Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
  1. Home
  2. Books
  3. Objectivity and the Rule of Law
  • Cited by 64
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
November 2009
Print publication year:
2007
Online ISBN:
9780511619014
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511619014
Subjects:
Law: General Interest, Law, Legal Philosophy, Philosophy
Series:
Cambridge Introductions to Philosophy and Law
Information

Book description

What is objectivity? What is the rule of law? Are the operations of legal systems objective? If so, in what ways and to what degrees are they objective? Does anything of importance depend on the objectivity of law? These are some of the principal questions addressed by Matthew H. Kramer in this lucid and wide-ranging study that introduces readers to vital areas of philosophical enquiry. As Kramer shows, objectivity and the rule of law are complicated phenomena, each comprising a number of distinct though overlapping dimensions. Although the connections between objectivity and the rule of law are intimate, they are also densely multi-faceted.

Reviews

'The argument is ingenious, and stated with clarity … Kramer's book shows plainly that legal positivism is not to be dismissed as mere pedantic quibbling and internecine disputation of no genuinely broad import. His book offers a vigorous aid to reflection upon the real and apparent attributes of law and legal systems, and how they might relate to questions of political morality.'

Source: Political Theory

'Professor Kramer disentangles the complicated notion of objectivity into six distinct conceptions, and differentiates the rule of law - the set of conditions necessary for any functioning legal system - from the Rule of Law - a moral judgment entrenched in the liberal-democratic tradition. … The strength of this compelling account is Professor Kramer's effortless interweaving of positive and normative analysis.'

Source: Harvard Law Review

'Matthew Kramer's new book tackles questions of objectivity and the rule of law with his characteristic erudition, depth and acute insight. It is one of the first in an exciting series entitled Cambridge Introductions to Philosophy and Law under the editorship of William Edmundson. … Kramer is most certainly to be congratulated for a fine work of scholarship.'

