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Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 February 2017

Richard H. Steinberg
Richard H. Steinberg*
Affiliation:
UCLA School of Law
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Extract

Since the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO), commentators have debated the wisdom of replacing the model of political-diplomatic dispute settlement under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) with a model of legalized dispute settlement. Under the GATT model, a dispute settlement panel report could be given full legal force only if adopted by a consensus of GATT Contracting Parties, including the party that lost the case. Under the WTO model, a report of the panel or the Appellate Body is adopted automatically unless WTO members, including the prevailing member, decide by consensus to block it, which is sometimes referred to as “negative consensus.” Many analysts whose work has focused on the politics of dispute settlement have emphasized the success, political flexibility, and apparent sustainability of the older model and cautioned that the legalized approach might be too cumbersome in various political contexts. Those favoring the legalized approach have emphasized its legitimizing capacity and potential to constrain more powerful WTO members from engaging in unilateral or rule-breaking behavior.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 98 , Issue 2 , April 2004 , pp. 247 - 275
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 2004

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References

1 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Apr. 15, 1994, in World Trade Organization, The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 4 (1999) [hereinafter The Legal Texts]. The WTO legal texts and dispute settlement reports are available online at <http://www.wto.org>.

2 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30,1947, TIAS No. 1700, 55 UNTS 194.

3 Improvements to the GATT Dispute settlement Rules and Procedures, Apr. 12, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 61-67 (1990) [hereinafter GATT DSU].

4 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes [hereinafter DSU], Apr. 15,1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, in THE LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 1, at 354.

5 See, e.g., Goldstein, Judith & Lisa, L. Martin, Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note, 54 Int’l Org. 603,603–32 (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Robert, E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years, 8 Minn. J. Global Trade 1 (1999)Google Scholar [hereinafter Hudec, New WTO]; see also Robert, E. Hudec, The Judicialization of GATT Dispute Settlement, in In Whose interest? Due Process and Transparency in International Trade 9 (Michael, M. Hart & Debra, P. Steger eds., 1992)Google Scholar [hereinafter Hudec, Judicialization].

6 See, e.g., John, H. Jackson, Restructuring the Gatt System 56–80 (1990)Google Scholar; Ernst-Ulrich, Petersmann, The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System: International Law, International Organizations, and Dispute Settlement (1997)Google Scholar; H. Weiler, J. H., The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement (Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 9/00), at <http://www. jeanmonnetprogram.org/links/index.html> (last visited Mar. 8,2004)+(last+visited+Mar.+8,2004)>Google Scholar; see also Robert, O. Keohane, Moravcsik, Andrew, & Anne-Marie, Slaughter, Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational, 54 Int’l Org. 457, 457–88 (2000)Google Scholar.

7 See, e.g., Claude, E. Barfield, Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: the Future of the World Trade Organization (2001);Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 Chi. J. Int’l L. 401 (2000)Google Scholar (expressing concern that the WTO dispute settlement system is simultaneously generative and insular); see also Daniel, K. Tarullo, The Hidden Costs of International Dispute Settlement: WTO Review of Domestic Anti-Dumping Decisions, 34 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 109 (2002)Google Scholar.

8 See, e.g., Ragosta, John, Joneja, Navin, & Zeldovich, Mikhail, WTO Dispute Settlement: The System Is Flawed and Must Be Fixed, 37 Int’l Law. 697, 748–50 (2003)Google Scholar.

9 See, e.g., Wallach, Lori, The FP Interview: Lori’s War, Foreign Poly, Spring 2000, at 37 Google Scholar.

10 Senator Max Baucus stated that WTO panels are “making up rules that the US never negotiated, that Congress never approved, and I suspect, that Congress would never approve.” US DSU Proposal Receives Mixed Reactions, Bridges Wkly. Trade News Dig., Dec. 20, 2002 Google Scholar, at<http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/02-12-20/wtoinbrief.htm> [hereinafter Baucus Statement].

11 Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding, Proposal of the Africa Group in the WTO, para. 2 (Oct. 2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter Proposal of Africa Group].

12 For example, compare textualist with dynamic approaches to activist statutory interpretation. E.g., Frank, H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533,547 (1983)Google Scholar; William, N. Eskridge Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 Va. L. Rev. 275 (1988)Google Scholar; Karen, M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Statutory Interpretation, Democratic Legitimacy and Legal System Values, 21 Seton Hall Legis. J. 233, 281 (1997)Google Scholar; John, F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 673,685 (1997)Google Scholar; Nicholas, S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 1073, 1078–79 (1992)Google Scholar.

13 See, e.g., Ragosta, Joneja, and Zeldovich, supra note 8.

14 See, e.g., Esserman, Susan & Howse, Robert, The WTO on Trial, Foreign Aff., Jan./Feb. 2003, at 130 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

15 See, e.g., BARFIELD, supra note 7; Goldstein & Martin, supra note 5; John, A. Ragosta, Unmasking the WTO: Access to the DSB System, 31 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 739 (2000)Google Scholar.

16 Proposals aimed at increasing transparency or democratic representation in die WTO dispute settlement process raise important policy questions, but consideration of those proposals is beyond the scope of this article.

17 European Communities is used herein to refer to the European Community, the European Communities, or the European Economic Community. The European Economic Community was “seated” at GATT meetings from about 1960. John, H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT 102 (1969). The European Communities became a member of the WTO at its inception.Google Scholar

18 GATT/WTO refers to the institutional system of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and its successor organization, the World Trade Organization.

19 See Robert, E. Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement After the Tokyo Round: An Unfinished Business, 13 Cornell Int’l L.J. 145 (1980)Google Scholar; see also Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 210-14, paras. 16-18 (1980); GATT DSU, supra note 3.

