Armstrong, T.Arrow's theorem with restricted coalition algebras. Journal of Mathematical Economics 7 (1980), 55–75
Arrow, K.A difficulty in the concept of social welfare. The Journal of Political Economy 58 (1950), 328–46
Arrow, K. Social choice and individual values (2nd ed.). Yale University Press: New Haven, 1963
Arrow, K. and A. Sen and K. Suzumura (Eds.), Handbook of social choice and welfare, vol. I, North-Holland, New York, 2002
Austen-Smith, D. and J. Banks, Positive political theory I: collective preferences. University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, 2000
Barberá, S.Manipulation of social choice mechanisms that do not leave ‘too much’ to chance. Econometrica 45 (1977a), 1573–88
Barberá, S.Manipulation of social decision functions. Journal of Economic Theory 15 (1977b), 266–78
Barberá, S.Pivotal voters. A new proof of Arrow's theorem. Economic Letters 6 (1980), 13–16
Barberá, S.Strategy-proofness and pivotal voters: a direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. International Economic Review 24 (1983), 413–17
Barberá, S. and Dutta, B. and Sen, Arunava, Strategy-proof set valued social choice functions. Journal of Economic Theory 101 (2001), 374–94
Barberá, S., Sonnenschein, H., and Zhou, L., Voting by committees. Econometrica 59 (1991), 595–609
Bartholdi, J. and Orlin, J., Single-transferable vote resists strategic voting. Social Choice and Welfare 8 (1991), 341–54
Batteau, P, Blin, J., and Monjardet, B., Stability of aggregation procedures, ultrafilters, and simple games. Econometrica 49 (1981), 527–34
Beja, A.Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem re-visited. Extended domains and shorter proofs. Mathematical Social Sciences 25 (1993), 281–6
Bell, J. and A. Slomson, Models and ultraproducts: An Introduction. North Holland: Amsterdam-London, 1969
Benoit, J.Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted. Journal of Economic Theory 102 (2002), 421–36
Benoit, J.The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a simple proof. Economic Letters 69 (2000), 319–22
Black, D. Theory of committees and elections. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1958
Blau, J.Social choice functions and simple games. Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 63 (1957), 243–4
Blau, J.A direct proof of Arrow's theorem. Econometrica 40 (1972), 61–7
Blau, J. and Deb, R., Social decision functions and the veto. Econometrica 45 (1977), 471–82
Brams, S. and P. Fishburn, Approval voting. Birkhäuser Boston, Cambridge, MA, 1983
Brams, S. and P. Fishburn, Voting procedures. In the Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare. Arrow, Sen, and Suzumura, eds. (2002), 175–236
Burani, N. and W. Zwicker, Coalition formation games with separable preferences (preprint). Department of Mathematics, Union College (2000)
Campbell, D. Equity, efficiency, and social choice. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992
Campbell, D. and Kelly, J.. A trade-off result for preference revelation. Journal of Mathematical Economics 34 (2000), 129–42
Campbell, D. and Kelly, J.. A leximin characterization of strategy-proof non-resolute social choice procedures. Economic Theory 20 (2002), 809–29
Ching, S. and Zhou, L., Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules. Social Choice and Welfare 19 (2002), 569–80
COMAP [Consortium for Mathematics and Its Applications] For all practical purposes: Introduction to contemporary mathematics (6th ed.) W. H. Freeman: New York, 2003
Comfort, W. and S. Negrepontis, The theory of ultrafilters. Springer-Verlag: New York, 1974
Condorcet, M. Essai sur l'application de l' analyse ‘a la probabiliti'e des d'ecisions rendues ‘a la pluralit'e des voix. De L'Imprimerie royale, Paris, (1785)
deFinetti, B.La pr'evision ses lois logiques, ses sources subjectives. Ann. Inst. H. Poincaré 7 (1937), 1–68
Denicolo, V.Independent social choice functions are dictatorial. Economics Letters 19 (1985), 9–12
Denicolo, V.Fixed agenda social choice theory: correspondence and impossibility theorems for social choice correspondences and social decision functions. Journal of Economic Theory 59 (1993), 324–32
