltraum,” 5 Osteuropa Eecht 100 (1959)Google Scholar; Swatkowsky, Andrew, “The Soviet Attitude on Outer Space,” Problems of Communism, May-June, 1960, p. 20.Google Scholar

The present writer’s research has disclosed only one Soviet statement which clearly permitted the extension of sovereignty beyond the airspace, and this position was based on grounds of “security” rather than on usque ad coelum. Kovalev, and Cheprov, , “Artificial Satellites and International Law,” 1958 Soviet Yearbook of International Law 134 (Moscow, 1959)Google Scholar.

10 Zadorozhnyy, G. Y., “The Artificial Satellite and International Law,” Sovetskaya Eossiya, Oct. 17, 1957 (Moscow), p. 3 Google Scholar; 1961 Senate Symposium, p. 1048.

11 Durdenevsky, V. N., Mezhdunarodnoye Pravo [International Law] 217 (Moscow, 1947, edited by Durdenevsky, and Krylov, S. B.)Google Scholar. This was repeated verbatim in the section by Durdenevsky in the leading 1951 textbook edited by Ye. Ya. Korovin. The 1951 and 1956 editions of the Soviet Legal Encyclopedia stated simply: “The ceiling of air space has not been established, although in practice it is determined by the technical capabilities of aviation.” V. V. Yevgen’yev, and S. B. Krylov, Yurisdicheskiy Slovar’ (1st ed., 1953), p. 82; (2nd ed., 1956), Vol. I, p. 122.

12 A. Galina [Osnitskaya, G. A.], “On the Question of Interplanetary Law,” Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo, July, 1958 (No. 7), p. 53 Google Scholar; English in 1961 Senate Symposium, p. 1052. The “ceiling” principle was supported also by Kovalev, F. N. and Cheprov, I. I., “Artificial Satellites and International Law,” 1958 Soviet Yearbook of International Law 130 (Moscow, 1959)Google Scholar.

13 G. A. Osnitskaya, “ International Legal Problems of the Conquest of Space,” 1959 ibid. 58 (Moscow, 1960); English summary in 1961 Senate Symposium, p. 1091. This “ceiling” principle was never again supported by any Soviet writer.

14 Zadorozhnyy, loc. cit. note 10 above; also in 1961 Senate Symposium, p. 1049.

15 Kovalev and Cheprov, loc. cit. note 12 above, p. 138.

16 The last approval of this principle was at the February, 1959, Second Annual Meeting of the Soviet Association of International Law, as recorded in 1959 Soviet Yearbook of International Law 411 (Moscow, 1960). References below to this footnote refer to the statements of the individual authors as reported in this Yearbook.

17 Markov, Marko G., “On the Question of the Boundaries of Air Territory in International Law,” Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo, August, 1961 (No. 8), p. 100 Google Scholar. The reputation of Messrs. Kovalev and Cheprov was redeemed, however, because Dr. Markov indicated that they had expressly stated (indeed, just two paragraphs after their widely quoted and misconstrued statement on “effective control”) that “the ability to shoot down a space ship cannot serve by itself as a sufficient criterion for determining the vertical boundary of state sovereignty.” This August, 1961, article is of particular interest because it was written by a Bulgarian, was the first space law article to appear in more than a year in the Soviets’ leading law journal, and was the first space law article by a Bulgarian ever published in a Soviet periodical. Dr. Markov was elected on March 21, 1962, as an officer of the Governing Council of the Bulgarian Astronautical Society to supervise the affairs of its Space Law Committee. For pertinent views, see also the editorial in Bulgaria’s leading law journal: “The Aggressive Actions of the Military Aviation of the U.S.A. against the Soviet Union—a Violation of International Law,” Pravna Mis’l, Summer, 1961 (No. 3), pp. 3–7.

18 Markov, ibid., p. 101 (note 32), referring to pp. 137–138 of the 1958 Soviet Yearbook of International Law, which discusses Khrushchev’s above-quoted statement. The reference to Khrushchev’s statement is particularly obvious, because the most direct discussion of the inequality of boundaries resulting from the effective control theory appears, not on pp. 137–138, but on p. 139.

19 This August, 1961, article (on p. 101) nevertheless opposed the establishment of a high boundary for state sovereignty, “ on the condition” that the West would agree to the demilitarization of outer space. The significance of this condition, in the circumstances of the Bulgarian case, goes beyond such problems as space reconnaissance, as is indicated by Galina’s [G. A. Osnitskaya’s] September, 1958, statement (see 1961 Senate Space Symposium, p. 1059) that even “rockets of short and medium range . . . in their flight can leave the limits of the earth’s atmosphere and travel through outer space. The liquidation of military bases will create, consequently, an additional guarantee that cosmic space will not be used for military purposes.” The converse is, of course, also true, i.e., the demilitarization of outer space, with a low boundary, might contribute to the “liquidation” of military bases.

20 Kovalev and Cheprov, loc. cit. note 12 above, citing U. S. press statements during January-March, 1958 (p. 137) and indicating obsolescence of airspace as a delimiting criterion (p. 134).

21 Osnitskaya, 1959 Soviet Yearbook of International Law 57–58; the first part of this quote is in the English summary published in 1961 Senate Symposium, p. 1091.

22 Zhukov, loc. cit. note 6 above, p. 94; 1961 Senate Symposium, p. 1082. Zhukov’s statement and its context were repeated almost verbatim by Bomashkin, E. S., Corresponding Member of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, in Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo, January, 1960 (No. 1), p. 22.Google Scholar

In August, 1961, the security criterion was associated with the aggressive “effective control” criterion, allegedly espoused by the United States, which in turn was strongly attacked as being of a “purely empirical nature “ and as having been “borrowed directly from the arsenal of the old international law.” This August, 1961, article refers to the abuse of the security criterion by attacking “ The attempt of the United States to extend the spatial boundary of the criterion of security, by transforming it into a function of the development of rocket technology and telemetry, and by constantly raising the vertical boundary of territorial airspace. . . . [which] conflicts with the Soviet desire to exclude outer space from the strategic plans of the militarists. . . . “ Markov, loc. cit. note 17 above, p. 101.

23 On Nov. 9, 1960, the Deputy Chairman of the U.S.S.B. Academy of Science’s Space Law Commission, Dr. G. P. Zadorozhnyy, in an address to the Swabian Society, indicated that the advance of the space age had resulted in the transformation of space legal problems into problems primarily political in nature. G. P. Zadorozhnyy, “Basic Questions of Space Law” (mimeo., Nov. 9, 1960), reported in Stuttgarter Zeitung, Nov. 11, 1960, p. 4, cols. 2–3; reviewed in Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo, June, 1961 (No. 6), pp. 117–118.

24 See note 90 below.

25 The clearest discussion of the obvious danger of an air law analogy was in Prof. Yevgeniy Korovin’s “International Status of Cosmic Space,” International Affairs, January, 1959 (No. 1), p. 54; also in 1961 Senate Symposium, p. 1064. The Soviets, however, were careful not to reject entirely the possibility of drawing analogies with traditional air law. Thus G. P. Zhukov, in “Space Espionage Plans and International Law,” International Affairs, October, 1960 (No. 10), p. 56; also in 1961 Senate Symposium, p. 1100, stated: “ It is possible to draw an analogy with the rules of air law which declare aerial espionage unlawful and specifically prohibit the use of photographic equipment for these purposes.”

