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The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: a Positivist View

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 February 2017

Bruno Simma  and
Andreas L. Paulus
Andreas L. Paulus
Affiliation:
Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich
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Extract

When we were invited to contribute a positivist perspective to the present symposium, we did not know whether to regard this invitation as flattering or as an insult: does positivism not represent old-fashioned, conservative, continental European nineteenthcentury views—naive ideas of dead white males on the possibility of objectivity in law and morals? There is little we can do about being male and white, but we have certainly not seen ourselves as positivists of that kind. From the range of methodologies that the editors assembled, we could associate ourselves with several approaches just as much as with positivism. But in reflecting on our day-to-day legal work, we realized that, for better or for worse, we indeed employ the tools developed by the “positivist” tradition.

Type
Symposium on Method in International Law
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 93 , Issue 2 , April 1999 , pp. 302 - 316
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1999

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References

1 See the first decision of the appeals chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereinafter ICTY):

Indeed, elementary considerations of humanity and common sense make it preposterous that the use by States of weapons prohibited in armed conflicts between themselves be allowed when States try to put down rebellion by their own nationals on their own territory. What is inhumane, and consequently proscribed, in international wars, cannot but be inhumane and inadmissible in civil strife.

Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeal on Jurisdiction, No. IT–94–1–AR72, para. 119 (Oct. 2, 1995), 35 ILM 32 (1996) [hereinafter Tadić Interlocutory Appeal]. See also Steven R. Ratner, The Schizophrenias of International Criminal Law, 33 Tex. Int’l L.J. 237, 239, 240, 249 (1998).

2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, Art. 15, 999 UNTS 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].

3 Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Appeals Judgement, No. IT–96–22–A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, para. 11, 111 ILR 386, 395 (Oct. 7, 1997). But see Joint Separate Opinion of Judges McDonald and Vohrah, para. 78, id. at 314.

4 For a more detailed description, see Ulrich Fastenrath, Relative Normativity in International Law, 4 Eur. J. Int’l L. 305 (1993).

5 See Georg Jellinek, Die Rechtliche Natur der Staatenverträge 2, 42–49, 56–58 (Vienna, Alfred Hölder 1880).

6 Heinrich Triepel, Völkerrecht und Landesrecht 27–32, 79–87 (Leipzig, Hirschfeld 1899). Similarly, 1 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise 21–22 (2d ed. 1912).

7 S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7).

8 See Prosper Weil, Le Droit international en quête de son identité, 237 Recueil des Cours 75–76 (1992 VI).

9 See H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 606–15 (1958); Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (Max Knight trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1967) (1960) [hereinafter Kelsen, Pure Theory]. According to Kelsen:

The Pure Theory of Law is a theory of positive law.…

….

It is called a “pure” theory of law, because it only describes the law and attempts to eliminate from the object of this description everything that is not strictly law: Its aim is to free the science of law from alien elements.

Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law 1 (2d rev. ed., Robert W. Tucker ed. 1967). For a naturalist response, see Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630 (1958).

10 See Kelsen, Pure Theory, supra note 9, at 198–205, 211–14.

11 Primary rules designate rules imposing obligations; secondary rules, as “rules of recognition, change and adjudication,” relate to the creation, variation or violation of primary rules. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law 79–99 (2d ed. 1994). According to Hart, however, international law lacks an “ultimate rule of recognition” and comprises primary rules only. Id. at 213–37.

12 See Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law? 77 AJIL 413, 414–18 (1983).

13 See Kelsen, Pure Theory, supra note 9, at 205–08.

14 See Hart, supra note 11, at 135.

15 See Oppenheim, supra note 6, at 22. For an analysis of the changes in subsequent editions of the treatise, see W. Michael Reisman, Lassa Oppenheim’s Nine Lives, 19 Yale J. Int’l L. 255 (1994).