20 See Goldstein & Martin, supra note 5; Hudec, Judicialization, supra note 5.

21 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 Google Scholar [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. GATT panels rarely relied expressly on the Vienna Convention for legal sources or methods of interpretation. An exception is found in United States— Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, June 19, 1992, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 296, para. 5.79 (1993)Google Scholar [hereinafter U.S.—Malt Beverages].

22 See, e.g., United States—Continuing Dumping and Offset Act of 2000, WTO Doc. WT/DS217/AB/R, para. 299 (adopted Jan. 27, 2003)Google Scholar (affirming that a member may be found not acting in good faith independently of violating a substantive obligation in a WTO agreement) [hereinafter U.S.—Dumping and Offset]; Korea—Measures Affecting Government Procurement, WTO Doc. WT/DS163/R, para. 7.96 (adopted June 19, 2000) (unless expressly or implicitly excluded by the WTO agreements, public international law may be invoked by a panel as the basis for a substantive finding against a member) [hereinafter Korea—Government Procurement]; see also Pauwelyn, Joost, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go ? 95 AJIL 535 (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

23 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §2411 (2000).

24 Dispute Settlement, U.S. Objectives for Brussels, in The U.S. Delegation Briefing Book for the Brussels Ministerial (U.S. Trade Rep., Dec. 1990)Google Scholar (on file with author).

25 Many statements to that effect were made in the Uruguay Round Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, from its early days. See, e.g., Summary and Comparative Analysis of Proposals for Negotiations, Note by the Secretariat, Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG13/W/14/Rev.2 (June 22, 1988) [hereinafter 1988 GATT Secretariat Note]; Meeting of 25 June 1987, Note by the Secretariat, Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG13/2 (July 15,1987) [hereinafter 1987 GATT Secretariat Note].

26 DSU, supra note 4, Arts. 3.2, 19.2.

27 A few WTO DSU negotiators contemplated the possibility that in interpreting WTO agreements, the Appellate Body would engage in expansive lawmaking. However, most trade ministers consistently underestimated or dismissed that possibility, focusing instead on the virtues of its function of applying the rules. Telephone interview with Bradley, A. Jane , Former assistant United States trade representative for monitoring and enforcement, and U.S. representative to die Uruguay Round Dispute Settlement Negotiations (Oct. 2002)Google Scholar. After die Uruguay Round agreements were signed, some members of the U.S. Congress expressed serious concern about the potential for judicial lawmaking, Senator Dole, Robert Going so far as to propose the establishment of a special U.S. commission to review certain Appellate Body decisions. WTO Dispute Settlement Review Commission Act, S. 1438,104th Cong. (1995)Google Scholar.

28 Filling gaps refers to judicial lawmaking on a question for which mere is no legal text directly on point, whereas clarifying ambiguity refers to judicial lawmaking on a question for which legal text exists but contains ambiguity. Ultimately, the distinction between filling gaps and clarifying ambiguity may be fragile, but it is respected here out of convention. See generally A. Hart, H. L. , The Concept of Law 121–50 (1961)Google Scholar.

29 See generally William, J. Davey, Has the WTO Dispute Settlement System Exceeded Its Authority? 4 J. Int’l Econ.L. 79 (2001)Google Scholar, available at <http://www3.oup.co.uk/jielaw/hdb>.

30 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Nov. 6, 1998), reprinted in 38 ILM 118 (1999)Google Scholar [hereinafter U.S.—Shrimp/Turtle I].

31 DSU, supra note 4, Art. 13.

32 European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/ AB/R, paras. 5-10 (adopted Sept. 25, 1997), excerpted in 37 ILM 243 (1998)Google Scholar [hereinafter EC—Bananas].

33 Id., para. 10.

34 Indonesia—Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WTO Doc. WT/DS54/R, paras. 4.1–4.35 (adopted July 23, 1998)Google Scholar [hereinafter Indonesia—Autos].

35 Conversely, in Japan— Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, WTO Doc. WT/DS44/R (adopted Apr. 22,1998)Google Scholar [hereinafterJapan—Film], the dispute settlement system clarified an ambiguity in a way that permitted a member to continue engaging in behavior that may have injured a foreign firm. The panel interpreted the nonviolation nullification or impairment standard in GATT Article XXIII: 1 (b), clarifying ambiguities in a way that left a narrow basis for claims based on that standard.

36 United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Aug. 16, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993)Google Scholar, reprinted in 30 ILM 1594 (1991)Google Scholar (unadopted) [hereinafter U.S.—Tuna/Dolphin I]; United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc. DS29/R (June 16, 1994), reprinted in 33 ILM 839 (1994 Google Scholar) (unadopted) [hereinafter U.S.— Tuna/Dolphin II].

37 U.S.—Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 30, para. 129.

38 Id., para. 161.

39 See Richard, H. Steinberg, Explaining Similarities and Differences Across International Trade Organizations, in The Greening of Trade Law: International Trade Organizations and Environmental Issues 281 (Richard, H. Steinberg ed., 2002)Google Scholar.

40 In still other instances, it is not clear whether ambiguity was intended by negotiators, but the Appellate Body made law by interpreting the ambiguity. See, e.g., European Communities—Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, WTO Doc. WT/DS62/AB/R (adopted June 22, 1998) [hereinafter EC—Computer Equipment AB Report]; see also European Communities—Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, WTO Doc. WT/DS62/R, paras. 5.26-5.42 (adopted June 22,1998, with AB report) [hereinafter EC—Computer Equipment panel report].

41 United States—Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea, WTO Doc. WT/DS202/AB/R (adopted Mar. 8, 2002) [hereinafter U.S.—Line Pipe]; United States- Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia, WTO Doc. WT/DS177/AB/R (adopted May 16,2001) [hereinafter U.S.—Lamb Meat]; United States—Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities, WTO Doc. WT/DS166/AB/R (adopted Jan. 19,2001) [hereinafter U.S.—Wheat Gluten].

