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Ambient-Based Policy Instruments: The Role of Recommendations and Presentation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 September 2016

John Spraggon  and
Robert J. Oxoby
John Spraggon
Affiliation:
Department of Resource Economics at the University of Massachusetts in Amherst, Massachusetts
Robert J. Oxoby
Affiliation:
Department of Economics at the University of Calgary in Calgary, Alberta
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Abstract

We explore the effects of recommended play and the presentation of payoff information on behavior in an ambient-based policy instrument experiment. Specifically, we test the effects of recommended play (via a description of marginal decision making) and a payoff table on the behavior of individuals facing an ambient-based policy instrument. We find that recommended play and the presentation of a payoff table increases the use of the socially optimal strategy, thereby increasing efficiency. These results suggest that providing decision makers with a richer description of the decision making environment significantly reduces decision error, significantly improving the efficiency of ambient-based policy instruments.

Keywords

ambient pollution instrumentsrecommended playexperiments
Type
Contributed Papers
Information
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review , Volume 39 , Issue 2 , April 2010 , pp. 262 - 274
Copyright
Copyright © 2010 Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association 

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