Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-r5fsc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-20T17:29:15.311Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
Series:   Elements in Ethics

Parfit's Ethics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 April 2021

Richard Yetter Chappell
Richard Yetter Chappell
Affiliation:
University of Miami

Summary

Derek Parfit (1942–2017) was one of the most important and influential moral philosophers of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. This Element offers a critical introduction to his wide-ranging ethical thought, focusing especially on his two most significant works, Reasons and Persons (1984) and On What Matters (2011), and their contribution to the consequentialist moral tradition. Topics covered include: rationality and objectivity, distributive justice, self-defeating moral theories, Parfit's Triple Theory (according to which consequentialism, contractualism, and Kantian ethics ultimately converge), personal identity, and population ethics.
Get access

Keywords

Parfitconsequentialismethical theorypopulation ethicsdistributive justice
Type
Element
Information
Series: Elements in Ethics
Online ISBN: 9781108582377
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 13 May 2021

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Arntzenius, Frank, and McCarthy, David. 1997. ‘Self Torture and Group Beneficence’. Erkenntnis 47 (1): 129–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Arrhenius, Gustaf. 2000. ‘An Impossibility Theorem for Welfarist Axiologies’. Economics and Philosophy 16 (2): 247–66. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267100000249.Google Scholar
Chang, Ruth. 2016. ‘Parity, Imprecise Comparability, and the Repugnant Conclusion’. Theoria 82 (2): 183–215. https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12096.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chappell, Richard Yetter. 2012. ‘Fittingness: The Sole Normative Primitive’. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249): 684–704.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chappell, Richard Yetter 2015. ‘Value Receptacles’. Noûs 49 (2): 322–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chappell, Richard Yetter 2017a. ‘Knowing What Matters’. In Does Anything Really Matter? Essays on Parfit on Objectivity, edited by Singer, Peter. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Chappell, Richard Yetter 2017b. ‘Rethinking the Asymmetry’. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (2): 167–77. https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2016.1250203.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chappell, Richard Yetter 2019. ‘Fittingness Objections to Consequentialism’. In Consequentialism: New Directions, New Problems?, edited by Seidel, Christian, 90–112. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Chappell, Richard Yetter n.d.a. ‘The 2-D Argument against Metaethical Naturalism’.Google Scholar
Chappell, Richard Yetter n.d.b. ‘There Is No Problem of Collective Harm: Difference-Making Without Vagueness’.Google Scholar
Elster, Jon. 1983. Sour Grapes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Greene, Joshua, and Baron, Jonathan. 2001. ‘Intuitions about Declining Marginal Utility’. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 14: 243–55.Google Scholar
Gustafsson, Johan E. 2020. ‘Population Axiology and the Possibility of a Fourth Category of Absolute Value’. Economics and Philosophy 36 (1): 81–110.Google Scholar
Howard, Nathan Robert, and Laskowski, N. G.. 2019. ‘The World Is Not Enough’ [online version]. Noûs. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12293.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Huemer, Michael. 2008. ‘In Defence of Repugnance’. Mind 117 (468): 899–933.Google Scholar
Hume, David. 1739. A Treatise of Human Nature. Project Gutenberg, e-book. www.gutenberg.org/files/4705/4705-h/4705-h.htm.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hurka, Thomas. 1983. ‘Value and Population Size’. Ethics 93 (3): 496–507.Google Scholar
Kagan, Shelly. 2011. ‘Do I Make a Difference?’. Philosophy and Public Affairs 39 (2): 105–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kirchin, Simon. 2010. ‘A Tension in the Moral Error Theory’. In A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory, edited by Joyce, Richard and Kirchin, Simon, 167–82. Dordrecht: Springer.Google Scholar
Lazari-Radek, Katarzyna de, and Singer, Peter. 2020. ‘Parfit on Act Consequentialism’. Utilitas 32 (4): 416–26. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820820000126.Google Scholar
Lewis, David K. 1976. ‘Survival and Identity’. In The Identities of Persons, edited by Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg, 17–40. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mackie, John Leslie. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. London: Penguin.Google Scholar