26 Kovalev and Cheprov, 1958 Soviet Yearbook of International Law 131. The authors explained that they were only applying to outer space an analogy from the principles of air law governing the upper layers of the atmosphere. Dr. V. A. Zarzar, Voprosy Vozdushnogo Pravo, Vol. I (1927), p. 96, had first suggested this analogy more than 30 years earlier, but spoke in terms of “free movement” rather than “legal vacuum.”

27 Korovin, loc. cit. note 25 above, pp. 58–59; 1961 Senate Symposium, p. 1070; Zhukov, loc. cit. note 6 above, p. 94; 1961 Senate Symposium, p. 1081; Kovalev, F. N. and Cheprov, I. I., “Solving the Legal Problems of Outer Space,” Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo, July, 1960 (No. 7), pp. 136–137 Google Scholar.

28 S. V. Molodtsov, Mezhdunarodno-Pravovoy Eezhim Otkrytogo Morya i Kontinental- ‘nogo Shelf a [The International Legal Regime of the Open Seas and the Continental Shelf] (Moscow, Soviet Academy of Sciences Publishing House, 1960. 348 pp.); reviewed in Izvestiya Vysshikh Uchebnykh Zavedeniy, Pravovedeniye, No. 2 (1961), pp. 185–187.

29 Molodtsov, loc. cit. note 16 above, pp. 432–433.

30 Ibid., p. 433; see also pp. 413–415.

31 The leading proponents are Yevgeniy Korovin and G. Y. Zadorozhnyy, respectively Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Space Law Commission of the U.S.S.E. Academy of Sciences. Dr. Zadorozhnyy, in fact, was the first to advocate the analogy with freedom of the sea in his October, 1957, article; see note 10 above. Prof. Korovin originally opposed this analogy (see Korovin, loc. cit. note 25 above, p. 54, 1961 Senate Symposium, p. 1064), but was criticized for his opposition and changed his position (see Meshara, note 32 below, p. 409). The best-known opponents of res communis among Soviet space law jurists are Kovalev and Cheprov, (loc. cit. note 12 above, pp. 140–141), who pointed out differing security requirements on the high seas and in outer space; and Q. A. Osnitskaya (note 13 above, pp. 60–61, 1961 Senate Symposium, pp. 1092–1093), who introduced the distinction of a “heightened risk” in outer space.

32 V. P. Meshara, loc. cit. note 16 above, p. 409.

33 Korovin, loc. cit. note 6 above, p. 90; 1961 Senate Symposium, p. 1075.

34 Thus G. A. Osnitskaya claimed that the attempt of the State Department Legal Adviser to draw an analogy with Antarctica had “the obvious aim of helping the United States at the appropriate time to assert its claims to outer space.” G. A. Osnitskaya, loc. cit. note 13 above, pp. 60–61 (not included in English summary in 1961 Senate Symposium).

35 The Soviet representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Zorin, stated on Dec. 4, 1961: “ I f the principle of unanimity could be applied in the Antarctic, there is no reason why it could not in outer space activities.” Verbatim Record of U.N. First Committee discussion of the Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Dec. 4, 1961 (Doc. A/C. 1/SR. 1210), pp. 41–42.

36 Molodtsov, S. V., “The Antarctic Treaty,” Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo, May, 1960 (No. 5), p. 66 Google Scholar.

37 Ibid., p. 68.

38 Zadorozhnyy, op. cit. note 23 above.

39 Kovalev and Cheprov, loc. cit. note 12 above, pp. 38–39.

40 Hid., p. 46.

41 Kovalev and Cheprov, loc. cit. note 12 above, p. 142.

42 Korovin, loc. cit. note 6 above, p. 90; 1961 Senate Symposium, pp. 1074–1075.

43 Korovin, Yevgeniy, “ Space Exploration and International Relations, a Discussion,” International Affairs, June, 1961 (No. 6), p. 61 Google Scholar.

44 Molodtsov, loc. cit. note 16 above, p. 432; Osnitskaya, loc. cit. note 13 above, p. 62; 1961 Senate Symposium, p. 1094.

45 G. P. Zadorozhnyy, op. cit. note 23 above. See also Korovin, Yevgeniy A., “ Peaceful Cooperation in Space,” International Affairs, March, 1962 (No. 3), p. 63 Google Scholar.

46 Korovin, loc. cit. note 6 above, p. 89; 1961 Senate Symposium, p. 1073.

47 Osnitskaya, loc. cit. note 13 above, p. 64; 1961 Senate Symposium, p. 1094. Prof. Korovin quotes Khrushchev’s statements on Sept. 15, 1959, at Andrews Air Force Base, and on Sept. 16, 1959, at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. as formulating “with utmost precision” the entirely “ new “ Socialist approach to sovereignty over celestial bodies. Premier Khrushchev stated merely that: “We regard the sending of a rocket into outer space and the delivery of our pennant to the Moon as our achievement. And by this word ‘ our ’ we mean the countries of the entire world, i.e., we mean that this is also your achievement and the accomplishment of all people living on Earth. “Korovin, loc. cit. note 6 above, p. 90; 1961 Senate Symposium, p. 1074. See also New York Times, Sept. 17, 1959, p. 18.

48 Korovin, loc. cit. note 45 above, p. 63. This Soviet attitude may stem from the omission in the resolution of any reference to the limitation of sovereignty and from the decision to delete from the end of Article 1b of Section A the words “ by claim of sovereignty or otherwise.” Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Dec. 2, 1961 (Doc. A/C.1/L.301).

49 In April, 1960, one of the leading Communist spokesmen on space policy repeated the Communist renunciation of sovereignty both over Antarctica and over celestial bodies, but pointed out that the Soviet Union has not renounced any basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in the Antarctic, and let it be known that if the United States started to apply the principles of territorial acquisition in outer space, then the Communist states will assert the sovereignty over celestial bodies which their activities have created. Criteria for determining when acts may be considered to amount to territorial acquisition were left for further study. Vladimir Kopal, “Penetration into the Universe and International Law,” Mezinárodní Politika, April, 1960 (No. 4), p. 246.

50 Leon Lipson, “ International Political Implications of Activities in Outer Space,” Report of a Conference, Joseph M. Goldsen, Chairman, Oct. 22–23, 1959, Report B-362- EC, The BAND Corp., Santa Monica, California, May 5, 1960, pp. 79–80.

51 The term “ demilitarization” is frequently used by the Soviets interchangeably with the term “neutralization,” although the Soviets do point out that, according to “traditional” international law before the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the U.N. Charter outlawing war, demilitarization was designed for peacetime use, and neutralization was reserved for application in time of war. For Soviet definition of the two terms in a space law context, see Yevgeniy Korovin, “ On the Neutralization and Demilitarization of Outer Space,” International Affairs, December, 1959 (No. 12), p. 82; also in 1961 Senate Symposium, p. 1085.

