Some years ago, I had occasion to write about what I called “the multiple marginality of the Sudan.” I attempted to analyze different levels of Sudan’s intermediacy – between Arab Africa and Black Africa, between Islamized Africa and Christianized Africa, between Arabic-speaking Africa and English-speaking Africa, between the Africa of the desert and the Africa of the tropical bush. The continent’s largest country in square miles was condemned to multiple layers of marginality and blessed with the mediating opportunities of being herself intermediate.

Historially two salient features characterized the educational system. It was racially segregated and education for the African majority was largely for exploitation. In this paper, I will review the main features of the educational system in colonial Zimbabwe; the legacy of that system and what the new African Government proposes to do to change it to fit the needs of the new Zimbabwe. The 1899 Education Ordinance had set up two separate systems of education, one for Whites and the other for Blacks. The Ordinance left African education entirely in the hands of Christian missionaries with the government giving small grants to mission schools, provided that these schools were kept open for a minimum of four hours a day, of which not less than two hours were to be devoted to industrial training.

The focus of any discussion of Nigeria at this time in its history is the outlook for success of its recently reconstituted democratic political system. Equally in question should be the validity of external assessments of the Nigerian political situation, some of which in the past have tended, I believe, to rest on misunderstandings of Nigerian politics.

Following the collapse of many civilian and constitutional governments in postcolonial Africa, most political analysts and commentators drew a dismal conclusion. They decided that democratic representation based upon freedom of speech and association would be abandoned in Africa and they proclaimed the onset of an era of authoritarian rule. Some analysts, in the tradition of colonialist thought, asserted that cultural and social conditions in Africa are simply unsuited to the practice of liberal democracy.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss briefly the current reconstruction efforts in Zimbabwe. The historical roots of prevailing social problems will be outlined and, government attempts in addressing these problems, both now and in the future, will be reviewed. The emphasis will be factual rather than analytical, in the hope that the information provided will contribute to the formulation of solutions to the many problems facing the new nation of Zimbabwe. It is difficult to do justice to such a complex subject without a National Development Plan covering all sectors of the economy. Unfortunately, this plan will not be published until possibly mid-June 1981. A global picture is indispensable in dealing with education, because manpower requirements are determined to a large extent by what is happening in all sectors of the economy, which in turn is influenced by the government’s development strategies.

In his opening address to the fifty members of the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) on 18 October, 1975, the head of Nigeria’s new military government, General Murtala Ramat Muhammed, declared: “It is important that we avoid a reopening of the deep splits which caused trauma in the country.” Those splits, as was made known to the outside world during the civil war, were ethnic, regional, and, to a lesser extent, religious in nature. Of these three modes of overt division, Nigerians have always been most successful in controlling the religious aspect. General Murtala’s statement is instructive on the problem of regional splits: “The fear of the predominance of one Region over another has . . . been removed to a large extent by the simple Constitutional Act of creating more States.” Four months later, following the assassination of Murtala, the successor regime of General Obasanjo declared the creation of seven more states, bringing the number up to nineteen from the twelve established by General Gowon in May 1967. While it is evident that the existence of “regions” has not been obliterated by their subdivision into states, this development has reduced the immediate political visibility and at least some of the salience of regional boundaries.

Note: Since this brief review of educational reform in Tanzania is intended to offer insight into a number of problems that confront those involved in transforming the recently independent societies of southern Africa, and since my research on these issues is still at a preliminary stage, I present my comments in schematic form. A brief note on resources and selected citations appear at the end.

At the end of colonial rule in Africa, almost everywhere the formal educational system was assigned major roles in the construction of the new society. Skilled personnel had to be trained to replace the departing Europeans. The vast expansion of social services required many new doctors, engineers, and architects. The increased responsibilities of the public sector required managers, accountants, and planners. And, of course, there had to be a rapid increase in the teaching corps, at all levels.

During the armed struggle for the nation’s independence, the Eastern border provinces of Rhodesia became the center of intense military activity. Accordingly, it was from this region that entire villages were evacuated, as families crossed into Mozambique to escape enclosure by the Smith regime into “protected villages.” The Tangwena people of the area, long pursued by the white power structure in an attempt to disperse them, moved en masse across the border. It was also from this region that vast numbers of school students and other frustrated youth left to answer the call to swell the ranks of the liberation forces. It was natural then that the resettlement of returning refugees from Mozambique camps between January and September 1980 was concentrated in the general Umtali-Fort Victoria area.

This essay attempts to summarize the Islamic aspect of political culture in Nigeria. It is not intended as an analysis of the recent elections in Nigeria whereby civilian governments were established to replace the military regime. Yet the emphasis on constitutional change, focuses on those aspects of Islamic culture in Nigeria which are likely to affect what ordinary citizens feel ought to be among the basic purposes of government. This essay is largely interpretative rather than empirical, and is based on a profound respect for many of the varieties of Islamic culture in Nigeria.

