Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-tf8b9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-24T05:07:01.448Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

An Experimental Analysis of a Points-Based System for Managing Multispecies Fisheries

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 September 2016

Christopher M. Anderson
Christopher M. Anderson*
Affiliation:
Department of Environmental and Natural Resource Economics at the University of Rhode Island in Kingston, Rhode Island
Get access

Abstract

An industry group has proposed a novel system for managing the Northeast Multispecies Fishery. Each harvester would be endowed with a budget of points, and each species would have a “point price,” or number of points that must be paid out of his budget when landing that species. By varying the point prices throughout the season, management could redirect effort across species. This paper presents a benchmarked experimental testbed of this management system, and shows that harvesters do respond to point prices, which can be chosen to support harvest of most of the allowable catch of each species without severely over-harvesting any of them.

Keywords

multispecies fisherypoints systemeconomic experimentquotaderby
Type
Contributed Papers
Information
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review , Volume 39 , Issue 2 , April 2010 , pp. 227 - 244
Copyright
Copyright © 2010 Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Anderson, C.M. 2004. “How Institutions Affect Outcomes in Laboratory Tradable Fishing Allowance Systems.” Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 33(2): 282–297.Google Scholar
Anderson, C., and Holland, D. 2006. “Auctions for Sale of Initial Catch Entitlement.” Land Economics 82(3): 333–352.Google Scholar
Anderson, C., Plott, C., Shimomura, K.-I., and Grant, S. 2004. “Global Instability in Experimental General Equilibrium: The Scarf Example.” Journal of Economic Theory 115(2): 209–249.Google Scholar
Anderson, C.M., and Sutinen, J.G. 2005. “A Laboratory Assessment of Tradable Fishing Allowances.” Marine Resource Economics 20(1): 1–23.Google Scholar
Anderson, C.M., and Sutinen, J.G. 2006. “The Effect of Initial Lease Periods on Price Discovery in Laboratory Tradable Fishing Allowance Markets.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 61(2): 164–180.Google Scholar
Arnason, R. 2002. “ITQs in Practice: An International Review.” In Hatcher, A., Pascoe, S., Banks, R., and Arnason, R., eds., Future Options for UK Fish Quota Management. CEMARE Report. No. 58, Centre for the Economics and Management of Aquatic Resources (CEMARE), University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, UK.Google Scholar
New England Fishery Management Council. 2009. “Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan.” Available on http://www.nefmc.org/nemulti/index.html (accessed July 14, 2009).Google Scholar
Northeast Seafood Coalition. 2006. “Points System Management Program: An Output Control Management Proposal for the Northeast Multispecies Fishery.” Scoping comment received in response to Amendment 16 of the Northeast Multispecies FMP. Available at http://www.northeastseafoodcoalition.org/uploads/Points_System_Submission_Dec_2006.pdf (accessed July 14, 2009).Google Scholar
North Pacific Fishery Management Council (NPFMC). 2003. “Experimental Analysis of Arbitration Structures, Preliminary Results.” BSAI Crab Rationalization Program Trailing Amendments, Appendix 3–4C. NPFMC, Anchorage, AK.Google Scholar
Scarf, H. 1960. “Some Examples of Global Instability of the Competitive Equilibrium.” International Economic Review 1(3): 157–171.Google Scholar
Truong, T., Jiao, Y., and Azadivar, F. 2006. “A Point Incentive System for Selective Fishing.” Mimeo, Marine Fisheries Institute, University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth, MA. Mimeo on file with authors.Google Scholar