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Postprocessualism and the Nature of Science: A Response to Comments by Hutson and Arnold and Wilkens

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Todd L. VanPool  and
Christine S. VanPool
Todd L. VanPool
Affiliation:
Department of Anthropology, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 87108
Christine S. VanPool
Affiliation:
Department of Anthropology, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 87108
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Abstract

The comments by Hutson and Arnold and Wilkens challenge our 1999 argument that postprocessual research can be scientific. Both critique our characteristics of science. Arnold and Wilkens contend that postprocessual research is never scientific, because postprocessualists do not evaluate knowledge claims using information derived independently from the claims being evaluated. We argue that Arnold and Wilkens' criticisms are based on an inaccurate characterization of our arguments. We also argue that their claim that postprocessual perspectives do not use independently derived knowledge claims when evaluating propositions about the past is simply incorrect. Hutson argues that science cannot be demarcated from other academic research, so determining whether some postprocessual research is or isn't scientific is a moot issue. We argue that while science does share similarities with other academic pursuits, it remains a useful problem-solving strategy that can be differentiated from non-scientific scholarly pursuits. In addition, we agree with Hutson that a 'synergy through disunity' is desirable within archaeology, but again argue that such a synergy will not be produced through an intellectual conflict phrased in terms of “processual science” vs. “postprocessual non-science”.

Résumé

Résumé

En nuestro artícule de 1999 propusimos que, a pesar de las diferencias existentes entre los modelos procesual y postprocesual, ambas aproximaciones no difieren en términes de método cientifico. Críticas presentadas por Huston, y Arnold y Wilkens desafían nuestra propuesta. Por un lado, Arnold y Wilkens sostienen que el modelo postprocesual no puede ser cientifico, dado que sus seguidores no evalúanpostulados, del conocimiento cognoscitivos usando informatión derivada independientemente de estospos-tulados. Por otro lado, Hutson sostiene que la ciencia no debe y no puede ser diferenciada de otros métodos de conocimiento, de lo que dériva la conclusion de que el debate sobre el carácter cientifico del postprocesualimo es vano. Nosotros sostenemos que las criticas dirigidas por Arnold y Wilkens hacia nuestra discusión de ciencia están basadas en una interpretation inexacta de nuestros argumentes originales. Continuámes sugiriendo que Arnold y Wilkens erran al sostener que las perspectivas postprocesuales no pueden, y de hecho no usan, postulados independientes al evaluar proposiciones sobre elpasado. Nosotros rebatimos la acusación de Hutson sobre nuestra supuesta preferenciapor un 'modelo traditional de ciencia' caduco, demostrando que 1) nuestra discusión original es incompatible con el modelo traditional tal y como lo caracteriza Hutson, y 2) nuestros argumentes coinciden substancialmente con sus propias críticas del modelo traditional. También enfatizamos que nuestra definición de ciencia no resta méritas a la formulatión de hipótesis ni a la evaluatión critica del contexte social de la teoria. Proponemos que, mientras de hecho la ciencia mantiene muchas afinidades con otras actividades investigativas, se distingue como una util estrategia indagatoria que puede ser diferenciada de otras estrategias no-cientifícas. Finalmente, coincidimos con Hutson en que la 'sinergia a través de la désunion' es a la vez deseable y posible en arqueologia, pero réitérámes que dicha sinergia no puede serproducida mediante un confticto intelectual esbozado en términes de un enfrentamiento entre 'ciencia procesual' y 'anticiencia postprocesual'.

Type
Comments
Information
American Antiquity , Volume 66 , Issue 2 , April 2001 , pp. 367 - 375
Copyright
Copyright © The Society for American Archaeology 2001

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