Duggan, J.A geometric proof of Gibbard's random dictator theorem. Economic Theory 7 (1996), 365–9
Duggan, J. and T. Schwartz, Strategic manipulability is inescapable: Gibbard-Satterthwaite without resoluteness (preprint). Department of Economics, University of Rochester, (1993)
Duggan, J. and Schwartz, T., Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized. Social Choice and Welfare 17 (2000), 85–93
Feldman, A.Non-manipulable multi-valued social decision functions. Public Choice 34 (1979a), 177–88
Feldman, A.Manipulation and the Pareto rule. Journal of Economic Theory 21 (1979b), 473–82
Feldman, A.Manipulating voting procedures. Economic Inquiry 17 (1979c), 452–72
Feldman, A.Strongly nonmanipulable multi-valued collective choice rules. Public Choice 35 (1980a), 503–9
Feldman, A. Welfare economics and social choice theory. Kluwer: Nijhoff, 1980b
Felsenthal, D. and M. Machover, The measurement of voting power: theory and practice, problems and paradoxes. Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, UK, 1998
Felsenthal, D. and Machover, M., After two centuries, should Condorcet's voting procedure be implemented?Behavorial Sciences 37 (1992), 250–74
Fishburn, P.Arrow's impossibility theorem: concise proof and infinite voters. Journal of Economic Theory 2 (1970), 103–6
Fishburn, P. The theory of social choice. Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, 1973
Fishburn, P.The axioms of subjective probability. Statist. Sci. 1(1986), 335–58
Gärdenfors, P.Manipulation of social choice functions. J. Econom. Theory 13 (1976), 217–28
Gärdenfors, P.A concise proof of theorem on manipulation of social choice functions. Public Choice 32 (1977), 137–42
Gärdenfors, P. On definitions of manipulation of social choice functions. Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences, edited by Jean-Jacques Laffont. North Holland, Amsterdam, 1979
Geanakoplos. Three brief proofs of Arrow's impossibility theorem. Cowles Discussion Paper 1123R, 1996
Gibbard, A.Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result. Econometrica 41 (1973), 587–601
Gibbard, A.Manipulation of schemes that mix voting with chance. Econometrica 45 (1977) 665–81
Gibbard, A.Straightforwardness of game forms with lotteries as outcomes. Econometrica 46 (1978), 595–614
Guilbaud, G.Les théories de l'intérêt général et le problème logique de lagrégation. Economie Appliquée 5 (1952), 501–84
Hansson, B.Group preferences. Econometrica 37 (1969), 50–4
Kelly, J.Strategy-proofness and social choice functions without single-valuedness. Econometrica 45 (1977), 439–46
Kelly, J. Arrow impossibility theorems. Academic Press: New York, 1978
Kelly, J. Social choice theory: an introduction. Springer-Verlag: New York, 1987
Kelly, J.Social choice bibliography. Social Choice and Welfare 8 (1991), 97–169
Kirman, A. and Sondermann, D., Arrow's theorem, many agents and invisible dictators. Journal of Economic Theory 5, (1972), 267–77
Lauwers, L. and Liedekerke, L.. Ultraproducts and aggregation. Journal of Mathematical Economics 24 (1995), 217–37
MacIntyre, I. and Pattanaik, P., Strategic voting under minimally binary group decision functions. Journal of Economic Theory 25 (1981), 338–52
Makinson, D.Combinatorial versus decision-theoretic components of impossibility theorems. Theory and Decision 40 (1996), 181–90
May, K.A set of independent, necessary and sufficient conditions for simple majority decision. Econometrica 20 (1952), 680–4
McLean, I. and A. Urken (ed. and transl.), Classics of social choice. Michigan University Press: Ann Arbor, MI, 1993
Merlin, V. and Saari, D., A geometric examination of the Kemeny rule. Social Choice and Welfare 17 (2000), 403–38
Mihara, H.Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternative. Social Choice and Welfare 17 (2000), 393–402
Mihara, H.Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function: A constructive proof. Social Choice and Welfare 18 (2001), 543–53
Mill, J. Considerations on representative government. Harper and Brothers: New York, 1862
Monjardet, B.Une autre prevue du théorème d'Arrow. R.A.I.R.O. 12 (1978), 291–6