16 See Oppenheim, supra note 6, at 22.

17 For an extensive presentation of recent criticisms of positivism, see Joseph H. H. Weiler & Andreas L. Paulus, The Structure of Change in International Law or Is There a Hierarchy of Norms in International Law? 8 Eur. J. Int’l L. 545, 549–58 (1997), with further references.

18 Mary Ellen O’Connell, New International Legal Process, 93 AJIL 334, 339 (1999).

19 See Hart, supra note 11, at 48–49, 79–80.

20 Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence and Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflict: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity, 93 AJIL 316 (1999).

21 See Terry Nardin, Law, Morality, and the Relations of States 15–16, 49–50 (1983).

22 See Kenneth W. Abbott, International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts, 93 AJIL 361 (1999); Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, The Law and Economics of Humanitarian Law Violations in Internal Conflict, 93 AJIL 394 (1999) (both with further references).

23 Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 22, at 399.

24 See Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International Law, 93 AJIL 379 (1999); Martti Koskenniemi, Letter to the Editors of the Symposium, 93 AJIL 351 (1999).

25 Weil, supra note 12, at 441–42.

26 For extensive treatment of these developments and their impact on international law, see Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions 1–6 (1995); Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AJIL 524 (1993); Bruno Simma, From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law, 250 Recueil des Cours 215 (1994 VI); Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 Eur. J. Int’l L. 503 (1995).

27 1 Oppenheim’s International Law 26 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992). Similarly, Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §102 cmt. b (1987) [hereinafter Restatement]. See also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 ICJ Rep. 14, 99–100, paras. 188–89 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua].

28 See Nicaragua, 1986 ICJ Rep. at 98, para. 186; Restatement, supra note 27, §103(2) (d); Alfred Verdross & Bruno Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht §566 (1984).

29 See Restatement, supra note 27, §102 cmts. f, i. On codification and the impact of international organizations on sources generally, see 1 Oppenheim’s International Law, supra note 27, at 45–52,110–14; Verdross & Simma, supra note 28, §§589–96.

30 See Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Fights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 Austl. Y.B. Int’l L. 82,102–06 (1992); Verdross & Simma, supra note 28, §606. This development can be squared with the wording of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, which requires only general international recognition of those principles, not their deduction from domestic law. Cf. Oppenheim’s International Law, supra note 27, at 36–37, 40 (limiting general principles to those applied in faro domestico, but emphasizing their role as independent source); Restatement, supra note 27, §102(1) (speaking of “rules … accepted as such by the international community of states … by derivation from general principles common to the major legal systems of the world”) & reporters’ note 7 (emphasizing the origin of general principles in domestic law). But cf. id. §701 (c) (general principles as source of human rights law).

31 See Oppenheim’s International Law, supra note 27, at 41–42; Restatement, supra note 27, §103(2) (a), (b); Verdross & Simma, supra note 28, §§618–22.

32 But cf. Martti Koskenniemi, From Apologx to Utopia 8–50 (1989) (arguing that such balancing is impossible).

33 See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, Art. 8, para. 2(c), (e), UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9* (1998), reprinted in 37 ILM 1002 (1998) [hereinafter ICC statute].

34 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 UNTS 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. It has been ratified by 124 states. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General as at 31 December 1997, at 85, UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/16 (1998) [hereinafter Multilateral Treaties]. See also GA Res. 96 (I), UN GAOR, 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1134, UN Doc. A/231 (1946).

35 See, e.g., Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987 (the Proxmire Act), Pub. L. No. 100–606, §2(a), 102 Stat. 3045 (1988) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §1091 (1994)); Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] §220 (FRG).

