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Series:   Elements in Epistemology

On Believing and Being Convinced

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2025

Paul Silva Jr.
Paul Silva Jr.
Affiliation:
University of Cologne

Summary

Our doxastic states are our belief-like states, and these include outright doxastic states and degreed doxastic states. The former include believing that p, having the opinion that p, thinking that p, being sure that p, being certain that p, and doubting that p. The latter include degrees of confidence, credences, and perhaps some phenomenal states. But we also have conviction (being convinced simpliciter that p) and degrees of conviction (being more or less convinced that p). This Element shows: how and why all of the outright doxastic states mentioned above can be reduced to conviction thresholds; what degrees of conviction fundamentally are (degreed reliance-dispositions); why degrees of conviction are not credences; when suspending a belief is compatible with continuing to believe; and the surprising extent to which Kant endorsed the theory of conviction that emerges in this Element.
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Keywords

beliefconvincedconvictioncredencecertaintyconfidence
Type
Element
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Series: Elements in Epistemology
Online ISBN: 9781009524117
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 30 January 2025

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