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Citizen Access to Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a Transnational and Federal Context

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 February 2017

Eric Stein  and
G. Joseph Vining
Eric Stein
Affiliation:
University of Michigan Law School
G. Joseph Vining
Affiliation:
University of Michigan Law School
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Extract

In an international legal order dominated by states, the individual citizen is generally viewed as lacking international legal personality. It is true with little exception that an individual cannot appear in an international forum, political or judicial, to press his rights. Despite the dramatically increased emphasis upon international protection of basic human rights, individuals have been given access to international dispute-settlement machinery in only a few isolated instances within the United Nations system, and on a regional level pursuant to the European Convention on Human Rights.1

Type
Research Article
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 70 , Issue 2 , April 1976 , pp. 219 - 241
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1976

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References

1 International civil servants may press their service-connected grievances before ad- Ministrative tribunals established by the United Nations and the specialized agencies. M. B. Akehurst, The Law Governing Employment in International Organizations (1967); Byung Chul Koh, The United Nations Administrative Tribunal (1966). If the state concerned consents, an individual may complain against it to a committee of experts under the UN sponsored Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Schwelb, , The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 15 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 996 (1966)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Pursuant to procedures evolved in UN General Assembly Committees and in certain other UN bodies, individuals may file petitions and even may be heard in person. Individuals may complain directly to the European Commission of Human Rights if the state against which the complaint was lodged recognizes such jurisdiction, but only the states contracting parties and the Commission have access to the European Court of Human Rights. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Arts. 25 and 48, 213 UNTS 221 (1955). 219

2 Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).

3 Judgment of Aug. 30,1968, 30 BVerwGE 191.

4 Cases 10 and 18/68,,Società “Eridania” Zuccherifici Nazionali et at. v. Commission of the European Communities, 15 Recueil De La Jurisprudence De La Cour De Justice Des Communautés Européennes(REC.) 459 ( 1969 ) .

5 The Court of Justice of the Communities in Case 26/62, N.V. AlgemeneTransport en ExpeditieAndernemung van Gend en Loos v. NederlandseTariefcommissie, 9 REC. 1 (1963); [1963] EUROPEAN COURT REPORTS (ECR) 1 at 12; [1963] Common Market Law Reports (C.M.L.R.) 105; Commerce Clearing House, Chicago, Common Market Reporter (CCH COMM. MKT. REP.) ¶8008.

6 Art.177 of the EEC Treaty.

7 The corresponding articles in the other Community treaties are Article 33 of the ECSC Treaty and Article 146 of the Euratom Treaty.

8 5 U.S.C. §702 (Supp. V, 1965-1969). This discussion is limited to judicial re- View of acts of federal administrative agencies which have both rulemaking and de- Cisionmaking authority. We do not address the special problem of judicial review of congressional acts for constitutionality.

9 Daig in H. Von Deh Groeben, H. Von Boeckh, J. Thiesing, 2 Kommentah Zum Ewg-Vehthag 209 at 234 (2nd ed. 1974); Peters in 3 C.M.L. REV. 233 at 241 (1965).

10 Cases 16/62 and 17/62, Confédération Nationale des Producteurs de Fruits et Légumes et al. v. Council, 8 REC. 901 (1962); [1962] ECR 471; [1963] C.M.L.R. 160; CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ¶8005 at 7186. Cases 19/62-22/62, Fédération Na- tionale de la Boucherie en Gros, etc. v. Council, 8 REC. 943 (1962); [1962] ECR 491; [1963] C.M.L.R. 160; CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ¶8006.

11 Case 25/62, Plaumann & Co. v. Commission, 9 REC. 197 (1963); [1963] ECR 95; [1964] C.M.L.R. 29; CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ¶8013 at 7274.

12 In the above cases the attorneys for the defendant Council and Commission urged an even more restrictive interpretation that would have denied any association capac- ity to sue as such under any circumstances despite the specific Treaty language to the contrary (“any … legal person“) and that would not recognize a government as a “person” within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 173. The Court rejected these assertions and on this issue followed the conclusions of its Advocates General.