36 For recent examples, see Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgement, No. ICTR–96–4–T (Sept. 2, 1998), available at Web site of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [hereinafter ICTR] <http://www.un.org/ictr/english/judgements/>, summarized in 37 ILM 1399 (1998) [hereinafter Akayesu]; Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Judgement and Sentence, No. ICTR–97–23–S, para. 40 (Sept. 4, 1998), reprinted in 37 ILM 1411 (1998); Prosecutor v. Karadžić and Mladić, Review of the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61, Nos. IT–95–5–R61, IT–95–18–R61, paras. 92–95 (July 11, 1996), 108 ILR 86, 133–36 (ICTY 1996). For national prosecutions, see Steven R. Ratner & Jason S. Abrams, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law 151–58 (1997); Catherine Cisse, The End of a Culture of Impunity in Rwanda? Prosecution of Genocide and War Crimes before Rwandan Courts and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 1 Y.B. Int’l Humanitarian L. 161, 175–86 (1998); Carla J. Ferstman, Domestic Trials for Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity: The Example of Rwanda, 9 Afr. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 857 (1997); cf Attorney-General v. Eichmann, 1965 Psakim Mehoziim 3, 36 ILR 5, 32–39 (D.C. Jm. 1961), aff’d, 16 Piskei Din 2003, 36 ILR 277, 297, 303 (S. Ct. Isr. 1962) (universal jurisdiction for genocide as crime against humanity); José Alejandro Consigli, The Priebke Extradition Case before the Argentine Supreme Court, 1 Y.B. Int’l Humanitarian L. 341 (1998).

37 See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), Preliminary Objections, 1996 ICJ Rep. 595 (July 11) [hereinafter Application of Genocide Convention].

38 Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 ICJ Rep. 15, 23 (May 28). See also Application of Genocide Convention, 1996 ICJ Rep. at 615, para. 31; Corfu Channel (UK v. Alb.) (Merits), 1949 ICJ Rep. 4, 22 (Apr. 9); Nicaragua, 1986 ICJ Rep. at 114, paras. 218–20.

39 For further examples, see ICTY Statute, Art. 4, in Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 808 (1993), annex, UN Doc. S/25704 (1993), reprinted in 32 ILM 1159, 1192 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Report]; ICTR Statute, Art. 2, SC Res. 955, annex, UN SCOR, 49th Sess., Res. & Dec, at 15, UN Doc. S/INF/50 (1994), reprinted in 33 ILM 1602 (1994). See also Restatement, supra note 27, §702(a) (genocide as violation of customary law).

40 See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, annexed to Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, Art. 6(c), 59 Stat. 1544, 82 UNTS 279, 288 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter]:

Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated. (Interior emphasis added)

See also International Military Tribunal, Judgment, reprinted in 41 AJIL 172, 249 (1947) [hereinafter IMT Judgment]; Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal, GA Res. 95 (I), UN GAOR, 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1144, UN Doc. A/236 (1946). For examples of national prosecutions, see Fédération Nationale des Déportés et Internés Résistants et Patriotes v. Barbie, 78 ILR 124 (Cass. crim. Fr. 1983–1985); Eichmann, 36 ILR at 48–49 (D.C. Jm.), 239–52 (S. Ct.); Crim. C., R.S.C., ch. 30, §1 (3d Supp. 1985) (Can.); Regina v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701 (Can.), critically summarized in 90 AJIL 460 (1996).

41 See ICTY Statute, supra note 39, Art. 5; SC Res. 827, para. 2, UN SCOR, 48th Sess., Res. & Dec, at 29, UN Doc. S/INF/49 (1993).

42 ICTR Statute, supra note 39, Art. 3. See also the relevant ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence confirming the wording of the Statutes: Tadic Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 1, paras. 138–42; Kambanda, supra note 36, para. 40. For an account of the history of crimes against humanity, see Prosecutor v. Tadić, Opinion and Judgement, No. IT–94–1–T, paras. 618–23 (May 7, 1997), 112 ILR 1 [hereinafter Tadić Judgement]; Akayesu, supra note 36, §6.4.

43 See Tadić Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 1, paras. 138–42; ICTY Report, supra note 39, para. 34.

44 Control Council Law No. 10, Art. 11(1) (c), Control Council for Germany, Official Gazette, Jan. 31, 1946, at 50 [hereinafter CCL 10]. See Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 (1950–53).

