Book contents
- Under the Gun
- Under the Gun
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Logic of Party Violence
- 3 Setting the Stage
- 4 Who Owns the Guns? the Muttahida Qaumi Movement and Violence in Karachi
- 5 The Pakistan Peoples Party and the Gangs of Lyari, Karachi
- 6 Allying with Militants? the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz and Sectarian Groups in Punjab
- 7 An Ideology of Nonviolence? the Awami National Party in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
- 8 Party Violence in Comparative Perspective
- 9 Conclusion
- Appendix
- Bibliography
- Index
7 - An Ideology of Nonviolence? the Awami National Party in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 November 2022
- Under the Gun
- Under the Gun
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Logic of Party Violence
- 3 Setting the Stage
- 4 Who Owns the Guns? the Muttahida Qaumi Movement and Violence in Karachi
- 5 The Pakistan Peoples Party and the Gangs of Lyari, Karachi
- 6 Allying with Militants? the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz and Sectarian Groups in Punjab
- 7 An Ideology of Nonviolence? the Awami National Party in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
- 8 Party Violence in Comparative Perspective
- 9 Conclusion
- Appendix
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The Pashtun Awami National Party (ANP) may have engaged in violence in Karachi, but in , I explain why it refrains from violent acts in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province. KP is a heavily armed province which has faced the brunt of militant violence over the last decade. Despite this, the ANP has chosen not to engage in violence itself or ally with any violence specialists in the area. I rule out explanations for this divergence that center on levels of electoral competition, ideology, or features exclusive to Karachi. Instead, I suggest that the ANP’s distinct violence strategies are a function of the dissimilar nature of ANP support bases in these two areas and the nature of state coercive capacity which affects the party’s incentives for violence. I use a combination of qualitative evidence from Peshawar, Islamabad, and Karachi along with survey data to showcase key differences between Pashtun voters in Karachi and KP.
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- Information
- Under the GunPolitical Parties and Violence in Pakistan, pp. 173 - 196Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022