This project is to develop an agricultural training school as part of a larger primary/secondary school complex for refugee children from Mozambique near Shamva in northeastern Zimbabwe. The end of the war and the coming of independence has left Zimbabwe with the task of reorienting old structures and institutions. This is particularly true in agriculture and education. Alternative models must be developed in order to provide the skills and experience necessary to rebuild the country along more egalitarian lines. The Danish organization, Development Aid People to People, who are the organizers of this project, provided assistance to ZANU (PF) for the schools in Mozambique and trained 150 ZAND (PF) cadres in their school in Denmark. After independence, Dr. Mutumbuka, Minister of Education, asked the group to continue their assistance, and the school project developed through discussion. Dr. Mutumbuka places tremendous importance on the success of the school as a model for Zimbabwe in the struggle for appropriate education.

In assessing the outlook for the administration of justice under the second Nigerian Republic, one should consider in retrospect the political significance of courts and police, particularly as these agencies affect the work of political development and nation-building. Perhaps in deference to the myth of the apolitical judicial and legal process, little attention has been paid to the political impact of both courts and police, beyond the judicial-review powers of the higher courts or the use of the police as agents of terror.’ Comment on the more “ordinary” doings of police and courts is all too often an afterthought or is missing entirely.

The first-time visitor to Salisbury cannot help but be impressed by the exceptionally clean and modern downtown area. The well-kept parks and spotless boulevards put any city in the United States to shame. Supermarket shelves are well stocked, and the near total absence of beggars makes one wonder if this is in fact part of the African continent. If one stays inside the downtown area and its rich suburbs, one can easily miss the ugly truth that millions of people in this relatively affluent nation are suffering from malnutrition and that whole communities have been destroyed by starvation.

Oil has become Nigeria’s engine of growth, replacing peasant agriculture. But the transmission system has its own peculiar rhythm. As managed by government, the oil revenues have produced an economic fluctuation comparable to the business cycle in the more developed capitalist economies. As in the classic business cycle, there appears to be at work a cyclical process which I call the Nigerian petro-political fluctuation, such that one economic fluctuation produces conditions which generate the next. This article will present the workings of the petro-political fluctuation during the years 1973-79.

In late February, readers of the New York Times read of a pragmatic Planning Minister in a newly independent African state issuing his country’s first development plan whose strategy was based upon building on the existing economic structures. That same day, readers of the Wall Street Journal read of a revolutionary new African state issuing its guidelines for the radical transformation of its economy toward a new socialist order. The casual reader might not even have of noticed that the two stories were commenting on the same by event: the announcement in Salisbury by Economic Planning Minister Bernard Chidzero of the newly independent Zimbabwean Government’s first development guidelines.

In the decade since Nigeria ended its civil war. Southern Africa has become the paramount concern of Nigerian foreign policy. No other foreign-relations issue generates such a unified Nigerian response as does opposition to White supremacy in the Southern redoubt. At the same time, extraordinary wealth from petroleum exports has provided a new capability to influence developments in Southern Africa and, ultimately, the outcome of the confrontation between Black and White in South Africa. With its strategic impact on the economies of the United Kingdom and the United States, Lagos has demonstrated a willingness to use its leverage to attain policy goals in the region. The Nigerian government appears to be offering the West a choice. It expects the Western nations to be more attentive to Nigerian concerns and demands on African issues if they are not to face economic retaliation. During the past four years Lagos began to define this choice in its relations with Great Britain. A consideration of these relations would be instructive for the United States; the political and economic implications of this policy should be clear to London and Washington as they piece together parallel approaches to Southern Africa.

At a panel discussion on “Uganda After Amin” at the 1980 African Studies Association annual conference, Professor Ali Mazrui wondered aloud why social scientists on Africa were speaking of reconstruction in Uganda after the fall of General Idi Amin, rather than re-design. Professor Mazrui suggested that since the political system inherited by Idi Amin when he overthrew Milton Obote was faulty and unable to meet the needs of Ugandan people, and since Amin, who was kicked out of office by Ugandan guerrillas and Tanzanian soldiers early in 1977 had left the system practically in shambles, would it not be a much better idea for the new leaders (if one can consider Milton Obote in his return engagement as President of Uganda as a new leader) to think of creating a new political system rather than simply reconstructing one on the basis of the old system.

Throughout nearly twenty years of often tumultuous post-colonial history, Nigerian foreign policy has been surprisingly consistent. It may be too early to judge the capabilities and determination of the new civilian government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari, but if the past is any guide, the basic concerns of Nigerian foreign policy are not likely to change.

Future decisions will probably continue to reflect the pursuit of three vital and interrelated domestic objectives: to build greater national unity by overcoming deep regional, ethnic, and religious differences; to achieve rapid economic development for a nation that, despite great oil wealth, has a per-capita income of less than $400; and to complete the process of full self-determination which has yet to encompass all sectors of the modern economy. Among the three, the quest for national integration has been of paramount concern.