13 Article 33 of the ECSC Treaty reads: ”… Undertakings or the associations referred to in Article 48 may, under the same conditions, institute proceedings against decisions or recommendations concerning them which are individual in character or against general decisions or recommendations which they consider to involve a misuse of powers (détoumement de pouvoir) affecting them (à lew égard—ihnen gegenüber).” Compare the above language “decisions … concerning them” with the requirement of “direct and individual concern” in the corresponding EEC Art. 173(2) supra. There is considerable literature comparing the ECSC and the EEC Treaties on this issue and commenting on the case law. See e.g. G. Bebr, Judicial Control of the Eubopean Communities 68-77 (1962); A. Tizzano, La Cobte Di Giustizia Delle Communità Euhopee 396-415 (1967) and also in R. Quadm, R. Monaco, A. Tba-Bucchi, 3 Trattato Istitutrvo Della Communità Economica Europea, Commen-Tario 1277-85 (1965); Daig in Kommentah supra note 9, at 222-36; C. H. Ule, Empfiehlt Es Sich, Die Besttmmungen Des Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrechts Über Den Rechtsschutz Zu Ändern Und Zu Erganzen?, Gutachten Für den 46. Deutschen Juristentag 13-32 (1966); Bebr, Recours en annulation et en carrencein W. J. Ganshof Van Der Meersch (ed.), Les Novelles, Droit Des Communautés Euhopéennes 309-19 (1969) with bibliography at 309; RasquinetChevallier, L'article 173, alinéa 2 du Traité C.E.E., 2 REV. TRIM. DR. EUR. 31 (1966); Barav, Direct and Individual Concern: An Almost Insurmountable Barrier to the Admissibility of Individual Appeal to the EEC Court, 11 C.M.L. REV. 191 (1974).

14 According to Article 189, a “regulation” is “directly applicable” by national courts and other authorities throughout the Community territory.

15 Cases 16/62 and 17/62, Confédération Nátionale, supra note 10. The Court added in Confédération Nationale that it would look beyond the official designation of the act as a “regulation“: Consequently, in order to determine in doubtful cases whether one is concerned with a decision or a regulation, it is necessary to ascertain whether the measure in question is of individual concern to specific individuals. In these circumstances, if a measure entitled by its author a regulation contains provisions which are capable of being not only of direct but also of individual concern to certain natural or legal persons, it must be admitted, without prejudice to the question whether that measure considered in its entirety can be correctly called a regulation, that in any case those provisions do not have the character of a regulation and may therefore be impugned by those persons under the terms of the second paragraph of Article 173. [1962] ECR at 478-79. In support of a more liberal interpretation, see A. Tizzano, Supra note 13, at 404-11. But see Bebr, Recours en annulation et en carrence, supra note 13, at 318. On the above cases, see note by Cartou in [1962] Sirey Jurisprudence 126.

16 Case 25/62, Plaumann, supra note 11, [1963] ECR at 107. Since the plaintiff in this case was not concerned “individually,” the Court found it unnecessary to deal with the question of “direct” concern.