45 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, Nov. 30, 1973, Arts. 1–3, 1015 UNTS 243 [hereinafter Apartheid Convention]. As of December 31, 1997, the Convention was in force for 101 parties, but for none of the “Western” states. See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 34, at 167. See also Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, Nov. 26, 1968, Art. I(b), 754 UNTS 73 [hereinafter Convention on Statutory Limitations]; ICC statute, supra note 33, Art. 7, para. 1.

46 See Eichmann, supra note 36, at 48–49 (D.C.Jm.) & 139 (S. Ct.); Barbie, supra note 40, at 136; David Turns, War Crimes without Warf? 7 Afr. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 825–26 (1995); and the references supra note 36. For national laws, see Ratner & Abrams, supra note 36, at 51–53.

47 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, Art. 2, 6 UST 3114, 75 UNTS 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, Art. 2, 6 UST 3217, 75 UNTS 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, Art. 2, 6 UST 3316, 75 UNTS 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, Art. 2, 6 UST 3516, 75 UNTS 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, Art. 1, paras. 3, 4, 1125 UNTS 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, Art. 1, 1125 UNTS 609 [hereinafter Protocol II].

48 See, supra note 47, Geneva Conventions I, Art. 49; II, Art. 50; III, Art. 129; IV, Art. 146; and Protocol I, Art. 85.

49 The ICRC commentary implicitly equates war crimes punishable at an international level with grave breaches, see International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, paras. 3411–22, 3521–23 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987).

50 ICTY Statute, supra note 39, Art. 2; ICTY Report, supra note 39, paras. 39, 40.

51 Tadić Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 1, para. 94.

52 See Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals (United Nations War Crimes Commission ed., 1947). For recent national prosecutions of war crimes, see, e.g., In re G. (Mil. Trib., Division 1, Switz., Apr. 18, 1997), summarized in 92 AJIL 78 (1998); Public Prosecutor v. Djajić, 3 St 20/96 (Sup. Ct. Bavaria May 23,1997), excerpted in 1998 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 392, summarized in 92 AJIL 528 (1998). See also U.S. War Crimes Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-192, §2(a), 110 Stat. 2104 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §2441 (Supp. II 1996)). Before Nuremberg, war crimes were prosecuted nationally according to customary international law, see Rüdiger Wolfrum, The Decentralized Prosecution of International Offences through National Courts, in War Crimes in International Law 233, 239 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds., 1996).

53 There is ample evidence for the existence of such opinio juris. See, e.g., ICTY Statute, supra note 39, Art. 3; ICC statute, supra note 33, Art. 8.

54 Annex to Hague Convention [No. IV] Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3e sér.) 461. See IMT Judgment, supra note 40, at 218.

55 See ICTY Report, supra note 39, para. 44.

56 See Tadić Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 1, Separate Opinion of Judge Abi-Saab, 105 ILR at 537–38; The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, para. 1209 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995). But see Tadić Interlocutory Appeal, supra, paras. 80–81.

57 See Tadić Judgment, supra note 42, Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald; see also Prosecutor v. Delalić, Judgement, No. IT–96–21–T, paras. 230–34 (Nov. 16, 1998); Prosecutor v. Rajić, Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61, No. IT–95–12–R61, para. 22 (Sept. 13, 1996), summarized in 91 AJIL 523 (1997); Theodor Meron, Classification of Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia: Nicaragua’s Fallout, 92 AJIL 236 (1998).

58 Geneva Conventions, supra note 47, common Art. 2; Protocols I and II, supra note 47, Art. 1.

59 ICTR Statute, supra note 39, Art. 4.

60 See Tadić Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 1, paras. 128–34 (citing military manuals and Yugoslav law); Delalić, supra note 57, paras. 307–10; Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AJIL 554, 558–65 (1995).