52 The best statement of the Soviet bargaining position may be found in the letter by Major General Georgii I. Pokrovsky to the editors of International Affairs, July, 1959 (No. 7), p. 106. Raymond Garthoff has described Gen. Pokrovsky as “an authoritative spokesman on future weapons and warfare.” This position was expressed also in many of the disarmament negotiations and debates, e.g. Ambassador Zorin’s statement in the general debates of the U.N. First Committee on October 25, 1960 (Doc. A/C.1/SE.1090), p. 41.

53 These were the words of President Eisenhower in his letter of Jan. 12, 1958, to Soviet Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin. See “International Negotiations Regarding the Use of Outer Space, 1957–1960,” with appendix of pertinent documents, prepared by the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, 1961 Senate Symposium, p. 986.

54 Korovin, loc. cit. note 25 above, p. 57; also in 1961 Senate Symposium, p. 1068.

55 Lazarev, loc. cit. note 16 above, p. 409.

56 If the United States gains space superiority, the “law of peaceful coexistence” might cause the Soviets to reverse their position, so that “equality” would require not the coupling of space demilitarization with terrestrial disarmament, but rather their separation. This in turn might cause changes in the Soviets’ attitudes on the “legality” of arms control. At present, the Soviets contend that only complete and global disarmament or “demilitarization” is consistent with peaceful co-existence, and that arms control is merely a capitalist concept to legalize armaments and war and to facilitate indirect aggression against the independence of the Soviet Union. See Korovin, “The U.S.S.E. and Disarmament,” with appendices, in International Conciliation, No. 292 (Sept. 1933), for official statements of Soviet policy with regard to disarmament, calling for the destruction of military, naval and air bases, and the prohibition of military propaganda, inter alia.

57 Among the best examples of distortions in Soviet space legal literature are the statement by Prof. Yevgeniy Korovin quoting President Eisenhower as having created NASA in order “ t o secure the use of all advantages hidden in the military possibilities of outer space,” Korovin, “Osnovnyye Problemy Sovremennykh Mezhdunarodnykh Otnosheniy 164 (Moscow, 1959); and the statement by G. P. Zhukov at the May, 1961, Moscow Space Policy Symposium that “the Mercury project is regarded in the United States as an integral part of the plans for instituting ‘control’ and even ‘domination’ over outer space,” Zhukov, loc. cit. note 43 above, p. 59.

58 Attempts by Western scholars to create objective legal standards for the delineation of “peaceful uses” of outer space have been met by Soviet objections that such standards might legitimize what the Soviets regard as unpeaceful uses. See Korovin, loc. cit. note 45 above, p. 61, commenting on the phased space regulation proposed by Prof. F. B. Schick in the article “Space Law and National Security,” published without Prof. Schick’s prior knowledge in International Affairs, March, 1962 (No. 3) immediately following Prof. Korovin’s comments. Prof. Schick (on pp. 58–59) divides space activities into three types according to their susceptibility to international regulation.

The first category of “sharable” and relatively non-sensitive activities would be incorporated into the “first stage” of legal regulations. The pursuit of the activities regulated in the first-stage treaty would be prima facie peaceful, even if such activities could potentially serve non-peaceful purposes [thus reversing the burden of proof which the Soviets seek to impose on the United States]. Conversely, violation of provisions incorporated in the first-stage treaty would serve as prima facie evidence of unpeaceful uses. Activities of a less sharable or more sensitive nature would be regulated as soon as agreement can be reached on the requirements for stage two. Although Prof. Korovin did not categorically reject the possibility of seeking agreement, in the beginning, only on stage-one type activities, it was clear that in his opinion the only objective solution to the “peaceful uses” problem would be American acceptance of the methods proposed by the Soviets for demilitarization of outer space within the larger context of general and complete disarmament.

59 The testing of nuclear weapons by the Soviets in the fall of 1961 at altitudes in excess of 100 miles, as well as the general testing of high-megaton range bombs, may have been directed toward possible strategic break-throughs in missile defense and penetration techniques. This testing, perhaps in conjunction with tests of beam-directed energy (LASER and MASER) and other “fantastic” weapons of which Premier Khrushchev boasts, may have been the subject of Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky’s statement at the XXIId Party Congress on Oct. 23, 1961, and again of the statement in the May 10, 1962, issue of Krasnaya Zvesda that: “The problem of destroying enemy rockets in flight has been successfully solved in the Soviet Union.”

60 G. P. Zhukov, loc. eit. note 25 above, p. 55; also in 1961 Senate Symposium, p. 1098. G. A. Osnitskaya, “Legal Problems of Space Exploration,” Review of Contemporary Law (an organ of the International Association of Democratic Jurists), December, 1960 (published July, 1961), p. 56.

61 Soviet condemnation of specific types of TT. S. satellites as aggressive began shortly after the May, 1960, TJ-2 ease (see R. D. Crane, “Guides to the Study of Communist Views on the Legal Problems of Space Exploration,” loc. cit. note 6 above, p. 1014), but the Soviets did not label any specific satellite as aggressive until the July 23, 1961, issue of Krasnaya Zvesda specifically included Midas III and Tiros III in the same legal category as the U-2 planes and designated them as “acts of aggression.” Col. B. Aleksandrov, “Spies in Space,” Krasnaya Zvesda, July 23, 1961, p. 3.

62 Editorial, “ A Most Serious Violation of International Law,” Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo, July, 1960 (No. 7), pp. 35–44, especially p. 42.

63 G. A. Osnitskaya, loc. cit. note 60 above, p. 56. The Soviets seem to agree that Art. 2, par. 4, requires the use of armed force, but contend that “whatever category a plane formally belongs to, its character is determined by the functions it performs.” Korovin, note 67 below, p. 50. For a discussion of the use of force and Soviet non-aggression treaties, particularly that of Nov. 16, 1933, with the U. S., see editorial cited note 62 above, particularly p. 40.

64 Zhukov, loc. cit. note 25 above, p. 55; 1961 Senate Symposium, p. 1098. See also N.V. Zakharova, “Bilateral Treaties of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Aid Among Socialist States,” Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo, February, 1962 (No. 2), pp. 80–91, who explains the principle of socialist internationalism, which requires each socialist state to regard aggression against one socialist state as a threat to the others, but qualifies this by stating (p. 90) that Albania (i.e., Communist China) is no longer within the scope of socialist internationalism.

65 Editorial, note 62 above, p. 39.

66 The first such argument was advanced by Dr. G. P. Zhukov at the October, 1959, Moscow Space Policy Symposium, in which he stated that, because Art. 2, par. 4, of the U.N. Charter prohibits threats against the territorial integrity and political independence of any state, “there are already sufficient grounds for declaring illegal attempts by certain U. S. groups to utilize space for military purposes.” Zhukov, loc. cit. note 6 above, p. 94; 1961 Senate Symposium, p. 1082.

67 Korovin, Ye. A., “ Aerial Espionage and International Law,” International Affairs, June, 1960 (No. 6), p. 50 Google Scholar.