42 In the Uruguay Round negotiations, U.S. negotiators refused to agree to a test that would require national authorities to quantify the relative effects of imports and other factors on domestic industry. In so refusing, they intended to enable the International Trade Commission to continue using its qualitative approach to analysis of the “substantial cause” question in safeguard cases. Interview with Reif, Timothy, Democratic chief trade counsel, U.S. House Committee on Ways and Means (Apr. 2002)Google Scholar.

43 U.S.—Lamb Meat, supra note 41, para. 185.

44 Relying on the obligation under the Antidumping Agreement not to attribute injury caused by other factors to the dumped imports, the Appellate Body established a requirement to “separate and distinguish” the effect of the dumped import from die effects of other factors. United States—Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, WTO Doc. WT/DS184/AB/R, para. 226 (adopted Aug. 23, 2001) [hereinafter U.S.— Japan Hot-Rolled Steel].

45 See, e.g.. Executive Branch Strategy Regarding WTO Dispute Settlement Panels and the Appellate Body, Report to the Congress Transmitted by the Secretary of Commerce 8–10 (Dec. 30,2002)Google Scholar [hereinafter Report to Congress], available athttp://www.ita.doc.gov/FinalDec31ReportCorrected.pdf>; BARFIELD, supra note 7, at 45-56; Tarullo, supra note 7, at 117 n.23.

46 Argentina-Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, WTO Doc. WT/DS121/AB/R (adopted Jan. 12, 2000) [hereinafter Argentina—Footwear].

47 Report on the Withdrawal by the United States of a Tariff Concession Under Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT Doc. CP/106 (Nov. 10,1951); see also JACKSON, supra note 17, at 560-61.

48 Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, in THE LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 1, at 275.

49 Argentina—Footwear, supra note 46, para. 49.

50 While the foregoing cases are not a random or representative sample of judicial lawmaking at the WTO, it is noteworthy that virtually all of these instances of lawmaking facilitated market-opening interpretations of WTO law, whereas only one decision (U.S.—Shrimp/Turtle I) created law that may support market closure.

51 Brownlie, Ian, Principles of Public International Law 1-29 (6th ed. 2003)Google Scholar.

52 WTO Agreement, supra note 1, Art. IX:2.

53 Compare Japan—Alcoholic Beverages, Nov. 10, 1987, GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 83 (1988) (employing a textual approach to application of GATT Art. Ill), with U.S.—Malt Beverages, supra note 21 (employing an “aim-and-effects” approach to application of Art. III). See also Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Doc. WT/ DS8/AB/R (adopted Nov. 1, 1996) (rejecting use of the “aim-and-effects” test and employing a textual approach).

54 Bhala, Raj, The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law (Part One of a Trilogy), 14 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 845, 853 (1999)Google Scholar; Bhala, Raj, The Precedent Setters: De Facto Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Two of a Trilogy), 9 FlA. St. J. Transnat’l L. & Pol’y 1 (1999)Google Scholar; Bhala, Raj, The Power of the Past: Towards defure Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Three of a Trilogy), 33 GEO. WASH. Int’l L. Rev. 873, 910–13 (2001)Google Scholar.

55 Working Procedures for Appellate Review, WTO Doc. WT/AB/WP/4, para. 4(3) (Jan. 24,2002) [hereinafter Working Procedures]; see also Claus-Dieter, Ehlermann, Six Years on the Bench of the “World Trade Court”: Some Personal Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, 36 J. World Trade 605, 612–13 (2002)Google Scholar.

56 It may be argued that judicial lawmaking by the Appellate Body, de facto stare decisis, and the development of a legalization culture among Appellate Body members and their staff are ratcheting WTO law forward in a way that is similar to the way common law develops. See Ragosta, Joneja, & Zeldovich, supra note 8; see also Joseph, H. Weiler, The Eu, the WTO, and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International Trade? (2000)Google Scholar.

57 See, e.g., Bradley, C Cannon, A Framework for the Analysis of Judicial Activism, in Supreme Court Activism and Restraint 368,368–87 (Stephen, C. Halpern & Charles, M. Lamb eds., 1982)Google Scholar; Frank, B. Cross, Thoughts on Goldilocks and Judicial Independence, 64 Ohio St. L. J. 195,214 (2003)Google Scholar; Ernest, A Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1144–45 (2002)Google Scholar.

58 See, e.g., Lijphart, Arend, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries 225–26 (1999)Google Scholar.

59 See id.; Daniel, O. Conkle, Legal Theory: Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1115, 1121–22 (1988)Google Scholar; Shannon, Ishiyama Smithey, Judicial Activism in Post-Communist Politics, 36 Law & Soc’y Rev. 719, 722 (2002)Google Scholar.

60 From 1980 through 1994,82% of the 109 adopted GATT panel reports held that at least one of the national measures at issue was GATT-inconsistent; for WTO cases initiated before 2001,89% of the 152 dispositive reports (i.e., adopted panel reports in cases where there was no appeal; adopted Appellate Body reports in all other cases) held that at least one of the national measures at issue was WTO-inconsistent. The difference is not significant at the .05 level. Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt kindly provided the rate for adopted GATT panel reports. The data on WTO-era dispositive reports are from Marc, L. Busch & Reinhardt, Eric, Developing Countries and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/Worde Trade Organization Dispute Settlemmt, 37 J World Trade 719, 724 (2003)Google Scholar, which reported the number of dispositive rulings that were pro-complainant, “mixed,” or pro-respondent. “Mixed” cases held for the complainant on challenges to some, but not all, of the national measures at issue.

61 See Choudhry, Sujit & Hunter, Claire, Measuring Judicial Activism on the Supreme Court of Canada: A Comment on Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. Nape, 48 McGill L. J. 525, 532 (2003)Google Scholar.

62 See Keohane, Moravcsik, & Slaughter, supra note 6.

63 This differs from the typical measure of activism in the municipal context, where “activist” decisions include those based on either rule application or lawmaking.