61 For an extensive critique, see Simma & Alston, supra note 30. For a rather robust reply, see Richard B. Lillich, The Growing Importance of Customary International Human Rights Law, 25 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 1, 10–21 (1995–96). See oisoTheodor Meron, The Continuing Role of Custom in the Formation of International Humanitarian Law, 90 AJIL 238, 240 (1996).

62 See Delalić, supra note 57, para. 417; ICTY Report, supra note 39, para. 29; Simma, supra note 26, para. 39. But see Bardo Fassbender, UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto 211—13 (1998).

63 Tadić Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 1, paras. 79–84.

64 Id., paras. 86–137.

65 See Michael Bothe, War Crimes in Non-International Armed Conflicts, in War Crimes in International Law, supra note 52, at 293. The UN Secretary-General has been very outspoken in this regard: the Security Council “included within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Rwanda Tribunal international instruments regardless of whether they were considered part of customary international law or whether they have customarily entailed the individual criminal responsibility of the perpetrator of the crime.” Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 955 (1994), para. 12, UN Doc. S/1995/134. But see Akayesu, supra note 36, §6.5; Tadić Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 1, paras. 128–37.

66 See ICC statute, supra note 33, Art. 8, para. 2(c).

67 As of March 5, 1999, 77 states had signed the statute, and 1 had ratified it. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General (visited Mar. 9, 1999) <http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/>.

68 See S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 10, at 70 (Sept. 7) (Moore, J., dissenting); 1 Oppenheim’s International Law, supra note 27, at 746–47. For a recent definition, see United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, Art. 101, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/122 & Corrs. 1–11, reprinted in United Nations, Official Text of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with Annexes and Index, UN Sales No. E.83.V.5 (1983). For a skeptical view, see Alfred P. Rubin, The Law of Piracy 343–45 (1988).

69 See, e.g., International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, TIAS No. ,11,081, 1316 UNTS 205; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 UST 1975, 1035 UNTS 167.

70 See, e.g., Apartheid Convention, supra note 45, Arts. III-V (providing for international criminality, universal jurisdiction, and an international tribunal); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, Art. 5(2), 1465 UNTS 85 [hereinafter Torture Convention].

71 For an argument in favor of characterizing torture as an international crime, see Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Judgement, No. IT–95–17/1–T, paras. 134–64 (Dec. 10, 1998); Delalić, supranote 57, paras. 446–77. Similarly, see Restatement, supra note 27, §103 reporters’ note 7, §702(d).

72 For an overview of recent national prosecutions, see Ratner & Abrams, supra note 36, at 146–56.

73 See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985), reprinted in 79 ILR 535, 545–46; Eichmann, 36 ILR at 32–39 (D.C. Jm.), 297, 303 (S. Ct.); Polyukhovich v. Australia, 91 ILR 1, 39–51 (Brennan, J., dissenting), 119–32 (Toohey, J., concurring) (High Ct. Austl. 1991); Restatement, supra note 27, §404, cmt. a & reporters’ note 1. For an overview of domestic laws, see Ratner & Abrams, supra note 36, at 156–58. For a law providing for universal jurisdiction for genocide, see, e.g., StGB §6, No. 1. But see U.S. Genocide Implementation Act of 1987, supra note 35 (limiting jurisdiction to offenses committed in the United States or cases where the alleged offender is a U.S. national); Galinier v. Munyeshyaka, 102 Revue Gánárale de Droit International Public 825 (1998), note Alland (Cass. crim. Fr. 1998) (universal jurisdiction for genocide limited to the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda).

74 See Meron, supra note 60, at 564; L. R. Penna, Criminal Sanctions far Violations of International Humanitarian Law, in National Implementation of International Humanitarian Law 73, 77–78 (Michael Bothe ed., 1990). Again, the U.S. War Crimes Act of 1996, supra note 52, is limited to cases in which the alleged offender or the victim is a U.S. national.

75 See the Conventions cited supra note 69.

76 See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 40, Art. 7; ICTY Statute, supra note 39, Art. 7(2); ICTR Statute, supra note 39, Art. 6(2); ICC statute, supra note 33, Art. 27. See also IMT Judgment, supra note 40, at 221.

