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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 April 2017
The recent changes effected in the foreign policy of the United States both as regards the relations of that State with its neighbors in the Western Hemisphere and as regards its position as a world Power have brought again to the fore the question of the validity of the Monroe Doctrine. There are reasons to believe that this traditional policy, if not completely repudiated by the very State which brought it into being, will, at least, remain uninvoked during some period of time. In fact, it would appear that in so far as it is concerned with the problem of intervention, the doctrine has been definitely rejected by the present administration through the so-called “good neighbor policy.” Furthermore, it has but recently been observed in the Congressional debates preceding the passage of the Neutrality Joint Resolution of August 31 of last year, that the imposition of an impartial arms embargo against belligerents would preclude the United States from applying the Monroe Doctrine in case a weak American State should be the object of aggression by a foreign Power.
1 The Joint Resolution approved February 29, 1936, extending and amending the Joint Resolution of Aug. 31, 1935, contains the following paragraph:
“Sec. lb. This act shall not apply to an American republic or republics engaged in war against a non-American State or States, provided the American republic is not coöperating with a non-American State or States in such war.”
2 Elihu Root, Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 1914, p. 10: “No one ever pretended that Mr. Monroe was declaring a rule of international law or that the doctrine which he declared has become international law.” “Son principe ne fait point partie des principes du droit des gens. Sa prétention émise plus d’une fois par les Etats-Unis de 1’imposer plus ou moins aux Etats européens est dénuée de tout fondement juridique.” Rivier, Principes du Droit des Gens, Paris, 1894, t. I, p. 406. See also Brierly, The Law of Nations, p. 164; Oppenheim, International Law, 1905, Vol. I, p. 190; Stockton, Outlines of International Law, London, 1924, p. 47; and the declaration of President Roosevelt, 1906, reported in Fauchille, Droit International Public, 1.1, p. 603, to the effect that the doctrine is a political principle which is not a part of international law but which can become later a part of it; and the statement of Senator Swanson at the time of the debates in 1926 as to the adherence of the United States to the protocol of the Permanent Court of International Justice, “we were not willing to have it incorporated in the body of international law,” reported by Gamer, “The Recrudescence of the Monroe Doctrine,” Political Science Quarterly, 1930, Vol. XLV, p. 249 Google Scholar.
3 Second Pan American Scientific Congress, Jan. 6,1916. Pan American Union Bulletin, Vol. 42 (1916), p. 2.
4 Treaty of Peace with Germany. Reservations Reported by the Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany the Treaty of Peace with Germany, done at Versailles on June 28, 1919. Government Printing Office, 1919, p. 3; Finch, “The Treaty of Peace with Germany in the United States Senate,” this JOurnal, Vol. 14 (1920), p. 199. See also the Hitchcock resolution of reservations, approved by the President. Finch, loc. cit., p. 186; Kluyer, Documents on the League of Nations, Leyden, 1920, p. 224.
5 See Basdevant, , “L’Action Coercitive Anglo-Germano-Italienne contre le Vénézuela (19023),” Revue Gtntrale de Droit International Public, 1904, p. 445 Google Scholar.
6 The President of the Council in his reply of Sept. 1,1928, to Costa Rica declared that an attempt at definition would be liable to have the effect of restricting or enlarging “the sphere of application of such engagements as foreseen by Article 21 of the Covenant,” and that “Such a task was not one for the authors of the Covenant; it only concerns the States having accepted inter se engagements of this kind.” Official Journal, Vol. 9, p. 1608 Google Scholar. As regards a tacit recognition by Latin American States of the exclusive right of interpretation of the doctrine by the United States in respect to the Inter-American Arbitration Treaty, see Gamer, loc. cit., p. 250: “If, however, they all ratify it without reservations as to its effect on the Monroe Doctrine and especially with full knowledge that it is understood in the United States as excluding disputes involving the Doctrine, it will amount to recognition by them of the claim of the United States to be the sole interpreter and to settle in its own way disputes involving the Doctrine.”