17 Waelbroeck, Les compétences de la Cow de Justice (II), [1971] Rev. Critique De Jurisprudence Belge 513 at 530.

18 The cases in which this paragraph was applied or discussed are: Cases 16 & 17/62, Confédération Nationale des Producteurs de Fruits et Légumes et al. v. Council, 8 REC. 901 (1962); [1962] ECR 471; [1963] C.M.L.R. 160; CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ¶8005. Cases 19-22/62, Fédération Nationale de la Boucherie en Gros et du Commerce en Gros des Viandes et al. v. Council, 8 REC. 943 (1962); [1962] ECR 491; [1963] C.M.L.R. 160; CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ¶8006. Cases 31 & 33/62, Milchwerke Heinz Wöhrmann & Sohn KG et Alfons Lütticke GmbH v. Commission, 8 REC. 965 (1962); [1962] ECR 501; [1963] C.M.L.R. 152; CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ¶8007. Case 25/62, Plaumann & Co. v. Commission, 9 REC. 197 (1963); [1963] ECR 95; [1964] C.M.L.R. 29; CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 18013. Case 1/64, Glucoseries Réinies v. Commission, 10 REC. 811 (1964); [1964] ECR 413; [1964] C.M.L.R. 596; CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ¶8024. Case 38/64, Getreide-Import Gesellschaft v. Commission, 11 REC. 263 (1965); [1965] ECR 204; [1965] C.M.L.R. 276; CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ¶8033. Case 40/64, Marcello Sgarlata et al. v. Commission, 11 REC 279; (1965); [1965] ECR 215; [1966] C.M.L.R. 314; CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ¶8034. Cases 106 & 107/63, Alfred Toepfer et Getreide-Import Gesellschaft v. Commission, 11 REC. 525 (1965); [1965] ECR 405; [1966] C.M.L.R. I I I; CCH COMM. MKT. REP. U8031. Case 30/67, Industria Molitoria Imolese et al. v. Council, 14 REC. 171 (1968); [1968] ECR 115; CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ¶8060. Case 6/68, ZuckerfabrikWatenstedt GmbH v. Council, 14 REC. 595 (1968); [1968] ECR 409; [1969] C.M.L.R. 26; CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 18063. Cases 10 & 18/68, Società “Eridania” Zuccherifici Nazionali et al. v. Commission, 15 REC. 459 (1969); CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 18099. Cases 63 & 64/69, La Compagnie francaise commerciale et financiére, SA v. Commission, 16 REC 205 (1970); [1970] C.M.L.R. 369; CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ¶8090, 18091. Case 65/69, La Compagnie d'approvisionnement, de transport et de credit, SA v. Commission, 16 REC 229 (1970); [1970] C.M.L.R. 369; CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ¶8092.Case 69/69, SA Alcan Aluminium Raeren et al. v. Commission, 16 REC. 385 (1970); [1970] C.M.L.R. 337; CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ¶8110. Case 15/70, Amedeo Chevalley v. Commission, 16 REC 975 (1970); CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ¶8115. Cases 41-44/70, NV International Fruit Co. et al. v. Commission, 17 REC 411 (1971); CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1[8142.Case 15/71, Firma C. Mackprang, Jr. v. Commission, 17 REC 797 (1971); [1972] C.M.L.R. 52; CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ¶8155. Case 62/70, Werner A. Bock v Commission, 17 REC 897 (1972); [1972] C.M.L.R. 160; CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 18150. Case 42/71, Nordgetreide GmbH & Co. KG v. Commission, 18 REC 105 (1972); [1973] C.M.L.R. 368; CCH COMM. MKT. REP. |8174. Cases 9 & 11/71, Compagnie d'approvisionnement, de transport et de credit SA et GrandsMoulins de Paris SA v. Commission, 18 REC 391 (1972); [1973] C.M.L.R. 529; CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 18177.Case 96/71, R. & V. Haegeman v. Commission, 18 REC 1005 (1972); [1973] C.M.L.R. 365; CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ¶8181. Case 134/73, Holtz & Willemsen GmbH v. Council, [1974] ECR 1; [1975] C.M.L.R. 91; CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 18255.Case 175/73, Union Syndicate et al. v. Council, [1974] ECR 917; [1975] C.M.L.R. 131. Case 18/74, Syndicat Général du Personnel des OrganismesEuropéens v. Commission, [1974] ECR 933; [1975] C.M.L.R. 144. Cases 44, 46 & 49/74, Marie-Louise Acton et al. v. Commission, [1975] ECR 383.Case 72/74, Union Syndicate et al. v. Council, [1975] ECR 401.

19 Cases 106/63 and 107/63, Alfred Toepfer v. Commission, supra note 18.

20 The Court equated “direct concern” with the important Community concept of “direct applicability” and this raises some interesting problems which are beyond the scope of this article. The former is a procedural prerequisite for action before the Community Court; the latter goes to the merit of an individual's claim against a member state enforceable in a national court. For comments see Fromont in [1966] REC. DALLOZ-SIREY, JURISPRUDENCE 58; Peters in 3 C.M.L. REV. 233 (1965).

21 Case 62/70, Werner A. Bock v. Commission, supra note 18. For a comment, See Verougstraete, 8 Cahter De Droit Eur. 666 (1972).

22 The Commission “was in a position to know that the decisions would affect only the interests and legal status of these importers. Under these circumstances the importers are set apart from all other persons in a manner similar to the addressee” (CCH COMM. MKT. REP. at 7720).

23 Cases 41/70-44/70, N.V. International Fruit Company et al. v. Commission, Supra note 18. For a comment, see V.C. in 99 Journal De Droit International 687, 693 (1972).

24 Subsequently, the Court dismissed the case on the merits.

25 The Court said that the Commission decisions modifying or abolishing safeguard measures are “directly applicable” because Article 22 of the regulation under which the Commission acted provided that the Commission's decision shall take effect immediately and therefore “[i]t would be illogical to say that a decision to retain protective measures had a different effect….” Alfred Toepfer v. Commission, supra note 18, [1965] ECR at 411.

