Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 May 2014
A central debate in the literature on the state has focused on the state's relative strength and weakness in relation to society (Skocpol 1979; Nordlinger 1981, 1987; Evans, et al., 1985; Carnoy 1984). While this debate initially examined developed states and, more recently, semi-industrialized states in Latin America, increasing attention has shifted to African states. It is here where a paradox has emerged that has generated further questions about state power and state-society relations. Africa is plagued with political instability, coup d'etats, deteriorating economic conditions, and ineffective policy implementation (Sandbrook 1985). The current difficulties in meeting scheduled debt repayment deadlines and the pressure to make significant economic adjustments further illustrate the precarious financial status of many African states. Yet, African societies are well known for their heavily centralized bureaucratic apparatus that consumes a substantial portion of expenditures and capital investments. One indicator of state influence is the steady growth of parastatals in African countries. As they have expanded in number and in function, state power over these firms also has grown. And, in response to rapidly deteriorating economic conditions, many African states have enacted widescale debt management controls on foreign investment, public borrowing, and public sector investment. Scholars, whether conceptualizing this influential social group as an “organizational bourgeoisie” or a “managerial bourgeoisie,” consider African state bureaucracies to have their own power capabilities and defined interests (Markowitz 1977; Sklar 1979).
I wish to thank Thomas Callaghy, Edward Epstein, and Carol Thompson for their comments and suggestions. I also thank the National Science Foundation (SES-8410519) and the College of Social and Behavioral Science of the University of Utah for their financial and research support.