68 The best instance of this “ law “ occurred on March 3, 1962, when Premier Khrushchev designated as an “ act of aggression” President Kennedy’s announcement of the U. S. intention to resume atmospheric testing in response to Premier Khrushchev’s resumption of such testing in September, 1961.

69 Zhukov, loc. cit. note 25 above, p. 57; also 1961 Senate Symposium, p. 1101; see also Korovin, loc. cit. note 67 above, p. 50, and Osnitskaya, loc. cit. note 13 above, p. 59; 1961 Senate Symposium, p. 1092.

70 Korovin, loc. cit. note 25 above, p. 56; 1961 Senate Symposium, p. 1066. The distinction was also emphasized by Andrei Gromyko during the Security Council meetings on the U-2; see Nicholas N. Kittrie, Special Counsel, U. S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, “ ‘Aggressive’ Uses of Space Vehicles—the Remedies in International Law” (21 pp. mimeo.), Oct. 3, 1961.

71 Zhukov, loc. cit. note 25 above, p. 57; 1961 Senate Symposium, p. 1101. It is perhaps significant that the Soviet Government has never lodged any official protests against any American space activities. The Space Law Commission of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, however, of which G. P. Zhukov is Executive Secretary, did lodge a semi-official protest against Project Westford. See Commission on Legal Problems of Interplanetary Space, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, “American Diversion in Space,” International Affairs, December, 1961 (No. 12), p. 118.

72 The first Soviet condemnation of “ contamination of outer space by nuclear fallout” was by Kovalev and Cheprov, loc. cit. note 12 above, p. 143.

73 Ambassador Valerian A. Zorin, loc. cit. note 35 above, p. 37, condemned Project Westford, not only because of alleged interference with radio-astronomy and other scientific research, but because of “the dangers of such experiments for future trips by astronauts.” The next day during the continuance of debates on the Dee. 20, 1961, U.N. Resolution A/EBS/1721 (XVI) the Polish delegate, Jacek Machowski, said that Project Westford and “the highly advertised ‘spy in the sky’ operation . . . belong to the same category.” U.N. Doc. A/C. 1/SB. 1211, pp. 66–67.

74 N. Varvarov, Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, Nov. 6, 1961, charged the United States with “Uttering the cosmos with satellites.”

75 Osnitskaya, loc. cit. note 60 above, p. 55, indicated that the illegality of nuclear explosions in space was based on “the duty of guaranteeing the security of communications and of acting in a manner harmful to no one.”

76 Kovalev and Cheprov, loc. cit. note 12 above, p. 143.

77 Korovin, loc. cit. note 45 above, p. 63; loc. cit. note 43 above, pp. 61–62. See also G. A. Osnitskaya, “Towards a Cosmic Law,” Pravovedeniye, Izvestiya Vysshikh Uehebnykh Zavedeniy, December, 1961 (No. 4), p. 108, who equates peaceful activities in space with activities which do not cause “damages” (ushcherb).

The Soviets also have discussed problems of exobiological damages, which may be defined as harm to or from “non-sentient” life on celestial bodies (part of the problem of sterilization and decontamination), and harm to sentient life in space (part of the problem of “metalaw”). The delay to military programs and the reduction in efficiency of scientific research instruments which would result from a comprehensive program of sterilization prompted the Soviets for many years to regard the problem of sterilization as “ at best premature.” Korovin, loc. cit. note 25 above, p. 1063. Although the Soviets still do not wish to commit themselves on the exact methods used for sterilizing their vehicles and payloads, Soviet scientists (e.g., N. Zhukov et at, Meditsynskiy Eabotnik, Nov. 9, 1959) and, increasingly, official Soviet policy seem to favor international agreement in this area. Soviet comments on the problem of harm to sentient life in space range from the assertion by Osnitskaya in 1959 that the whole subject is “ a contrived and fantastic question” (Osnitskaya, loc. cit. note 13 above, p. 1089) to Sanakoyev’s less defensive statement in 1961 that “should this problem be raised by life, we Soviet people will define our attitude toward it “ (Sanakoyev, loc. cit. note 43 above, p. 63).

78 Ari A. Shternfel’d, Iskusstvenniye Sputniki Zemli [Artificial Satellites of the Earth] 176 (Moscow, 1956), emphasized the danger of nuclear rockets. This section was deleted from the 2nd edition published after the launching of the first Soviet satellite and widely distributed in English translation in the United States. Yevgeniy Korovin, loc. cit. note 25 above, p. 54; 1961 Senate Symposium, p. 1064, considered the difference in the degree of damages resulting from accidents in space and on the high seas as the principal factor preventing the drawing of an analogy from the “ free “ status of the high seas.

79 Galina [Osnitskaya], loc. cit. note 12 above, p. 57; 1961 Senate Symposium, p. 1057; Osnitskaya, loc. cit. note 13 above, p. 62; 1961 Senate Symposium, p. 1094.

80 Korovin, loc. cit. note 6 above, p. 56; 1961 Senate Symposium, p. 1067; Osnitskaya, loc. cit. note 60 above, p. 57.

81 Korovin, loc. cit. note 6 above, p. 90; 1961 Senate Symposium, pp. 1074–1075.

82 Osnitskaya, loc. cit. note 13 above, p. 62; 1961 Senate Symposium, p. 1094;

Meshara, loc. cit. note 16 above, p. 432.

83 Zhukov, G. P., “The United Nations and Problems of the Peaceful Use of Outer Space,” 1960 Soviet Yearbook of International Law 177–185 (Moscow, 1961)Google Scholar.

84 A detailed analysis of the pre-1962 code provisions may be found in Vladimir Gsovski and Armins Rusis, “Liability Under Soviet Law for Damages or Personal Injury Caused by Space Vehicles,” Studies and Reports, European Law Division, Library of Congress, May 8, 1959 (28 pp.). The principal pertinent changes in the 1962 codes are the elimination of gross negligence as a defense in Art. 90 of the U.S.S.E. Civil Code and the addition of gross negligence as a defense for cases of force majeure only in Art. 101 of the U.S.S.R. Air Code.

85 Korovin, loc. cit. note 43 above, pp. 61–62. Although it is not clear what legal mechanism the Soviets might use to invoke this “peaceful purposes” doctrine, one indication may be found in the Soviet interpretation of Sec. B, Par. 1, of the U.N. Resolution of Dec. 20, 1961. This paragraph “calls upon States launching objects into orbit or beyond to furnish information promptly to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space through the Secretary-General for purposes of registration of launchings.” In a somewhat forced interpretation of this paragraph, the Soviets contend that states must also register objects which did not orbit or are no longer in orbit, and contend that information must be furnished prior to the launching rather than “promptly” thereafter. The Soviets also have particular views on the precise type of information which must be submitted. The significance of this or any other Soviet interpretation of Sec. B, Par. 1, is indicated by the statement of the Soviet representative to the meetings of the U.N. Space Committee in March, 1962, that “any spaceships which might be forced to land or might have to effect forced landings” should be returned to the country of launching, “provided suitable information has been submitted to the United Nations concerning the launching.” Verbatim Record, U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, March 20, 1962 (U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/P.V.3), pp. 26–27.