7 See the rather extreme statement of Senator Lodge, “It is not international law, and is no more to be disturbed or questioned or interpreted by other nations, than are the independence of the United States, the Constitution which gave it its form of government, or the powers inherent in its sovereignty.” One Hundred Years of the Monroe Doctrine, Government Printing Office, 1923, p. 14.
8 Root, “The Real Monroe Doctrine,” loc. cit., p. 11; Clark, Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine, Washington, 1930, pp. xv seq. and xxi.
9 See Senate reservation to the Protocol of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Jan. 27,1926. This JOurnal, Supplement, Vol. 20 (1926), p. 73.
10 Furthermore, the doctrine could conceivably be invoked as a rule of international law only in so far as it is the inevitable and direct corollary of the principle of self-defense. Such a conclusion is in the light of the application of the Monroe Doctrine far from certain. See report of Committee of Foreign Relations of the Senate in regard to reservations to the Kellogg Pact. “. . . whenever it over-steps the principle of self-defense, reasonably interpreted, the right disappears and the policy is questionable, because it then violates the rights of others.” Reported by Gamer, loc. cit., p. 241.
11 Root-Takahira Agreement, Nov. 30, 1908, Malloy, Treaties, etc. of the United States, Vol. I, pp. 1046–1047; Lansing-Ishii Agreement, Nov. 2, 1917, Malloy, Vol. II, pp. 2721–2722; Treaty between the United States, Belgium, The British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands and Portugal relating to the Principles and Policies to be followed in Matters concerning China, Feb. 6, 1922, Art. Ill, Malloy, Vol. Ill, p. 3122.
12 See Holls, The Peace Conference at the Hague, p. 531: “Nothing contained in the said convention shall be construed to imply a relinquishment by the United States of America of its traditional attitude towards purely American questions.” American reservation to the Hague Convention of 1899 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.
13 See, for example, treaty with France, Art. Ill, which provides for the reservation of any dispute the subject matter of which “depends upon or involves the maintenance of the traditional attitude of the United States concerning American questions, commonly described as the Monroe Doctrine.” This JOurnal, Supplement, Vol. 22 (1928), p. 38.
14 See Gamer, loc. cit., p. 240 seq. and p. 246 seq.
15 See Arthur, Barratt, J., “The Real Monroe Doctrine,” Transactions of the Grotius Society, 1929, p. 3.Google Scholar
16 In addition, the reservation of the Monroe Doctrine in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, and the implied reservations in the Kellogg Pact and in the Inter-American Arbitration Treaty, have not been formally incorporated into these instruments, but rather formulated by the United States before or at the time of the signature. Since all of these treaties are both multilateral and of the character of treaty laws, it would be temerarious to conclude from the mere silence of the other contracting parties a consent to the reservation formulated by the United States, just as it is inadmissible to admit for the interpretation of a statute the opinion of one legislator enunciated during the parliamentary debates preceding the passing of the statute. As regards the American reservation to the Hague Convention of 1899, Merignhac declares: “D’autre part, ces repréentants ont émis une déclaration purement unilatéral, n’ayant rien d’obligatoire pour leurs co-contractants et constituant, en quelque sorte, un des ‘attendus’ de leur adhésion. . . . Le fait par le président d’une assemblée de donner acte d’une déclaration, sans que les autres membres aient été appelés à discuter et à voter à cet égard, n’implique aucune adhésion à cette déclaration. C’est un acte de pure courtoisie internationale.” Droit International Public, Paris, 1905, t. I, p. 417. See also Murkowitch, , Lea Rapporta entre l’article 10 et l’article 21 du Pacte de la Société dea Notiona, Paris, 1932, p. 94 Google Scholar.
17 See the arbitration treaties with: Italy, April 19, 1928, Habicht, Post-War Treaties for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 1931, p. 726, Art. II; Germany, May 5, 1928, ibid., 740, Art. II; Finland, June 7, 1928, ibid., 760, Art. II; Denmark, June 14,1928, ibid., 781, Art. II; Austria, Aug. 16,1928, ibid., 818, Art. II; Czechoslovakia, Aug. 16,1928, ibid., 821, Art. II; Poland, Aug. 16, 1928, ibid., 825, Art. II; Albania, Oct. 22, 1928, ibid., 848, Art. II; Sweden, Oct. 27, 1928, ibid., 859, Art. II.
