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Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency

An Analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 April 2017

Ernestine Fitz-Maurice
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Extract

The Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency, which was signed at Geneva on April 20, 1929, was the natural outgrowth of a conviction, held by the majority of states, that the counterfeiting of currency was an international crime, and moreover, that it was one of a decidedly virulent and insidious character. Had this belief not been widely prevalent, the proposal of the French Government that the League of Nations should undertake the drafting of a convention for the suppression of this crime would have fallen on barren ground. As it was, the existence of the conviction that the whole community of states had an interest in the repression of this form of criminality was what made the agreement at all possible. Repeatedly, especially during the years immediately preceding the drafting of this convention, the states had had occasion to observe that purely national action against counterfeiters was often insufficient, and that international action was in many cases extremely difficult, if not, impossible. Thus, in the face of this common menace, with which separately the states were unable to cope, they came in time to realize that international cooperation was necessary, and what is more, that it was imperative, if they were to make any headway in the prevention and punishment of such crime.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 26 , Issue 3 , July 1932 , pp. 533 - 551
Copyright
Copyright © by the American Society of International Law 1932

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References

1 The following states sent delegates: Albania, Germany, United States of America, Austria, Belgium, United States of Brazil, Great Britain and Northern Ireland, China, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Free City of Danzig, Spain, Ecuador, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Monaco, Nicaragua, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Boumania, Kingdom of The Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Latvia. A delegation of the International Criminal Police Commission was present in an advisory capacity.

2 C.328.M.114.1929.11. p. 48.

3 Ibid., Annex I, p. 219: Letter of M. Briand to the Secretary-General, June 5, 1926.

4 The Times, London, May 22, 1926, 13a.

5 C.328.M.114.1929.II.Annex III. pp. 228–244.

6 Ibid., pp. 9–42.

7 C.328.M.114.1929. Annex V. pp. 251, 252 and 274.

8 Ibid., p. 274.

9 Pella, V.V., La Coöperation des États dans la Lutte contre le Faux Monnayage, Paris, 1927, p. 21.

10 Article 3 reads as follows:

“The following should be punishable as ordinary crimes:

(1) Any fraudulent making or altering of currency, whatever means are employed;

(2) The fraudulent uttering of counterfeit currency;

(3) The introduction into a country of or the receiving or obtaining counterfeit currency with a view to uttering the same and with knowledge that it is counterfeit;

(4) Attempts to commit, and any intentional participation in, the foregoing acts;

(5) The fraudulent making, receiving, or obtaining of instruments or other articles peculiarly adapted for the counterfeiting or altering of currency.”

11 Art. 4 reads as follows: “Each of the acts mentioned in Article 3, if they are committed in different countries, should be considered as a distinct offence.”

12 Pella, V. V., pp. 79 and 80.

13 Pella, V. V., pp. 31–36.

14 Art. 5 : “No distinction should be made in the scale of punishments for offences referred to in Article 3 between acts relating to domestic currency on the one hand and to foreign currency on the other; this provision may not be made subject to any condition of reciprocal treatment by law or by treaty.”

15 “Before the French Revolution, counterfeiting currency was considered by royal ordinances as a crime of lèse-majesté of the second degree.” Pella, V. V., p. 31.

16 Recommendation VI. C.328.M.114.1929.II. p. 244, Annex III.

17 In this connection, it is understood that the judges of each country would only be called upon to take into account the international repetition of the offence if the foreign judgment could certify it according to the internal legislation of the country.

18 Art. 6: “In countries where the principle of the international recognition of previous convictions is recognized, foreign convictions for the offences referred to in Article 3 should, within the conditions prescribed by domestic law, be recognized for the purpose of establishing habitual criminality.”

19 Art. 8: “In countries where the principle of the extradition of nationals is not recognized, nationals who have returned to the territory of their own country after the commission abroad of an offence referred to in Article 3 should be punishable in the same manner as if the offence had been committed in their own territory, even in a case where the offender has acquired his nationality after the commission of the offence. This provision does not apply if, in a similar case, the extradition of a foreigner could not be granted.”

20 Art. 9 : “Foreigners who have committed abroad any offence referred to in Article 3, and who are in the territory of a country whose internal legislation recognizes as a general rule the principle of the prosecution of offences committed abroad, should be punishable in the same way as if the offence had been committed in the territory of that country. The obligation to take proceedings is subject to the condition that extradition has been requested and that the country to which application is made cannot hand over the person accused for some reason which has no connection with the offence.”

21 Pella, V. V., pp. 86 and 87: The principle of universal competence is, for example, admitted in the Draft Penal Code of Poland of 1922, Art. 7; in the Chinese Draft Penal Code of 1920, Art. 5. To a lesser extent, this same principle is admitted in the Hungarian Penal Code, Art. 9; Austrian Penal Code, pars. 38, 39 and 40; German Penal Code, par. 4, etc.

