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The Construction and Deconstruction of Self in Alzheimer's Disease

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 November 2008

Steve R. Sabat†
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, Georgetown University, Washington DC 20057.
Rom Harré†
Affiliation:
Sub-Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, 10 Merton Street, Oxford OX14JJ.

Abstract

The loss of self in Aizeheimer's Disease is examined from a social constructionist view of the nature of the self. Empirical evidence derived from the structure of the discourse and behaviour of three Alzheimer's sufferers is presented to show that self1, the self of personal identity, persists far into the end stage of the disease. Self2, the multiple personae that are projected into the public arena, and which require the cooperation of others in order to come into being, can be lost, but only indirectly as a result of the disease. The primary cause of the loss of self2 is the ways in which others view and treat the Alzheimer's sufferer. Recommendations are made regarding interactions between Alzheimer's sufferers and caregivers.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1992

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