12 - Remembering intentions

Summary

Philosophical Investigations 633–93 contains a striking discussion of our capacity to remember our earlier intentions, wishes and emotions, and to remember how we meant an earlier word or remark. Wittgenstein writes:

633. “You were interrupted a while ago; do you still know what you were going to say?” – If I do know now, and say it – does that mean that I had already thought it before, only not said it? No. Unless you take the certainty with which I continue the interrupted sentence as a criterion of the thought's already having been completed at that time. – But, of course, the situation and the thoughts which I had contained all sorts of things to help the continuation of the sentence.

634. When I continue the interrupted sentence and say that this was how I had been going to continue it, this is like following out a line of thought from brief notes.

Then don't I interpret the notes? Was only one continuation possible in these circumstances? Of course not. But I did not choose between interpretations. I remembered that I was going to say this.

635. “I was going to say…” – You remember various details. But not even all of them together show your intention. It is as if a snapshot of a scene had been taken, but only a few scattered details of it were to be seen: here a hand, there a bit of a face, or a hat – the rest is dark. And now it is as if we knew quite certainly what the whole picture represented.[…]