It is commonplace to refer to southern Africa as an area of confrontation and strife — an area where conflict between white and black could engulf the southern half of the continent in total warfare. President Kaunda's warning that “warfare in southern Africa would make Vietnam look like a child's picnic” characterizes the opinion of a large number of concerned lookers-on.
Adding to the severity of the situation is the possibility of big-power involvement. With the outbreak of open hostilities in southern Africa, it is possible that the major powers would be seized by a crisis of brinkmanship. Even while failing to lead to war, such a crisis would threaten the modus Vivendi which enables the big powers to regulate their conflicts and to forestall armed hostilities.
Motivated in part by these concerns, the arms control project of the Center for International Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology simulated the conduct of American and foreign leaders under conditions of conflict in southern Africa. In this article, I will report on some aspects of CONEX III, as this simulation was called. I will leave it largely to the reader to assess the validity of the findings and will furnish materials to enable such assessments. Questions of validity aside, the study is an important one. It brings to light the options possibly available to the leaders of black Africa for preserving the peace of the continent while advancing the goals of self-determination and majority rule.