86 Romashkin, P. S., “Technical Progress and Soviet Law,” Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo, January, 1960 (No. 1), p. 23 Google Scholar, discussing the rôle of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the rôle of the International Court of Justice.

87 Some general policy guides are given, for example, in G. B. Sharmazanashvili, “Peaceful Resolution of International Disputes—One of the Most Important Principles of International Law,” Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo, January, 1962 (No. 1), pp. 71–79.

88 See, for example, the comment by V. M. Koretsky at the meeting of the Air and Space Law Committee of the International Law Association on Aug. 10, 1960, that in outer space, as in other areas, states are bound by contemporary international law and thus are bound by the principles of peaceful co-existence, in particular by the requirement of equality [i.e. unanimity]. International Law Association, Eeport of the 49th Conference, Hamburg, 1960, p. 256.

89 Verbatim Record of the Third Meeting of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, March 20, 1962 (U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/P.V.3), pp. 23–25. Dr. Morozov added that: “These important principles and provisions should be studied and should become a basis for the work of the juridical sub-committee.”

90 This primitive phase of peaceful co-existence is often traced from Lenin’s statement on Nov. 21, 1920: “We found ourselves in such a position that, not securing international victory, a single and final victory for us, we secured for ourselves conditions in which we could exist together with capitalist powers.” Soehineniye, “Vol. 31, p. 385, cited in Trukhanovsky, Istoriya Mezhdunarodnykh Otnosheniy [History of International Relations], Vol. I, p. 217 (Moscow, 1961).

Western scholars who have written in detail on the meaning of this primitive type of “peaceful co-existence,” which existed from 1920 to about 1958, include: Wladyslaw W. Kulski, Peaceful Coexistence: An Analysis of Soviet Foreign Policy (Regnery, 1959, 662 pp.), with bibliography; Elliot K. Goodman, The Soviet Design for a World State (Columbia University Press, 1960), with a chapter on “The Meaning of Peaceful Coexistence,” pp. 164–189; Milton Kovner, The Challenge of Coexistence, A Study of Soviet Economic Diplomacy (Public Affairs Press, 1961), with a chapter on “The Meaning of Coexistence,” pp. 4–20; and B. N. Carew Hunt, A Guide to Communist Jargon 26–33 (Macmillan, 1957). One of the most useful articles is John N. Hazard’s “Legal Research on ‘Peaceful Co-existence,’“ 51 A.J.I.L. 63–71 (1957), which develops the early ideological conflict between the terms “peaceful co-existence” and “peaceful co-operation.” Of the many separate bibliographies on “peaceful co-existence,” perhaps the two most useful are Durdenevsky’s standard bibliography on Soviet international law, Sovetskaya Literatura po Mezhdunarodnomu Pravu, Bibliografiya, 1917–1957, under the headings “Battle for Peace,” for pre-1950 citations, and “Peaceful Co-existence,” for more recent materials; and the selective bibliography compiled by the Committee on Juridical Aspects of Peaceful Coexistence for the International Law Association, Report of the 49th Conference, Hamburg, 1960, pp. 368–370.

91 See Robert D. Crane, “ Sino-Soviet Law—A Conceptual Analysis” (Booklet Series, World Rule of Law Center, Duke University, 1962), an address to a joint meeting of the East Asian Institute and the Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law at Columbia University on Jan. 10, 1962.

92 The final reversal of Soviet policy on neutralism and the rejection of the “inevitable clash” at the XXth Party Congress in 1956 prepared the way for the final abolition of the period of “capitalist encirclement” in Premier Khrushchev’s speech at the XXIst Party Congress on Jan. 27, 1959. Vneocherednoy XXI S’yezd Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, Stenograficheskiy Otchet, Vol. I, p. 107 (Moscow, 1959); translated in Leo Gruliow, Current Soviet Policies, III, The Documentary Record of the Extraordinary 21st Communist Party Congress, p. 68 (Columbia University Press, 1960).

93 The most authoritative definition of this new dogma of “ peaceful co-existence” was given in October, 1961, at the XXIId Party Congress, which also proclaimed the related principle that the class nature of law in the Soviet Union no longer exists. This definition consists of only two paragraphs, the first defining the form of “peaceful co-existence” and the second defining its content:

“Peaceful co-existence of the Socialist and capitalist countries is an objective necessity for the development of human society. . . . Peaceful co-existence implies renunciation of war as a means of settling international disputes, and their solution by negotiation; equality, mutual understanding and trust between countries; consideration of mutual interests; non-interference in internal affairs; recognition of the right of every people to solve all the problems of their country by themselves; strict respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries; promotion of economic and cultural co-operation on the basis of complete equality and mutual benefit.

“Peaceful co-existence serves as a basis for the peaceful competition between socialism and capitalism on an international scale and constitutes a specific form of class struggle [the highest form] between them. As they consistently pursue the policy of peaceful co-existence, the Socialist countries are steadily strengthening the position of the world Socialist system in its competition with capitalism. Peaceful co-existence affords more favorable opportunities for the struggle of the working class in the capitalist countries and facilitates the struggle of the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries for their liberation.” The New Program of the Communist Party (first published in Russian in July, 1961), in Arthur P. Mendel, Essential Works of Marxism 418 (Bantam Books, 1961). For general comment on the revolutionary nature of the new Soviet doctrines, see Rodolfo Mosca, “The New Ways of Communism,” 6 Orbis 65–75 (1962).

94 The theoretical justification for this dynamic approach was given by Prof. Korovin as follows: “Premier Khrushchev, in his address at the Conference of Communist and Workers Parties [in November, 1960], stated that as representatives of the most advanced ideology we should not occupy a defensive position. Premier Khrushchev emphasized that the Soviet Union and the socialist countries now hold the initiative in the international arena, whereas the imperialist states and their governments are on the “blind defensive.” One asks, however, to what extent our scholarly work shows this initiative and evidences an offensive attack. . . . We usually merely explain the position of our enemy, and then begin to correct and criticize it. Would it not be more correct to proceed from our own concepts, from the democratic principles of international law, and then, having proclaimed their binding character and universality, to show that any theories hostile to them constitute a violation of the generally recognized and therefore generally binding principles of law, a violation of the peaceful co-operation [properly interpreted] of peoples and states.” Tevgeniy Korovin, “The Declaration of the Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers Parties and the Tasks of the Science of International Law,” Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta, August, 1961 (No. 3), text quoted from p. 66, footnote quoted from pp. 64 and 71–72.

For a rephrasing of Korovin’s ideas in terms somewhat more palatable to Western statesmen, see the statement of the Director of the Legal Office of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, G. I. Tunkin, in “Verbatim Record of the 717th Meeting of the Sixth Committee, United Nations, Nov. 21, 1961 (Provisional A/C.6/SB.717, p. 13, Official, p. 139).