64 Measuring the extent of Judicial activism also requires highly qualitative judgment. See Choudhry & Hunter, supra note 61.

65 These calculations are based on data set forth in note 60 supra.

66 Judicial lawmaking was raised several times in the Uruguay Round dispute settlement negotiations, but in all of those instances participants were expressing a preference that prospective changes in the dispute settlement system should not create, by constructive interpretation, obligations that were not established in the texts of GATT/WTO agreements. See, e.g., 1998 GATT Secretariat Note, supra note 25; 1987 GATT Secretariat Note, supra note 25.

67 Croome, John, Reshaping the World Trading System: a History of the Uruguay Round (1995)Google Scholar.

68 Telephone interviews with Bradley, A. Jane and Freiberg, Kenneth (Jan. 2003) (identifying panel report on United States Tax Legislation(DISC), Nov. 12,1976, GATT B.I.S.D. (23d Supp.) at 98 (1977)Google Scholar (United States permitted its adoption only in conjunction with a Contracting Parties decision, the substance of which was negotiated between the European Communities and the United States, interpreting various points of GATT law) [hereinafter U.S.—DISC]; Canada—Discriminatory Application of Retail Sales Tax on Gold Coins, Feb. 12,1986 (Canada agreed with certain parts of the report and rescinded the tax, but blocked adoption of the report because it disagreed with findings relating to the most-favored-nation principle) (unadopted) [hereinafter Canada—Gold Coins]; U.S.—Tuna/Dolphin I and II, supra note 36).

69 Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Peter Balas, to the Trade Negotiations Committee, Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, WTO Doc. TN/DS/9 (June 6, 2003); Proposal of Africa Group, supra note 11; Proposals on DSU by Cuba, Honduras, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding, Dispute settlement Body Special Session, WTO Doc. TN/DS/W/18 (Oct. 7, 2002); Contribution of the United States to the Improvement of the Dispute settlement Understanding of the WTO Related to Transparency, Communication from the United States, Dispute settlement Body Special Session, WTO Doc. TN/DS/W/13 (Aug. 22,2002); Minutes of Meetings of the Special Sessions of the Dispute settlement Body: 17-18 February 2003, WTO Doc. TN/DS/M/9 (July 1, 2003)Google Scholar; 28-30January 2003, WTO Doc. TN/ DS/M/8 (June 30,2003); 16-18 December 2002, WTO Doc. TN/DS/M/7 (June 26,2003); 13-15 November 2002, WTO Doc. TN/DS/M/6 (Mar. 31,2003); 14 October 2002, WTO Doc. TN/DS/M/5 (Oct. 14,2002); 10 September 2002, WTO Doc. TN/DS/M/4 (Nov. 6, 2002); 15July 2002, WTO Doc. TN/DS/M/3 (Sept. 9, 2002).

70 Complaints about the following cases may be found in the sources cited supra note 69: U.S.—Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 30; EC—Bananas, supra note 32; Indonesia—Autos, supra note 34; Japan—Film, supra note 35; EC—Computer Equipment panel report, supra note 40; U.S.—Lamb Meat, supra note 41; U.S.—Wheat Gluten, supra note 41; U.S.—Line Pipe, supra note 41; U.S.—Japan Hot-Rolled Steel, supra note 44; Argentina—Footwear, supra note 46. See also REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 45.

71 Confidential notes on meetings of the informal DSU Reform Group from October 22, 1998, through September 24, 1999 Google Scholar (on file with author).

72 These articles were selected by searching the LEXIS database “US & Canadian Law Reviews, Combined,” for articles that mentioned “GATT” at least ten times and “dispute settlement” at least five times (Feb. 7, 2004).

73 Charnovitz, Steve, Environmental Trade Sanctions and the GATT: An Analysis of the Petty Amendment on Foreign Environmental Practices, 9 Am. U. Int’l L.J. 751 (1994)Google Scholar; Daniel, A. Farber & Robert, E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory States: A GATT’s-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1401 (1994)Google Scholar.

74 These figures are based on the author’s review of articles selected by searching the LEXIS database “US & Canadian Law Reviews, Combined,” for articles that mentioned “WTO” at least ten times and “dispute settlement” at least five times (Feb. 7, 2004).

75 E.g., BARFIELD, supra note 7, at 9.

76 E.g., Baucus Statement, supra note 10.

77 E.g., Raustiala, supra note 7; Wallach, supra note 9.

78 E.g., Goldstein & Martin, supra note 5.

79 Stephen, D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in International Regimes (Stephen, D. Krasner ed., 1983)Google Scholar.

80 See Keohane, Moravcsik, & Slaughter, supra note 6.

81 See, e.g., Anne-Marie, Burley & Mattli, Walter, Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration, 47 Int’l Org. 41 (1993)Google Scholar; H. Weiler, J. H. , The Transformation of Europe, 100 Yale L.J. 2403 (1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

82 DSU, supra note 4, Arts. 3.2, 19.2.

83 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Art. 17.6(H), WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, in THE LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 1, at 147, 168.

84 At the restrained extreme, textualists rely exclusively on legislative text. They reject attempts to understand legislative intent in the application of law, often viewing legislative intent as a fiction and arguing that public choice literature has shown that practices such as logrolling and side payments make it difficult to determine legislative intent. See Easterbrook, supra note 12, at 547-48; Manning, supra note 12, at 295-301.

85 Originalists take a more activist position, relying on legislated texts plus an understanding of legislative intent in order to give effect to the original intent of legislators. See Eskridge, supra note 12; Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 12; Michael, P. Healy, Communis Opinio and the Methods of Statutory Interpretation: Interpreting Law or Changing Law, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 539 (2001)Google Scholar; Zeppos, supra note 12.