22 C.328.M.114.1929.11. Annex. V, pp. 269, 270.

23 The conference did, however, recommend for some future time “that the rules for the extradition of accused or convicted persons should be unified on an international basis…” Recommendation XII.

24 C.51.M.28.1926.V : Report on Extradition adopted by the Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law at its Second Session, January, 1926. Reprinted in Special Supplement to this Journal, Vol. 20 (1926), p. 242.

25 C.P.D.I.25: Report of Subcommittee, Mr. Brierly and Mr. De Visscher. Reprinted in Special Supplement to this Journal, ibid., p. 243.

26 C.P.D.I.25: “A further difficulty under this heading [Extradition crimes] arises out of the practice, all but universal in modern extradition treaties, of excluding from extradition ‘political crimes.’ We think it certain that this exclusion would have to be made in any general convention, but we feel grave doubts as to whether it would be possible to secure any agreed definition of ‘political’ in this connection.” Mr. Brierly, Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law. (Spi. Supp., this Journal, Vol. 20 (1926), p. 245.)

27 Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. I, 4th ed., p. 577.

28 See footnote 2, p. 534.

29 Art. 10: “The offences referred to in Article 3 shall be deemed to be included as extradition crimes in any extradition treaty which has been or may hereafter be concluded between any of the high contracting parties. The high contracting parties who do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty or reciprocity, henceforward recognize the offences referred to in Article 3 as cases of extradition as between themselves….”

30 The Optional Protocol reads in part as follows: “Recognizing the important progress regarding the suppression of counterfeiting currency which has been realised by the Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency bearing this day’s date, the high contracting parties signatory to this protocol, subject to ratification, undertake, in their mutual relations, to consider, as regards extradition, the acts referred to in Article 3 of the said convention as ordinary offences….”

31 Garner,, J. W., “International Convention for the Repression of Counterfeiting,” this Journal, January, 1930 (Vol. 24), pp. 135–139.Google Scholar

32 At its Warsaw meeting in 1928, the International Law Association included counterfeiting among the list of extraditable crimes in the final text of the Draft Extradition Convention which it drew up. International Law Association Reports, Warsaw Conference, 1928.

33 C.328.M.114.1929.11: Report to the Council by the Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law on Recommendations VII and VIII adopted by the Mixed Committee, pp. 246–7, Annex IV.

34 Art. 12: “In every country, within the framework of its domestic law, investigations on the subject of counterfeiting should be organized by a central office. This central office should be in close contact:

“(a) With the institutions issuing currency;

“(b) With the police authorities within the country;

“(c) With the central offices of other countries….”

35 See also Recommendation VI, wherein it is provided that “central offices should be created… in colonies and other territories which are under the authority of the mother-country….”

36 S.d.N. 1926.II.59.Annex IV. p. 3.

37 Articles 13, 14 and 15.

38 Recommendations IV, V, VI, VII and VIII, X and XI.

39 See footnote 3, p. 534.

40 Recommendation IX.

41 See p. 537.

42 Recommendation XIV: “That the despatch and the execution of letters of request should be regulated by an international convention so as to produce a uniform system of rules.”

43 A.15.1925.V.

44 Article 16 in part:

The transmission of letters of request relating to offences referred to in Article 3 should be effected:

(a) Preferably by direct communication between the judicial authorities, through the central offices where possible;

(b) By direct correspondence between the Ministers of Justice of the two countries, or by direct communication from the authority of the country making the request to the Minister of Justice of the country to which the request is made;

(c) Through the diplomatic or consular representative of the country making the request in the country to which the request is made…

Nothing in the present article shall be construed as an undertaking on the part of the high contracting parties to adopt in criminal matters any form or methods of proof contrary to their laws.

45 April 20, 1929.

46 On the above date, the following states signed the convention : Albania, Germany, United States of America, Austria, Belgium, Great Britain and Northern Ireland, India, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Free City of Danzig, Spain, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Monaco, Norway, Panama, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Switzerland, and Czechoslovakia.

To the Optional Protocol, the signatures were as follows : Austria, Colombia, Cuba, Greece, Portugal, Roumania, Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Czechoslovakia, Panama, Bulgaria, Spain, and Poland.

Up to June 1, 1931, the ratifications were as follows:

To the Convention: Spain, April 28, 1930.

Bulgaria, May 22, 1930.

Estonia, August, 1930.

Portugal, September 18, 1930.

Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, November 24, 1930.

Denmark, February 19, 1931.

Greece, May 19, 1931.

Norway, March 16, 1931.

To the Optional Protocol: Spain, April 28, 1930.

Bulgaria, May 22, 1930.

Estonia, August 30, 1930.

Roumania, November 10, 1930.

Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, November 24, 1930.

Denmark, February 19, 1931.

Greece, May 19, 1931.

Norway, March 16, 1931.

47 Art. 25 provides that the date when the convention shall come into force “shall be the ninetieth day after the receipt by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations of the fifth ratification or accession.”