95 Yevgeniy Korovin, “Proletarian Internationalism in International Relations,” Ch. II, in Osnovnyye Problemy Sovremennykh Mezhdunarodnykh Otnosheniy [Basic Problems of Contemporary International Relations] 60 (Moscow, 1959). In a review article, Dr. M. I. Lazarev, in Pravovedeniye, No. 1, 1961, p. 174, welcomes Prof. Korovin’s book as the “first scientific periodization of the development of the basic principles of proletarian internationalism.” One might add that this recognition of the evolution of Soviet international legal theory has been lacking not only in Soviet literature but even more so in analyses by Western scholars.

The most recent authoritative announcement on the subsidiary function of “peaceful co-existence” stated: “Contrary to the assertions of the dogmatists, the principle of peaceful co-existence presents the most subtle and most effective expression of the party principle of proletarian internationalism. . . . Peaceful co-existence of states with different regimes is not the abandonment of the class struggle in the world arena, but the selection of such deployment areas for this struggle as are best suited for the interests of all mankind.” Inozemtsev, I., “Peaceful Coexistence—The Most Important Present-Day Problem,” Pravda, Moscow, Jan. 17, 1962, p. 5 Google Scholar.

The fundamental subsidiarity of “peaceful co-existence” was indicated by the recent statement of Sh. Sanakoyev that, although the new concept of peaceful co-existence derives from the “permanent” shift of the correlation of forces in favor of Communism, nevertheless the policy of peaceful co-existence can continue only “ to the extent that the forces of Socialism grow stronger.” Sh. Sanakoyev, “The Socialist Community and Mankind’s Progress,” International Affairs, March, 1962 (No. 3), p. 12.

96 Proletarian internationalism as it operates among Communist countries was elevated during the period of ideological ferment in 1956–1957 to the level of a formal legal doctrine, known as “socialist internationalism.” Western legal scholars conclude from analysis of pertinent documents that the Soviets sponsored the doctrine of socialist internationalism to give formal equality to the other Communist states in order to avoid the appearance of Russian hegemony, and yet at the same time to secure for the U.S.S.E. the legal basis for controlling and, if necessary, intervening in other Communist countries to support their proletariats in accordance with the principles of proletarian internationalism. The Yugoslav, and, for a while, the Chinese and Polish Communists, in order to prevent what the Communist Chinese termed the exercise of “great Power chauvinism,” insisted that the principles of “peaceful co-existence,” in particular, such principles as non-intervention and non-aggression, apply within the Communist bloc as well as between it and the “capitalist” camp. See John N. Hazard, “Soviet Socialism as a Public Order System,” 1959 Proceedings, American Society of Int. Law 30–41; Loeber, Dietrich, “Die Eeehtsstruktur des Ostblocks,” 6 Osteuropa Eecht 196–211 (1960)Google Scholar, also 27 Social Research 183–202 (1960); Gasteyger, Curt, “Neue Entwicklungen im sowjetischen Volkerrecht,” Jahrbuch fur Ostrecht, May, 1961 (No. 1), pp. 39–50 Google Scholar; also “Theorie und Praxis im sowjetischen Volkerrecht,” 16 Europa Archiv 427–430 (1961); Zakharova, loc. cit. note 64 above.

97 The functions of proletarian internationalism in determining the legal relations between “socialist” and “capitalist” states are:

(1) Maintenance and accentuation of bipolarity in the world, which is the most crucial of all elements in the dynamic policy of revolution by “peaceful co-existence.” This is facilitated by maintaining a dichotomy—both in theory and as much as possible in practice—between the legal principles of socialist internationalism designed to govern the Communist bloc and those of “peaceful co-existence” designed to govern relations of the bloc with its class enemies. The overriding importance of this function of proletarian internationalism may be illustrated by considering the profound implications of the following heretical statement in The Programme of the League of Yugoslav Communists, Beograd, “Yugoslavia,” 1958, p. 83: “Active coexistence can be implemented only in relations between states and peoples, not in relationships between blocs. There can be no co-existence between blocs, for that would not be co-existence at all, but merely a temporary truce concealing the danger of new conflicts.”

(2) Consolidation of the Communist bloc in order to present the united front against capitalism necessary to achieve “both the internal and external tasks of Communism.” Aleksandrov, “State and Communism,” “Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta, November, 1961 (No. 4), p. 10. The unity of the Communist bloc is to be achieved primarily through the formal, legal manifestation of proletarian internationalism in the following doctrines of socialist internationalism: “negotiated agreement,” which consists essentially in “periodic consultation and the exchange of opinions among the leaders of the parties and states on the most important political and economic questions,” Zakharova, loc. cit. note 64 above, p. 88; and the legal principles of reciprocal aid, fraternal co-operation, and mutual benefit, which have established positive duties on the part of [otherwise] sovereign states within the Communist bloc to support one another in the interests of the entire bloc, as these interests are determined by the party leaders in the most advanced socialist state. Zakharova writes: “co-operation of socialist states . . . has as one of its principal purposes . . . the securing of peaceful co-existence. To achieve this worthy goal it is necessary to continue the battle to strengthen fraternal co-operation of the socialist countries against any attempts whatever to weaken their monolithic unity [monolitnoye yedinstvo].” Zakharova, ibid. 90.

(3) Guidance of revolutionary workers’ parties in non-Communist countries in their efforts to support the right of the “people”—in both colonial and non-colonial areas—to national sovereignty and self-determination. The Soviet delegate to a recent conference on “peaceful co-existence” explains this right as follows: “National sovereignty is a condition or state immanent in any nation. . . . It may be secured only if national sovereignty is added and guarded by state sovereignty. That is to say, state sovereignty of a national state is to secure the national sovereignty of its people. Thus the right to self-determination stresses the sovereign right of each nation to secure its national sovereignty. The recognition of the sovereignty of a nation implies the recognition of its sovereign right to be an independent state.” E. Touzmoukhamedov, Statement to the Committee on Juridical Aspects of Peaceful Coexistence of the International Law Association, Report of the 49th Conference, Hamburg, 1960, pp. 335–336. The relationship of this distinction to proletarian internationalism within the Communist bloc is, of course, a matter of dispute.

(4) Development of socialist internationalism as a new socialist international law to serve as a stage in the progressive growth of general international law conducive to the victory of world Communism. See Korovin, “International Law Today,” International Affairs, July, 1961 (No. 7), p. 20. The first discussion of “socialist international law” in this intra-bloc sense, rather than in the traditional sense of a socialist or “progressive-democratic” element in a pluralistic international law, was in M. Rapaport’s article, “ The Essence of Present International Law,” Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo, November/December, 1940 (Nos. 5/6), p. 145, at a time when the only two “socialist” countries were the U.S.S.B. and the Mongolian Peoples’ Republic. Although this view was supported in several articles—apparently not consulted by Western scholars—during the Stalinist era, it was not officially accepted until the 1957 Declaration of Representatives of the Communist and Workers’ Parties of Socialist Countries (the 1957 Moscow summit conference) and, to the present writer’s knowledge, was not designated as a “stage” in the development of general international law until after the next Communist summit conference in November, 1960.