Monjardet, B. Introduction to social choice theory: The Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. Cahiers MSE: CERMSEM. Université Paris 1, (1999)
Monjardet, B.Social choice and the “Centre de Mathématique Sociale”: Some historical notes. Social Choice and Welfare (to appear in 2005)
Moulin, H.The proportional veto principle. Rev. Econ. Stud. 48 (1981), 407–16
Moulin, H. The strategy of social choice. North-Holland: New York, 1983
Moulin, H.Fairness and strategy in voting. Proceedings of Symposia in Applied Mathematics 33 (1985), 109–42
Moulin, H. Fair division and collective welfare. The MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 2003
Muller, E. and Satterthwaite, M.. The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy proofness. Journal of Economic Theory 14 (1977), 412–18
Nandeibaum, S.An alternative proof of Gibbard's random dictatorship result. Social Choice and Welfare 15 (1998), 509–19
Nurmi, H. Comparing voting systems. D. Reidel Publishing Company: Dordrecht, Holland, 1987
Pazner, E. and Wesley, E,, Stability properties of social choices in infinitely large societies. Journal of Economic Theory 14 (1977), 252–62
Pazner, E. and Wesley, E., Cheatproofness of the plurality rule in large societies. Review of Economic Studies 45 (1978), 85–91
Ramamurthy, K. Coherent structures and simple games. Kluwer: Dordrecht, Netherlands, 1990
Riker, W. Liberalism against populism: a confrontation between the theory of democracy and the theory of social choice. W. H. Freeman: San Francisco, 1982
Riker, W. The art of political manipulation. Yale University Press: New Haven and London, 1986
Saari, D. The geometry of voting. Springer-Verlag: New York, 1994
Saari, D. Basic geometry of voting. Springer-Verlag: New York, 1995
Saari, D. Choatic elections: a mathematician looks at voting. The American Mathematical Society, 2001
Satterthwaite, M.Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. Journal of Economic Theory 10 (1975), 187–217
Savage, L. The foundations of statistics. Wiley: New York, 1954
Schmeidler, D. and H. Sonnenschein, Two proofs of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem on the possibility of a strategy-proof social choice function, in Decision Theory and Social Ethics Issues in Social Choice. H. Gottinger and W. Leinfellner, editors. Reidel: Dordrecht (1978), 227–34
Schofield, N. Social choice and democracy. Springer Verlag: Berlin, 1985
Sen, A.A possibility theorem on majority decisions. Econometrica 34 (1966), 491–9
Sen, A. Collective choice and social welfare. Holden Day: San Francisco, 1970
Sen, A.Social choice theory: a re-examination. Econometrica 45 (1977), 53–89
Sen, A. Choice, welfare, and measurement. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 1982
Sen, Arunava, Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. Economic Letters 70 (2001), 381–5
Shepsle, K. and M. Bonchek, Analyzing politics: rationality, behavior, and institutions. Norton: New York and London, 1997
Smith, D.Manipulability measures of common social choice functions. Social Choice and Welfare 16 (1999), 639–61
Straffin, P. Topics in the theory of voting. Birkhauser: Boston, 1980
Tanaka, Y. An alternative direct proof of Gibbard's random dictatorship theorem, preprint, 2004
Taylor, A. Mathematics and politics: strategy, voting, power, and proof. Springer-Verlag: New York, 1995
Taylor, A. 2002. The manipulability of voting systems. The American Mathematical Monthly 109, 321–37
Taylor, A. and W. Zwicker, Simple games: desirability relations, trading, and pseudoweightings. Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, 1999
Neumann, J.Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele. Mathematische Annalen 100 (1928), 295–320
von Neumann, J. and O. Morgenstern, Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, 1944
Wilson, R.Social choice theory without the Pareto principle. Journal of Economic Theory 3 (1972), 478–86
Young, H P.Social choice scoring functions. SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics 28 (1975), 824–38
Young, H. P. and Levenglick, A.. A consistent extension of Condorcet's election principle. SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics 35 (1978), 285–300