26 Cases 10 and 18/68, Eridania, supra note 18. See also Adv. Gen. Roemer in Case 1/64, GlucoseriesRéunies v. Commission, and in Case 26/62, Plaumann & Co. v. Commission, and also in Cases 106/63 and 107/63, Alfred Toepfer v. Commission, supra note 18.

27 Case 69/69, SA Alcan Aluminium Rearen et al. v. Commission, supra note 18. See also Case 25/62, Plaumann & Co. v. Commission, supra note 18; cf. Adv. Gen. Gand in Case 38/64, Getreide Import v. Commission, supra note 18.

28 Advocate General Gand relied here on the views of his colleague Roemer in Plaumann.In the Alcan case Advocate General Gand pressed the argument that if the Commission's decision had granted the requested authorization to the government the decision would not have direct effect on the plaintiff; consequently, the actual decision in this case refusing the authorization must be equally without direct effect on him, apparently in the interest of symmetry. Case 69/69, Alcan, supra note 18, CCH COMM. MKT. REP. at 7256.Daig distinguishes the decisions in which the Commission addresses an order, prohibition, or authorization to a member state. Daig in Kommentar, supra note 9, at 232-33.

29 Case 6/68, Zuckerfabrik Watenstedt v. Council, supra note 18. See also Case 1/64, GlucoseriesRéunies v. Commission, supra note 18, where both the Advocate General and the Court found no individual effect.

30 Case 38/64, Getreide-Import Gesellschaft v. Commission, supra note 18. For comments on this case, see Mailänder, Privater Rechtsschutz im Recht der Europdischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, [1965] Betrieb 1312; ULE, supra note 13 at 17-19. The Court attempted to distinguish the case from Toepfer on the ground that, unlike The Toepfer situation, the Commission did not know of the plaintiff's application at the time of its decision. Bebr feels this factual difference might explain the two different holdings “at least partially.” Bebr, Recours en annulation et en carrence, supra note 13, at 315. See oho Case 30/67, Industria Molitoria Imolése v. Council, supra note 18.

31 In Case 69/69, Alcan v. Commission, supra note 18, the Court found no direct concern and remained silent on the issue of individual concern although Advocate Gen eral Gand held individual concern to be present. In Case 64/69, La Compagnie française v. Commission, supra note 18, the Court found no individual concern even though, according to the plaintiff, the contested provision of the Commission regulation applied to a group of specified enterprises (including the plaintiff) since these enterprises were positively known and identifiable even before the contested provision was issued. The Court stated: “The fact that a transitional rule concerns only certain situations created prior to a date which it sets and which are therefore often determined even before the rule goes into effect does not prevent such a rule from being an integral part” of and sharing the general character of a regulation. Thus retroactivity alone is not enough “unless there is a misuse of discretionary power.” CCH COMM. MKT. REP. at 8323.

32 Case 1/64, Glucoseries Régimes v. Commission, supra note 18.

33 Kovar in 93 Journal De Droit International 707, at 711-12 (1966).

34 In his opinions in the International Fruit case, Advocate General Roemer stated: “[I]t is extremely doubtful that we are actually dealing with a regulation in the sense of the definitions that were so often given in previous decisions of the Court” (CCH COMM. MKT. REP. at 7635). But see Case 64/69 La Compagnie francaise, supra note 18. In that case, denying that a provision in a regulation was of individual concern to the plaintiff, the Court said: “Unless there is a misuse of discretionary power, such a provision shares in the general legal nature” of the regulation (CCH COMM. MKT. REP. at 8323).

35 E.g. Advocate General Roemer in Case 6/68, Zuckerfabrik Watenstedt v. Commission, Supra note 18. It is, however, difficult to reconcile Mr. Roemer's own position in this and in the Glucoseries case 1/64, supra note 18, unless one concludes that the lapse of four years and the intervening experience with the system led him to change his mind.

36 See Stein, Review of Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht by Hans Peter Ipsen in 22 AM. J. COMP. L. 156 (1974).

37 Case 69/69, Alcan, supra note 18, CCH COMM. MKT. REP. at 7256.

38 M. Lagrange very likely had in mind the type of Council regulation comparable in substance if not in form to an act of Parliament which, according to the French conception of separation of powers, could not be made subject to judicial review. 1976]

39 In that case, the Court could also consider the legality of the Council regulation; if it found that the regulation infringed the Treaty, it would annul the decision, holding the underlying regulation inapplicable pursuant to Article 184.

