Can There be an Epistemology of Moods?

Summary

By entitling her recent collection of essays on philosophy and literature Love's Knowledge, Martha Nussbaum signals her commitment to giving a positive answer to the question posed by the title of this paper. If love can deliver or lay claim to knowledge, then moods (the variety of affective states to which human nature is subject) must be thought of as having a cognitive significance, and so must not only permit but require the attentions of the epistemologist. As Nussbaum points out, such a conclusion runs counter to a central strand of thinking in both ancient and modern philosophy. The rational or cognitive side of human nature is often defined in contrast to its affective or emotional side, the latter being understood as having no role to play in the revelation of reality. On the contrary, where reason and the senses can combine to disclose the way things are, moods typically cloud that cognitive access by projecting a purely subjective colouration onto the world and leading us to attribute properties or qualities to it which have at best a purely personal and internal reality.

Nussbaum contests this understanding of the passions through her reading of Aristotle's moral philosophy. According to that reading, emotions are composites of belief and feeling, shaped by developing thought and highly discriminating in their reactions; they can lead or guide an agent, picking out objects to be pursued or avoided, working in responsive interaction with perception and imagination.