18 See Fauchille, Droit International Public, t. I, pt. 1, p. 644.
19 Davis, , “Wanted: A Consistent Latin-American Policy,” Foreign Affairs, July, 1931, p. 567 Google Scholar.
20 Vol. I, p. 147.
21 T. I, pt. 1, pp. 644, 645.
22 Charlemagne Tower, “The Origin and Meaning of the Monroe Doctrine,” this Journal, Vol. 14 (1920), p. 24 Google Scholar.
23 Miller, The Drafting of The Covenant, Vol. I, p. 276 seg.
24 See Fauchille, op. cit., t. I, pt. 1, p. 645.
25 “Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine for securing the maintenance of peace.” Miller, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 425. See also pp. 322, 425, 457, 460; also, for example, the Wiseman draft of March 25: “Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to impair the validity of any international engagement or understanding for securing the peace of the world such as treaties of arbitration and the Monroe Doctrine.” Ibid., Vol. I, p. 336.
26 See Miller, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 336: “Koo then asked me about the Monroe Doctrine and said he was in favor of having a recognition of it in the Covenant, but thought that the language should not be so broad so as to include other agreements such as the so-called Japanese Monroe Doctrine.”
27 Official Journal of the League of Nations, Vol. I, p. 248, Amendment presented March 24, 1921.
28 Op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 187 and 295.
29 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 445.
30 House, Seymour: What Really Happened at Paris, New York, 1921, p. 416. See also Fleming, The United States and the League of Nations, New York, 1932, p. 158.
31 Miller, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 447.
32 Professor Scelle has declared in this respect, “L’assimiler à un traité d’arbitrage sous prétexte que ses vues sont pacifiques, c’est encore augmenter la confusion et la superchérie.” “L’Elaboration du Pacte,” Ørstedfonden, Munch: Les Origines et L’Oeuvre de la Société des Nations, Copenhagen, 1923, p. 129 Google Scholar. See also Brown, , “Mexico and the Monroe Doctrine,” this Journal, Vol. 26 (1932), p. 119 Google Scholar.
33 See Whitton, , Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International, 1934, III, p. 149 Google Scholar; and Ray, , Commentaire du Pacte de la Société des Nations, t. I, p. 575 Google Scholar.
34 See the declaration of the representative of France, M. Noblemaire, at the Second Assembly. “A regional understanding was an understanding limited in space geographically.” Records of the Second Assembly, Meetings of the Committees, 1st Committee, Sept. 19, 1921, p. 23.
35 See Ray, , op. dt., t. I, p. 575 Google Scholar.
36 See the declaration of the Mexican Government before its entry into the League of Nations in 1931: “On this occasion Mexico thinks it necessary to state, when accepting, that she has never recognized the regional understanding mentioned in Article 21 of the Covenant.” Cited by Hudson, , “Mexico’s Admission to Membership in the League of Nations,” this Journal, Vol. 26 (1932), pp. 115–116 Google Scholar; and the statement of Cantilo, delegate of Argentina to the Committee of Arbitration and Security: “. . . il serait inexact, tout-à-fait inexact de donner comme le fait l’article 21, même par voie d’exemple, le nom d’entente régio-nale à, une déclaration politique unilatéral qui n’a jamais, que je sache, été approuvée explicitement par les autres pays américains.” Cited by Ray, , op. cit., I, p. 576 Google Scholar.
37 Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine, p. xxiv.