Mintz-Woo, Kian. 2018. ‘On Parfit’s Ontology’. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (5): 707–25. https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2017.1381935.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nefsky, Julia. 2011. ‘Consequentialism and the Problem of Collective Harm: A Reply to Kagan’. Philosophy and Public Affairs 39 (4): 364–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ord, Toby. 2020. The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity. London: Bloomsbury.Google Scholar
Otsuka, Michael. 2009. ‘The Kantian Argument for Consequentialism’. Ratio 22 (1): 41–58. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2008.00417.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Parfit, Derek. 1976. ‘Lewis, Perry, and What Matters’. In The Identities of Persons, edited by Rorty, Amelie, 91–108. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Parfit, Derek 1984. Reasons and Persons. Reprint. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.Google Scholar
Parfit, Derek 1997. ‘Equality and Priority’. Ratio 10 (3): 202–21.Google Scholar
Parfit, Derek 2003. ‘Justifiability to Each Person’. Ratio 16 (4): 368–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Parfit, Derek 2011a. On What Matters: Volume One. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Parfit, Derek 2011b. On What Matters: Volume Two. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Parfit, Derek 2016. On What Matters: Volume Three. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Parfit, Derek 2017. ‘Future People, the Non-Identity Problem, and Person-Affecting Principles’. Philosophy and Public Affairs 45 (2): 118–57. https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12088.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Portmore, Douglas W. 2019. ‘Consequentialism and Coordination: How Traditional Consequentialism Has an Attitude Problem’. In Consequentialism: New Directions, New Problems, edited by Seidel, Christian, 71–89. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Quinn, Warren S. 1990. ‘The Puzzle of the Self-Torturer’. Philosophical Studies 59 (1): 79–90.Google Scholar
Railton, Peter. 1984. ‘Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality’. Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (2): 134–71.Google Scholar
Rawls, John. 1999. A Theory of Justice. Revised edition. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Regan, Donald H. 1980. Utilitarianism and Co-Operation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Roojen, Mark van. 2017. ‘Derek Parfit: On What Matters, Volume III’. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/on-what-matters-volume-iii/.Google Scholar
Rosen, Gideon. 2009. ‘Might Kantian Contractualism Be the Supreme Principle of Morality?’. Ratio 22 (1): 78–97. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2008.00419.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scanlon, Thomas M. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Scanlon, T. M. 2014. Being Realistic About Reasons. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sidgwick, Henry. 1907. The Methods of Ethics. Seventh edition. London: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Singer, Peter. 2009. The Life You Can Save: Acting Now to Stop World Poverty. New York: Random House.Google Scholar
Skorupski, John. 2010. The Domain of Reasons. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Smilansky, Saul. 2005. ‘On Not Being Sorry about the Morally Bad’. Philosophy 80 (2): 261–65. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819105000264.Google Scholar
Smith, Michael. 1994. The Moral Problem. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Sobel, David. 2011. ‘Parfit’s Case against Subjectivism’. In Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 6, edited by Shafer-Landau, Russ. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Suikkanen, Jussi. 2017. ‘Non-Realist Cognitivism, Truth and Objectivity’. Acta Analytica 32 (2): 193–212. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-016-0300-5.Google Scholar
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. 1976. ‘Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem’. The Monist 59 (2): 204–17. https://doi.org/10.5840/monist197659224.Google Scholar
Voorhoeve, Alex. 2014. ‘How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims?’. Ethics 125 (1): 64–87.Google Scholar
Williams, Bernard. 1981. ‘Internal and External Reasons’. In Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers, 1973–1980. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Yudkowsky, Eliezer. 2008. ‘The True Prisoner’s Dilemma’. http://lesswrong.com/lw/tn/the_true_prisoners_dilemma/.Google Scholar

Save element to Kindle

To save this element to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Parfit's Ethics
Available formats
×

Save element to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Parfit's Ethics
Available formats
×

Save element to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Parfit's Ethics
Available formats
×