Element contents
Series: Elements in Global China
Chinese Soft Power
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 February 2022
Summary
This Element presents an overarching analysis of Chinese visions and practices of soft power. Maria Repnikova's analysis introduces the Chinese theorization of the idea of soft power, as well as its practical implementation across global contexts. The key channels or mechanisms of China's soft power examined include Confucius Institutes, international communication, education and training exchanges, and public diplomacy spectacles. The discussion concludes with suggestions for new directions for the field, drawing on the author's research on Chinese soft power in Africa.
- Type
- Element
- Information
- Series: Elements in Global ChinaOnline ISBN: 9781108874700Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 28 April 2022
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