This article is concerned with the accountability of the civil advocate for results obtained for a client. It distinguishes the criminal trial by arguing that for effective implementation the adversary system, as it is commonly understood, requires that the professional advocates be equally competent and equally adversary and that because it does not meet these criteria, the criminal trial cannot be looked to as a model either of the adversary system or of the behavior of advocates in the civil trial. Rules of behavior for the civil litigator should be drawn with the primary objective of ascertaining truth. Moreover, the civil litigator cannot claim immunity from moral accountability by reference to the lawyer's role; he or she is personally accountable for an immoral result obtained for a client. Seeking to avoid this accountability all lawyers might reject an immoral but lawful cause, so that persons with such causes would be deprived of professional representation. The conflict between the lawyer's personal morality and the social value of professional assistance is resolved by reference to a formula for assigning counsel similar to those in Mathews v. Eldridge and Lassiter v. Department of Social Services. The author analyzes the moral dilemma of a lawyer who is so assigned and proposes a solution.

A key criticism that has emerged in the debate over the search and seizure exclusionary rule is that it exacts heavy societal costs in the form of lost prosecutions and that such costs outweigh any demonstrated social benefits. This article examines the costs of three exclusionary rules using data collected for 7,500 cases in a nine-county study of criminal courts in three states. It emphasizes motions to suppress physical evidence but for comparative purposes also includes motions to suppress confessions and identifications. The results show that the various exclusionary rules exact only marginal social costs. Motions to suppress physical evidence are filed in fewer than 5% of the cases, largely drug and weapons cases, while serious motions to suppress identifications and confessions are filed in 2% and 4% of the cases. The success rate of motions to suppress is equally marginal. Successful motions to suppress physical evidence occur in only 0.69% of the cases, while successful motions to suppress identifications or confessions occur much less often. Moreover, not all who successfully suppressed evidence escaped conviction, especially when only an identification or a confession was suppressed. In all, only 46 cases—less than 0.6% of the cases studied—were lost because of the three exclusionary rules combined, most of them involving offenses that would have incurred less than six months’ imprisonment or first offenders. Finally, the impact of unsuccessful motions on subsequent plea bargaining was found to be marginal; only unsuccessful motions to exclude confessions resulted in any real sentencing concessions.

The controversy over a “good faith mistake” exception to the exclusionary rule and the 1982 National Institute of Justice study of the effects of the rule in California have focused attention on the “costs” of the rule. This article reviews the NIJ study and seven other relevant studies and concludes that the NIJ study's claim that the rule has a “major impact” on the disposition of felony arrests is misleading and exaggerated. California data show that prosecutors reject only 0.8% (8 in 1,000) of felony arrests because of illegal searches. The effect of the rule is concentrated in drug cases in which the rejection rate by prosecutors is 2.4% (not 30%, as suggested by the NIJ study), but the rejection rate for non-drug arrests is less than 0.3%, and the rate is even lower for violent crimes. Even if one looks at the cumulative effect of the rule through all stages of the felony process in California, only about 2.35% of felony arrests are lost because of illegal searches, and this is a high-side estimate based on potentially atypical samples. Moreover, studies of “lost arrests” have not differentiated between arrests resulting from bona fide crime investigations and arrests that resulted from arbitrary searches or arrests that were made to seize contraband, for harassment, or for purposes other than obtaining a conviction. The author concludes that available data show the cost of the rule is marginal, especially in view of the ambiguous nature of the lost arrests. Moreover, it is doubtful that a good faith mistake exception would save any substantial proportion of the arrests lost following illegal searches. In particular, an exception for searches conducted under an improper warrant would save only a negligible proportion of lost arrests.