40 It is, in any case, doubtful that the Court would want to adhere to its present narrow interpretation of “individual concern” should a private party contest a decision addressed not to a member state but to another private party, as is likely to occur particularly in the field of competition. E.g., a Commission decision addressed to parties to a restrictive agreement which exempts the agreement from the Treaty prohibition and third parties (competitors) feel aggrieved by the decision. P. J. G. Kapteyn and P. Verloren Van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European Communities After the Accession of New Member States at 169 (1973).

41 A. W. Green, Political Integration by Jurisprudence—The Work of the Court of Justice of the European Communities in European Political Integration 111 (1969).

42 Some of the Commission's extreme positions were criticized by the Advocates General. We were able to find only one case in which the Commission's counsel, having first taken a rather untenable position against standing on one of the two requirements, reversed himself in the course of the proceeding. Case 38/64, Getreide Import Ges.v. Commission, supra note 18, Opinion, [1965] ECR at 211.

43 Kovar criticizes such potential “denial of justice,” supra note 33, at 710.

44 The Advocate General buttressed this view by adding that: [t]his argument can only avail if the applicants first prove that the Treaty gives private individuals concerned a guarantee of direct and complete legal protection, for it clearly cannot fall within the powers of the Court of Justice to amend the Treaty on this point. Case 40/64, Sgarlataet al. v. Commission, supra note 18, Opinion, [1965] ECR at 235.

45 In defining the reach of Article 173(2) the Court must have had in mind the long-range consequences in national legal systems if it ignored the principle underlying national constitutions that, in a system of power relationships based on law, an affected citizen must presumptively have some remedy against illegal official action. The German Federal Constitutional Court has ruled that at this stage of integration it retains power to review a Community act for compatibility with the Federal Constitution if it is claimed that the act violates a basic right protected by the Constitution. Decision of May 29, 1974, 37 BVerfGE 271 (1974).

46 Since, according to Article 177, only the court of last instance is required to refer the Community law questions to the Court of Justice, it may take years before the case reaches, the highest national court. ULE (supra note 13, at 19-20, 22) considers this route “a difficult and prolonged detour.” He suggests (de lege ferenda) a modification of Article 173(2) that would omit the requirement of direct and individual concern and allow standing to contest a decision addressed to another if the plaintiff's “legally protected interests” are affected. Thus the Treaty would conform to German administrative law which allows standing in case of impairment of a right as well as a legally protected interest. Ule cites J. H. Kaiser, Mailänder, and possibly Badura as supporting this suggestion. He cites Zweigert, Lagrange, Mathijsen, Catalano, and Ehle as urging replacement of the requirement of “direct and individual” or (Daig) of “individual” so as to broaden access to the Court. Zweigert, Empfiehlt essich, Bestimmungen über den Rechtsschutz zu ändem? Haupthefebat, Zehn Jahre Rechtssprechung Des Gerichtshofs Deh Europäischen Gemeinschaften 580-97 (1965).Rapport fait au nom de la Commission juridiquesur la protection juridique des personnes privéets dans les Communautés europeennes, Rap. M. A. Deringer, PARL. EUR. Doc. 39, 3 May 1967.

47 Cf. Case 25/62, Plaumann & Co. v. Commission, supra note 18, with Case 4/69, Alfons Lütticke GmbH v. Commission, 17 REC. 325 (1971), CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 18136. See also Case 5/71, Aktien-Zuckerfabrik Schöppenstedt v. Council, 17 REC. 975 (1971), CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ¶8153; Gilsdorf, Die Haftung der Gemeinschaft aus normative Handeln auf dem Hintergrund der Rechtssprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs, 10 EUROPARECHT 73 (1975).

48 Cases 19/62-22/62, Fédération Nationale v. Council, supra note 18, [1962] ECR at 486.

49 Case 6/68, Zuckerfabrik Watenstedt v. Council, supra note 18, [1968] ECR at 418; Cases 10 & 18/68, Società “Eridania” v. Commission, supra note 18, CCH COMM. MKT. REP. at 8431-34.

50 Case 175/73, Union Syndicaleet al. v. Council, supra note 18, [1974] ECR at 930 (Opinion by Mr. Reischl); Case 18/74, Syndicat Général du Personnel des Organismes Européens v. Commission, supra note 18, [1974] ECR at 948 (Opinion by Mr. Trabucchi).