38 Moreover, even admitting for the sake of argument that the term “regional understanding” should be understood in the sense of an understanding between States of the same region, it is by no means certain that the Monroe Doctrine has been as universally rejected by Latin American States as is generally believed to be the case. During the course of the nineteenth century the Monroe Doctrine was approved by Latin American States in the Pan American Congresses of 1826, 1847, 1856,1865. Fauchille, op. cit., t. I, pt. 1, p. 642. At the plenary session of the Peace Conference, April 28, 1919, the representatives of Honduras and Uruguay implied their approval of the doctrine. Miller, , op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 706, 717 Google Scholar. In 1920, the President of the latter State proposed the acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine by every American Republic (citing Scott, , “American Solidarity,” this Journal, Vol. 14 (1920), p. 601 Google Scholar), and three years later this same State proposed at the Pan American Conference in Chile the adoption of the Monroe Doctrine as a Pan American doctrine for the mutual protection of the interests of all the nations of America ( Brown, , “Mexico and the Monroe Doctrine,” loc. cit., p. 118 Google Scholar). In 1921 at the Second Assembly of the League of Nations, the representatives of both Brazil and Cuba opposed the Czechoslovakian amendment which would permit a modification of Art. 21. Records of the Second Assembly, Meetings of Committees, pp. 24–25, 30. The representative of Brazil, Fernandez, declared in effect “Doubtless, there were many ways in which to understand this doctrine, and even in the United States there were various views in regard to it; but certain points of it were agreed upon by all the American States. The Covenant recognized, then, the Monroe Doctrine to the extent that the American States were in agreement.” Ibid., p. 30. In 1928, at the time of its reëntry into the League of Nations, Costa Rica declared “Le Gou-vemement et le peuple de Costa Rica se plaisent à reconnaltre les avantages indiscutables qu’à des époques ménorables de la vie politique de l’hémigphère occidental, ils ont tirés de la déclaration que le Président James Monroe a faite dans son célèbre message du 2 décembre 1823.” Journal Officiel de la Société des Nations, 1928 II, p. 1607.
39 This last statement is, of course, inexact.
40 Cited by Brown, , “Mexico and the Monroe Doctrine,” loc. cit., p. 119 Google Scholar. See also Scelle, , op. cit., p. 129 Google Scholar.
41 This anomaly is all the more striking in that President Wilson himself declared at the Peace Conference: “There is no thought in my mind that the Monroe Doctrine invalidates the Covenant, but there is in some minds the thought that the Covenant invalidates the doctrine, so that we are seeking to remove that, as I believe, erroneous impression by distinctly saying, there is nothing in this Covenant inconsistent with the Monroe Doctrine. Now, if there is anything in the Monroe Doctrine inconsistent with the Covenant, the Covenant takes precedence of the Monroe Doctrine, not only because it is subsequent to it, but because it is a body of definite obligations which the United States cannot explain away even if it wanted to explain.” Miller, , op. tit., Vol. I, p. 459, April 11, 1919 Google Scholar.
42 President Wilson declared in this respect at the fifteenth and final session of the Commission of the League of Nations: “Anybody reading the Covenant and seeing the assent of the United States appended can not [?]... bring its forces to Europe whenever it is obliged to do so by the terms of this Covenant. That is the only thing, that until this time, the United States never did. It is one thing that it never wanted to do, but it is one thing that it is consciously consenting to in becoming a member of the League; so that it is reversing its whole historic [?]... in assenting to this Covenant and it needs to be assured that in doing that it is not invalidating long-continued understandings on the other side of the water ...” Miller, , op. cit., Vol. I, p. 459 Google Scholar.
43 “Les engagements internationaux, tels que les traités d’arbitrage, et les ententes région-ales, comme la doctrine de Monroë, qui assurent le maintien de la paix, ne sont considérés comme incompatibles avec aucune des dispositions du présent Pacte.”
44 Official Journal, 9II, p. 1608.
45 Ibid., p. 1608.
46 Cf., for example, the League intervention in the dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay, Journal Officiel, X, p. 266, and a hypothetical case concerning Paraguay and Uruguay brought forward during the negotiations on the Covenant. Miller, , op. cit., Vol. II, p. 383 Google Scholar, as well as the acceptance by the United States of the League solution in the Leticia dispute. Journal Officiel, XIV, p. 503.
47 “The Real Monroe Doctrine,” Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 1914, p. 19. See also Basdevant, , op. cit., p. 447 Google Scholar, and Fauchille, , op. cit., I, p. 643 Google Scholar.