Source: Law Quarterly Review

Refine List

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
Cancel
×

Contents

Contents
References
Bibliographic Notes
References
Bix, Brian. 2005. “Cautions and Caveats for the Application of Wittgenstein to Legal Theory.” In Campbell, Joseph Keim, O'Rourke, Michael, and Shier, David (eds.), Law and Social Justice (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 217–28.
Blackburn, Simon. 1993. Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Coleman, Jules. 1995. “Truth and Objectivity in Law.” 1 Legal Theory33–68.
Coleman, Jules, and Leiter, Brian. 1995. “Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority.” In Marmor, Andrei (ed.), Law and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 203–78.
Craig, Paul. 1997. “Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework.” Public Law467–87.
Duxbury, Neil. 1999. Random Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dworkin, Ronald. 1965. “Philosophy, Morality and Law – Observations Prompted by Professor Fuller's Novel Claim.” 113 University of Pennsylvania Law Review668–90.
Dworkin, Ronald. 1977. “No Right Answer?” In Hacker, Peter and Raz, Joseph (eds.), Law, Morality, and Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 58–84.
Dworkin, Ronald. 1978. Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Dworkin, Ronald. 1985. A Matter of Principle. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Dworkin, Ronald. 1986. Law's Empire. London: Fontana Press.
Dworkin, Ronald. 1991. “On Gaps in the Law.” In Amselek, Paul and MacCormick, Neil (eds.), Controversies about Law's Ontology (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press).
Dworkin, Ronald. 1996. “Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It.” 25 Philosophy and Public Affairs87–139.
Endicott, Timothy. 2000. Vagueness in Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fine, Kit. 2001. “The Question of Realism.” 1 Philosophers' Imprint1–30.
Freeman, Michael. 2001. Lloyd's Introduction to Jurisprudence. London: Sweet & Maxwell.
Fuller, Lon. 1969. The Morality of Law. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Revised edition.
Green, Michael. 2003. “Dworkin's Fallacy, or What the Philosophy of Language Can't Teach Us about the Law.” 89 Virginia Law Review1897–1952.
Greenawalt, Kent. 1992. Law and Objectivity. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hare, R. M. 1963. Freedom and Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hare, R. M. 1981. Moral Thinking. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hare, R. M. 1989. “Principles.” In Essays in Ethical Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 49–65.
Harris, J. W. 1997. Legal Philosophies. London: Butterworths. Second edition.
Hart, H. L. A. 1961. The Concept of Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hart, H. L. A. 1983. “Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law.” In Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 343–64.
Hills, Alison. 2004. “Is Ethics Rationally Required?” 47 Inquiry1–19.
Holton, Richard. 2000. “Minimalism and Truth-Value Gaps.” 97 Philosophical Studies137–68.
Horwich, Paul. 1998. Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Second edition.
Kramer, Matthew. 1998. “Rights without Trimmings.” In Kramer, Matthew H., Simmonds, N. E., and Steiner, Hillel, A Debate over Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 7–111.
Kramer, Matthew. 1999a. In Defense of Legal Positivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kramer, Matthew. 1999b. In the Realm of Legal and Moral Philosophy. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press.
Kramer, Matthew. 2001. “Getting Rights Right.” In Kramer, Matthew H. (ed.), Rights, Wrongs, and Responsibilities (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), 28–95.
Kramer, Matthew. 2004a. Where Law and Morality Meet. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kramer, Matthew. 2004b. “The Big Bad Wolf: Legal Positivism and Its Detractors.” 49 American Journal of Jurisprudence1–10.
Kramer, Matthew. 2005. “Moral Rights and the Limits of the Ought-Implies-Can Principle: Why Impeccable Precautions Are No Excuse.” 48 Inquiry307–55.
Landers, Scott. 1990. “Wittgenstein, Realism, and CLS: Undermining Rule Skepticism.” 9 Law and Philosophy177–203.
Leiter, Brian. 2001. “Introduction.” In Leiter, Brian (ed.), Objectivity in Law and Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1–11.
Locke, John. 1975 [1689]. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Edited by Nidditch, Peter.
Lucy, William. 2005. “The Possibility of Impartiality.” 25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies3–31.
Madison, James. 1961 [1788]. “Federalist Paper No. 10.” In Hamilton, Alexander, Madison, James, and Jay, John, The Federalist Papers (New York: New American Library), 77–84. Edited by Rossiter, Clinton.
Marmor, Andrei. 2001. Positive Law and Objective Values. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McDowell, John. 1985. “Values and Secondary Qualities.” In Honderich, Ted (ed.), Objectivity and Morality (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul), 110–29.
Moore, Michael. 1982. “Moral Reality.” 1982 Wisconsin Law Review1061–1156.
Moore, Michael. 1992. “Moral Reality Revisited.” 90 Michigan Law Review2424–2533.
Nozick, Robert. 2001. Invariances: The Structure of the Objective World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Paske, Gerald. 1989. “Rationality, Reasonableness, and Morality.” 10 Logos: Philosophic Issues in Christian Perspective73–88.
Patterson, Dennis. 2006. “Wittgenstein on Understanding and Interpretation.” 29 Philosophical Investigations129–39.
Pettit, Philip. 2001. “Embracing Objectivity in Ethics.” In Leiter, Brian (ed.), Objectivity in Law and Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 234–86.
Postema, Gerald. 2001. “Objectivity Fit for Law.” In Leiter, Brian (ed.), Objectivity in Law and Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 99–143.
Raz, Joseph. 1996. “Intention in Interpretation.” In George, Robert (ed.), The Autonomy of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 249–86.
Raz, Joseph. 2001. “Notes on Value and Objectivity.” In Leiter, Brian (ed.), Objectivity in Law and Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 193–233.
Reiff, Mark. 2005. Punishment, Compensation, and Law: A Theory of Enforceability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Rosati, Connie. 2004. “Some Puzzles about the Objectivity of Law.” 23 Law and Philosophy273–323.
Sainsbury, R. M. 1988. Paradoxes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schauer, Frederick. 1991. Playing by the Rules. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Simmonds, N. E. 2004. “Straightforwardly False: The Collapse of Kramer's Positivism.” 63 Cambridge Law Journal98–131.
Sosa, David. 2001. “Pathetic Ethics.” In Leiter, Brian (ed.), Objectivity in Law and Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 287–329.
Stavropoulos, Nicos. 2005. “Objectivity.” In Golding, Martin and Edmundson, William (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (Oxford: Blackwell), 315–23.
Stroud, Barry. 1977. Hume. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Summers, Robert. 1993. “A Formal Theory of the Rule of Law.” 6 Ratio Juris127–42.
Svavarsdóttir, Sigrún. 2001. “Objective Values: Does Metaethics Rest on a Mistake?” In Leiter, Brian (ed.), Objectivity in Law and Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 144–93.
Tamanaha, Brian. 2004. On the Rule of Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Waldron, Jeremy. 1992. “The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity.” In George, Robert (ed.), Natural Law Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 158–87.
Wiggins, David. 1998. Values, Needs, Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Third edition.
Williams, Bernard. 1985. “Ethics and the Fabric of the World.” In Honderich, Ted (ed.), Morality and Objectivity (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul), 203–14.
Williams, Bernard. 2001. “From Freedom to Liberty: The Construction of a Political Value.” 30 Philosophy and Public Affairs3–26.
Williams, Glanville. 1956. “The Concept of Legal Liberty.” 56 Columbia Law Review1129–50.

Metrics

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

Book summary page views

Total views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between #date#. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Usage data cannot currently be displayed.