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Game theory and evolution

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2016

John Haigh
John Haigh*
Affiliation:
Mathematics Division, University of Sussex
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Extract

Maynard Smith and Price (1973) have shown that the methods and terminology of Game Theory can be used to study the evolution of various strategies in animal species. They write aij as the mean ‘value’ to the user of strategy i when his opponent uses strategy j; these values aij are related to the fitness of the user of i, in the sense that, if aij is large, it is advantageous to use strategy i when one's opponent uses strategy j, and this advantage will be reflected in an increase in one's reproductive potential. For example, these may be a contest for territory, or dominance rights.

Type
Research Article
Information
Advances in Applied Probability , Volume 7 , Issue 1 , March 1975 , pp. 8 - 11
Copyright
Copyright © Applied Probability Trust 1975 

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References

Maynard Smith, J. and Price, G. R. (1973) The logic of animal conflict. Nature 246, p. 15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Maynard Smith, J. (1974) The theory of games and the evolution of animal conflicts. J. Theoret. Biol. 47, p. 209.CrossRefGoogle Scholar