77 See Regina v. Bow Street Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, [1999] 2 W.L.R. 827 (H.L.) [hereinafter Pinochet III], which confirmed and reversed in part an earlier decision, Regina v. Bow Street Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, [1998] 3 W.L.R. 1456 (H.L.), reprinted in 37 ILM 1302 (1998) [hereinafter Pinochet II], vacated by Regina v. Bow Street Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, [1999] 2 W.L.R. 272 (H.L.), reprinted in 38 ILM 430 (1999) (because of the alleged bias of Lord Hoffmann). In the latest decision, the Law Lords decided by a 6–1 majority that the Torture Convention, supra note 70, excludes the invocation of immunity by former heads of state and by their home state on their behalf, provided that the Convention is in force for the states concerned. By holding that most of the charges against Senator Pinochet did not constitute extraditable crimes, the Lords avoided a general pronouncement to the effect that the invocation of immunity by former heads of state is excluded in all cases of international crimes, Pinochet III, supra, at 847 C (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). But see id. at 899 F (Lord Hutton), 913 H (Lord Millett), 924 F (Lord Phillips).

78 None of the Law Lords claimed that serving heads of state were subject to prosecution, see, e.g., Pinochet III, supra note 77, at 844 F (Lord Browne-Wilkinson), and Pinochet I, 37 ILM at 1334 (Lord Nicholls), 1336 (Lord Steyn).

79 See Convention on Statutory Limitations, supra note 45; Barbie, supra note 40, at 132–41 (1984) (imprescriptibility of crimes against humanity, but not war crimes); Sergio Marchisio, The Priebke Case before the Italian Military Tribunals: A Reaffirmation of the Principle of Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, 1 Y.B. Int’l Humanitarian L. 344 (1998); Consigli, supra note 36. The objections of Western states to the Convention were merely due to the inclusion of apartheid.

80 See Alien Tort Claims Act, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §1350 (1994)); Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. §1350 note (1994); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), 577 F.Supp. 860 (1984); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert, denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996), summarized in 90 AJIL 658 (1996).

81 See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§1330–1332, 1391, 1441, 1602–1611 (1994 & Supp. II 1996); State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, pt. I (UK), 17 ILM 1123 (1978). Case law is divided on the question whether state immunity also applies to individuals acting in an official capacity. See Chuidian v. Philippine Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1106 (9th Cir. 1990); Hilao v. Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1126 (1995) (mem.). The Law Lords in Pinochet III carefully limited the exclusion of immunity for former heads of state to criminal proceedings.

82 For an overview, see Ratner & Abrams, supra note 36, at 193–204, with further references.

83 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 2, Art. 2(3); Torture Convention, supra note 70, Art. 7; American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,1969, Arts. 1, 2,1144 UNTS 123; Velásquez-Rodríguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 1988 Ann. Rep. 35, para. 166; Report of the Human Rights Committee, 47 UN GAOR, Supp. No. 40, Annex VI, general comment 20(44) (Art. 7), para. 15, at 195, UN Doc. A/47/40 (1992). For extensive treatment, see Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 Yale L.J. 2537, 2551–612 (1991); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Special Problems of a Duty to Prosecute: Derogation, Amnesties, Statutes of Limitation, and Superior Orders, in Impunity and Human Rights in International Law and Practice 57, 57–65 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995).

84 See, e.g., General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, Annex 7, Art. VI, 35 ILM 75, 138 (1996): “Any returning refugee or displaced person charged with a crime, other than a serious violation of international humanitarian law … or a common crime unrelated to the conflict, shall upon return enjoy an amnesty” (emphasis added).

85 See Ratner, supra note 1, at 250: “The portrait of international criminal law is one of a legal environment resembling more a patchwork than a coherent, let alone complete, system.”

86 South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber, v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, Judgment, 1966 ICJ Rep. 6, 34, para. 49 (July 18).