Book contents
- Tying the Autocrat’s Hands
- Series page
- Tying the Autocrat’s Hands
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 A demand-side theory of authoritarian rule of law
- 3 Authoritarian judiciary: How the party-state limits the rule of law
- 4 State-business relations in China
- 5 Who bribes?
- 6 When do authoritarian rulers build less corrupt courts?
- 7 When do authoritarian rulers invest in courts?
- 8 Conclusion
- Appendix A Research Methods
- Appendix B Technical Details
- References
- Index
3 - Authoritarian judiciary: How the party-state limits the rule of law
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 January 2015
Book contents
- Tying the Autocrat’s Hands
- Series page
- Tying the Autocrat’s Hands
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 A demand-side theory of authoritarian rule of law
- 3 Authoritarian judiciary: How the party-state limits the rule of law
- 4 State-business relations in China
- 5 Who bribes?
- 6 When do authoritarian rulers build less corrupt courts?
- 7 When do authoritarian rulers invest in courts?
- 8 Conclusion
- Appendix A Research Methods
- Appendix B Technical Details
- References
- Index
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- Tying the Autocrat's HandsThe Rise of The Rule of Law in China, pp. 50 - 85Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2014