86 At the most activist extreme, some advocate a dynamic approach, which accepts as its premises that jurists perform a quasi-legislative function de facto and that there is a need for the law to change with environmental shifts. The dynamic approach therefore favors basing judicial decisions on policy considerations, particularly where changes in society and law make original intent seem irrelevant to modern problems. See Eskridge, supra note 12; Zeppos, supra note 12.

87 See generally John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832).

88 I Oppenheim’s International Law 1278 (Jennings, Robert & Watts, Arthur eds., 9th ed. 1992)Google Scholar; Cameron, James & Kevin, R. Gray, Principles of International Law in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, 50 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 248,254 (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

89 Michael, J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 539, 555 n.49 (2002)Google Scholar.

90 S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 10, at 18.

91 See generally Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 ICJ Rep. 226, 289–90 (July 8) (Guillaume, J., sep. op.)Google Scholar; id. at 279-80 (Vereshchetin, J., sep. op.); Ford, Christopher, Judicial Discretion in International Jurisprudence: Article 38(l)(c) and “General Principles of Law,” 5 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 35,56–60 (1994)Google Scholar; Weil, Prosper, “The Court Cannot Conclude Definitively . . .”Non Liquet Revisited, 36 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 109, 111–13 (1997)Google Scholar.

92 E.g., Stephen, P. Croley & John, H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AJIL 193, 213 (1996)Google Scholar.

93 Hudec, Judicialization, supra note 5, at 30-31.

94 DSU, supra note 4, Art. 3.2.

95 See Weil, supra note 91, at 112 (recounting that position, but not endorsing it).

96 E.g., Croley & Jackson, supra note 92; Pauwelyn, supra note 22; Weil, supra note 91, at 110; see also Hughes, Layla, Limiting the jurisdiction of Dispute Settlement Panels: The WTO Appellate Body Beef Hormone Decision, 10 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 915,919–22 (1998)Google Scholar (arguing that the Appellate Body’s invocation of in dubio mitius was unnecessary, given other methods of interpretation).

97 Croley & Jackson, supra note 92.

98 See generally id.; Howse, Robert, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate, 27 Colum.J. Envtl. L. 491, 514–19 (2002)Google Scholar; Pauwelyn, supra note 22.

99 Joel, P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40Harv. Int’l L.J. 333, 338–44 (1999)Google Scholar.

100 Brazil—Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, WTO Doc. WT/DS22/AB/R (adopted Mar. 20, 1997).

101 United States—Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany, WTO Doc. WT/DS213/AB/R (adopted Dec. 19,2002) (rejecting the panel’s inference that a de minimis standard in provisions on countervailing duty investigations had to be applied in sunset reviews) [hereinafter U.S.—Carbon Steel from Germany].

102 Indeed, the only reference to non liquet in any WTO panel report or Appellate Body decision was critical of using the principle. India—Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile, and Industrial Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS90/R, para. 3.119 (adopted Sept. 22, 1999, with AB report).

103 European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WTO Doc. WT/DS26/ AB/R, at 41-42 (adopted Feb. 13, 1998) [hereinafter EG—Beef Hormones].

104 Tarullo, supra note 7, at 118-20.

105 U.S.—Japan Hot-Rolled Steel, supra note 44, para. 57.

106 United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R, at 17 (adopted May 20,1996), reprinted in 35ILM 603 (1996) (Article XX of the GATT1994 had to be interpreted according to the general rule of interpretation laid down in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, supra note 21, which “has attained the status of a rule of customary or general international law”) [hereinafter U.S.—Gasoline] ;Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 53, at 97 (similar statement with respect to Article 32 of die Vienna Convention).

107 Vienna Convention, supra note 21, Art. 31 (1).

108 Id., Art. 32; see also BROWNLIE, supra note 51, at 19-23.

109 U.S.—Gasoline, supra note 106, at 17.

110 A broader discussion of the determinacy of international law discourse is beyond the scope of this article. See generally Kennedy, David, A New Stream of International Law Scholarship, 7 Wis. Int’l L.J. 1 (1998)Google Scholar.

111 Ehlermann, supra note 55, at 617.

112 Id. at 616; see Claus-Dieter, Ehlermann, Reflections on the Appellate Body of the WTO, 6 J. Int’l Econ. L. 695, 699–700 (2003)Google Scholar.

113 For example, in Argentina—Footwear, supra note 46, para. 50, the Appellate Body relied on ordinary meaning to require demonstration of “unforeseen developments” in safeguard cases, despite having apparently accepted the argument that the Uruguay Round negotiators intended not to require such a demonstration.

114 See, e.g., Tarullo, supra note 7.

115 Judith Goldstein, Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz have shown that this claim is robust, despite a recent counterclaim to the contrary. Judith Goldstein et al., How Does the Trade Regime Affect International Trade? (paper prepared for annual meeting of American Political Science Association, Aug. 28-31, 2003), at <http://credpr. stanford.edu/events/APSA2003.pdf>; see also Andrew, K. Rose, Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? 94 Am. Econ. Rev. (forthcoming 2004)Google Scholar.

116 For discussions of this point, see Ehlermann, supra note 112, at 705; Roessler, Frieder, The Scope, Limits and Functions of the GATT Legal System, 8 World Econ. 287 (1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tarullo, supra note 7.

117 See John, H. Barton, The Economics of TRIPs: International Trade in Information-Intensive Products, 33 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 473 (2001)Google Scholar.

118 McRae, Donald, Claus-Dieter Ehlermann’s Presentation on the Role and Record of Dispute Settlement Panels and the Appellate Body of the WTO: Comment by Professor Donald McRae, 6 J. Int’l Econ. L. 709, 716 (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

119 See, e.g., John Gerard, Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, in International Regimes, supra note 79, at 195 Google Scholar.

120 Marceau, Gabrielle, A Call for Coherence in International Law: Praises for the Prohibition Against “Clinical Isolation” in WTO Dispute Settlement, 33 J. World Trade 87 (1999)Google Scholar; Pauwelyn, supra note 22. But see McRae, supra note 118, at 712-15.

