Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- Acknowledgments
- Contributors
- What Are Constitutions, and What Should (and Can) They Do?
- Constitution and Fundamental Law: The Lesson of Classical Athens
- Contract, Covenant, Constitution
- Constitutionalism in the Age of Terror
- The Liberal Constitution and Foreign Affairs
- Do Constitutions Have a Point? Reflections on “Parchment Barriers” and Preambles
- The Origins of an Independent Judiciary in New York, 1621-1777
- Foot Voting, Political Ignorance, and Constitutional Design
- Pluralist Constitutionalism
- Deliberative Democracy and Constitutions
- The Constitution of Nondomination
- Can We Design an Optimal Constitution? Of Structural Ambiguity and Rights Clarity
- Index
Contract, Covenant, Constitution
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- Acknowledgments
- Contributors
- What Are Constitutions, and What Should (and Can) They Do?
- Constitution and Fundamental Law: The Lesson of Classical Athens
- Contract, Covenant, Constitution
- Constitutionalism in the Age of Terror
- The Liberal Constitution and Foreign Affairs
- Do Constitutions Have a Point? Reflections on “Parchment Barriers” and Preambles
- The Origins of an Independent Judiciary in New York, 1621-1777
- Foot Voting, Political Ignorance, and Constitutional Design
- Pluralist Constitutionalism
- Deliberative Democracy and Constitutions
- The Constitution of Nondomination
- Can We Design an Optimal Constitution? Of Structural Ambiguity and Rights Clarity
- Index
Summary
INTRODUCTION
The authority that states claim for themselves is so sweeping and unaccommodating to challengers that, absent a compelling justificatory account, it verges on despotism. An imaginative story offering a less heavy-handed representation of the state will, therefore, be welcome. In the liberal tradition, the protagonist of that story has usually been social contract. There are, of course, numerous variations on the contract narrative, but in each the state is deemed to be not the master but rather the creation of individual citizens. More precisely, to the extent that the state does exercise mastery, it does so in virtue of a status freely conferred on it by those over whom rule is exercised.
The social contract story yields several morals. First, it implies that private citizens are not the mere chattels of their rulers; they are not slaves or unemancipated minors or inferiors by nature. Rather, they are self-determining agents who have exited the state of nature and formed a civil order through an exercise of their own wills. Second, the state is in the service of its citizens. It owes them those performances for the sake of which it was created. Third, the bounds of obedience are not without limit. Should the regime fail to uphold the terms of the social contract, it can justifiably be cashiered. Running through the narrative, then, is a commitment to the dignity of ordinary human beings.
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- Information
- What Should Constitutions Do? , pp. 50 - 71Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2011