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Series:   Elements in Philosophy and Logic

The Many Faces of Impossibility

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2024

Koji Tanaka  and
Alexander Sandgren
Koji Tanaka
Affiliation:
Australian National University
Alexander Sandgren
Affiliation:
Umeå Universitet, Sweden

Summary

Possible worlds have revolutionised philosophy and some related fields. But, in recent years, tools based on possible worlds have been found to be limited in many respects. Impossible worlds have been introduced to overcome these limitations. This Element aims to raise and answer the neglected question of what is characteristically impossible about impossible worlds. The Element sheds new light on the nature of impossible worlds. It also aims to analyse the main features and utility of impossible worlds and examine how impossible worlds can capture distinctions which are unavailable if we limit ourselves to possible world-based tools.
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Keywords

impossible worldslogical impossibilitynon-normal worldsnon-classical logichyperintentionalitycounterpossibles
Type
Element
Information
Series: Elements in Philosophy and Logic
Online ISBN: 9781009180573
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 28 March 2024

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