121 McRae, supra note 118, at 713.

122 E.g., Korea—Government Procurement, supra note 22; U.S.—Dumping and Offset, supra note 22.

123 See Trachtman, supra note 99, at 342-43; see also European Communities—Measures Affecting the Importation of Certain Poultry Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS69/AB/R, para. 81 (adopted July 23, 1998)Google Scholar (holding that a tariff agreement between two WTO members does not constitute WTO law applicable by a panel) [hereinafter EC—Poultry].

124 See, e.g., Sarah, H. Cleveland, Human Rights Sanctions and International Trade: A Theory of Compatibility, 5 J. Int’l Econ. L. 133 (2002)Google Scholar; Carlos Manuel, Vásquez, Trade Sanctions and Human Rights—Past, Present, and Future, 6 J. Int’l Econ. L. 797 (2003)Google Scholar.

125 GATT DSU, supra note 3, para. G:2.

126 Telephone interview with A. Jane Bradley, former assistant United States trade representative for dispute settlement (Jan. 14, 2003); see, e.g., Canada—Gold Coins, supra note 68; U.S.—DISC, supra note 68.

127 DSU, supra note 4, Art. 17.14.

128 BARFIELD, supra note 7, at 1. In citing this argument, I neither endorse nor challenge the claim of a constitutional flaw.

129 See, e.g., Ferejohn, John & Weingast, Barry, A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 12 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 263 (1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ferejohn, John & Weingast, Barry, Limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutory Interpretation, 80 Geo. L J. 565 (1992)Google Scholar; McCubbins, Mathew, Roger, G. Noll, & Weingast, Barry, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1631 (1995)Google Scholar.

130 See, e.g., Karen, J. Alter, The European Union’s Legal System and Domestic Policy: Spillover or Backlash? 54 Int’l Org. 489 (2000)Google Scholar; Burley & Mattli, supra note 81; Cooter, Robert & Drexl, Josef, The Logic of Power in the Emerging European Constitution: Game Theory and the Division of Powers, 14 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 307 (1994)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Geoffrey, Garrett, R. Kelemen, Daniel, & Schulz, Heiner, The European Court of Justice, National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union, 52 Int’l Org. 149 (1998)Google Scholar; Kelemen, R. Daniel , The Limits of Judicial Power: Trade-Environment Disputes in the GATT/WTO and the EU, 34 Comp. Pol. Stud. 622 (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

131 WTO Agreement, supra note 1, Art. IX.

132 See WTO Establishes Appellate Body (Nov. 30, 1995), at<http://www.sunsonline.org/trade/process/followup/ 1995/index.htm>.

133 In the municipal context, such vetoes are used routinely to avoid the appointment of activist Judges. See Tsebelis, George, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (forthcoming 2004)Google Scholar.

134 Anonymous telephone interview with a current Appellate Body member (Feb. 11, 2004); Anonymous telephone interview with a former senior USTR official (Feb. 26, 2004).

135 Anonymous telephone interview with a former senior USTR official who participated in the process of selecting members of the first Appellate Body (Feb. 13, 2004).

136 TSEBELIS, supra note 133, at 331-32.

137 Such tactics have been used against the U.S. Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice. See Garrett, Kelemen, & Schulz, supra note 130; Gely, Rafael & Pablo, T. Spiller, The Political Economy of Supreme Court Constitutional Decisions: The Case of Roosevelt’s Court-Packing Plan, 12 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 45 (1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rosenberg, Gerald, Judicial Independence and the Reality of Political Power, 54 Rev. Pol. 369 (1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

138 Curzon, Gerald & Curzon, Victoria, GATT: Traders’ Club, in The Anatomy of Influence 299 (Robert, W. Cox & Harold, K-Jacobson eds., 1973)Google Scholar; Richard, H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining at the GATT/WTO, a56 Int’l Org. 340 (2002)Google Scholar.

139 Calculated from Central Intelligence Agency, World Fact Book (2002)Google Scholar, and World Trade Organization, International Trade: 2002 Trends and Statistics (2002).

140 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, in The Legal Texts Google Scholar, supra note 1, at 17.

141 Steinberg, supra note 138. The definition of agenda setting is from Tsebelis, George, The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda-Setter, 88 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 128 (1994)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On the agenda-setting process at the WTO, see also Blackhurst, Richard, Reforming WTO Decision-Making: Lessons from Singapore and Seattle, in The World Trade Organization: Freer Trade in the Twenty-First Century 295 (Klaus, Gunter Deutsch & Speyer, Bernhard eds., 2001)Google Scholar.

142 More detailed descriptions of these proposals and EC-U.S. diplomatic discussions of them may be found in Steinberg, supra note 138, at 364-65.

143 WTO Agreement, supra note 1, Art. IX.

144 See, e.g., BARFIELD, supra note 7, at 125-29; Hudec, Judicialization, supra note 5.

145 Negotiations on Improvements and Clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding on Improving Flexibility and Member Control in WTO Dispute Settlement, Textual Contribution by Chile and the United States, WTO Doc. TN/DS/W/52 (Mar. 14, 2003) [hereinafter U.S. Proposal].

146 In May 2003, the chairman of the DSU negotiating group offered a draft proposal, which excluded the partial adoption idea, but the Chairman’s Text was deemed problematic by representatives of the European Communities, the United States, and other members. See Proposed Amendments to the DSU, Chairman’s Text, Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, WTO Doc. JOB(03)/91/Rev.l (May 28, 2003), annex to WTO Doc. TN/DS/9, supra note 69.

147 See, e.g., Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/M/142, paras. 57, 60 (Jan. 27, 2003) (U.S. representative criticized the panel and Appellate Body decisions in U.S.—Dumping and Offset, supra note 22, as “troubling,” asserting that any finding based on importation into WTO law of a “good faith” principle from public international law would “unambiguously exceed the mandate of dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body,” and urging other members to “object to this Report”).