98 Korovin, loc. cit. note 94 above, pp. 70–71. See also the very frank article by Gerhard Herder, et ah, “The Moscow Declaration of Communist and Workers Parties of November 1960 and Some Questions of International Law,” Part I, Staat und Recht, May, 1961 (No. 5), p. 845.

99 Yevgeniy Korovin, F. I. Kozhevnikov, and G. P. Zadorozhnyy, “Peaceful Coexistence and International Law,” Izvestiya, April 18, 1962, p. 5. The “cult of the individual” represents at least two basic errors in international law: (1) it denies the sovereignty of the people as distinct from the sovereignty of the state, and thus undermines the legality of revolution in non-Communist countries, and the legality of Soviet aid to the suppression of revolution in accordance with the doctrine of proletarian internationalism in Communist countries; and (2) it denies the rôle of the people in forming international law, thus undermining the effectivity of domestic legislation, particularly within Communist countries, as a source of international law during the present period of rapid and radical change, when treaties and custom no longer suffice to effectuate international law’s progressive transformation.

100 Premier Khrushchev, in opening the AU-Union Conference on Questions of Ideological Work, called by the Central Committee to discuss the results of the XXIInd Party Congress, stated: “The Soviet Union has now entered a new phase of development, and this puts an imprint of profound change on all spheres of our life, including the ideological sphere. . . . Ideological activity deals with the consciousness of man and with his psychology; it acts upon his thoughts and emotions. . . . It is necessary, Comrades, to emphasize particularly that the peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems has never signified and will never signify the peaceful coexistence of the different ideologies, socialist and capitalist. In the field of ideology, a class struggle, a struggle for people’s minds and hearts has been and will be waged.” Pravda, Moscow, Dec. 26, 1961.

Premier Khrushchev was even more explicit in his Jan. 6, 1961, report on the November, 1960, Communist summit conference by stating: “The time is not far away when Marxism-Leninism will possess the minds of a majority of the world’s population” [Emphasis added]. N. K. Khrushchev, “ For New Victories of the World Communist Movement,” Kommunist, January, 1961 (No. 1 ) ; also in Annual Report of the American Bar Association, Vol. 86 (1961), Supplemental Report of the Special Committee on Communist Tactics, Strategy and Objectives, p. 621. See also notes 2 and 3 above. One might consider this ideological offensive and its embodiment in the campaign of “peaceful co-existence” as a type of global brainwashing.

101 The Soviet delegate to the United Nations stated more than two years ago that: “ In the century of space and nuclear energy, the need for international cooperation is clear for all to see, and requires no proof. Indeed, it is impossible to conceive of any study of outer space in the absence of an exchange of the data collected by the scientific institutions of the whole world.” 823rd Plenary Meeting of the U.N. General Assembly, Oct. 6, 1959 (U.N. Doc. A/P.V. 823, p. 404). The Soviets support their statements on space co-operation with enthusiastic statements, such as the following by General Georgii I. Pokrovsky in June, 1961: “ I f the benefit mankind could gain from improved weather forecasts were to be measured in terms of money, it would run to an annual saving of thousands of millions of rubles. This sum is so large that it could more than compensate for all the money spent on space research.” Pokrovsky, loe. cit. note 43 above, p. 62.

102 Zakharova, loc. cit. note 64 above, p. 83. See also the statement that in the capitalist countries “the creativity of the leading scholars and scientists are cynically appropriated by capitalist monopolies. In these conditions one cannot speak of giving disinterestedly to another state the results of this or that scientific research.” A. I. Poltorak, “Legal Forms of Cultural and Scientific Co-operation of Socialist Countries,” Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo, October, 1961 (No. 10), p. 162.

The Executive Editor of Casopis pro Mezinárodní Právo states that real progress in astronautics can be achieved only after the elimination of capitalism and the establishment of world Communism. Vladimir Kopal, “Penetration into the Universe and International Law,” Mezinárodní Politika, April, 1960 (No. 4), pp. 242–243.

103 In December, 1961, the Soviets gave up their demand for veto power in the U.N. Space Committee in return for U. S. withdrawal of a proposal that certain jurisdiction of the Committee be transferred to the U.N. Secretariat. The representatives unanimously agreed that “ it will be the aim of all members of the Committee and its sub-Committees to conduct the Committee’s work in such a way that the Committee will be able to reach agreement in its work without need for voting (U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/OE.2, p. 5 [emphasis supplied]), but did not exclude the operation of Rule 126 which provides for majority vote in all U.N. committees. The representatives from Communist countries, however, subsequently have stated that the principle allowing a right of veto has been accepted, usually expressed by the diplomatic terms “unanimity,” “agreed decisions,” “consensus of opinion,” “without voting,” or “on the basis of equality.” (The Soviet delegate also indicated opposition to the December agreement that the specialized agencies dealing with space matters report directly, not to the U.N. Space Committee, but to the Economic and Social Council and to the General Assembly; see comment in New York Times, March 21, 1962, p. 8, col. 5).

104 The Soviet representative indicated that the principles governing the utilization of ground and space telecommunications systems, and seemingly also principles governing interconnection, standardization, spectrum and systems management, and program monitoring, should be determined “on the basis of international regional agreements.” “Verbatim Record. of the Third Meeting of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, March 20, 1962 (U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/P.V.3), pp. 18–20. Some introductory background information may be found in Andrew G. Haley, “Space Communications and Cooperation with Iron Curtain Countries,” Signal, November, 1961 (No. 11) and December, 1961 (No. 12).

105 At the Moscow Space Policy Symposium in May, 1961, the future weapons specialist, General Georgia I. Pokrovsky, stated: “Soviet scientists, engineers and workers who have created the most advanced rocketry in the world have secured for their country the leading place in space studies. Hence it is natural and inevitable that the Soviet Union should rightly play the leading part in the international efforts in space research. This rôle in no way infringes the interests or prestige of other states. On the contrary, this should be one of the forms of disinterested scientific and technical mutual assistance in consolidating peace and international co-operation.” Pokrovsky, loc. cit. note 43 above, p. 62. This policy of “leadership” will undoubtedly vary according to the domestic and intra-bloc needs of the Soviet Union, and will probably not be advanced in direct dealings with non-Communist scientists. Particularly enlightening, however, in this regard would be a comparison of Soviet space-administrative proposals with the administrative structure, operation, and policy guidance of the Joint Nuclear Research Institute at Dubna, near Moscow.

106 K. Brutents, “The Shadow of the Dollar over Africa,” Pravda, Moscow, April 6, 1962, p. 5.

107 The best recent discussion by the Soviets on the sources of international law is the book by Dr. N. M. Minasyan, Istochniki Sovremennykh Mezhdunarodnogo Prava [Sources of Contemporary International Law] (151 pp., Rostov-na-Donu, 1960). Soviet doctrine provides furthermore that the drafters of a treaty do not have independent wills, but represent states, and that their discussions and expression of will do not determine the wills of the states; nor does the ratifying organ {e.g., Congress) express this will. The will of the state is always the will of the ruling class (or, in the case of the Soviet Union since October, 1961, the “will of all the people”). For an analysis of traditional Soviet treaty interpretation, see Hans Werner Bracht, “Die. Auslegung internationaler Verträge in der sowjetischen Völkerrechtslehre,” 7 Osteu’ropa Recht 66–81 (1961). A stimulating discussion of the general problem of agreement of wills in the field of law between Communist and non-Communist states is Dietrich Loeber’s “Rechtsvergleichung zwisehen Ländern mit verschiedener Wirtschaftsordnung,” 26 Rabels Zeitschrift für Ausländisches und Internationales Privatrecht 201–229 (1961).

