Element contents
Abstractionism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 February 2025
Summary
The aim of this Element is to provide an overview of abstractionism in the philosophy of mathematics. The authors distinguish between mathematical abstractionism, which interprets mathematical theories on the basis of abstraction principles, and philosophical abstractionism, which attributes a philosophical significance to mathematical abstractionism. They then survey the main semantic, ontological, and epistemological theses that are associated with philosophical abstractionism. Finally, the authors suggest that the most recent developments in the debate pull abstractionism in different directions.
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- Online ISBN: 9781009375139Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 06 February 2025
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