148 U.S.—Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 30.

149 Proposal of Africa Group, supra note 11, para. 2.

150 Interview with WTO Deputy Director-General Andrew Stoler, Monterey, Cal. (Jan. 2002).

151 Robert, Z. Lawrence, Crimes and Punishments? An Analysis of Retaliation Under the WTO 5 (2004)Google Scholar; Kelemen, supra note 130, at 624.

152 John, H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding—Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation, 91 AJIL 60, 60–64 (1997)Google Scholar.

153 Govaere, Inge, The Reception of the WTO Agreement in the European Union: The Legacy of GATT, in Regionalism and Multilateralism After the Uruguay Round 703 (Demaret, Paul, Jean-François, Bellis, & Gonzalo García, Jiménez eds., 1997)Google Scholar; Richard, H. Steinberg, Direct Application of Multilateral Trade Agreements in the United States, in id. at 715 Google Scholar.

154 Ragosta, Joneja, & Zeldovich, supra note 8.

155 Odell, John & Eichengreen, Barry, The United States, the ITO, and the WTO: Exit Options, Agent Slack, and Presidential Leadership, in The WTO as an International Organization 181 (Anne, O. Krueger ed., 1998)Google Scholar.

156 See generally Frank, H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (1921)Google Scholar; Stout, Lynn, Irrational Expectations, 3 Legal Theory 227 (1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

157 Putnam, Robert, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 Int’l Org. 427 (1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

158 See Raymond, A. Bauer, Sola Pool, Ithiel de , & Lewis Anthony, Dexter, American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade (1967)Google Scholar; Schattschneider, E. E. Politics, Pressures and the Tariff: a Study of Free Enterprise in Pressure Politics as Shown in the 1929–30 Revision of the Tariff (1935)Google Scholar; Goldstein & Martin, supra note 5.

159 Garrett, Kelemen, & Schulz argue that ECJ decisions that impose high domestic political costs on member state governments favor a defiant reaction. Garrett, Kelemen, & Schulz, supra note 130; see also Kelemen, supra note 130.

160 McRae, supra note 118, at 716; Hudec, supra note 19.

161 A similar point has been made in the EC context. Garrett, Kelemen, & Schulz, supra note 130.

162 R. Daniel Kelemen argues that the greater the number of EC member states adversely affected by an ECJ decision, the greater the likelihood of a defiant reaction. Kelemen, supra note 130.

163 See Haas, Ernst, The Uniting of Europe (1958)Google Scholar; Burley & Mattli, supra note 81.

164 Robert Lawrence has recently suggested that a WTO member should be permitted to refuse compliance with a politically unpalatable decision and instead pay compensation or suffer retaliation. LAWRENCE, supra note 151, at 46-47. Breach and compensation might be politically Pareto-improving in any single case, or in any set of cases, in which the net outcome for each member is neutral, that is, if each member were to “win some and lose some.” But the approach would not work if it needed to be employed frequently by a powerful member in response to consistent losses as both a complainant and a respondent.

165 Hudec, supra note 19, at 189-92.

166 Garrett, Kelemen, & Schulz make a similar point in the context of ECJ decisions. Garrett, Kelemen, & Schulz, supra note 130.

167 Burley & Matdi, supra note 81.

168 See generally Kenneth, J. Arrow, The Limits of Organization (1974)Google Scholar (authority decision making requires that the decision maker have information about every other party’s preferences); Caminker, Evan, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multi-member Courts, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2297 (1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (showing how appellate judges may use alternative deliberative procedures to generate information); Steinberg, supra note 138.

169 European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc. WT/ DS135/AB/R (adopted Apr. 5, 2001) [hereinafter EC—Asbestos].

170 See, e.g., Ragosta, Joneja, & Zeldovich, supra note 8; Tarullo, supra note 7.

171 See, e.g., U.S.—Lamb Meat, supra note 41; U.S.—Line Pipe, supra note 41; U.S.—Wheat Gluten, supra note 41; U.S.—Japan Hot-Rolled Steel, supra note 44.

172 Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WTO Doc. WT/DS161 /AB/R (adopted Jan. 10, 2001); EC—Beef Hormones, supra note 103.

173 Korea—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Doc. WT/DS75/AB/R (adopted Feb. 17, 1999) Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 53.

174 Canada—Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WTO Doc. WT/DS31 /AB/R (adopted July 30,1997).

175 India—Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, WTO Doc. WT/DS146/AB/R (adopted Apr. 5, 2002) [hereinafter India—Autos]; Australia—Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive Leather, WTO Doc. WT/DS126/R (adopted June 16, 1999); Indonesia—Autos, supra note 34.

176 Data through December 10, 2002, are from Report to Congress, supra note 45, at 4-5. Between then and December 31, 2003, the United States prevailed dispositively as a complainant in Japan—Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, WTO Doc. WT/DS245/AB/R (adopted Dec. 10,2003); never failed dispositively to prevail as a complainant; had at least one measure successfully and dispositively challenged in United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of2000, WTO Doc. WT/DS217/AB/R (adopted Jan. 27,2003) [hereinafter U.S.—CDSOA], and United States—Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS248/AB/R (adopted Dec. 10, 2003) [hereinafter U.S.—Steel Safeguards]; and dispositively withstood challenges in United States—Rules of Origin for Textiles and Apparel Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS243/R (adopted July 21, 2003).

177 19 U.S.C.S. §3801, §3805 (Supp. 2003).

178 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 45, pt. III(C).

179 Id., pt. rV(A) (1). For example, the United States has proposed, inter alia, suspension of proceedings by agreement of the parties to a dispute, interim review of and comment on Appellate Body draft reports, and “partial adoption” of a panel or Appellate Body report. See id.; U.S. Proposal, supra note 145; text at note 145 supra.

