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The Development of the Aircraft Industry in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 July 2016
Extract
Progressively less information becomes available from the Soviet Union about the development of its aircraft industry. In examining the material that has been released during the past five decades, much confusion arises in the initial attempts to piece this material together chronologically and to show realistically the development of the aircraft industry in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It seems that much time would be spent before a somewhat realistic picture might be obtained. Therefore, it appears appropriate that a definitive analysis be presented at this time.
The industrial development under the Communists in the Soviet Union is, and has been, a direct result of a bureaucratic state-planned economy. Voznesensky points out that the balance of the national economy, which lies in the hands of the State, includes the production and allocation of the social product, the production and allocation of fixed capital, the balance and distribution of man-power, the production and allocation of national income, the balance of money incomes and outlays of the population, and the balance and allocation of material resources.
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- Research Article
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- Copyright © Royal Aeronautical Society 1955
References
page 209 note * From The Economy of the US.S.R. During World War 11 by Nikolai A. Voznesensky, Deputy Premier of the U.S.S.R. and Chief of the State Planning Commission in 1947.
page 209 note † On 16th April 1922 Soviet Russia signed her first treaty with a major power. This treaty is known as the “ Treaty of Rapallo ” and Germany and the Soviet Union not only established diplomatic relations between themselves but also renounced financial claims upon each other. Other powers, fearing a Soviet-Germanentente, were forced to a more conciliatory attitude towards both nations after this treaty.
page 210 note * M. Gromoff and M. Radzevitch flew from Moscow to Konigsberg, Berlin, Paris, Rome, Vienna, Warsaw, and back to Moscow, a distance of 4,042 miles in thirty-four and a quarter hours flying time, averaging about 120 miles per hour, in an early ANT-3.
page 211 note * Actually this is only part of the reason for the industrial expansion to the east. By 1935, diplomatic relations with Germany were definitely hostile and in the event of an open war, all of the Soviet industrial reserve would no longer be concentrated in the western sections of the U.S.S.R. and thus would be less acceisible to invaders from the West.
page 212 note * In 1938, A. N. Tupolev, who was the “ father of aviation in the Soviet Union” and for fifteen years the chief engineer of the “ ZAGI,” was exiled to Siberia, along with many of his associates. Many other less fortunate designers of note, such as Kalinin, were completely annihilated. This, coupled with the hostile German relations and the knowledge of an impending war, made it imperative that new Soviet aircraft designers be obtained immediately.
page 214 note * Not only were the American production figures over four times the corresponding Soviet production figures for 1944, but the American aircraft were also much larger and heavier; at this time the Americans were concentrating on a strategic air force while the Soviets were concentrating on fighters, pursuit aircraft and attack bombers.
page 214 note † Over 68 per cent, of the German aircraft production facilities,at the end of the war, were located in the Soviet-occupied territories; the Soviets obtained facilities from the Germans to produce well over 25,000 aircraft annually. Of the German airframe producing plants, the present Soviet-occupied territory includes 63 per cent, of the total German plants that produced pursuits and fighters in 1944, 91 per cent, of the total German plants that produced light and medium bombers in 1944, almost 98 per cent, of the total German plants that produced heavy bombers in 1944, 42 per cent, of the total German plants that produced transport aeroplanes in 1944, and about 73 per cent,of the total German plants that produced other miscellaneous types of aeroplanes (trainers, observation aircraft, etc.) in 1944. These figures have been obtained from the German Air Ministry and are further broken down in the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey report (see footnote *** in Table I).
page 214 note ** Among those men that are applying their talents in the service of the U.S.S.R. are such individuals as Anton von Poller of Hitler's economic staff, Siegfried Guenther. the chief engineer at the Heinkel Works, and Dr. Baade, Junkers' chief designer, and the man responsible for some of Germany's most advanced (at that time) jet bombers.
page 216 note * Coal production is scheduled to be increased by 43 per cent, during the five-year period, crude petroleum is to show an increase of 85 per cent., electric power is to be increased by 80 per cent., pig iron by 76 per cent., crude steel by 62 per cent., rolled steel by 64 per cent., and cement by 120 per cent. During the quinquennium, aluminium output is scheduled to be increased by 160 per cent., copper should be increased by 90 per cent., lead by 170 per cent., nickel by 53 per cent., tin by 80 per cent, and zinc by 150 per cent. The output of coking coal should be raised by 50 per cent, and the building and metal processing industries should be doubled. The capital investment in industry should reach twice the level of the preceding five-year period. In the engineering and chemical industries, if the 1950 production index is 100, the 1955 index targets are 230 for steam-turbines, 780 for hydro-turbines, 185 for metallurgical equipment, 350 for oil equipment, 260 for large machine tools, 120 for motor cars, 119 for tractors, 179 for caustic soda, 188 for mineral fertilisers, and 182 for synthetic rubber.
page 216 note † Cotton materials are to be increased by 61 per cent., woollen materials by 54 per cent., leather footwear by 55 per cent., sugar by 78 per cent., animal fats by 72 per cent, and vegetable fats by 77 per cent.
page 216 note * At the end of the Second World War, the three bottlenecks in the Soviet aircraft industry were aluminium production, aero-engine production and precision machinery production. The requirements for precision machinery were adequately fulfilled by the acquisitions from the German factories and plants. Similarly, the engine production has been greatly advanced by both German material and manpower. It remains, therefore, that the aluminium production is, in all probability, the outstanding present bottleneck in the Soviet aircraft industry.
page 217 note * This distribution reflects the earlier stated objectives of the Soviet Air Force. It has been obtained from a comparison with the similar figures for the other countries, during the past ten years. For purposes of comparison, the following table is presented for the German war—time production (taken from the Aircraft Division Industry Report on the Strategic Bombing of the German Aircraft Industry, by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Aircraft Division, January 1947):
| Type of craft | Percentage of total Aeroplane Produced | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1939 | 1940 | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | |
| pursuits and Fighter-Bombers | 22.7 | 28.7 | 31.7 | 33.5 | 46.0 | 72.7.7 |
| Light and Medium Bombers | 35.0. | 36.5 | 36.4 | 40.5 | 31.7 | 15.0 |
| Heavy Bombers | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 1.3 |
| Transport Aeroplanes | 11.4 | 7.1 | 8.2 | 8.1 | 8.0 | 2.5 |
| others | 30.8 | 27.3 | 23.2 | 20.3 | 12.4 | 8.5 |