108 Professor Korovin states that, in accordance with the ideology of the November, 1960, Communist summit conference, “When treaties are considered as instruments of peaceful co-existence, primary attention must be given to the question whether the given treaty serves to strengthen peaceful co-existence or, on the contrary, whether it leads to its violation. A finding of the latter would be tantamount to a recognition of the legal nullity of the entire treaty.” Korovin, loc. cit. note 94 above, p. 68.

This “objective” interpretation of treaties is not a new phenomenon and prompted Professor Oliver J. Lissitzyn to conclude as early as 1959, in a review of Shurshalov’s first book on treaty law, that the emphasis on “objective factors” rather than on subjective wishes as the basis of the validity and effectiveness of treaties “comes close to what might be called a Marxist ‘natural law’ doctrine.” Lissitzyn, “Recent Soviet Monographic Literature on International Law,” 5 Osteuropa Recht 26 (1959). In 1956, at an international conference of Communist jurists, the First “Vice Minister of Justice of the U.S.S.E. anticipated later developments in his attempt to support the Soviet position on peaceful co-existence by his doctrinally off-beat statement that the principles of peaceful co-existence “have become part of the conception of law held by civilized humanity and have become their natural law, because by their nature these principles are the fundamental rules of natural international law.” P. J. Kudryatsev, “The Legal Principles of Peaceful Co-existence,” VIth Congress of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, Brussels, May 22–25, 1956, Proceedings of the Commission on Legal Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, pp. 18–22.

This appeal to “objective” standards is reconciled with the traditional emphasis on the “will” of the parties by means of another innovation in Soviet international law, namely, by the development of a new science of the “forms” of international law. One of the principal elements of this new science is the use of the preamble as a separate procedural treaty determining the substantive meaning of the main treaty. The Soviets consider that no preamble is complete without some exhortatory reference to “peaceful co-existence.” Soviet jurists state that the first Communist treatment of this subject and one of the first works to recognize the importance of “forms” in international law is the article by I. I. Lukashuk, “The Preamble to International Treaties,” Pravovedeniye, 1959, No. 3, pp. 134–136.

109 Poltorak, loc. cit. note 102 above, p. 167. The principal steps in this type of law formation are: (1) agreement by scientists on recommendations for specific forms or means of co-operation and development in detail of the operative and regulatory procedure; (2) incorporation of a statement in the preamble or appendix to the recommendations that the observance of the recommendations should establish a new order; (3) request in the preamble or appendix that the recommendations be effectuated by bilateral or multilateral agreements; (4) request that the recommendations, as representative statements of the consenting will of the respective countries from which the scientists come, should be given legal significance; (5) international agreement at the departmental or lower level on annual plans of co-operation; (6) formal inter-governmental treaty ratifying the recommendations either directly or as part of annual plans of co-operation.

For obvious reasons, this particular type of source for international law is operative at present only within the Communist bloc. Nevertheless, the marked Soviet tendency to carry over domestic legal concepts and customs of the U.S.S.R. into Soviet legal arrangements with underdeveloped countries in the field of economic co-operation would indicate that the Soviets would attach to agreements of scientists at joint East-West conferences more legal significance than might initially be apparent.

See also the article “On the Interrelationship of Technical and Legal Norms,” Vestnik Leningradskogo Universiteta, Seriya Ekonomiki, Filosofii i Prava, August, 1961 (No. 3), and related Soviet sources on the relationship of science and politics in the Soviet Union. This interrelationship is also of great importance in determining Soviet attitudes toward international organizational problems in the space field, for example, toward the division of functions between COSPAE and the International Astronautical Federation.

110 I. P. Blishchenko, Mezhdunarodnoye i Vnutrigosudarstvennoye Pravo [International and Municipal Law] 190–205 (Moscow, 1960). See also note 99 above on the relationship between the role of domestic legislation in international law and the heresy of the “cult of the individual.”

111 Minasyan, op. cit. note 107 above, p. 146. In a very favorable review of this book published in Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo, January, 1962 (No. 1), pp. 125–127, the leading Soviet jurists, V. N. Durdenevsky and M. Lazarev, stated that this book is the first systematic Soviet work on the subject of the sources of international law. Dr. Minasyan emphasizes (on pp. 135–136) the enormous importance of the domestic law of the Soviet Union in international law, and points out that domestic law can serve as a source of international law only if (1) it is “democratic and peace-loving in its essence . . . that is, corresponding to the basic generally recognized principles of peaceful co-existence of states, such as sovereign equality and territorial integrity, non-interference and non-aggression [to prohibit counter-revolutionary forces], equality and reciprocal advantage.” One of the examples given by the Communists of the role of Soviet domestic legislation is Lenin’s Decree on Peace, issued on Nov. 8, 1917, which allegedly was the first step in establishing the “principal of peaceful settlement of disputes” as part of international law (Sharmazanashvili, loc. cit. note 87 above, p. 72; International Conciliation, No. 292 (Sept. 1933), p. 310); (2) it relates to the field of international relations. Soviet law, according to Minasyan (p. 134), has always been directed toward the international welfare of the peoples of the world; (3) it is officially or tacitly recognized by other states or at least is not protested by them. One might note here the provision in the projected new Soviet Constitution, announced in April, 1962, on “peaceful co-existence.”

A more conservative book by P. I. Lukin emphasizes that domestic law can serve as a source of international legal rules and principles, but can serve only as an influence on, not as a source of, international law as such. P. I. Lukin, Istochniki Mezhdunarodnogo Prava [Sources of International Law] 129–130 (Moscow, 1960). This book was not mentioned in the review of the Minasyan book in January, 1962.

112 Lipson, loc. cit. note 9 above, p. 17.

113 Lipson, 1959 Proceedings, American Society of Int. Law 45.

114 Joseph Whelan, “Implications of the Soviet Space Program for International Cooperation and International Law,” in Soviet Space Programs: Organization, Plans, Goals, and International Implications, p. 216, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, U. S. Senate, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., May 31, 1962.

115 A preliminary discussion of some elements of such a free democratic strategy may be found in Robert D. Crane, “Developing Space Legal Strategy,” Orbis, July, 1962. The best discussion of the moral/military problems involved is in the book, Morality and Modern Warfare (168 pp., Baltimore, Helicon Press, 1960, edited by William J. Nagle), in particular Ch. Ill, “Technology, Strategy and National Military Policy,” by Col. John K. Moriarty, and Ch. V, “Theology and Modern War,” by the Rev. John Courtney Murray, S.J.