180 EC—Beef Hormones, supra note 103.

181 See, e.g., U.S.—Steel Safeguards, supra note 175; U.S.—CDSOA, supra note 176; U.S.—Carbon Steel from Germany, supra notel01;United States—Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, WTO Doc. WT/DS138/AB/R (adopted June 7,2000) [hereinafter U.S.—Hot-Rolled Steel from UK].

182 See, e.g., India—Autos, supra note 175; Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, WTO Doc. WT/DS142/AB/R (adopted June 19,2000) [hereinafter Canada—Autos]; Indonesia—Autos, supra note 34.

183 See, e.g., Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS114/R (adopted Apr. 7, 2000) [hereinafter Canada—Pharmaceuticals]; India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals and Agricultural Chemical Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS79/R (adopted Sept. 2, 1998) [hereinafter India—Pharmaceuticals].

184 See, e.g., Chile—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Doc. WT/DS110/AB/R (Dec. 13, 1999) [hereinafter Chile—Alcoholic Beverages]; Korea—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Doc. WT/DS75/AB/R (Jan. 1, 1999) [hereinafter Korea—Alcoholic Beverages]; Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 53.

185 The European Communities prevailed in U.S.—Steel Safeguards, supra note 176; U.S.—CDSOA, supra note 176; U.S.—Carbon Steel from Germany, supra note 101; United States—Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products from the European Communities, WTO Doc. WT/DS212/AB/R (adopted Jan. 8,2003); United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, WTO Doc. WT/DS176/AB/R (adopted Feb. 1, 2002); U.S.—Wheat Gluten, supra note 41; United States—Import Measures on Certain Products from the European Communities, WTO Doc. WT/DS165/AB/R (adopted Jan. 10,2001); India—Autos, supra note 175; Canada—Autos, supra note 182; U.S.—Hot-Rolled Steel from UK, supra note 181; United States—Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, WTO Doc. WT/DS136/AB/R (adopted Sept. 26, 2000); Argentina—Footwear, supra note 46; Chile—Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 184; United States—Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations, “WTO Doc. WT/DS108/AB/R (adopted Mar. 20, 2000) [hereinafter U.S.—Tax Treatment]; Korea—Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS98/AB/R (adopted Jan. 12, 2000); Korea—Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 184; Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 53; Argentina— Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports of Ceramic Floor Tiles from Italy, WTO Doc. WT/DS189/R (adopted Nov. 5, 2001); United States—Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, WTO Doc. WT/DS160/R (adopted July 27, 2000); Argentina—Measures on the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished Leather, WTO Doc. WT/DS155/R (adopted Feb. 16,2001); Canada—Pharmaceuticals, supra note 183; India—Pharmaceuticals, supra note 183; Indonesia—Autos, supra note 34.

The only case lost by the European Communities as a complainant during the period was United States—Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WTO Doc. WT/DS152/R (adopted Jan. 27, 2000).

186 The European Communities did not prevail in European Communities—Anti-Dumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil, WTO Doc. WT/DS219/AB/R (adopted Aug. 18,2003); European Communities- Trade Description of Sardines, WTO Doc. WT/DS231/AB/R (adopted Oct. 23, 2002); European Communities—Anti- Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linens from India, WTO Doc. WT/DS141/AB/R (adopted Mar. 12,2001); EC—Poultry, supra note 123; EC—Beef Hormones, supra note 103; EC—Bananas, supra note 32.

The European Communities dispositively withstood challenges in EC—Asbestos, supra note 169, and EC—Computer Equipment, supra note 40.

187 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/RW (adopted Nov. 21, 2001, with AB report).

188 EC—Beef Hormones, supra note 103.

189 Id. at 41-42.

190 U.S.—Tax Treatment, supra note 185; United States—Tax Treatment of Foreign Sales Corporations, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities, WTO Doc. WT/DS108/AB/RW (adopted Jan. 29,2002).

191 U.S.—Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 30.

192 See, e.g., EC—Poultry, supra note 123, para. 135; United States—Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Shirts and Blouses from India, WTO Doc. WT/DS33/AB/R, pt. VI (adopted May 23, 1997).

193 James, McCall Smith, WTO Dispute Settlement: The Politics of Procedure in Appellate Body Rulings, 2 World Trade Rev. 55 (2003)Google Scholar.

194 EC—Bananas, supra note 32, para. 135.

195 Working Procedures, supra note 55, rules 24, 27.

196 U.S.—Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 30.

197 EC—Bananas, supra note 32, paras. 8-12.

198 Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WTO Doc. WT/DS70/AB/R, pt. VII (adopted Aug. 20, 1999).

199 Interview with Andrew Staler, former deputy director-general of the WTO, Geneva (July 5, 2002). Mr. Staler did not personally endorse these positions.

200 Lauterpacht, Hersch, The Development of International Law by the International Court 155(1982)Google Scholar.

201 Croley & Jackson, supra note 92; Tarullo, supra note 7.

202 BARFIELD, supra note 7, at 125-29 (suggesting one third); Hudec, Judicialization, supra note 5 (suggesting a majority).

203 According to Barfield, both Robert Keohane and Thomas Cottier have suggested this possibility. BARFIELD, supra note 7, at 223 n.15.

204 Steinberg, supra note 138, at 364.

205 This analysis of proposals for fundamental constitutional change may not bear on more subtle and moderate proposals for fine-tuning DSU rules.

206 Richard, H. Steinberg, The Prospects for Partnership: Overcoming Obstacles to Transatlantic Trade Policy Cooperation in Asia, in Partners or Competitors? The Prospects for U.S.-European Cooperation on Asian Trade 213 (Richard, H. Steinberg & Bruce, Stokes eds., 1999)Google Scholar.

207 Throughout the last decade, the EC and U.S. markets have continuously accounted for about 65% of WTO gross domestic product Central Intelligence Agency, supra note 139; World Trade Organization, supra note 139