Element contents
Series: Elements in Metaphysics
Properties
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 July 2022
Summary
Although the subject matter of this Element is properties, do not expect in-depth introductions to the various views on properties 'on the market'. Instead, here that subject matter is treated meta-philosophically. Rather than ask and try to answer a question like do properties exist? this Element asks what reasons one might have for thinking that properties exist (what problem properties, if they exist, are there to solve), what counts as solving that (or those) problems (including what counts as 'a property'), as well as how we ought to proceed when trying to find out if properties exist (by which method this ought to be decided). As it turns out, these questions and their answers are all intricately intertwined. Theory comparison and theory evaluation is in other words (and perhaps not that surprisingly) tricky. Do properties exist? After reading this Element all we can say is therefore this: that depends.
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- Series: Elements in MetaphysicsOnline ISBN: 9781009008938Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 28 July 2022
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