51 The German courts and the doctrine have mitigated the rigor of the language of the statute requiring that plaintiff be injured “in his rights.” §42(2) Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung of Jan. 21, 1960. See also infra, text at note 60.

52 See, e.g., CBS v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942); Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §551(13), 7 U.S.C. §§702, 704, 706 (Supp. V, 1965-1969).

53 Supra text at note 24.

54 Marine Terminal v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970); seeVining, Direct Judicial Review and the Doctrine of Ripeness in Administrative Law, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1443 (1971).

55 Supra note 8.

56 Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479 (1938).

57 Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939).

58 See, e.g., Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).

59 See, e.g., Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities, 390 U.S. 1 (1968).

60 See supra text at note 51. See also ULE supra note 13, at 21-22. Fromont believes, referring to the Toepfercase, that the Court of Justice in fact adopted the “subjective public right” test without saying so in so many words. Fromont, , L'influence dudroitfrangais et du droitallemandsur les conditions de recevabilité du recours en annulation devant la Cour de Justice des Communautés européennes, 2 Rev. Trim. Dr. Eur. 47, at 63 (1966)Google Scholar. See also Fromont, , Der Rechtsschutzgegen Massnahmen der Verwaltungim Europa der Sechs, 4 Europarecht 202 (1969)Google Scholar.

61 Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).

82 Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1953).

63 Commissaire du gouvernement Mosset stated in his well-known conclusions that standing to institute judicial review of administrative action will be given if the contested decision “injures the plaintiff materially or morally” and if the consequences of the decision affect plaintiff in his capacity as a member of a “defined or limited category.” C.E. 26 Oct. 1956, Association Générate des administrateurscivils, R.D.P., 1956, 1309, cited in Fromont, L'influence du droit… , supra note 60, at 56.

64 The principal case was Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), described supra at note 2. See oho Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 408 F.2d 1147, 1151 (1st Cir. 1969), vacated 397 U.S. 315 (1970), reaffirmed 428 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1970), reversed 400 U.S. 45 (1970).

65 Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, supra note 64.

66 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).

67 United States v. S.C.R.A.P., 412 U.S. 669 (1973).

68 The Court commented at the time and has emphasized since that rules of standing are developed by the Court “for its own governance.” Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, supra note 2, 397 U.S. at 154; Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2205, 2215 (1975). The Court had never required a statutory basis for its legal right test. In essence the Court shifted the judicial presumptions within which legislatures must work. Legislative materials are now searched for a specific intent to deny standing rather than a specific intent to grant it.

69 See, e.g., Coalition for the Environment v. Volpe, 504 F.2d 156 (8th Cir. 1974); Diggs v. Schultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. den.411 U.S. 931 (1973); Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 433 F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

70 See, e.g., Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1968); SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT (1970).

71 See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, supra note 68; United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).

72 In addition, in one case following the announcement of the new formula three members of the Court turned again to a special standing statute using the term “aggrieved” to justify hearing the challenge of a white resident of a housing project to the legality of the housing agency's alleged exclusion of black applicants. The Justices did, however, concur in the majority decision to grant standing, which was based on general principles rather than any specific permission by the legislature. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).

73 See, e.g., Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, supranote 66.

74 Associated Industries v. Ickes, supra note 58. See also F.C.C. v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, supra note 2.

75 Sax and Dimento, Environmental Citizen Suits: Three Years’ Experience Under the Michigan Environmental Protection Act, 4 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1 (1974).

76 See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 155 (1967). Although the Court of Justice has made full use of the consolidation procedures, most recently it has defined the standing to sue of associations so as to cause numerous separate actions to be filed by individual association members instead of a single action by the association itself. Case 18/74, SyndicatGénéral du Personnel des Organismes Européennes v. Commission, supra note 18. See Cases 44, 46 & 49/74, Marie-Louise Acton et al. v. Commission, and Case 72/74, Union Syndicaleet al. v. Council, supra note 18. The Court held, with the support of the Advocate General, that although an association has a general capacity to appear in court as a “legal person,” and may also participate as an intervenor, it cannot sue for annulment in its own name unless it can show that it was aggrieved in its own functional rights (e.g., violation of its contract with the public agency) or upon an express “mandate” from the aggrieved members.