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  1. Home
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  3. Probability and Evidence
  • Cited by 24
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
August 2016
Print publication year:
2016
Online ISBN:
9781316494219
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316494219
Subjects:
Philosophy: General Interest, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy
Series:
Cambridge Philosophy Classics
Information

Book description

In this influential study of central issues in the philosophy of science, Paul Horwich elaborates on an important conception of probability, diagnosing the failure of previous attempts to resolve these issues as stemming from a too-rigid conception of belief. Adopting a Bayesian strategy, he argues for a probabilistic approach, yielding a more complete understanding of the characteristics of scientific reasoning and methodology. Presented in a fresh twenty-first-century series livery, and including a specially commissioned preface written by Colin Howson, illuminating its enduring importance and relevance to philosophical enquiry, this engaging work has been revived for a new generation of readers.

Reviews

'… the strongest and most influential parts of Probability and Evidence are Horwich’s solutions to various puzzles about scientific reasoning … the book might very well still be of considerable interest to those who are looking for an engaging and readable introduction to the topic of scientific reasoning from a Bayesian perspective.'

Finnur Dellsén Source: Metascience

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Contents

Contents
References
Bibliography
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