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  • Cited by 32
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
June 2012
Print publication year:
2010
Online ISBN:
9780511778766

Book description

Most readers are familiar with the concept of a monopoly. A monopolist is the only seller of a good or service for which there are not good substitutes. Economists and policy makers are concerned about monopolies because they lead to higher prices and lower output. The topic of this book is monopsony, the economic condition in which there is one buyer of a good or service. It is a common misunderstanding that if monopolists raise prices, then monopsonists must lower them. It is true that a monopsonist may force sellers to sell to them at lower prices, but this does not mean consumers are better off as a result. This book explains why monopsonists can be harmful and the way law has developed to respond to these harms.

Reviews

‘Blair and Harrison provide a clear, approachable, and useful analysis of the economics of monopoly on the buying side of markets, a subject that is much too frequently both overlooked and misunderstood. The authors also include a comprehensive, policy-driven analysis of bilateral monopoly and show how monopsony power is exercised in a number of markets, including agriculture, sports leagues, and medical services. This excellent, well-written, and timely book should be on the shelf of every industrial organization economist as well as every competition or antitrust lawyer.’

Herbert Hovenkamp - University of Iowa

‘Blair and Harrison have written an exhaustive, and probably the definitive, treatment of the law and economics of monopsony. This book explores the issue in depth and also discusses many examples that put the topic easily within the grasp of readers who do not have a background in either law or economics. It is unquestionably the best single source for research on this topic.’

Keith N. Hylton - Boston University

‘By putting together in a single location and further organizing and developing what we know about monopsony, Blair and Harrison have not only produced a very interesting book, but also done a great service to the profession. This unique monograph includes a detailed treatment of relevant antitrust rules and case law, a thorough but very accessible treatment of relevant economic theory, as well as numerous examples and details of specific industries in which monopsony issues arise in practice. I am sure it will become the standard reference on monopsony, and that I will refer students of economics and antitrust to it for years to come.’

Francine LaFontaine - University of Michigan

‘This work sets out the fundamental economics of monopsony in a way that will satisfy economists yet is accessible to lawyers. It canvasses the current law on monopsony, taking account of the Supreme Court’s provocative case on predatory buying and other recent developments. It contains timely new chapters examining agricultural markets, the NCAA, and physician collective bargaining. The authors’ message is that monopsony is more prevalent than many think and not as well understood as it should be. Lucid, comprehensive, and insightful, Monopsony is the definitive treatment of a difficult and overlooked area. It has no good substitute. Serious students of antitrust law and economics will find it indispensable.’

John E. Lopatka - Pennsylvania State University and the Dickinson School of Law

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Contents

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